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CHAPIER SIX 
Broadcasting and Politics: The Whip-Hand, 1929-1931. 
"The Government has no desire to interfere with BBC programmes. But 
it cannot be disinterested regarding the political use made by it of 
its opportunities. Just as it supplies Jazz rubbish (not even good 
Jazz) for popular consumption so, if it is not careful with its 
politics, it will have to supply Jazz politics .... The only way the 
BBC can protect itself is by planning its political broadcasting in 
close co-operation with the Parties. " 
Ramsay thcDonald, 9 August 1930. 
"the three party caucuses ... are firmly determined that no-one 
outside the ranks of strict officialdom shall be allowed to address 
the listeners. Broadcast politics are under a censorship as severe as 
anything in Russia. " 
J. M. Kenworthy, in Modern Wireless, 
April 1931. 
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Between 1929 and 1931 the BBC struggled for a greater degree of 
political affairs independence whilst the parties, ever more 
suspicious, sought further to impose their will upon it. These two 
contrary forces both saw as one solution an attempt formally to 
define their relationship, and efforts to do so took up much time and 
effort in 1930. The crisis and election of 1931, however, destroyed 
any hope of achieving general agreement and confirmed the Labour 
Party in its view of the BBC as being anything but the politically, 
impartial body that was -claimed. Reith's vision of the BBC's 
political destiny, dependent as it was not only upon faultless 
programme intent (if not content), but also upon an unblemished 
public image, was thus seriously threatened. But if the practical 
attainment of the ideal suffered setbacks, recognition of that goal 
and declarations as to its practicability continued unabated. 
The Labour victory in May 1929 had little effect upon BBC policy 
or programmes. Indeed, once MacDonald had made his broadcast upon 
becoming Prime- Minister, the BBC found itself without any political 
pressure on it at all. The new Labour Government was too busy trying 
to get to grips with national issues to take the positive interest in 
broadcasting that its pre-election eagerness had indicated it might. 
The Conservative Party was carrying out a post mortem in which 
internal rather than external causes were to be sought as scapegoats. 
Within the BBC the tensions between Reith, Clarendon and Ethel 
Snowden were coming to a head in the second half of 1929, and may in 
part account for the lack of any real progress or initiative from the 
Corporation over the summer. Between June and September there was 
remarkably little political affairs broadcasting, apart from 
Bartlett, Barry and the news bulletins, and for much of August even 
Bartlett and Barry took a rest. In his first talk after the election 
Gerald Barry had commented upon the newsreel film of the new Cabinet 
and upon MacDonald's broadcast: 
The new Government seems to be nuking use of modern inventions to 
expound and popularise their policy .... Possibly the difficult 
business of governing a country may become more human and 
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understandable if the faces and voices of those aio do the job 
are brought into direct and personal contact with the man and 
wann in the street. 
In the first months of the labour Government, however, there was 
little evidence of any interest 2in using 
the wireless. Only one 
ministerial talk was broadcast. The BBC itself continued to 
broadcast speeches from outside functions, but only one such occasion, 
was considered politically controversial, when J. H. Thomas and Winston 
Churchill both spoke at the Royal Institute of International 
Affairs. In July H. G. Wells made his first broadcast, an undeniably 
forthright criticise of the League of Nations, which Vernon Bartlett 
felt compelled to answer in a broadcast which was hardly impartial. 
This lull, however, was not to last. The Listener had suggested 
that Wells' talk 'may lead to a series of frank surveys of the great 
problems of the day by the men and women most qualified to deal with 
them', and the au4tumn saw the first 'Points of View' symposium, 
already mentioned. In November the BBC started athat was to become 
one of its longest running series of programmes, 'The Week In 
Westminster'. At the time this was the most directly political 
programme being regularly broadcast, consisting as it did of a 
rotation of bis from all parties, weekly describing proceedings in 
parliament. It started experimentally as a morning programme for 
women given by women LIPS, although male bis were soon brought in 
also. Occasionally it was broadcast to an afternoon and evening 
audience. Because it ran so smoothly and received very few complaints 
its significance in political broadcasting tends to be forgotten. 
1. The Listener, 19 June 1929,859. 
2. G. M. Gillett on British Overseas Trade, on 24 July 1929. 
3. This was on 8 July 1929. 
4. The Listener, 17 July 1929,84. 
5. It is not mentioned, for example, in A. Briggs' History of 
Broadcasting, vol. II. 
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Yet it was fulfilling precisely the function i; 1ich Reith saw for 
political broadcasting, providing balanced statements of political 
fact and opinion, informing the public on political events and views, 
yet without passing comment on than and without arousing party anger 
against the BBC. 
Also in September Labour's use of its broadcasting opportunities 
rose sharply as its representatives at the League of Nations accepted 
a BBC offer to broadcast weekly. Conservative complaints at this 
received a prompt reminder that the BBC had offered identical 
facilities in 1927 and 1928 but that these had been turned down. To 
compound what the Conservatives saw as a sudden upturn in labour 
broadcast propaganda, Philip Snowden broadcast on the Hague 
Settlement following his return from the negotiations. Although the 
talk was regarded as ministerial Snowden certainly took the 
opportunity to emphasise his own role in the settlement. Conservative 
couplaints at the 'Points of View' series and at the increased number 
of ministerial' broadcasts provided the starting point for a host of 
usually groundless fears. The Morning Post in particular attacked the 
BBC and in early November the Post Office warned Reith that a 
Conservative private member motion on political broadcasting seemed 
possible. In preparation for this Reith set out a comprehensive 
memorandum which he also sent to Davidson, listing the various forms 
of political affairs broadcasting and demonstrating very effectively 
the BBC's scrupulous determination to be impartial. In the event 
only a parliamentary question was put, asking whether it was now the 
BBC's polg. cy to allow unlimited facilities for ministers to 
broadcast. 
The determination of Conservatives to see bias was only 
marginally less impressive than their ignorance of the facts. 
6. BBC, PPIG, W. T. Lech (GPO) to Reith, 28 October 1929. 
7. BBC, PPIG, Memorandum on Political Broadcasting by Reith, 30 
October 1929. 
8. H. C. Debates, vol. 231: col. 857, Sir J. Foyer, 5 November 1929. 
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Following the first 'Week in Westminster' broadcast given by Labour 
biP Mary Agnes Hamilton, a Conservative member expressed his 
'considerable disquietude' that parliamentary proceedings ceedings should 
'week by week' be disclosed by a Labour aber. Perhaps it was 
with such prejudice in mind that The Listener cccmented: 
Most people, whilst they support freedom of speech and 
controversy in theory, dislike very heartily being brought up 
against it in practice.... On the contrary we unconsciously train 
ourselvya to be prejudiced, because this saves us a lot of mental 
effort. 
Within Conservative Central Office there was certainly a growing 
conviction of bias. In January 1930 Gower had his attention drawn to 
a forthcoming series on the meaning of international co-operation; he 
was informed that of the six speakers two were 'Socialist', two 
Liberal, one independent (Lord Cecil) and only one Conservative. 
Gower suggested that an informal word between Baldw lr and Clarendon 
might be more effective than a formal protest. Feeling was 
already very high, for a letter was drafted (but not sent) from 
Davidson to Clarendon stating that 'the limit is very nearly reached 
with regard to the political partisanship of the BBC'. It complained 
of the following week's talks program. - strich included Wilson Harris, 
'the most partisan Liberal journalist', the labour President of the 
Board of Trade, William Graham (on Britain's export trade), Sir 
Herbert Samuel and Vernon Bartlett, 'about whose grotesque 
performances I have already had reason to catiplain'. It ended with an 
appeal 
for fair play and equal opportunity for all points of view, and 
that you should not be merely a sausage machine for the 
9. A. C. Debates, vol. 232: col. 1323, Mr. J. R. Renner, 26 November TM. 
10. The Listener, 6 November 1929,608. 
11.000, J 4/1/23, W. J. Willis to Cower, 15 January 1930; Gower to 
Davidson 16 January 1930. 
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Soci1lists with an occasional sausage for the Liberals thrown 2 
out. 
The BW announcement of a non-controversial series on the work of the 
trade unions, arranged in conjunction with the TUC, led Gower to 
suggest that the Conservative Ashridge Education Ccanittee should 
demand from the BW time to give similar non-controversial 
broadcasts. Rather mire sensibly John Buchan, the Co =ittee! s 
chairman, pointed out that there was no real Conservative equivalent 
to the trade unions. He also put his finger on a perfectly valid 
problem for the Conservative Party and one afiich was to recur in the 
1950s: 
the real trouble is that [the Bit] get far more Radicals and 
Socialists to give talks than Conservatives. When I have talked 
to Reith about this, his answer has always been that be is 
willing to broadcast talks by Conservatives if we will provide 
people to will interest the public, in the same way as Bernard 
Shaw, Wells etc. lnterest 
it. So you see the situation is rather 
a difficult one. 
Neither Gower nor Davidson aas satisfied and in May the latter 
asked Lawrence Storr, the secretary of the Shadow Cabinet, to 
investigate whether or not a case could be made proving that the BBC 
exercised 'a hostile discrimination against the Cons rvative point of 
view' in its ordinary talks and commentaries. Storr's report 
could not have pleased him, for he concluded that there was no proof 
of conscious political bias. On the other hand he agreed that 
army of the popular lectures and addresses broadcast by the EEC 
12.000,0004/1/23, draft letter for Davidson to Clarendon, 24 
January 1930. 
13. Coo, C0ß4/1/23, J. Buchan to L. Storr, 4 February 1930. For a 
similar problem in the 1950s see G. Wyndham Goldie, Facing the 
Nation, London 1977,85-91. 
14. C00, C 004/l/23, Storr to Davidson, 9 May 1930. 
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are to some extent coloured with a Socialistic or Radical tinge - 
I have particularly in mind the weekly or occasional addresses by 
men like Vernon Bartlett and Wilson Harris; but it is quite 
possible that these men are selected for the purpose of 
broadcasting, not on account of their political views, which are 
incidental, but because of their popula 15 , knowledge of their 
subject, and attractiveness as lecturers. 
Like Buchan he found a prime cause of the trouble in the Party 
itself, whose members, he felt, did not have the instinct or desire 
for personal advertisement that existed amongst labour supporters. 
Storr therefore urged that Conservative supporters with a good 
microphone voice, preferably not MPs, should be encouraged to offer 
their services to the BBC. Faced with such a depressing conclusion 
and on the verge of being forced to resign as Party Chair=n, 
Davidson could do nothing. 
Reith was confident that in most cases complaint was unjustified. 
However he was always most anxious, when there was evidence of error, 
that the parties should be aware that it was not deliberate and that 
action had been taken. Thus when the late evening news bulletin 
omitted reference to a major speech of Baldwin's, because it had been 
given good coverage in the earlier news, he innodiately telephoned 
Sir Geoffrey Fry, Baldwin's Private Secretary, in order to say 
he thought it absolutely wrong that the speech should not have 
been referred to in the second news bulletin, and to tell 
(Baldwin)ls t he had himself rebuked the announcer for the 
omission. 
Similarly in February 1931, in response to a Morning Post accusation 
that a speech by Baldwin had been printed in The Listener next to an 
15. Ibid. 
16. Coo, O 4/1/23, memo by G. Fry, 7 February 1930, see also The 
Times, 7 February 1930, for letter of complaint at this 
melon. 
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advertisement for a book expounding contradictory views, Reith again 
rang Fry, admitted that the juxtaposition was an unfortunate accident 
and said that the person responsible might be sacked as a result. 
Such an excuse did not satisfy Patrick Gower, who told Fry: 
though Sir John Reith might not be personally responsible and 
might not deliberately have given any Socialistic bias to the 
policy of the BBC, nonetheless there had been a series of 
"accidents" all of which were in favour of Labour and none of 17 
them in favour of Conservative views. 
Reith was therefore very conscious of just how touchy the 
Conservatives were %bile they were in opposition. Yet this did not 
prevent the BBC from attempting to deal with such sensitive topics as 
Empire Free Trade, India and Russia during this period. At the same 
time it must be said that Reith's inherent respect for the authority 
of the government of the day undoubtedly did make it mare difficult 
to cover these issues and limited what could be done, as did his 
anxiety to obtain party acceptance of and agreement to political 
affairs broadcasting. It was not surprising that the talks production 
staff, who did not have Reith's responsibilities, should have chafed 
under a seemingly over cautious Board. Roger Eckersley later 
described this growing tension within the BBC: 
[Talks) Policy was - to a greater extent than in anything else, 
dictated from above - but it did fall to me to read through 
carefully any talks which dealt with controversial subjects, to 
have regular meetings with the Director of Talks, and to speak to 
Talks Schedules and attanpt to know as much about the speakers as 
possible, at Control Board. I confess this side of the work was 
most difficult - on top was a Board that believed in moderation - 
below a band of eager enthusiasts who wished 1% reform the world 
and who were highly critical of being checked. 
17. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/t186-8, memo by Fry, 28 February 1931. 
See also the Morning Post, 26 and 27 February 1931, and 2 lurch 1931. 
18. R. H. Eckersley, The BBC and All That, London 1946,156. 
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Nevertheless it would be wrong to describe Reith as either 
innately timid or excessively cautious, even though his Board might 
sometimes be so. Like most astute tacticians he judged according to 
circumstance when he should hold back and when he might push forward. 
If producers were frustrated by evidence of caution, political 
pressure and protest was greatest when caution was put to one side. 
Late in 1929 Lord Beaverbrook requested that he be allowed to 
talk about his personal brainchild, Empire Free Trade. In view of 
public interest in the issue the BBC Board decided in January 1930 to 
agree to this proposal, on the strict understanding that any such 
talk would not mention party issues or personalities, would be vetted 
in advance and would be answered by some suitable critic. Beaverbrook 
accepted these conditions and the BBC sought for a suitable opponent, 
either a well known economist or a popular critic. Both Keynes and 
Sir Josiah Stamp were already due to broadcast the previous month, in 
a discussion on unemployment, and it was felt desirable to avoid a 
socialist econömist lest his opposition to Beaverbrook be construed 
as anti-Imperial. The BBC was equally anxious not to have a 
Conservative as this would have narrowed the issue to a party one and 
turned it potentially into an attack and defence of Baldwin, against 
whom Beaverbrook was currently conducting his infamous vendetta. 
Eventually Lloyd George was chosen and, because it was stressed that 
this was not a party political but an economic issue, it was felt to 
be nei 
lhýer necessary 
nor desirable to consult the parties on the 
matter. 
Conservative Central Office was first apprised of the broadcast 
by a chance conversation between Hilda Matheson and Marjorie Maxse, 
the Party's Chief Women's Officer. Patrick Gower inmediately 
expressed his surprise at not having been consulted, and Baldwin felt 
strongly enough about the issue to say that he felt the BBC should 
invite him to broadcast. Reith's argument that this would make it a 
party issue and that Labour would then also be eligible to broadcast 
19. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/f126, Reith to Fry, 17 February 1930. 
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was rejected by Gower. The issue, he stated, was simply one between 
Baldwin, the Conservative Party and Beaverbrook, and concerned no one 
else. To Davidson Gower was enthusiastic about the 'first rate 
opportunity .... that was too great to miss' that this would give 
Baldwin to explain his policy: 
I hope that you will be able to persuade Mr. Baldwin to seize 
this great opportunity ... mere especially a 20 the Conservative 
Party is more vitally concerned than any other. 
Reith, however, was not given the opportunity to react to this 
proposal, as the next day Beaverbrook announced the formation of the 
United Empire Party. Given that the issue was now undoubtedly party 
political, the Conservatives immediately changed their tactics and 
demanded that the whole discussion be cancelled. To enter into debate 
with Beaverbrook, it was recognised, would be to give his new party 
credibility and status. When, however, it was pointed out by the BBC 
that Beaverbrook would gain even more publicity from being cancelled 
than from broadcasting, Baldwin agreed to a full party discussion, 
with the three parties each broadcasting within a fortnight of 
Beaverbrook. 
In this rather accidental way a party political series was 
arranged without reference to either the Government or Labour Party 
headquarters, and the first that MacDonald heard of it was a letter 
from Reith to tell him of the arrangements. The Prime Minister was 
understandably 'amaed' and protested angrily at a series about which 
he had not been consulted and which was hardly in Labour's interests. 
He informed Reith that he would regard the scheme as 'a breach of 
both the understanding and agreement between the Government in Office 
and the British Broadcasting Corporation'. Reith was aware that 
20. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65. f127, Gower to Davidson, 17 February 
1930. 
21. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/f138-141, Fry to Reith, 24 and 28 
February 1930. 
22. BBC, PPBPPB, C. P. Duff (No. 10) to Reith, 4 March 1930. 
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the series had not been arranged with the degree of consultation that 
there should have been, and he was also aware of how dangerous it was 
for the BBC to ignore the vehemently stated opinion of the Prime 
Minister, for whose authority in any case he had a genuine respect. 
His reply therefore reflected this regard for MacDonald's wishes and 
a concern to retain the approval of the main party leaders: 
I understand that the Prime Minister feels we should have 
submitted the letter to him earlier, and I am very sorry indeed 
that this was not done. I asked in my letter if he approved, and, 
as I said on the telephone, if he did not, I would recommend 
cancellation. Shall I do this? I am sure the Prime Minister would 
look to the Corporation to carry the responsibility for 
cancellation without associating the Government with it. 
Although this certainly seems excessively sycophantic it may be 
queried whether Reith could safely or sensibly have defied the Prime 
Minister's wishes. As for the last sentence, Reith had even less 
desire than MacDonald to have it publicly known that the BBC was so 
exposed and susceptible to government pressure. 
The controversy had provided the impetus for the parties once 
again to discuss the whole question of political broadcasting, and 
the BBC Board agreed to let the Beaverbrook discussion drop for the 
time b2e4ing, on hearing that inter-party discussions were to take 
place. It was too hopeful of agreement; a proposal that the party 
ratio should be tied to the votes cast at the last election was 
quickly rejected by the Conservatives, and Winston Churchill proposed 
allocating broadcasts in proportion to the number of MPs of each 
party in the Commons. As this would have provided the Liberals with 
only about one speech in ten it was clearly unacceptable to them, and 
the discussions soon lapsed in stalemate. 
5 
23. BBC, PPBPPB, Reith to Duff, 5 March 1930. 
24. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/f148, Reith to Fry, 13 March 1930. 
25. Daily News, 18 March 1930; The Times, 6 June 1930, lOe. 
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Following this apparent impasse Hilda Matheson abandoned the 
Beaverbrook discussion as a lost cause; determined nevertheless to 
have some sort of debate of Free Trade, which she regarded as the 
major economic issue of the moment, she proposed an economic debate 
on the subject, avoiding party lines. The Board, however, 
26 re mre determined to have Beaverbrook than she had anticipated. Having 
accepted that the early negotiations had not been adequate and having 
back tracked as a result, Reith was now ready to take a harder line 
if the parties could not agree amongst. themselves. Under increasing 
pressure fron Beaverbrook, he tried to impose deadlines for a 
decision on the parties, telling the three whips In June that he 
would like a series on Free Trade to start in July. The ponderous 
machinery of inter-party discussion was not to be hurried; the matter 
was referred from whips to leaders and from leaders to whips, and in 
mid-July the BBC was informed that a new int 
28 party committee was 
to 
be -established to consider the question. Reith, however, was 
tired of delay. He was not prepared to watch the parties 
procrastinate further and so determined to press ahead regardless. 
The party rota for this discussion, he informed the whips, would be 
that which had pertained before the 1929 dissolution, namely two 
government speakers to one Liberal and one Conservative. Lord 
Beaverbrook would broadcast first and the discussion series would be 
concluded with talks by three i2mpartial economic experts, the whole 
to take place during the autumn. 
9 
The parties did not regard this proposal as a statement of fact, 
but as a suggestion for discussion. They were confident that nothing 
could or would be done without their approval. Indeed it is clear 
that leaders of both major parties erroneously believed there was a 
26. BBC, TDD, Matheson to R. Eckersley and Reith, 4 April 1930; 
note by Reith, 9 April 1930. 
27. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/f147, Reith to Whips, 25 June 1930. 
28. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/f152-156, Baldwin to MacDonald, 4 July 
1930; MacDonald to Baldwin, 9 July 1930; note by Fry, 18 July 
1930. 
29. BBC, PPBG, Reith to Whips, 21 July 1930. 
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formal agreement forbidding political broadcasting without party 
consent. Tom Kennedy, the Government Chief whip, informed Reith that 
no comment could be made on his proposals until after the inter-party 
conference the following week, which he asked him to attend. Both the 
Empire Free Trade discussion and political broadcasting generally 
would be considered. 
The difficulties which the Corporation had encountered since 1928 
in arranging party political broadcasting, and the production staff's 
reactions to the programme value of such broadcasts, had by now 
wrought an interesting change in the BBC's attitude towards them. 
Never particularly endeared to the party system, by 1930 Reith's 
political experience had made him positively antipathetic towards it. 
By contrast the success of impartial, explanatory talks and the ease 
with which they could be arranged, had made a considerable 
impression. Already in January Reith had told Churchill that 
We are as anxious as anyone to develop the expression of original 
and provocative points of view, but we believe that in some ways 
this can be done mo 30 effectively outside the confines of 
stereotyped party rota. 
Now these views were crystallised in an unsigned memorandum setting 
out the BBC's viewpoint in preparation for the inter-party 
conference. Explanatory talks and non-party symposia were described 
as being amongst the most popular and important features of BBC 
programmes and ones which would be developed further. With regard to 
party broadcasts, however, 
the BBC take the view that the public demand for the discussion 
of current political controversies at the microphone by the 
political leaders is during normal times a limited one. In view 
of the wide range of entertainment, information and education 
with which the BBC now supply their listeners, party political 
30. BBC, CWSC, Reith to Churchill, 20 January 1930. 
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interests must inevitably compe3tle for space with a large number 
of equally important interests. 
It was recognised that at General Elections, or when some particular 
national issue which resolved itself on party lines was currently of 
importance, then party debates were appropriate: 
but so complex have political questions today become, that the 
public is anxious to hear, not only the views of the party 
leaders, but perhaps even more the views of experts, commercial, 
financial, economic, legal, international etc., who can speak 
with the authorit3y of disinterested specialists on the subjects 
under discussion. 
3 
With this in mind the BBC felt that symposia in which party views 
were stated alongside expert opinions, as in the proposed Empire Free 
Trade series, were the best way of covering such political issues. 
Where there were topics that were of a purely party political nature 
it was suggested that single programme debates on the lines of the 
De-rating Bill progranine would be appropriate. The central point of 
this memorandum was the proposal that, except at elections and during 
national emergencies, the initiative for organising symposia and 
discussions on political issues should be with the Corporation. In an 
accompanying set of detailed proposals Reith suggested that party 
controlled political broadcasts should be restricted to two months a 
year, including May for a series on the budget. Single programme 
discussions of party political issues would be arranged by the BBC 
when appropriate, the Corporation deciding the subject but ready to 
listen to suggestions, and the parties nominating their speakers, 
subject to microphone suitability. Symposia would be organised 
31. BBC, PPBPPB, unsigned memorandum marked in pencil 'draft for 
D. G. July 31st 1930', c. 31 July 1930. The description does not 
exclude the possibility that Reith himself wrote this 
memorandum as it could be a pencilled secretarial reminder to 
give it to him to take to the meeting. 
32. See also BSBC,. PPBPPB, Matheson to Reith via R. Eckersley, 7 Nov- 
ember 1930. 
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regularly, again the subjects and most speakers being chosen by the 
BBC, but 
3parties 
choosing official representatives where 
appropriate. 
3 
Reith had no opportunity of discussing these proposals verbally 
with the all-party conference before the House rose for the summer, 
for the meeting arranged for 30 July had to be cancelled at the last 
minute owing to a division in the Commons. Reith was informed by 
Kennedy that the parties were therefore 'not in a position to express 
views' on his Empire Free Trade symposium plans until parliament 
reassembled at the end of October. 
34 
This was too much for Reith 
who, particularly now that the House had risen, was not prepared to 
accept further delay fron the parties. There can be little doubt that 
he deliberately misunderstood Kennedy's letter and, having sent out 
invitations to Beaverbrook and other experts to broadcast, replied 
that 
I note what you say with respect to our proposals for the Empire 
Trade Symposium, so we shall proceed with the arrangements in so 
far as we can make them. 
Beaverbrook and other non-party speakers would broadcast first, 
giving the parties time to arrange their own representatives. 
Kennedy's secretary immediately wrote to Reith that his chief had 
not contemplated anything further being done until party agreement 
had been reached. MacDonald, who had taken a personal interest, 
similarly informed the new BBC chairman, J. H. Whitley, that he was 
'simply amaed' and that he regarded this decision as 
a very serious breach of the existing agreement as to the use of 
33. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/f161-162, memcorandum by Reith, 31 July 
1930. 
34. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/f160, Kennedy to Reith, 1 August 1930. 
35. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/f163, Reith to Kennedy, 6 August 1930. 
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the British Broadcasting Corporation Wir3less, and one to which 
the Government cannot remain indifferent. 
Baldwin likewise agreed that Kennedy's letter had been clearly 
misinterpreted and endorsed the PM's protest. He called it 'a nasty 
business' and sug gested that the BBC had rushed things through. 
Geoffrey Fry told the Conservative Chief Whip, Sir Bolton Eyres- 
Monsell, that the whole issue had flared up at a most inconvenient 37 
time. 
It was at this point that the parties realised the BBC was acting 
entirely within its rights and contrary to no agreement. Their 
reaction to the discovery revealed a determination on both sides, 
particularly the Conservative, to supervise political broadcasting 
closely and to allow the BBC little freedom on this issue. Eyres- 
Monsell was particularly forthright: 
Reith has 'deliberately misread the meaning in view of what had 
already taken place - Really it is an amazing piece of effrontery 
for the BBC to dictate to the 3 political parties and I think the 
PM should stand up to them .... I want to control the BBC - that 
vast potential weapon for propaganda etc. - until we make sure it 
is developing on the right lines, and if we allow 3them 
to dictate 
to us on this occasion, they may get out of hand. 
Geoffrey Fry suggested to H. G. Vincent, MacDonald's Private 
Secretary, that the PM might usefully 'threaten the BBC' by drawing 
Whitley's attention to certain sentences in the letter of March 1928, 
when the controversy ban had been removed. The letter had called the 
removal 'an experiment .... for the present' and had stated that 'the 
36. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/f164, N. Butler to J. H. Whitley, 7 
August 1930. 
37. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/f170-174, Fry to Eyres Monsell, 9 August 
1930. 
38. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/f175, Eyres-Monsell to Pry, 11 August 
1930. 
4 
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Government hold themselves 
s9 
free to modify their present decision 
after further experience'. Conservative anger was not, of course, 
simply because the BBC seemed to be getting out of control. Their 
particular concern was to stop Beaverbrook from broadcasting if 
possible, though Fry was careful not to imply this to Vincent. 
MacDonald did not need Tory advice, although he was not quite so 
hostile to the BBC. In a minute sent to Whitley he wrote: 
the Government has no desire to interfere with the BBC 
programmes. But it cannot be disinterested regarding the 
political use made by it of its opportunities. Just as it 
supplies Jazz rubbish (not even good Jazz) for popular 
consumption so, if it is not careful with its politics, it will 
have to supply Jazz politics .... The only way the BBC can 
protect itself is by planning its political broadcasting in close 
co-operation with the Parties. That co-operation has not been 
sought with any degree of businesslike capacity in this case. 
MacDonald knew, however, that there was little he could do but 
wait until parliament reassembled and then re-open general 
discussions. Only at the very end of September were the whips able to 
come together again to discuss the issue. Their conclusion, as passed 
on to the BBC, was predictably that 
broadcast discussions not confined to representatives of the 
political parties appear to present difficulties which do not 
arise in connec4ti on with arrangements for Party political 
speeches as such. 
39. Fry's emphasis. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/f176-178, Fry to Eyres- 
Monsell, 14 August 1930. 
40. BBC, PPBPPB, minute by MacDonald of 9 August 1930, sent to Whitley on 18 August 1930. 
41. BBC, PPBPPB, Kennedy to Gainford, 31 September 1930. 
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When the all-party conference finally convened in November the 
parties were unanimous in condemning the Beaverbrook broadcast which 
was shortly to take place. They protested 'against the recognition of 
a political party other than were represented in the room', and at 
long last decided not to appear in the same series as Beaverbrook, 
lest this'give him credibility. A more significant agreement was 
that the party broadcast ratio should be 9: 8: 5, and at a succeeding 
meeting Reith was delighted to have his specific proposals for, 
political broadcasting, first drafted for the abortive meeting in 
July, accepted completely. A symposium on unemployment, with 
experts and three party representatives, was agreed to, as was a 
series of party speeches, possibly on fiscal policy. The BBC's 
boldness had forced the parties to come to agreement and Reith had 
some reason to be pleased. It had not, however, caused them to 
abandon their general intention to keep a tight control on political 
broadcasting, and here the conclusions of the parties and the BBC at 
the meeting sharply diverged: 
the Parties noted the claim of the BBC to the effect that the 
Corporation did not regard themselves as bound in every case to 
secure the agreement of the three political parties as a 
preliminary to proceeding with a political broadcast. In the view 
of the Party representatives, however, it was held that if the 
BBC proceeded in face of failure to*secure such an agreement, the 
question of the proper use of the Corporation's discretionary 
power might be re-opened and the present arrangement by which the 
three Parties had agreed to_participate in political broadcasting 
might be brought to an end. 
44 
The BBC did, however, undertake, dangerously but not surprisingly, 
42. For press conments on the Beaverbrook talk see A. Briggs 
(1965), Op. Cit., 136-137. 
43. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 105,18 November 1930. 
44. BBC, PPBPPB, Agreed aide memoire on meetings of 4 and 18 
November 1930. 
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always to consult with the parties before arranging a broadcast 
involving party politics. 
The BBC and parties had agreed on details but not on the 
fundamental nature of their relationship. Conservatives and Labour 
were now united in their determination to exercise as much control as 
they could over political broadcasting, though already there was 
confusion as to just how comprehensive that term was and to which 
programmes the 9: 8: 5 ratio applied. The BBC by contrast was anxious 
to be able to broadcast more political affairs progranmes and so saw 
the agreement as a gain. It also wanted greater independence from 
party pressure and whim, but whether it had actually achieved it was 
more doubtful. 1931 was to see more political broadcasting than ever 
before on such controversial subjects as India, Russia, unemployment 
and disarmament, yet throughout it was to be very clear that the BBC 
was inhibited by political pressure either from the political parties 
or fron the Government. The agreement of 1930 eased the situation not 
at all and, by committing the BBC to a written definition of its 
rights and obligations vis-a-vis political affairs broadcasting, gave 
the parties a degree of control over its output which they put to 
good use. 
The broadcasting symposium on unemployment went ahead in January 
and February 1931, virtually without complaint, whilst later in the 
year Si 4William Beveridge gave a series of six talks on the same 
subject. The parties agreed to hand in their scripts 
simultaneously so that none would have an advantage, although Reith 
protested that this would lessen the interest of the talks and, in 
the event, Baldwin did not do so. The proposed discussion of the 
budget,. however, did not take place as the Chancellor objected that, 
by incorporating his by now traditional broadcast into this series, 
45. In the discussion series the experts were Professor Henry Clay, 
J. M. Keynes, D. H. MacGregor, and A. Loveday, whilst Seebohm 
Rowntree, Herbert Morrison and Stanley Baldwin represented the 
parties. The experts were not confined to factual statements 
but could give personal opinions. 
A 
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the Government would be losing one broadcasting opportunity. 
46 
Instead the parties agreed to a discussion on 'The effect of tariffs 
on employment' and accepte4d7this time that simultaneous submission of 
scripts was unnecessaxy. The BBC was beginning to find that 
although technically it could go ahead with broadcasts without party 
consent, in practice it needed their approval in order to obtain 
party speakers. 
A more serious incident occurred in February. Oswald Mosley and 
Lord Eustace Percy had been asked to debate on 'Tradition'. When it 
became clear that the broadcast would be more politically orientated 
than originally intended the BBC felt obliged by the November 
agreement to postpone it and consult the parties. As Roger Eckersley 
rather undiplomatically told Mosley, 
the BBC is under obligation to the three Parties not to undertake 
discussions of a political nature without prior consultation with 
the representatives of the Parties .... what might be possible at 
one time could not be' donýe$ at another without leading the BBC 
into considerable trouble. 
He insisted that it was a matter of courtesy to inform the parties, 
rather than a request for permission, but this postponement - and in 
the event cancellation - was as strict an interpretation of the 
agreement as the parties could have wished for. Mosley was 
understandably9 furious and refused to speak 'by permission' of the 
party whips. 
4 
Writing of this incident in Modern Wireless J. M. 
Kenworthy argued that 
46. BBC, PPBPPB, Kennedy to Reith, 17 March 1931. 
47. BBC, PPBG, Kennedy to Reith, 2 April 1931. William Graham, 
Neville Chamberlain, and Lloyd George gave these talks, each 
twenty minutes long. 
48. BBC, 001, R. Eckersley to 0. Mosley, 10 February 1931. 
49. BBC, OOM, note of telephone call from 0. Mosley to R. 
Eckersley, 10 February 1931. 
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the suppression of this particular talk was a scandal; and to 
pretend now that the BBC is independent of political influence 
after this episode is arrant humbug .... the three party caucuses 
... o are firmly determined that no-one outside the ranks of 
strict officialdom shall be allowed to address the listeners. 
Broadcast politics are under a censorship as severe as anything 50 
in Russia. 
Leonard Woolf similarly analysed the danger of such referral of 
programnes to the whips, in the Political Quarterly: 
in the first place this establishes a far too wide sphere of 
influence for the party politicians, for practically every 
subject is potentially of interest to politicians. Secondly, in 
practice it gives the party whips a kind of censorship over the 
choice of subjects and speakers where they seem to impinge upon 
politics. Nothing could be more fatal to the future of 
broadcasting .... If the party whips had their will 
[vital 
controversies] would never be discussed at all - except by the 51 
party hacks. 
Woolf 's general analysis was fair, but accusations that during 
the early 1930s the BBC submitted itself to and was muzzled by the 
whips and the parties were not entirely valid. The objection to the 
proposed budget discussion came from Snowden, and his successor, 
Neville Chamberlain, was equally determined not to allow the 
50. J. M. Kenworthy, 'Free the BBC', Modern Wireless, April 1931, 
360-362. 
51. L. Woolf, 'The Future of British Broadcasting', Political 
Quarterly, April-June 1931,172-185. His general premise was 
that 'Every Englishman in public pays lip-service to democracy, 
but in practice and private too often denies its postulates. 
One of its postulates is that "the people" should decide things 
for themselves and that it should not be left to the few to 
decide what the many want and what should be given to them. 
This implies that the many should also be given the 
prerequisites of a rational choice, namely the facts and 
knowledge, so far as possible, all facts and knowledge, not 
those which a dictator or oligarchy think safe or innocuous'. 
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Opposition an opportunity to broadcast criticisms of the budget. 
This, however, was an attitude that had pertained since 1928 when 
Churchill had first broadcast, and was not affected in any way by the 
1930 agreement. As for the Mosley/Percy debate, there is no evidence 
of its cancellation being the result of party objection - although 
there may have been some. That it never took place after its first 
postponement was more likely due to Mosley's claim that he would 
thereby be speaking by permission of the whips, and his refusal to do 
so. Roger Eckersley undoubtedly handled Mosley badly, and it may be 
doubted whether he need strictly have interpreted the 1930 agreement 
to include such debates. Nevertheless the BBC certainly did not here 
accept unprotestingly a cancellation imposed on them by the parties. 
Far more influential than the parties, as far as the BBC was 
concerned, was the government of the day, and the relationship of 
BBC, parties and government at this time is best illustrated by BBC 
coverage of the highly controversial issues of India and Russia. The 
Corporation had been anxious for some time to inform its audience of 
the increasingly complex Indian situation. Towards the end of 1929 
C. A. Siepma. nn, Hilda Matheson's deputy, had contacted Sir John Simon, 
whose Royal Conmission report was expected shortly, about the idea of 
an explanatory series. 
5ý 
Meanwhile Vernon Bartlett dealt with 
India, following 53e Viceroy's promise of dominion status, in one of 
his weekly talks. Simon cautiously approved of the idea of such 
programmes and subsequently broadcast on the findings of the 
Commission. Growing unrest in India, however, led the BBC Board to 
suspend plans for a complete talks series. It was mindful of Simon's 
opinion that 
it would be extraordinarily difficult for any series to be fixed 
up without embarking on controversial subjects and creating 
52. BBC, CJS, C. A. Siepma. nn to Sir John Simon, 1 November 1929. 
Siepn nn's official title was Director of Adult Education 
Talks. He succeeded Matheson as Director of Talks in January 
1932. 
53.7 November 1929. 
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embarrassments of one kind or another. 
Reith reassured Simon that because his report was an all-party one it 
could be considered non-controversial, and that therefore his own 
broadcast would not necessitate critical replies. Matheson, however, 
pointed out that the parties did not represent all shades of opinion 
and that the report was not, therefore, uncontroversial - throughout 
this period Churchill was constantly demanding to be allowed to 
broadcast on India. 
The BBC was nevertheless determined to go carefully. It was both 
respectful of expert and government opinion and convinced of the 
exceptional power and impact of broadcasting in foreign and imperial 
affairs. When the Indian High Commissioner suggested broadcasting 
talks by the four train parties at the Indian Round Table Conference, 
in November 1930, the BBC referred the matter to Wedgwood Benn, the 
Secretary of State for India, 'in view of the many and delicate 
problems involved'. The Board in any case did not favour the 
proposal: 
we feel that there would be a danger of misrepresenation - by a 
sentence detached from its context and circulated in Ind56 - and 
of course anything that is broadcast carries much weight. 
It was clearly mindful of the Government's desire to appease Gandhi 
and draw him to the Conference in order to negotiate. Not 
surprisingly Wedgwood Benn entirely agreed. He felt that the danger 
of the BBC being used for propaganda speeches in such circumstances 
would be extreme. He was already trying to dissuade conference 
54. BBC, PI, Note by Reith on Board decision 30 April 1930; Reith 
to Sir Claude Hill, 21 June 1930. 
55. BBC, CJS, Reith to Simon, 26 May 1930, Matheson to Reith, 26 
May 1930. 
56. BBC, PI, Gainford to Wedgwood Benn, 6 November 1930. 
398 
57 
delegates from making any statements to the press. 
By February 1931, however, with the Conference concluded and its 
report known, the Board felt that the subject might be more safely 
approached. A series of talks was proposed, four factual on the 
background, five on present problems and three by representatives of 
left, right and centre of the different Indian factions. Because 
Churchill was also demanding air time, however, it was decided to 
refer the series to the whips for the5r8 coxments, even though 
domestic party politics was not involved. The Conservatives made 
no comment on the proposals. But Wedgwood Benn felt strongly that 
Churchill should not broadca59, as it might provoke protests from the 
Indian National Congress. After consulting with the Prime 
Minister, Chief Whip Tom Kennedy sent a reply to Reith which was in 
effect a suggestion that the BBC should not, and perhaps could not 
rightfully, deal with foreign affairs. The argument was to become a 
familiar one in the future: 
the subject of the Indian, as of the Russian series, intimately 
concerns people of whom it is doubtful whether any considerable 
proportion can justly appreciate the exact relationship of the 
British Broadcasting Corporation to His Majesty's Government. It 
is not improbable that in either series expressions would be 
used, and opinions advanced, for which neither the Government nor 
the British Broadcasting Corporation could take responsibility, 
but which nevertheless would be interpreted, by the people whom 
they concern, as indicative of an official view promulgated 
through an official broadcasting service. This possibility at 
once distinguishes a broadcast debate from controversy conducted 
in the Press. No Government, and no political party, would wish 
to labour under the imputation of seeking to evade the discussion 
57. BBC, PI, Wedgwood Benn to Gainford, 11 November 1930. 
58. BBC, PI, Reith to Whips, 11 February 1931; BGP, Board minutes, 4 
February 1931. 
59. Prem 1/145, N. Butler to MW-Donald, 13 February 1931. 
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of any matter of public policy; and I hasten to disavow any such 
intention. But the suitability of the broadcasting medium for the 
purposes of controversy on subjects not primarily of purely 
domestic concern is, for the reasons I have indicated, open to 60 
question. 
Indeed, Kennedy even questioned whether the BBC was within its 
rights, under the terms of the letter of March 1928 lifting the ban, 
in discussing foreign affairs at all. 
This was the first time this issue had been raised in such a way, 
yet the fear of foreign misinterpretation of broadcast statements was 
genuine enough. Increasingly the BBC was to be caught between 
political parties who did not wish for uncontrolled broadcasting on 
domestic politics, and the government of the day and Foreign Office, 
who were anxious that their jobs should not be made more difficult by 
foreign affairs broadcasting. Despite Kennedy's disavowal of any 
intention to gag discussion of foreign affairs, there was, in the 
reference to the letter of March 1928, an attempt to make use of the 
Government's particular hold over broadcasting in a way that could 
not be done with the press. This pressure was to become ever greater 
throughout the 1930s. 
Kennedy's suggestion, however, was more than the Board was 
prepared to tolerate. Cautious it might be, but silent it would not. 
It rejected the view that it might be exceeding its rights, but 
assured Kenn61y that the greatest care was being taken to avoid high 
controversy. The Foreign and India Offices had been consulted and 
Sir John Simon's advice taken. For the final four talks it was agreed 
with Sir Findlater Stewart of the India Office (and without any 
suggestion from Kennedy) that the scripts would be senýt2 to the 1.0. 
for comments and checking of facts before transmission. Reith 
60. BBC, PI, Kennedy to Reith, 17 February 1931. 
61. BBC, PI, Reith to Kennedy, 26 February 1931. 
62. BBC, PI, Siepmann to Carpendale, 21 May 1931. Unfortunately it 
is not known if any alterations were made as a result. 
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felt that it was now time to go ahead, and the series proceeded as 
planned in April and May. 
Despite consultation with the whips and despite a major objection 
from the Government, the BBC had been sufficiently confident of 
itself to carry through this series which, if it avoided the views of 
the British parties, did nevertheless explain the nature of the 
Indian problem and the variety of views in India. This was perfectly, 
good political affairs broadcasting and, to Reith and Matheson, 
superior to a series of wholly opinionated talks. At the same time it 
must be said that the more delicate programmes were India Office 
approved, and the BBC's respect for India Office views was confirmed 
a fews months later when Churchill applied once again to broadcast. 
Churchill claimed that his request in February 
was refused on the grounds that these matters were settled by the 
Whips of the various parties. 
This was a ridiculous charge but one which, appearing as it did in 
the press, stuck. Churchill's immediate reason for wishing to 
broadcast, as Reith and Whitley were well aware, was his anger at the 
recent agreement between Gandhi and the Viceroy, Lord Irwin, that 
Congress would attend the next session of the Round Table Conference. 
Fearful of concessions Churchill was anxious to arouse public opinion 
against what he saw as government weakening. Reith knew also that the 
India Office were opposed to the publicising of Churchill's views. 
When Churchill visited Whitley and Reith he urged that 
in view of the extreme urgency and gravity of the situation, he 
would [if in Reith's place] permit the eitre right view to be 64 
given, even against the India Office objection. 
Reith was not averse to the idea, particularly if balanced by talks 
63. BBC, PPBWSC, Churchill to 'Whitley, 2 July 1931. 
64. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 106,21 July 1931. 
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from the left and the Round Table point of view. He felt obliged, 
however, to consult Wedgwood Benn for his views first, and Benn 
expressed strong opposition to any such series until after the Round 
Table Conference had met. Although he could not control expressions 
of opinion in the press, the Secretary of State for India was 
determined to do what he could to prevent Churchill or other 
extremists from disturbing events. Broadcasting was one area where 
official opposition might produce results, and it did. As Reith later 
wrote, 
the Board decided to accede to the request so emphatically made 
by the minister responsible for dealing with a particularly 
delicate and critical situation. 
Why was this decision taken? Government opposition to the series 
was twofold, fearing as it did both public reaction in Britain and 
disturbances in India. Only the latter was a valid argument for the 
BBC, however, and Wedgwood Benn made full use of it in his talk with 
Whitley and Reith. In rejecting the proposed series the Board 
implicitly accepted the notion that Kennedy had stated in his letter 
of 17 February - that the exceptional power of broadcasting and the 
possibility of foreign misunderstanding of the status of the BBC 
placed the Corporation in a different position from the press, giving 
it an added responsibility to take care in what it broadcast. The 
BBC's stance was honourable, but Churchill's protest at thus being 
prevented from broadcasting, in effect by the Government, also 
contained a good deal of truth: 
I can only regard your renewed refusal as a definite part of the 
attempt which is being made to -lull and chloroform the British 
people into a fateful decision. Discussion after the Conference 
has finished is no safeguard. Before each of these Conferences 
meet we are told "No one will be committed to anything". After 
they are over "d'ie cannot go back on what has been settled". I 
65. J. C. W. Reith (1949), Op. Cit., 151. 
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wish to warn the nation before it is too late. 
The dilemma revealed here was not to be fully resolved until the 
BBC entered more fully into the current affairs field. Until then 
political affairs broadcasting was largely concerned with the passive 
review of political policies and actions, its influence on public 
opinion being really relevant only at elections. Only later did it 
enter the realm of active pressure group politics of the kind that 
Churchill was demanding. But that it did not so involve itself was 
very much in line with Reith's vision of broadcasting - impartial, 
presenting the evidence and seeking the truth, different in form and 
intent from the press and seeking neither to influence events as they 
happened, nor to challenge the primacy of parliament as the arena in 
which political views were stated and national policy made. 
The other major foreign issue to be dealt with in 1931 was 
Russia. Russian affairs had been discussed in their regular series by 
both Vernon Bartlett and Harold Nicolson, and in March 1930 Reith had 
asked Matheson to make suggestions for a series on Russia. The Board, 
however, considered that the time was not suitable, and it held by 
its decision to 'leave Russia alone at present', despite fears by 
Matheson that 
f 
we are perhaps rendering ourselves liable to a charge of bias and 
prejudi6e if we put a kind of ban on all topical talks on 
Russia. 
In early 1931, however, with a new and more determined chairman, the 
Board approved a series of talks by experts describing modern Russia, 
to be called 'Russia in the Melting Pot'. Various problems were 
discovered in its preparation, as many experts were unwilling to 
speak lest they be refused future entry into Russia. Matheson also 
66. BBC, PIWSC, Churchill to Whitley, 8 August 1931. 
67. BBC, TR, Matheson to Reith, 4 April 1930, and note on this by 
Reith for R. Eckersley and H. Matheson, 9 April 1930. 
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recognised that extreme anti-soviet opinions would have to be avoided 
in view of an Angloý$oviet agreement not to engage in 'propaganda' 
against each other. The Foreign Office and Chatham House were 
consulted informally, although the Foreign Office was unwilling to 
vet scripts lest it be then held responsible for the views 
stated. Finally the whips were informed that the series was to 
take place, although they were not asked for their comments or 
advice. 
Reith nevertheless expected protests and received them. Kennedy 
doubted, as with the India series, whether the BBC should be covering 
foreign affairs at all. Eyres-Monsell, for his part, suggested an 
additional talk on labour conditions in Russia, to be given by a 
representative of the Anti-Slavery Society. The series, however, 
went ahead unchanged, and it was only once it had started that the 
Conservative Party inevitably began to complain in earnest. Already 
in February the Morning Post had protested at a broadcast talk on 
Russia by the'co nunist Maurice Dobb, in the symposium on 'Whither 72 
Mankind? '. Now, in July, the new Conservative Party Chairman, 
Lord Stonehaven, complained to Reith that 
the impression is gaining ground in the ranks of our Party that 
the British Broadcasting Corporation'is allowing the wireless to 
68. As Reith wrote: 'Extreme opinion for or against the Soviet 
system could not be included. A talk that would have been 
satisfactory to a right wing Conservative would have been 
improper in view of the fact that there is a Soviet Ambassador 
in the country. On the other hand, the kind of talk that an 
admirer of Soviet Russia would like to have given would have 
necessitated a Conservative right wing type of reply'. - BBC, 
IFA, Reith to Stonehaven, 7 July 1931. 
69. Foreign Office papers (hereafter FO), F0395/453, P418/39/150, 
Reith to Sir Robert Vansittart, 24 February 1931. 
70. BBC, TR, Reith to R. Eckersley, 14 February 1931. 
71. BBC, PI, Eyres Monsel1 to Kennedy (copy to BBC), 13 February 
1931. 
72. Morning Post, 28 February 1931. 
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be used for the purpose of giving glowing accounts about 
conditions in Russia which are propagandist in character and are 
probably open to criticism fro 73 he point of view of reliability 
of the facts contained in them. 
In particular there were objections to a talk by Mr. Stafford Talbot, 
Director of The British Russian Gazette and Trade Outlook. 
Within Conservative Central Office opinions were actually rather 
mixed, for Oliver Stebbings of the Research Department failed to find 
bias in any of"the talks and considered two of them to be critical of 
the Soviet system. Others were forced to fall back on the view that 
the bias was 
more a question of the general impression which is conveyed than 
the actual terminology employed. 
ýý 
It was felt that only the successful aspects of the Soviet Five Year 
Plan had been mentioned 16 and that facts critical of 
the communist 
system had been omitted. Patrick Gower told Stonehaven: 
the series as a whole constitutes propaganda of a very subtle and 
insidious kind because the general impression left on the mind of 
the listener is that thanks to the Five Year Plan Russia is in 
many respects a thriving and prosperous couunntry. All the evils of 
the Russian regime are completely ignored. 
Lord Stonehaven, however, was unusually prepared to see the BBC's 
viewpoint, and perhaps astute enough to recognise that diplomacy 
73. BBC, IFA, Stonehaven to Reith, 3 July 1931. 
74. Daily Mail, 30 June 1931 and 1 July 1931. 
75. COD, 0004/1/23, P. Cohen to Gower, 11 July 1931. 
76. COD, 0004/1/23, C. P. Selby to Gower, 21 July 1931. 
77. C CO, 0004/1/23, Gower to Stonehaven, 21 July 1931. 
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might achieve more than direct protest with a character such as 
Reith. Following a letter and meeting with the latter Stonehaven told 
him: 
I should like to make it absolutely clear that I will take it for 
granted in future that absolute impartiality is what the BBC 78 
seeks to achieve. 
He admitted that Central Office, as a partisan organisation, might 
occasionally feel the BBC had not achieved its objective, but 
stressed his' hope that friendly relations could be maintained by 
personal contact: 
Your letter leads me to hope that I succeeded in conveying to you 
my conviction of the very important part that the BW is destined 
to play in the vital matter of educating the Nati? 9 on the most 
difficult problems which confront it at the moment. 
Such friendly overtures brought immediate rewards, for Reith 
suggested that Gower or another Central Office representative should 
visit him occasionally to make suggestions and to discuss any 80 
complaints. 
The agreement between the BBC and the parties was clearly not 
nearly- so restrictive as Churchill and others suggested. Neither of 
these two series, of course, was on domestic politics, but both were 
of considerable interest to all the parties, whilst the Indian 
question was one of the greatest current political controversy. The 
BBC's decision to cover these topics in the relatively factual and 
objective way it did, without having politicians speak, may have 
reflected a desire not to further irritate the parties, but it was 
78. BBC, IFA, Stonehaven to Reith, 6 August 1931. 
79. Ibid. 
80.000,0004/1/23, Gower to Reith, 30 July 1931. Reith himself 
always preferred face to face meetings, as he was always at his 
best on such occasions. 
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also a reflection of the Corporation's general theory of political 
affairs broadcasting. It was in addition the result of its respect 
for the authority of the government of the day, and of an implicit 
appreciation that political broadcasting might potentially hinder the 
job of governing, at least as far as foreign and imperial affairs 
were concerned.. There is nothing to suggest - not even in the 
cancelled Percy/Mosley debate - that the BBC submitted to purely 
party or partisan pressure. Even its considerable respect for the 
government viewpoint was not unquestioning, . for the Corporation 
rejected the suggestion that foreign affairs coverage was outside its 
purview. Yet' it is fair to conclude that the practical interest of 
parties and government in political broadcasting helped to dissuade 
the BBC from taking any bolder steps and in maintaining its 
essentially respectful approach. 
The political crisis of 1931 was to be another major event in the 
life of the BBC and one from which it did not emerge with its honour 
wholly intact. Throughout 1931 Reith had personally been increasingly 
disenchanted with the Labour Government. His liking for MacDonald and 
Baldwin, however, made him very favourably disposed towards the 
formation of the National Government in August. Whether or not 
Reith's personal predilections themselves inclined BBC output more 
towards the Government is impossible to say, but thgiy certainly led 
to a less than scrupulous attention to balance. But this was 
hardly surprising. The BBC quite consciously allied itself to the 
best interests of the. state as it perceived them. On this occasion 
the mass of the establishment, the mass of the electorate and the 
most eminent politicians of every major party all saw those interests 
as being represented by the new Government. The BBC also saw this to 
be the case, as it had in the General Strike, and its actions were 
influenced accordingly. 
Between the formation of the National Goverment and the 
81. When the crisis broke, and for much of August, Reith was out of 
the country visiting Germany, Austria and Poland. It is clear 
that he quite underestimated the seriousness of events in 
Britain. 
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announcement of the General Election, talks on the political 
situation were entirely sympathetic to the Government viewpoint. 
MacDonald broadcast on the day following its formation and Snowden 
spoke after his second budget. He broadcast again when Britain went 
off the Gold Standard and MacDonald made a broadcast to announce the 
General Election. None of these talks, particularly the last two, 
were impartial in the way that ministerial broadcasts were supposed 
to be. MacDonald's last, broadcast from the Covent Garden Opera 
House, was a straight party speech in which he called for national 
unity, defended National Government 82 icy and regretted the Labour 
Party's refusal to unite behind him. Also in September Professor 
Henry Clay gave a talk on 'The Pound in Danger', which gave implicit 
support to government actions, as did Sir Josiah Stamp's broadcast 
inmediately before the election campaign cornnenced. Sir Arthur Steel- 
Maitland also broadcast on 'The Crisis: How you can help', whilst 
Vernon Bartlett came closer to home than usual in his weekly talk 
with some 'Reflections on the Pound', which again broadly accepted 
the necessity for the Government's policies. An editorial in'The 
Listener typified the BBC's approach to the crisis. It acknowledged 
that one of the weaknesses of democracy was instability of opinion 
due to rumour and suspicion in different sections of the community: 
distracted Counsels on the one hand, and stampeded herd action on 
the other, form the Scylla and Charybdis through which the ship 
of state must steer a midway course to safety in times of crisis. 
The calmness and lack of fear with which the country had reacted in 
this crisis, however, it ascribed to the wireless, to the 
"still small voice" which our present day statesmen are learning 
to use, not to excite passions, but to quiet fears and discipline 
actions. 
82. MacDonald papers, PR() 30/69/6/189, MacDonald's speech notes, 7 
October 1931. L. M. Weir, whose books, The Tragedy of Raiasay 
MacDonald, was a cruel attack on his subject, stated that this 
speech was made from the opera house as a melodroma. tic self- 
idolizing gesture - London 1938,554. 
83. The Listener, 30 September 1931,526. 
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This calming influence was well demonstrated by Snowden in his budget 
broadcast: 
Friends, I will try to talk to you simply to-night, as man to 
84 
man, as though we were sitting together round the fireside. 
The Listener hailed this 'psychological achievement', this 
'consolidating influence' of broadcasting; it welcomed the fact that 
in so far as [broadcasting] demonstrates the statesman's highest 
qualities, his patient explanation of difficulties, and the 
sympathetic discussion of remedies which must be taken, however 
unpleasant, it is performing the same kind of service that the 
doctor gives his patient by visiting hi $5bedside, instead of 
prescribing from a distance for his malady. 
The negotiations for the ratio of General Election broadcasts in 
1931 were, if it was possible, even more complex than those in 1929, 
there being double the number of parties and groupings to satisfy. 
Hilda Matheson was being hopelessly optimistic when she argued that 
there were only two main bodies of opinion and that a series of 
single night discussi $nýs would be the best and most interesting way 
of presenting them. The National Government representatives 
called Reith to the Commons to try to arrange broadcasts in the 
absence of any Labour negotiator, although Reith did suggest that 
Kennedy should be brought in. Despite the unfair situation the BBC's 
Director General produced a draft scheme which appeared to provide 
each political grouping with a broadcast and gave Labour, National 
84. The Listener, 16 September 1931, as delivered on 11 September 
1931. Snowden's biographer, Colin Cross, says of this 
broadcast: 'He spoke in sad but reassuring tones, his 
magnificent microphone technique a foretaste of what was to 
come a month later in the General Election'. - C. Cross, Philip 
Snowden, London 1966,309. 
85. The Listener, 30 September 1931,526. 
86. BBC, PPBGEB, Matheson to Reith via R. Eckersley, 2 October 
1931. 
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Labour and Conservatives two each. At the same time, however, it 
allocated the National Government forces six opportunities to the 
opposition's three (two Labour and one Lloyd George Liberal), 
8wwith 
the additional possibility of a broadcast by Mosley's New Party. 
Samuel immediately objected that Sir John Simon's Liberal 
Nationals had been given a broadcast and demanded two opportunities 
for his own National Liberals. 'When Arthur Henderson, the new Labour, 
Leader, heard of the proposals he declared them to be quite 
unacceptable: 
he was trying to make out that there ought to be as many speakers 
against the government as for, and at this ratee8he wanted for his 
Opposition as many as all the others together. 
MacDonald's secretary, Major Ralph Glyn, who was supposed formally to 
be arranging the details of the ratio, conceded another Labour 
broadcast, but Henderson demanded89a fourth, on the grounds that the, 
present allocation was 7: 3. Both Liberal Nationals and 
Conservatives then requested a further speech, whilst the Communist, 
Independent Labour, Scottish and Welsh Nationalist parties asked to 
broadcast, and Mosley assured Reith that he would have fifty 
candidates in the field. 
Reith had decided that a maximum of twelve periods would be made 
available for party broadcasts. Faced with such a demand he and Glyn 
determined to exclude parties with less than forty candidates, 
although they consciously - and without real justification - excepted 
Lloyd George from this rule. They also tacitly accepted that National 
Labour, with only twenntt candidates, would have two broadcasts, by 
Snowden and MacDonald. The result according to Reith was 'equal 
87. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 107,6 October 1931; BBC, PPBGEB, undated 
rough notes by Reith. 
88. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 108,8 October 1931. 
89. BBC, PPBGEB, Reith to Samuel, 8 October 1931. 
90. BBC, PPBGEB, Reith to R. Glyn, 
. 
12 October 1931. 
16 
410 
91 
discontent on all sides'. But this was hardly so. Churchill 
inevitably protested that there were five socialists (two being 
Snowden and MacDonald), three Liberals and only one Conservative 
broadcasting (Baldwin gave both Conservative speeches) and that 'this 
was carrying the suppression of 92nservative Opinion beyond the 
bounds of reason and fair play'. Yet protest from the Labour 
ranks was to be far louder, longer lasting and more deeply felt. 
The question remains whether Labour complaints of unfair 
allocation of party broadcasts were justified. The final figures were 
two Conservative, two National Labour, one National Liberal, one 
Liberal National, one Liberal (Independent) and three Labour. Reith's 
initial policy had aimed to give equality to each party, as at the 
1929 election, thus giving two broadcasts each to Con 93rvative, 
Liberal (in all its forms), Labour and National Labour. Samuel 
had argued that Lloyd George should be given a broadcast as a former 
Prime Minister and senior statesman, and Reith had agreed, it being 
sn 
understood that Lloyd George's group was Independent and outside the 
Government, whilst both the Samuel and the Simon groups were within 
it. Reith's policy therefore closely followed the 1929 precedent, 
although allowance was made for the Liberal confusion. The BBC was 
acting properly in claiming to allocate broadcasts to each recognised 
political party rather than equally to government supporters and 
opposition, even though there were effectively only two sides in the 
election. It would have been contrary to precedent if it had 
allocated broadcasts not according to the number of different parties 
but according to their presupposed views. Reith might claim, 
therefore, that he was applying the same criteria as he had in 1929 
and that Labour had no justification for complaint on those grounds. 
On the contrary, Glyn's granting of another Labour broadcast, 
without consulting Reith, broke with precedent by giving one party, 
91. C. Stuart, Op-Cit., 108,10 October 1931. 
92. The Times, 14 October 1931. 
93. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 108,8 October 1931; BBC, PPBGEB, R. Glyn 
to Churchill, 13 October 1931. 
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Labour, an advantage. 
But although Labour complaints were unjustified in this respect, 
it is clear that the BBC had not properly applied its own criteria in 
relation to minor and fringe parties. For these a different criterion 
was applied, namely the number of candidates, that number being 
deliberately high in order to exclude as many as possible. Indeed 
Reith's original figure of fifty was reduced to forty to give Mosley, 
a chance and to ensure that Simon (who fielded forty-one candidates) 
was eligible to broadcast. Yet, as we have seen, both MacDonald's and 
Lloyd George's minor parties received broadcasts although they were 
well below the required size. The BBC gave these two the opportunity 
to broadcast because their leaders were established figures (one 
being Prime Minister), whilst Mosley and others who had more 
candidates were excluded because they were not. The ILP was excluded 
on the candidacy rule even though it claimed to be a party 
independent from Labour, was so regarded by Reith and had almost as 
much right to be considered one as 9h4e different National Government 
parties had to be called separate. If the official Labour Party 
. 
(who denied ILP independence) had no reason to complain, the 
opposition parties as a whole most certainly did. To this extent the 
BBC's policy in respect of party broadcasts was clearly as 
sympathetic to the National Gove9rrnment as it had been in respect of 
pre-election speeches and talks. 
As in 1929 program es continued as normal. A series of talks by 
Leonard Woolf on 'The Modern State', in which he discussed democracy, 
dictatorship, equality and the need for democratising the educational 
system of Britain, went ahead without question, as did Bartlett's 
broadcasts. Also as in 1929 the progress of the election was reported 
on the news, although speeches at public meetings were not reported 
as the party leaders were broadcasting nightly. The manifestoes of 
94. BBC, PPBGEB, I. L. P. to Reith, 10 October 1931; Reith to Glyn, 
12 October 1931. 
95. See the editorial, The Clarion, November 1931. 
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the different parties were given at length, except for that of the 
Communist Party, which was disregarded. Again, however, it is clear 
that in these sumraries the National Government parties received more 
space than the opposition, as Figure 6.1 demonstrates: 
Figure 6.1: News coverage of party manifestoes, 1931 General 
Election. 
Mmifesto 1st news bulletin 2nd news bulletin Length of Total 
(6.00. p. m. ) (c. 9.40. p. m. ) Coverage Coverage 
(pages) (pages) 
National Govt: 
MacDonald. * * 3.00 ) 
Baldwin. * 3.75 ) 
Simon. * * 2.00 ) 16.50 
Samuel. * 2.75 ) 
Opposition: 
Labour. * * 3.00 ) 
Lloyd George. * * 1.00 ) 
I. L. P. * 1.00 ) 10.75 
T. U. C. * 1.75 ) 
One of the most controversial aspects of the BBC's coverage of 
the election was a statement made after the second news bulletin on 
the eve of the poll. This emphasised that the poll was secret (many 
first-time women voters did not realise this) and explained which 
parties were part of the National Government and which were opposed 
96. The New Party did not issue a manifesto. Length of coverage was 
not related to length of manifesto - Labour's manifesto, for 
example, was over twice as long as Baldwin's Conservative one. 
The BBC may also have been uncertain as to what status should 
be given to the ILP and TUC manifestoes. - BBC, PPBGEB, 
unsigned, undated memorandum on election news coverage, 1931. 
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to it. It also emphasised the importance of voting: 
on your action or failure to act may depend your awn and your 
children future, and the security and prosperity of your 
country. 
This was considered by the Labour Party to be a partisan statement, 
clearly sympathetic to the National Government, and a virtual 
repetition of National Government propaganda. The BBC of course 
denied that the wording was anything but an urging of people to vote. 
Yet on the day it was given Reith, having approved the statement, 
wrote in his diary: 'I have no do0ugbt that this will be regarded as 
tendentious by the Labour Party'. Election results were broadcast 
as they came in, until 4.00 a. m., and a summary given the next 
day. 
Once again politicians were aware of the importance of the party 
broadcasts. Patrick Gower told Baldwin that his first had been over 
the heads of many and argued: 'I do not think that you can make your 
talk too simple or elementary'. 
100 
Similarly Clifford Allen, who 
advised MacDonald on his final speech, felt that 'mood' would be all 
important: 
People are weary of fighting and clamour and abuse. They will 
rally to- yqif in this closing speech you reason quietly and 101 
movingly. 
MacDonald himself was sufficiently worried about Henderson's 
97. BBC, NBPB, undated script; quoted in statement by the TUC and 
NEC General Council, 10 November 1931. 
98. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 109,26 October 1931. 
99. BBC, PPBGEB, Unsigned, undated memorandum on election news 
coverage. 
100. Baldwin papers, Bal. 45/f88-9, Gower to Baldwin 21 October 1931. 
101. MacDonald papers, PRO 30/69/6/130, C. Allen to MacDonald, 20 
October 1931. 
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broadcast the previous 102 ning 
to spend a good part of his own in 
directly attacking it. According to Harold Nicolson, ' however, 
there was no comparison between the two broadcasts: 
Mr. MacDonald himself is a master of broadcasting .... Mr. 
Henderson, on the other hand, is about as bad a broadcaster as I 
have ever heard. He lacks that confidential tone which renders 
the words of Mr. MacDonald so conciliatory, so propitiatory, so 
entrancing. "What", one says when one listens to Mr. MacDonald, 
"a nice man! " And in saying so one is abundantly right. He is a 
nice man. And fortunately for 103 and the National Party his 
niceness burrs in his very voice. 
By common consent, however, the most powerful broadcast was 
Philip Snowden's whose skill 'lay in expressing extreme views iis 
way which made them sound the essence of reasonable moderation'. 
His description of the policies of his former colleagues as 
'Bolshevism run mad' made an enormous impact a 1d05 was generally 
considered to have influenced many of his listeners. 
The press agreed that the influence of broadcasting had been 
tremendous. The Week End Review stated that 
the efforts of thousands of organised political workers all over 
the country seemed insign Ö6 cant in effect compared with a dozen 
or so broadcast speeches. 
Similarly the Manchester Guardian editorialised that 
102. MacDonald papers, PRO 30/69/6/189, notes for broadcast, 24 
October 1931. 
103. The Spectator, 21 November 1931. 
104. C. Cross, Op. Cit., 318. 
105. Ibid, See also R. Bassett, Nineteen Thirty-ane, London 1958, 
321-323. 
106. The Week-End Review, 28 November 1931. 
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it is pretty generally agreed that this election was won at the 
fireside. 
1T e 
Wireless played a part it never did in any previous 
election. 
Finally, The Listener, having noted that party leaders were giving 
'careful thought and study to mastering the technique of effective 
electioneering at the microphone', concluded: 
we may soon expect a complete revolution inlOtghe art of guiding 
the citizen in the exercise of his franchise. 
The effect of the 1yi1 crisis on the development of political 
affairs broadcasting was to be far more serious than the General 
Strike. 1931 confirmed in the minds of Labour remnants the view that 
the ET was a naturally partisan organisation. It was a major factor 
in Labour's refusal, or extreme unwillingness for several years, to 
co-operate further in political broadcasting. Such suspicion and 
lasting resentment could only damage Reith's vision, so dependent as 
it was on preserving for the BBC an image of absolute purity. On the 
Conservative side as well, Lord Stonehaven notwithstanding, there was 
considerable suspicion of the BBC. Even during the election Reith was 
having to defend the Corporation from Conservative accusations, 
whilst Joseph Ball remained convinced that, 
a real case could be made out against the BBC by10aan intelligent 
examination of the-prograYrmes for some time past! 
The Labour Government years were therefore one of slow progress. The 
BBC was far from unfailingly accommodating of party demands and 
sought to reject party attempts to control political affairs output. 
Its own aspirations in this direction, however, were obstructed in 
107. The Manchester Guardian, 4 November 1931. 
108. The Listener, 21 October 1931,664. In the same editorial the 
Conservative use of cinema vans was also cited. 
109. Baldwin papers, Bal. 65/f203, Ball to Fry, 3 November 1931. 
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practice by party procrastination and pressure and by government 
influence. The Corporation's essentially respectful and less than 
bold approach was a necessary consequence of these external factors. 
But ironically it was also the inevitable product of Reith's hope 
that broadcasting would assume a central 'integrating' role in 
democratic government, a hope that had profound consequences for the 
BBC's 'responsible' attitude in its relations with the government of 
the day. The dangers of such an attitude were made clear in the 
crisis of 1931 when the BBC undoubtedly lapsed from the pedestal of 
political impartiality. That lapse was to have repercussions for 
years to come. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Broadcasting and Politics: Party Broadcasting 1931 - 1939. 
"I think it is unfortunate that there has been a tendency in recent 
years for the proportion of controversial broadcasts to decrease. I 
hope nobody has got cold feet! " , 
Herbert Morrison to Reith, 15 October 1937. 
"The Prime Minister must be guarded against a) putting his watch down 
right under the microphone; and b) using a chair with a bar across 
the bottom and scraping his feet backwards and forwards while he is 
talking. " 
S. J. de Lotbiniere (Director of Outside 
Broadcasts) on Baldwin, 15 April 1937. 
UNIVERSITY 
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Labour's anger at BBC policy during the 1931 crisis was 
considerable. The Labour Organiser complained of this 'gross misuse 
of its monopoly' by the BBC, which became 'virtually a Tory 
platform', whilst an article in the Labour Magazine declared that 
Cynical disregard of the principle of British fairplay by the 
party of the rich was never so clearly displayed as it was in the 
allotment of broadcasting facilities. 
l 
Arthur Henderson recognised that broadcasting had become 
perhaps the most effective medium of direct communication for 
political purposes, for it takes propaganda into the home circle 
in a more intimate way than does anything else. 
An 'emphatic protest' was made by the Labour Party NEC and the TUC 
General Council, and Beatrice Webb sunned up the feelings of much 
of the Movement when she wrote that 'the BBC has been collared by the 
defenders of capitalist enterprise'. 
By contrast the Conservative Party chairman, Lord Stonehaven, 
1. Editorial, The Labour Organiser, December 1931; R. B. Suthers, 
'Three Blind Mice - and Ananias, The Labour Magazine, vol. 10 
no. 7, November 1931,298-301. 
2. Arthur Henderson,, 'Labour's Army is Unconquered I, The Labour 
Magazine, vol. 10 no. 7, November 1931,291. 
3. Labour Party, National Executive Committee series (NEC), 10 
November 1931. Clement Attlee declared in the Commons that, 
admire the BBC as he did, the election had made him doubt its 
impartiality. This was part of a major speech about political 
broadcasting in which he described the BBC as, 'the most 
important instrument for the moulding of the national character 
and for the development of national life'. He did not wish to 
criticise the BBC lest it be driven into a cautious policy of 
'safety first'. Instead it should be an open forum for new 
ideas. - H. C. Debates, vol. 260: cols. 2312-2313,11 December 
1931. 
4. M. I. Cole (ed. ), Beatrice Webb's Diaries 1924-1932, London 
1956,297,4 January 1932. 
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thanked the BBC for 'enlightening 
5 
the electors. It certainly is a 
real safeguard for democracy'. Ignorant of 'The Week in 
Westminster' he urged Reith to provide such a programme: 
it is well worth while making a strong attempt to retain the 
undoubted influence exercised by the BBC on the electors during 
the Election by providing them with the kind of information about 
the doings of the Parliament that they 
6 
have elected, which they 
could not find in any organ of the press. 
With a National Government packed Commns he could be confident that 
such coverage would not be to its disadvantage. 
The Government was initially less well disposed, however, towards 
more formal political broadcasts. When in December Reith approached 
No. 10 about a possible series he was told that such a project was 
unwelcome. As the Chief Whip's Private Secretary, C. J. Harris, wrote: 
It was felt that there were so many sections amongst Government 
supporters who would claim representation that National 
Government unity would be endangered. 
The Government was concerned to present the country and National 
Government as united, both nationally and internationally, and Reith, 
still fully behind MacDonald and Baldwin, was sympathetic: 
I quite understood that some embarrassment might be created, and 
in general I8appreciated that in many respects it might be rather 
undesirable. 
5. BBC, PPBGEB, Stonehaven to Reith, 18 November 1931. 
6. BBC, PPBPR, Stonehaven to Reith, 30 November 1931. 
7. Prem. 1/127, C. J. Harris to N. Butler, 3, August, 1932. 
8. Prem. 1/127, Reith to C. P. Duff, 25 May 1932. 
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This readiness to accede to MacDonald's wishes, which represented, as 
Reith would have argued, the national interest, was made even more 
clear a few months later, when Reith repeated his proposal for such a 
series. He realised in any case that from a party point of view there 
was no other line he could take: 
As then, so now, we would not wish to embark upon anything which 
the Prime Minister did not regard with favour. Apart from this I 
imagined that if he were not favourable the Government Whips 
would not wish to co-operate with us in the matter, and of course 
such talks would have to be arranged through them. 
There was more, however, to Reith's informal and friendly contact 
with the Prime Minister than was immediately apparent. By developing 
such a relationship Reith was attempting to by-pass the Postmaster 
General, Kingsley Wood, whom he already disliked intensely, and also 
the party whips, whose effective control demeaned political 
broadcasting. He knew MacDonald to be well disposed towards him and, 
with parliament in recess and the Whips' Office virtually closed 
down, he sent the Prime Minister a proposal very different from 
anything previously agreed. This was for a series of single evening 
debates in which two political speakers, chosen by the BBC, debated 
issues also chosen by the Corporation. Each debate was to be 
trailered the previous week with an expert talk on the subject by 
such men as Keynes, Beveridge and Sir Arthur Salter. Subjects were to 
include tariffs, taxation, unemployment and the Means Test, India, 
disarmament and agricultural policy, with speakers ranging from 
Winston Churchill to James Maxton. There were seven Conservatives 
(two of the right), two Liberals and five Labour (one of the left), 
but no attempt had been made to have every shade of opinion 
represented in each debate. As Reith told Duff, MacDonald's Private 
Secretary: 
It is quite impossible to get a meeting of Party Whips 
9. Ibid. 
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together... if we wait until we have agreement among all the 
parties there is, on the one hand, what you wish to avoid, namely 
a National Government splitting up into all its component parts, 
and even then groups and individuals clamouring for 
representation as well, and on the other hand something that will 
be of very little interest to listeners, if, indeed, after much 10 
delay, anything happens at all. 
It was stressed that the BBC would take full responsibility for the 
debates; indeed it was clear that Reith had sent the proposals to the 
PM not for permission, but for information and his unofficial 
approval. In this way Reith hoped to strengthen the BBC's hand before 
the inevitable protests of party whips. He recognised, as did 
MacDonald, that a virtually partyless Prime Minister could take an 
unusually disinterested attitude to party wrangling. 
The BBC, however, had picked its moment badly. Indeed it is 
difficult to recognise any time during 1932 that might have been 
propitious. With the increasing likelihood of cabinet resignations 
the Government was extremely sensitive to any threat to its facade of 
unity. Moreover MacDonald was in Lossiemouth when Reith's letter 
arrived at No. 10, and so instructed Neville Butler, the duty private 
secretary, to send copies to Kingsley Wood and the Chief Whip. 
MacDonald himself was disposed to let the matter take its course, 
although not impressed with the proposed speakers, but Kingsley Wood 
raised objections. Having talked to the Phi, he visited the X1s 
chairman, J. H. Whitley, in order specifically to discourage him. 
His stated arguments were exactly those which Reith had foreseen - 
that each party would be incensed by the proplos3 als and that nothing 
could be decided until parliament reassembled. Whitley protested 
10. Prem. 1/127, Reith to C. P. Duff, 27 July 1932. 
11. Indeed National Labour was not even represented in any of the 
proposed debates. 
12. Prem. 1/127, Memorandum by H. G. Vincent, 5 August 1932. 
13. Prem. 1/127, Kingsley Wood to MacDonald, 10 August 1932. 
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at the delay, but there was by this stage little that he could do. 
Moreover these negotiations were running concurrently with one of the 
most notorious events in BBC inter-war history, the Hashagen affair, 
in which the Cabinet empowered Kingsley Wood to threaten to use 
Clause 4 (3) if 
14he 
Corporation did not cancel a talk by a former II- 
boat commander. Whitley believed that Kingsley Wood was in. a 
determined15mood, and was unwilling to exacerbate an already delicate 
situation. 
In Private Kingsley Wood's objections were closely bound up with 
a determination to preserve his own powers over the BBC. He had not 
missed Reith's ulterior motive in approaching the Prime Minister 
rather than the whips, and it is interesting that this led him to 
insist upon the independence of the BBC and upon the Government not 
assuming detailed responsibility for programmes: 
It is obvious that if the BBC adopted the practice of submitting 
their proposals in advance to the Prime Minister or the P the 
responsibility for the decision would rest with the Government of 
the day and not with the Corporation. If the Prime Minister of 
the day expressed approval apart from the PNM (even informally) 
it might affect the exercise of the powers of the PM referred to 
in clause 4 (3) of the Licence. It is important that this power 
should be fully maintained. 
14. See A. Briggs (1979), Op. Cit., 191-4, for details of this 
incident. See also pp. 537-8 below. 
15. Both Whitley and Reith, however, were outraged by this 
intervention of Kingsley Wood in the detailed discussion of the 
BBC's programmes. The BBC had sent its proposals to MacDonald 
quite informally: 'but for the PM thereupon to enter in and 
discuss the progranme detail by detail was an entire violation 
of the BBC's autonomy and was totally inconsistent with their 
having complete discretion and sole responsibility by their 
charter in regard to the organisation of their Service'. - Prem 
1/127, memorandun by C. P. Duff, 8 September 1932. They were not 
satisfied until assured that Kingsley Wood had been acting not 
as PM but on behalf of the PM, in his absence. 
16. Prem. 1/127, Kingsley Wood to MacDonald, 15 August 1932. 
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For example it could happen that developments in India might make a 
debate on that issue inadvisable. He felt that government freedom of 
action to veto such a debate would be limited if it had already given 
its approval. It was not for the Government, but for the parties, to 
advise the BBC on the acceptability of its proposals, and he 
therefore advised that Reith be referred back to the whips. 
MacDonald accepted Kingley Wood's main argument but was not 
impressed by his conclusion, which offered no answer to a seemingly 
insoluble problem. Already eight months had passed since Reith had 
first approached him, and the PMG's recommendation put the position 
back to where it was in 1930. The PLZ was conscious that the BBC was 
stymied by the necessity of obtaining party approval - in practice 
rather than as the result of the 1930 agreement - for party 
broadcasting, and that the jealousy of the whips and different party 
groups made progress impossible. Nearing the end of his political 
career MacDonald made an innovatory proposal which demonstrated that 
he still possessed the ability to see around a problem and to rise 
above the party strait-jacket. He suggested that an all-party 
. committee, not of whips but of men such as John Buchan and Clement 
Attlee, should be appointed to consider and agree any BBC proposals 
in regular consultation with Corporation representatives. His general 
attitude was constructive: 
I am coming generally more and more to the view that we should be 
a little more courageous about politics as a broadcast subject. 
It is quite impossible for us to carry out successfully 
responsibilities which really amount to sanctioning, or 
otherwise, of individual propositions, and that is really what 
the existing position is. .... Some of us might not care much 
about some of the things done, but on the whole it is far better 
to deal with these things in a way which is not too official. 
This proposal, which removed approval of party broadcasting from 
17. MacDonald papers, PRO 30/69/2/12, MacDonald to Kingsley Wood, 
18 August 1932. 
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the. whips to a less jealously party level, was 'excellent', as 
Kingsley Wood admitted. But the inept way in which it was 
implemented, and its unfortunate timing, were to ensure failure and 
turn the Parliamentary Advisory Committee (PAC) into a considerable 
hindrance rather than an aid to political affairs broadcasting. The 
Labour Party had not been consulted once throughout these 
negotiations and the Government Chief Whip had only occasionally been 
informed of developments. The motive for this had been a conscious 
desire to lift the discussions above mere party wrangling, but it was 
to have serious consequences. Surprisingly for a man thought of as a 
cold autocrat, Reith operated best at a personal level in 
negotiation, winning the respect of those he met and, it must be 
said, respecting the wishes and feelings of those he knew well more, 
perhaps, than those of people he did not know personally. That he had 
not yet met the new Labour leader, George Lansbury, may therefore 
have been of significance. But in any case he and Whitley had got 
into the dangerous habit of negotiating with the Prime Minister 
alone, and it was too easy to continue to do so. 
The first spanner in the works, however, was Sir Kingsley Wood's. 
Having sensibly suggested to MacDonald that - to escape party 
wrangling - it should be for the BBC to invite representatives to 
join the PAC, he added: 
I have no doubt they18would accept the names you might care 
informally to propose. 
MacDonald underlined this sentence and added a comment in the margin: 
'essential'. When, therefore, the Prime Minister and Chief Whip, 
David Margesson, saw Whitley on 14 September they were able to put 
forward not only the general proposal for an advisory committee, but 
also specific lames, including those of Liberal and Labour 
representatives. There was no suggestion, of course, that these 
18. Prem. 1/127, Kingsley Wood to MacDonald, 23 August 1932. 
19. Prem. 1/127, C. P. Duff to Kingsley Wood, 14 September 1932. 
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names were chosen in anything but good faith, but the fact that they 
were picked without0consulting either Liberal or Labour leaders was 
quite inexcusable. At this meeting the debates proposed back in 
July were also discussed in detail and some of them agreed. Again 
that such matters were considered by MacDonald, Margesson and Whitley 
without any reference to Labour was inevitably to lead to trouble. To 
add to the fault George Lansbury was not even informed when, acting 
on this meeting, the BBC invited Arthur Greenwood to broadcast in a 
debate on the leans Test, and Major James Milner to act as Labour's 
representative on the PAC. 
Lansbury was to come fresh to the whole issue of political 
broadcasting. Not having been involved in earlier negotiations, and 
convinced of the great power of wireless, he was prepared to go over 
old ground yet again. On hearing of Greenwood's invitation to 
broadcast he persuaded him to reject it, and protested to Whitley 
that party leaders should always be consulted about speaker and 
subject in party broadcasts. His argument was interesting in being 
the first to be based on the dangers of political agenda-setting by 
the BBC: 
the selection of the issue is a matter of vital importance. It 
would be quite possible to have a programme of discussions 
dealing with political questions .... without giving the 
Opposition the opportunity of bringing into relief the particular 
matters upon which. they think the general public should be, l 
enlightened. 
When series were approved in advance by the Prime Minister there was 
20. In his autobiography Reith stated that the PAC was established 
'After consultation with party chairmen and chief whips'. There 
is no evidence that Labour or Liberal chairmen or whips were 
consulted at all, and Lansbury's subsequent objections to the 
PAC make it clear that they were not - J. C. W. Reith (1949), 
Op. Cit., 172. 
21. Lansbury papers, Vol. 10/f277-9, draft letter (as sent) from 
La. nsbury to Whitley, 27 September 1932. 
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a lot of truth in this. 
The day after this letter was sent the Government. resignations of 
Snowden and Samuel over the Ottawa negotiations raised the scale of 
argument to an altogether higher level. Samuel requested an 
opportunity to broadcast the reasons for his resignation, and Reith 
willingly22agreed on the understanding that the Government would give 
a reply. After initial objections to the idea from MacDonald it 
was arranged that Snowden and Baldwin would broadcast on 30 September 
and Samuel and Simon on 1 October. Lansbury immediately demanded an 
Opposition broadcast, arguing that Labour policy on Ottawa was 
differen23 from that of either the Government or Samuel and 
Snowden. Whitley rejected his request - the broadcasts were about 
the resignations, not about the Ottawa Agreement; they followed 
parliamentary procedure and 24 so were purely a matter 
between 
Government and dissentients. Referring to Tonsbury's letter on 
the general question of political broadcasting, Whitley explained 
that the old system of consultation with whips and leaders had never 
worked, even when there were only three parties. Now, with many more, 
. 
it was impossible to carry on as before: 
We felt our listeners should hear political talks, and there were 
demands for such facilities. But, in order that such talks might 
be arranged, and after, as I have indicated, sad experience of 
other methods, we decided to take the matter more into our own 
hands, su2ject, however, to the advice of a Parliamentary 
Comnittee. 
5 
22. BBC, PPBMB, Samuel to Reith, 27 September 1932; Reith to 
Samuel, 28 September 1932. 
23. Lansbury papers, vol. 10/f261, Lansbury to Whitley, 29 
September 1932. 
24. BBC, PPBG, Whitley to Lansbury, 30 September 1932: 'I think it 
would have been definitely improper to have introduced other 
speakers on other issues, or even other speakers on the same 
issue'. 
25. Ibid. 
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Unfortunately Whitley concluded his letter with an ambiguous 
sentence in which he suggested that by now the majority of listeners 
could trust the BBC to be impartial, and that Lansbury should do so 
also, 'in view of the Corporation's greater knowledge of the 
suitability of subjects and speakers'. Lansbury completely misread 
the sense in which this was intended. In any case he denied that 
there were more than two parties now, the Government and the 
Opposition: 
I am astonished that the BBC should consider that it has a 
greater knowledge of the suitability of subjects and speakers 
than the Leaders of Parliamentary Parties. This is an 
extraordinary claim. It implies that the BBC controlling the 
greatest publicity service in the country is to judge what ought 
to be the political issues discussed and is further to select 
what politicians it pleases to represent organised political 
opinion .... I cannot share your view that listeners can trust 
the BBC to hold the balance fairly. Millions of Labour men and 
women bitterly resent the unfair manner in which at the last 
General Electi 
26 
and ever since the scales have been weighted 
against Labour. 
At Lansbury's request an emergency 
Party Annual Conference, which was 
carried unanimously protesting again 
the Opposition from the resignation 
and equitable 7 
treatment on 
broadcasting'. 
debate was held at the Labour 
then meeting, and a resolution 
st 'the deliberate exclusion' of 
broadcasts, and demanding 'just 
all matters of political 
Lansbury was particularly anxious to broadcast on the 
resignations in order that he might represent them to be the break up 
of the National Government. When, therefore, the BBC offered him a 
26. BBC, PPBG, Lansbury to Whitley, 2 October 1932. 
27. Labour Party Annual Conference Report, Conference minutes 1932, 
227. See also Raymond Postgate's scathing comments on this incident in Time and Tide, 8 October 1932,1087. 
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place in a debate on Ottawa to take place later in the month, he 
refuse28it as unsatisfactory and asked for a meeting with Whitley and 
R. eith. Although tensions were somewhat eased by this meeting, 
which Attlee also attended, the Labour Party was by now becoming 
entrenched in matters of principle. li nsbury and Attlee agreed that 
Greenwood might debate on the Means Test and Stafford Cripps on 
Ottawa, but at a Labour Party Policy Sub-Committee meeting it was 
resolved as a general rule that every Government political broadcast 
should be followed by one from the Opposition. It was also decided to 
reject the idea of an unofficiaal advisory committee approving 
unofficial -patty broadcasts. The Party was determined to 
control its own broadcast statements of policy; Cripps agreed to 
confer with the party Executive as to what he should say in his 
broadcast, and a small NEC sub-committee was appointed to consider 
Greenwood's broadcast statement on the Means Test. Lansbury told a 
National Joint Council meeting that his policy was to ensure that the 
political views of the Party should only be broadcast by official 30 
party representatives. 
All the Labour Party's suspicion and resentment of the BBC was by 
now apparent and Iansbury took the opportunity of these negotiations 
to complain about news bias. He raised again the issue of the press 
agencies: 
we shall never get a square deal with the other parties simply 
because the sources from which you get your summaries are under 
the control of newspaper proprietors who, in the political sense, 
only exist to support our opponents. 
28. BBC, PPBG, Whitley to Lansbury, 4 October 1932. 
29. Labour Party, NEC Policy Ca mittee minutes, 12 October 1932; 
BBC, PPBG, Lansbury to Whitley, 18 October 1932. 
30. Labour Party, National Joint Council minutes (NJC), 25 October 
1932; NEC, Minutes, 26 October 1932. 
31. Lansbury papers, vol. 10/f283, Lansbury to Reith, 20 October 
1932. 
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The TUC had already protested earlier in the year about 
misrepresentation of the General Strike in the BBC's ten year 
retrospect (1922 - 1932) prograrme, and the NJC now felt that 
arrangemen3s should be made for the Party to monitor all news 
bulletins. Writing in the Labour Magazine Lansbury complained of 
biased broadcasting before, during and since the election. He 
objected not only to the BBC's news sources but also to the news- 
readers: 
The inflection of the announcer's voice, the emphasis of certain 
words which newspaper men know so well how to use when putting a 
tendentious statement in their papers, all seem to me to show 
that those who control the BBC consider it their duty to support 
whatever Government is in power. I think that this is more 
obviously so when Governments which are not Labour Governments 33 
are in office. 
He protested at the idea of the BBC choosing either subjects or 
speakers for party debates and broadcasts, argued for absolute 
equality between Government and Labour speakers in everything and 
urged that Trade Union representatives should broadcast on all 
industrial disputes. Having expressed his determination that the BBC 
must be made directly responsible to parliament for its programmes, 
he produced the one argument that could not be specifically 
controverted: 
we cannot afford to allow one or two officials to decide what the 
public shall be allowed to hear .... I do not accuse the BBC of 
direct personal prejudice ... It is their judgement I call in 
question .... they are not supermen.... 
32. Labour Party, NJC minutes, 25 October 1932. There is no record- 
of any action having been taken on this decision. 
33. The Labour Magazine, November 1931,293-295. 
34. Ibid. 
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The BBC was by now determined to take a strong line. Already a 
year had passed since the last party broadcasts, those being the 
General Election series. Far from the delay being due to excessive 
BBC caution it was the direct consequence of protracted negotiations 
resulting from the BBC's attempt to break free from party control. 
That it had to undertake such negotiations was as much a case of 
practical politics as respect for the parties, for without party 
approval there would be no party representatives to broadcast in BBC 
arranged programmes. With Lansbury threatening to change the BBC's 
constitutional position, it had not yet reached the position where it 
could disregard party feelings completely by ignoring the refusal of 
one party to broadcast. In other words it was still at the stage 
where impartiality meant and had to mean equality of broadcasts (or 
an agreed ratio) rather35 han equality of opportunity to broadcast, 
whether accepted or not. 
Nevertheless Whitley and Reith were determined to deny Tansbu2y's 
accusations and assert BBC freedom insofar as they could. The Board 
restated once again the essential need for political independence: 
You have contended that official machinery should be used and 
that subjects and speakers alike should be nominated by the 
Parties. It is vital that the Corporation should be freed from 
any suggestion of interference, either by the Government or the 
Opposition, in the discharge of its responsibilities and, this 
being so, the Corporation became convinced that the official 
procedure advocated by you was unsuitable, and that the ultimate 
responsibility for determining what subjects can best be dealt 
with an3dý when and by whom must be taken by the Corporation 
itself. 
It was also stressed that, in the six debates already arranged, the 
35. The effective veto given to both major parties by the need to 
balance output was only finally removed in 1954. See the 
author's letter in The Listener, 27 November 1980,725. 
36. BBC, PPBG, BBC to La. nsbury, 14 November 1932. 
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opposition parties received equal representation with the Government, 
all but one opposition speaker now being Labour. They were therefore 
receiving preferential treatment out of all proportion to *their 
strength in the Comnons. 
These were views which the National Joint Council could not 
accept: 
It holds that the choice of subjects by the BBC without prior 
consultation with the Leaders of the political parties places in 
the hands of the Corporation the power to determine the electoral 
issues on which the public are to be invited to make up their 
minds. Such a power is one which no medium for disseminating news 
and opinions ought to enjoy. 
An NJC broadcasting sub-committee was set up and Milner wrote to 
Reith that he could not accept his invitation to join the PAC in view 
of these fundainental disagreements. Only the debates series went 
ahead, and even here everything was not settled, for at the last 
minute R. S. Hudson withdrew from the Means Test progranme because he 
felt that as a minister he should not take part. Clearly he was 
anxious not to lend any authority to such a public questioning of 
government policy. In addition it was decided not to proceed with 
the debate on India, the time not being suitable. 
Matters had clearly reached a stalemate. By refusing to 
relinquish control Lansbury had effectively barred greater BBC 
independence. He had also greatly decreased any value the PAC might 
have had, and ensured that the issue of agenda-setting would remain 
highly relevant, for only when political affairs coverage was 
unlimited would it cease to be so. As the Morning Post declared: 
37. BBC, PPBG, NJC to Whitley, 22 November 1932. 
38. BBC, PPBPAP, Milner to Reith, 6 December 1932. 
39. BBC, PPBG, Reith to Lansbury, 25 November 1932. 
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There can be no half-way house on this road. The choice is 40 
between all the way, and no part of the way. 
Yet it was undeniable that there was some point to many of Labour's 
objections. In the. case of the resignation broadcasts there was doubt 
as to whether the BBC had followed parliamentary procedure as it 
claimed. Even if it had, it might have been queried whether this was 
the correct line for an independent news organisation to take. As the 
NJC argued, 
the reconstruction of a Government arising out of differences 
between Ministers on questions of high policy raises issues of 
national importance on which the Official Opposition has a 41 
legitimate claim to express its views. 
Equally there was point in Labour's corrments on the BBC's news 
sources, as well as in its suggestion that ministerial broadcasts 
gave publicity and extra kudos to the Government by advertising its 
achievements. La. nsbury had also made the pertinent observation that 
the majority of the BBC's 'experts' - academics, economists, ex- 
editors of The Times - were eminently safe and 'trustworthy' people. 
Charles Siepmann, now Director of Talks, admitted to Reith, after a 
conversation with Stafford Cripps, that 'there is at least an element 42 
of justice in his objections on some counts'. 
Siepmann was disillusioned by the lack of progress. His 
40. Morning Post, 24 February 1933. The Morning Post favoured the 
latter choice. 
41. BBC, PPBG, NJC to Whitley, 22 November 1932. The Manchester 
Guardian, 3 October 1932, declared in an editorial that, the 
split in the Government has been conceived [by the BBC] purely 
as an internal matter, a domestic incident in the Government's 
life; from which it follows that only those are entitled to be 
heard who were members of the Government and would have wished 
it to continue unimpaired, if that had been possible. From the 
Government's angle of vision, that is a natural and not 
improper view. But is it the proper view for the B. B. C.? ' 
42. BBC, PPBG, Siepi nn to Reith, 23 February 1933. 
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conclusion was that whilst the BBC should continue to deal with 
political affairs, more and more speakers should bee3 drawn from 
outside the Cans so as to avoid party conflict. Labour's 
conclusions were rather different and in the private member's debate 
on broadcasting, in February 1933, it proposed an amendment to the 
motion - which complimented the BBC - calling for a Select Committee 
to review the Corporation's work. Labour speakers in this debate 
raised all the issues discussed privately with the BBC, but it was 
Sir Stafford Cripps who put his finger on the fundamental problem of 
limited political affairs broadcasting. The mover of the motion, 
Mr. C. E. G. Emott, had stated that there should be no limitations on 
what was broadcast save for that which undermined the State. Cripps 
cogently pointed out that views differed as to which issues such a 
restriction might apply. Eamott had approved of Churchill 
broadcasting on India but rejected a debate on pacifism as seditious. 
Cripps commented that many people would take an exactly contrary view 44 
as to which of these broadcasts was dangerous. 
Cripps' speech, however, also revealed one of the underlying and 
questionable assumptions to Labour's argument about agenda-setting - 
that politicians had, a-priori, a greater right to define political 
issues than had the media. Political issues, he argued, should be 
selected by the House of Coamons and not at Broadcasting House: 
if matters for debate over the broadcast are selected by the 
British Broadcasting Corporation there is a danger that they may 
create issues which, perfectly justly, they may think are the 
major political issues at the momentý, 5 
but in regard to which 
Members of this House would not agree. 
This was an attitude which the BBC, with its respect for 
parliamentary and political authority, undoubtedly recognised and in 
43. Ibid. 
44. H. C. Debates, vol. 274: col. 1824,22 February 1933. 
45. Ibid., col. 1829. 
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large measure accepted, yet which conflicted with its own notion of 
political and programme independence, to its general confusion. 
This, the first full debate on broadcasting since Crawford, 
demonstrated just how far the BBC had come in ten years. Although a 
Private Members debate, it was dominated by front-benchers and senior 
statesmen. To a man the speakers acknowledged the enormous power of 
radio and, almost without exception, they concentrated on political 
affairs broadcasting as the major issue. Kingsley Wood might have 
been paraphrasing Reith when he asked: 
Might not broadcasting net the real needs of the vast electorate 
and supply from all points of view and angles that presentment of 
issues and of policies which will usefully mould public opinion 
and help us to determine wisely the issues of our time. 
Lansbury, for his part, called the BBC's power of agenda-setting 'the 
greatest power' in the world', whilst John Buchan, in an excellent 
speech, encouraged the widest freedom of broadcast opinion, including 
co®unist: 
If we do not have controversy, we may be in danger of seeing 
manufactured throughout the land the terrible product which has 
been called "the broadcast mind", a mind dominated by a shallow 
uplift and a thin complacent scepticism; a mind surfeited with 
half-truths; 
4a 
mind that is incapable of grappling seriously with 
any problem. 
What Buchan did not consider was the danger that the beneficial 
effect of controversy might be offset by selective listening. 
48 
46. Ibid., cols. 1836 - 1837. 
47. Ibid., col. 1845; col. 1850. 
48. Churchill similarly gave a powerful speech in which he 
described political broadcasting as 'one of the greatest issues 
that Parliament can possibly have to deal with'. He, like 
435 
Kingsley Wood's speech was interesting in other respects. Like 
Emmtt he attempted to define the limitations upon political affairs 
broadcasting, and his conclusions were somewhat broader. Freedom did 
not mean a licence for subversive doctrines or propaganda against the 
functions of good government, but a reasonable liberty for the 
expression of free opinion and thought. Minorities and eminent 
individuals should have their say, but due regard should always be 
paid to the international situation. The criterion for a political. 
affairs broadcast should be 'whether it is a timely and useful 
contribution to the councils of the nation', and to back up this 
assertion he quoted that day's leader in the Manchester Guardian: 
At times the broadcasting authorities may unavoidably have to 
conclude that the ill-feeling a discussion of some issues might 
create would outweigh the good that discussion might do. 
These were clear counsels of caution for the BBC. 
Not the least interesting aspect of the R . 13's speech was that, in 
defending the PAC, he misleadingly - and certainly consciously so - 
gave the quite false impression that no-one, not even the Prime 
Minister, had been consulted by the BBC before it appointed the 
Committee. It was for 5t Öe 
BBC to choose who it wished to sit on its 
committees, he argued. The Labour Party of course disagreed and 
the Commons debate produced no effective result, despite the 
universal call for greater controversy. Indeed, when the NJC Sub- 
Committee on broadcasting reported in June its conclusions were 
counsels of perfection. Absolute equality should be given to all 
conflicting schools of thought; the Official Opposition (Labour) 
should enjoy equality of treatment with the Government in all 
Reith, saw broadcasting as the solution to democratic ills, for 
'The world is losing faith in this democracy'. - H. C. Debates, 
vol. 274: cols. 1855-1860. 
49. H. C. Debates, vol. 274: col. 1836,22 February 1933. 
50. Ibid., col. 1841. 
436 
broadcasts, including ministerials; this equality of opportunity 
should be extended to the Trade Union movement, whilst 
reasonable provision should be made for responsible working class 
organisations to initiate broadcast discussion, when, in their 
view, matters of importance need to be ventilated. 
These were proposals which the BBC could not accept. Reith and 
Whitley rejected the idea that all ministerial broadcasts should give 
a right of reply; they also knew that the Government would not accept 
Labour equality in party broadcasts. At a meeting of BBC and NJC 
representatives Whitley justified BBC practice by referring to the 
fact that all governments had been treated identically in the 
broadcasting of ministerial statements, including the budget talk and 
the Pty's speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet. BBC practice rested on 
its view that the government of the day had a national responsibility 
apart from any party one. On certain occasions, therefore, the 
Corporation judged a minister to be speaking as a representative of 
the nation. This was an argument which the Labour delegation did not 
recognise, and they also rejected the view that, if all shades of 
opinion received equal representation in party broadcasts, it would 
matte52 that the Government received perhaps only 20 percent. of the 
time. 
Such disagreement appeared insuperable, yet already the Talks 
Department had been producing proposals of its own for a series of 
ten single talk political broadcasts by party and non-party 
representatives, to be called 'The Debate Continues'. The previous 
debates series had been a failure for the two reasons that 
front rank politicians will seldom commit themselves to a debate 
on the microphone; and that ar 5a3nged studio debates are nearly 
always boring and platitudinous. 
51. Labour Party, NJC, Memorandum No. 39, June 1933. 
52. BBC, PPBG, Notes of meeting of NJC and BBC representatives, 11 July 1933. 
53. BBC, PPBPPB, L. Fielden to Siepma. nn, 20 June 1933 
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Fielden proposed this series to be effectively 'a vote of censure' on 
the Government, but which gave it a reply to every opposition critic, 
the latter to include such people as Churchill and Lord Cecil. When, 
however, this was referred to the PAC (which lacked a Labour 
representive but had a Liberal one) it reconmended a ratio of 5: 3: 1, 
omitting independent politicians such as Churchill and inclining 
slightly more favourably to the Government. The single broadcast was 
one for Samuel's group, which had resigned from the Government but, 
had not crossed the floor of the House. Inevitable complaints were 
duly received from the Government Chief Whip, Margesson, that this 
was effectively a ratio of 5: 4, and from Labour that it was 6: 3. 
Reith, however, stood by the PAC's proposal, despite Lansbury's 
continued demand for absolute equality between the Government and 54 
Official Opposition, although not now for other political groups. 
The Labour Party was torn between standing up for its principles 
and accepting defeat in order to obtain the broadcast opportunities 
it desperately desired. But faced with Reith's obduracy the need 
proved greater than the wish, and under strong protest it nominated 
Iansbury, Greenwood and Cripps to broadcast on 'The futility of the 
"National" Government', 'Immediate steps 5owards reconstruction' and 
'The ultimate aims of the Labour Party'. In the Supply Committee 
debate on the Post Office a few days later Attlee and Lansbury took 
the opportunity to protest at excessive government broadcasts, and 
made much suggestive play on Clause 4 of the Licence. In Labour 
Harold Laski, La. nsbury, Greenwood and others all rejected the view 
that the BBC was discharging its duty towards democracy, whilst at 
the Annual Party Conference a resolution called for the broadcasting 
of conference proceedings. Another delegate suggested that the 
Movement hire air-time on foreign stations to broadcast to 
54. BBC, PPBPPB, Reith to D. Margesson, 30 June 1933; BBC, PPBG, 
Lansbury to Reith, 10 July 1933. 
55. BBC, PPBG, NJC to Reith, 18 July 1933. 
56. H. C. Debates, vol. 280: cols. 2262 - 4,2298 - 2300,24 July 
1933. 
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Britain. Both these rather wild proposals were rejected by 
Lansbury, who felt that only further negotiation with the BBC would 
produce results. Indeed his comparatively moderate tone in debate 
reflected the Labour leadership's gradual acceptance that something 
was better than nothing. In an article in the Daily Herald in 
November Attlee, whilst still claiming equality for the Official 
Opposition, effectiv5egly ditched the claims of minority parties to 
have equal air-time. 
Yet Labour was not the only body to have sacrificed its 
principles. The BBC had also done so, conceding choice of subject to 
the parties and, as a result of the PAC recommendation, excluding 
non-party speakers. Churchill was omitted for the practical reason 
that it was intended to have a series on India in the New Year and 
that he would therefore have broadcast twice on the same subject. In 
the event, however, the Indian series was postponed and Churchill 
unintentionally kept from broadcasting until early 1935. The BBC had 
also reluctantly allowed the parties to choose their own 
broadcasters, although it attempted to suggest to Labour that the NJC 
nominate six names from which the BBC would choose the three to 59 
broadcast. As broadcast, this first truly party political series 
was a foretaste of things to come. Reith admitted that it was not a 
success and told the Board that 
the political series is unique in not having elicited one single 
57. Labour, October 1933,44. George Bernard Shaw, perverse as 
ever, denied that the BBC had any duty to democracy; Labour 
Party Annual Conference Report 1933, Conference minutes, 146 
and 234. 
58. Daily Herald, 14 November 1933. In this article he also 
declared that, 'the duty of the BBC is not to lull to sleep the 
minds of its listeners, but to excite them to individual 
judgement, to bring them face to face'with realities so as to 
be fit to play their part in an epoch of rapid change. ' 
59. Labour Party, NJC, Broadcasting Sub-Committee, 18 July 1933. 
The N. J. C. rejected this idea. 
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letter of any kind from listeners. 
Lack of audience interest was and had to be a major consideration 
of the BBC's in arranging party broadcasts. Political broadcasting 
would only become interesting when the parties relinquished control 
of the presentation of party policy. While they continued to refuse 
to do so there was no evidence that the audience wanted more, direct, 
party politics. The Listener was driven to reply, to American. 
accusations of caution, that the air-space available and the known 
preference of listeners were the real limitations on broadcast 
controversy: 
If political and other controversy in Great Britain seems mild by 
foreign standards, the explanation must be sought, not in any 
supposed bureaucratic tendencies of the broadcasting organisation 
or Governmental interference, but in the natural reserve and 
moderation which is characteristic of the British people. 
An interesting interpretation of the lack of party broadcasting, and 
one with which Reith would not have agreed, was put by Richard 
Crossman in The Spectator: 
it is probably still true in England that most people's interests 
are largely unpolitical. The BBC has rightly recognised this 
fact. It is not its job to make the public politically minded but 
to find out what its, interests are and foster them .... It is the 
task of the political parties, not of the BBC to awaken the 
nation to specifically political problems. 
The one lasting success of 1934 was to be the arranging of the 
60. BBC, PI, Reith to A. Dawnay, 28 June 1934; BBC, BGP, Director 
General's report for Board meeting, 17 January 1934. 
61. The Listener, 31 January 1934. 
62. R. H. S. Crossman, 'Talks for the ordinary man', The Spectator, 
28 June 1935. 
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first series of party broadcasts on the budget, and here it may be 
that I. nsbury's arguments proved influential. Reith had for many 
years now been trying to alter the Chancellor's one impartial 
statement into a series of controversial talks, but had been rejected 
in turn by Churchill, Snowden and now Neville Chamberlain. 
Chamberlain fully recognised the value of his single statement, but 
the BBC was increasingly aware that these63talks had acquired 'a 
certain tendentiousness in presentation'. In 1933, therefore,. 
Reith wrote to Chamberlain and Lansbury proposing the replacement of 
the impartial broadcast by two controversial talks. Lansbury 
immediately agreed, but Chamberlain rejected the idea - these were 
difficult and critical times, not suited to a controversial debate 
before an audience uninstructed in the complexities of the financial 
position. The Chancellor would be placed at a great disadvantage to 
his debating opponent, who did not have the responsibilities of 
office. Thus Chamberlain effectively vetoed a proposal which the 
BBC had proposed and to which the Opposition had agreed. Lansbury was 
understandably annoyed and queried whether it was right that one side 
could deny access to the microphone to another in this way: 
The Chancellor refused to make any statement on the Budget, and 
we were refused the right to make any statement. I think this is 
a dog-in-the-manger policy. They will not play themselves and 
they will not let anybody else play. 
63. BBC, PPBB, Siepmann to PAC members, 27 March 1933. Following 
the 1932 budget broadcast Neville Chamberlain told his sister 
Hilda that 'The broadcast seers to have gone very well and I 
have heard from many quarters, including Snowden who is I think 
a good judge, that it was just what was wanted. I am very glad 
as I attach much importance to it and it was constructed at 
short notice and in great pain'. Chamberlain was suffering from 
lumbago - Chamberlain papers, NC18/1/779, Neville to Hilda 
Chamberlain, 23 April 1932. 
64. BBC, PPBB, Reith to Lansbury and N. Chamberlain, 24 - 25 April 
1933. 
65. BBC, PPBB, J. D. B. Fergusson to Reith, 27 April 1933. 
66. H. C. Debates, vol. 280: col. 2299,24 July 1933. 
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There was much truth in this complaint, and when in 1934 the BBC 
again approached the Treasury it stressed that iGt7 was 'essential' 
that opinions on the budget were broadcast. The Treasury, 
however, were again completely opposed to the idea, and in a 
memorandum by J. D. B. Fergusson their objections were fully set out. It 
was pointed out that an opponent could easily produce imaginary and 
more popular alternatives to almost any budget, particularly a hard 
one. The Chancellor's task in persuading parliament to accept it, 
would become much more difficult if the Opposition had had the 
opportunity to whip up popular feeling. Once more the comment was 
made that in any wireless debate a minister was at a disadvantage 
compared with an opponent unburdened by responsibility. 
The most interesting argument, however, was one which was to 
become a cause celebre after the Second World War - the question of 
whether it was constitutionally right for a wireless debate on a 
subject to take place before the issue had been debated and decided 
on in parliament. It was an argument which essentially denied a 
legitimate role for public opinion and public pressure between 
elections: 
The whole system of representative institutions under which 
questions of policy are debated and decided by elected 
representatives in the House of Commons is jeopardised if it 
becomes more important to defend a policy directly to the BBC's 
audience than to justify it to Parliament. It seems indeed to me 
very doubtful whether it is desirable in the public interest or 
wise in the interests of good relations between the BBC and 
Parliament that there should be debates on the wireless on 
matters which are still under discussion in the form of 
Resolutions or Bills in Parliament. It means an appeal to 
virtually the whole electorate over the hhga. ds of Parliament on 
matters still to be decided by Parliament. 
67. BBC, PPBB, Siepmann to Sir Warren Fisher, 26 March 1934. 
68. Prem. 1/146, undated memorandum signed 'D. F. ', c. 26 march 1934. 
J. D. B. Fergusson did not use his first name. 
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That this argument could be applied to the BBC and not to the press 
6r public platforms was a recognition not only of the greater 
audience and believed power of broadcasting, but also of the very 
different relationship of BBC and state compared with that of press 
and state. Whereas the press was conceived of not merely as a channel 
for pressure group politics but as several pressure groups in itself, 
the BBC was not seen in this role at all. Educative and enlightening 
as it might be for public opinion, its role was to inform, not to. 
incite its audience to immediate action. Although, as we shall see, 
the BBC did broadcast talks and debates on matters actively before 
parliament, not even Reith yet saw it as a medium which would play an 
active role in pressure group politics. Political education was a 
dein cratic ideal in itself, and had as its raison d'etre an informed 
electorate. That on specific issues the BBC might play a more 
immediate part in actual policy making between elections, through the 
forming of public opinion, was only vaguely recognised, except by 
those such as Churchill who wished so to use it. 
Indeed the whole concept of public opinion as a major and 
conscious factor in the production of party policy was relatively 
recent. For sound, politic reasons Reith would have denied for. the 
BBC a role in pressure group politics, other than as a provider of 
news. By the 1930s politicians, parliament and the state, having 
awoken to the fact of broadcasting, had also taken on board received 
wisdom as to the enormity of its powers and influence. Reith later 
mentioned a comment about the BBC by a foreign envoy: 
I can understand politicians disliking you 6nd 
being afraid of 
you. You are too near a possible alternative. 
Yet the Corporation did not wish to give this impression, as the 
Radio Times declared in May 1934: 
Amongst the many suspicions that broadcasting has aroused during 
69. J. C. W. Reith (1949), Op . Cit., 309. 
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its short and startling career, none has been graver than the 
suspicion that it might attempt to replace Parliament in the 
exposition of political views and the moulding of political 
opinion amongst the public; a suspicion for 
0 which 
the history of 
British broadcasting has given no grounds. 
Given the climate of opinion about the power of broadcasting and the 
psychology of the mass; given party convictions of BBC bias in both, 
directions; given also the unavoidable example of the pressure 
politics of the popular press; given finally the role for which Reith 
did see broadcasting, and his determination to produce a medium 
fundamentally new and different, it would have been counter- 
productive at that time to have emphasised the 1 
BBC's potential as an 
active influence in current political issues. 
Yet, despite Reith's desire not to get involved in pressure 
politics, it was evident that he could not accept the conclusions of 
the Treasury- memorandum, which had been shown to him with 
Chamberlain's approval. He hastened to assure the Chancellor that a 
broadcast budget debate had never been intended. Taking his cue from 
a compromise proposal by MacDonald, he suggested firstly that a third 
talk by an independent economist broadly sympathetic to the 
Government should follow the Opposition's, and finally that a series 
of three talks by Labour, Samuellite Liberals and Government should 
follow Chamberlain's expository talk, thereby giving the Government 
two broadcasts and the final word. 
With the intervention and support of the Prime Minister for this 
70. Editorial, Radio Times, 25 May 1934. 
71. After the Second World War the infamous '14 day rule' was 
adopted as a Imre formal restraint upon the BBC's ability to 
deal with issues currently before Parliament. See A. Briggs, 
History of Broadcasting Vol . 1V, London 1979,605-612,632-633. 
This was initially a voluntary restriction, but was formalised 
in 1955. It was removed in 1957. 
72. BBC, PPBB, Reith to N. Chamberlain, 9 April 1934. 
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proposal Chamberlain accepted the idea, perhaps in part because the 
previous year's argument had resulted in no broadcast of any kind, 73 
not even his traditional 'impartial' one. In particular the 
agreed scheme saved the Chancellor's dignity by separating his talk 
from the subsequent debate, and ensured that he did not lend his 
authority to or become compromised in such a discussion. Chamberlain 
called the arrangement 'very satisfactory' and said that it did not 
matter at all that others would be debating the budget after his. 
talk. It was clear that the objections had been primarily from 
the Treasury and that Chamberlain recognised the terms of its 
Memorandum to be unacceptable to the BBC. As a politician he knew 
communication to be sometimes more valuable than silence, and he took 75 
great pains over his broadcasts as Chancellor. The subsequent 
budge7t6 broadcasts of 1934 were to set the pattern for all until 
1939. 
The BBC were therefore successful in finally arranging 
controversial discussions on the budget against Treasury opposition. 
But on the question of India, although its struggles were equally 
prolonged, the outcome was more in line with the arguments of 
Fergusson's memorandum. Coverage of the Indian question since the 
series of twelve talks in April and June 1931 had been slight and 
mostly favourable to the Government. The opening speeches of the 
Round Table Conference sessions in 1930 and 1931 had been broadcast 
and MacDonald had given a resume of the results of the first session. 
In December 1931 Reith admitted to Duff that the BBC had 'rather kept 
off India for obvious reasons', but suggested either a talk by 
73. BBC, PPBB, Note by A. Dawnay, 12 April 1934; Reith to MacDonald 
19 April 1934. 
74. BBC, PPBB, Neville Chamberlain to Kingsley Wood, 7 April 1934. 
75. Chamberlain papers NC18/1/267, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 21 
April 1934; NC18/1/913, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 21 April 
1935; NC18/1/957, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 19 April 1936. 
See also Note A at end of chapter, p. 483. 
76. The speakers in 1934 were Chamberlain, Attlee, Samuel and J. H. 
Thomas, the Chancellor speaking for 20 minutes, a supposedly 
expository talk, and the others for ten minutes each. 
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MacDonald? or a series of talks following the end of the second 
session. The proposal was referred by No. 10 to the India Office, 
with predictable results: the Secretary of State for India, Sir 
Samuel Hoare, was amenable to a single Government broadcast and 
offered to give it himself, but 
As regards an extended programme, the Secretary of State is not 
very keen about a series of talks by unofficial spokesmen.. 
Controversial and partisan talks would do more harm than good and 
it is difficult to avoid them. He suggests that if the BBC want 
to pursue the idea they should put up a progranm for our 
consideration. They might be advised to exclude fron this 
programme, as far as possible, champions of particular points of 78 
view and choose well informed but unbiased experts. 
In view of Hoare's objections, but anxious to have something, 
Reith asked him to broadcast an explanatory and impartial survey of 
developments since the last Round Table Conference session: 
it would be a real service to people who cull thei 9ideas on the 
Indian situation superficially from press comnents. 
In addition Sir Claude Hill, ex Indian civil servant, gave a personal 80 
view of the current situation. 
Following the second. adjournment of the Conference, however, the 
talk Hoare gave was anything but impartial. Siepma. nn called it 'a 
very tendentious talk of a rather tub-thumping nature' , whilst 
Whitley felt constrained to inform Hoare of BBC policy with regard to 
77. Pren. 1/145, Reith to C. P. Duff, 1 December 1931. 
78. Pren. 1/145, W. D. Croft to C. P. Duff, 9 December 1931. 
79. BBC, PISH, Reith to S. Hoare, 11 January 1932. 
80. The Listener, 30 December 1931. 
81. BBC, PISH, Siepmann to Reith, 27 January 1932. 
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ministerial broadcasts and to complain that his 'polemical' statement 
had caused great trouble 82 r 
the BBC; its 'useful and urgent purpose' 
had been 'unfulfilled'. Hoare rather brazenly replied that his 
talk could not have been partisan as there were not two views on the 
matter - he had expressed the opinion of the vast majority. 
Brazen it may have been, but it did at least raise the interesting 
question of when the 'vast majority' became a unani ms body and when 
a minority could be ignored. 
Despite this disagreement Reith allowed Hoare to broadcast again 
at the conclusion of the Round Table Conference third session in 
December, this time without repercussions. 
appreciative of the opportunity and told Reith tha- 
like a broadcast talk for bringing things home 
The Conference having ended, the BBC now felt able 
talks without risk of affecting negotiations. 
Hoare was very 
t 'there is nothin 81 
to the people'. 
to propose further 
Nevertheless its 
proposals were strictly sympathetic to the smooth running of 
Government policy. Reith proposed a series of three factual talks 
describing the Government White Paper which was being presented in 
March 1933, together with the constitutional issues it was attempting 
to resolve. The India Office could not object to such a proposal and 
even recommended that the talks be given not by a member of 
government but by an official of the Indian Civil Service, Sir John 
Thompson. Thompson was, of course, completely in tune with government 
policy and there was some reason for Attlee's comment that 
it is impossible for such talks owing to the selection and 
arrangement of fags and the emphasis given to them, to be other 
than tendentious. 
82. BBC, PISH, Whitley to Hoare, 12 February 1932. 
83. BBC, PISH, Hoare to Whitley, 18 February 1932. 
84. BBC, PISH, Hoare to Reith, 30 December 1932. 
85. H. C. Debates, vol. 276, col. 6,20 March 1933. See also 
Churchill's comment that, 'No statement is so tendencious as a 
one-sided statement of facts. The selection of the facts, the 
marshalling of the facts, the emphasis placed upon them, are 
all causes of controversy. ' - BBC, PIWSC, Churchill's Private 
Secretary to Reith, 6 March 1933. 
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BBC policy was, however, on the face of it, reasonable -a 
straightforward explanation of government proposals to be followed, 
at the time of the parliamentary debate on the issue, by a series of 
controversial talks by representatives of various opinions. But where 
it fell down was in its implementation. Firstly, instead of having a 
news summary of the White Paper, the BBC's innate respect for the. 
'expert' ledd6it to use a speaker sympathetic to the proposals he was 
describing. There was clearly still a confusion within the. 
Corporation as to the need to differentiate by manner of presentation 
between Acts which had already become law, and had therefore passed 
out of the realm of immediate controversy, and White Papers and Bills 
which had still to come before the House. Secondly it was unfortunate 
that a considerable period of time was to elapse between the 
descriptive talks and the controversial series. The reason for this 
was that the Bill was not due to come before the House until early in 
1934, when the Joint Select Committee on India had reported, whilst 
Reith was conscious of 'the desirability of having the different 
points of vie given closely in advance of the Parliamentary 87 
discussions'. According to Whitley the PAC was also unanimously 
of the opinion that a controversial debate should not occur while the 
Joint Select Committee was deliberating, although it seems unlikely 
that its advice was aninfluence upon the BBC's decision, for this 
had already been taken. 
Thus it was the BBC's role to keep the electorate informed of 
events as they happened, but not so far in advance as to result in a 
public opinion feedback to parliamentary or government deliberations. 
Churchill, who was vehemently demanding the right to broadcast on 
India at this time, had reason to feel frustrated, but not to suggest 
either government pressure or deliberate intrigue. Contact between 
BBC and India Office could not at this time be called pressure, 
86. See p. 491 below on the BBC's regard for 'experts'. 
87. BBC, PI, Reith to F. W. Phillips (Secretary of GPO), 16 March 
1933. 
88. BBC, CWSC, Whitley to Churchill, 25 October 1933. 
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merely advice which accorded with BBC policy and practice. Churchill 
was wrong when he complained to Reith that BBC policy 
partakes of the nature of an intrigue to force a particular line 
of policy upon the countryß9 thout the public being able to form 
a judgement on the merits. 
But he was at least partly correct, though not in the conspiratorial. 
sense he intended, when he declared in parliament: 
the withholding from the broadcast of Indian matters is not 
because of any fear of influencing the Indianas .... The object is 
to prevent the formation of British opinion. 
Siepta. nn began planning the controversial series in June 1933. He 
suggested that the ideal would be a straight fight between the right 
wing Churchill/Lord Lloyd faction and the Government, but admitted 
that 
for political reasons it may be necessary to provide for the 
representation of the official Opposition. 
91 
He also proposed three speakers from the left, right and centre of 
Indian opinion. As the proceedings of the Select Committee dragged 
on, however, it became clear that the Bill would not be presented to 
parliament before the end of 1934. The BBC's decision to be truly 
topical, by delaying the series until the time of the Commons debate, 
thus had the quite unintended effect of excluding any statements on 
India for over eighteen months. Only from June 1934 could the series 
be actively planned and by then no Indian delegates were available to 
89. BBC, PIWSC, Churchill's Private Secretary to Reith, 6 March 
1933. 
90. H. C. Debates, vol. 274, col. 1859,22 February 1933. 
91. BBC, PPBPAP, Siepmann to Reith, 23 June 1933. 
449 
broadcast. The Board, therefore, proposed nine speakers, including 
two Government, one Labour, one Liberal, Churchill, Lloyd and three 
non-political 'experts'. These latter were to be Lady Layton, Sir 
John Thompson (who was now admitted to be in favour of the white 
Paper) and, to balance him, C. F. Andrews, a speaker with left wing 
views and opposed to the Government's Proposals. This suggested 
series was then put to the PAC, whose objections and alternative 
recommendations were ignored, and to Lord Linlithgow, the Select. 
Committee chairman, who was listened to rather more respectfully. At 
his suggestion Sir George Schuster was added to the list of experts, 
to talk on economic aspects of the Indian question, and subsequently 
Reith suggested that Linlithgow himself should start the sseries with 
a factual statement of the Select Committee's conclusions. 
The Corporation did not view this series strictly as a party 
political one. It was anxious to include minority and expert 
viewpoints and-thereby reduce the party element, the whole forming a 
symposium by the different groups, rather than an official party 
fight with Churchill added. Yet few of the interested bodies were 
prepared to see it in this way. Churchill declared that there were 
only two sides - Labour and Liberals wanted to go further towards 
Indian independence than the Government and were therefore 
fundamentally sympathetic to its policies. Eight out of the ten 
speakers, he claimed, were in favour of the White Paper policy. He 
objected to Thompson being used as a representative of Indian Civil 
Service opinion; far more eminent was Sir Michael O'Dwyer 94who was 
also a right wing supporter of the India Defence League. Keith 
rejected his arguments, but agreed to make his talk the 
antepenultimate one, to be followed only by Labour and Government 
speakers. Churchill accepted with ill grace: 'there is no use arguing 
92. BBC, PI, Miss Nash to A. Dawnay, 17 July 1934. 
93. BBC, PI, Dawnay to Reith, 23 July 1934; Reith to Dawnay, 5 
September 1934. 
94. BBC, PIWSC, Churchill to Reith, 25 August 1934. 
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with an autocmt'. 
95 
Labour was even less inclined than Churchill to accept the 
proposals. Lansbury, by considering Churchill, Lloyd and the Liberal 
representative as Government supporters, saw the ratio as eight to 
two against Labour. Like Churchill he wondered why Thompson and 
Schuster had been chosen as experts when there were equally eminent 6 
men, experienced in Indian affairs, on the Labour side. This was 
a point which Reith had been careful to consider, and Andrews had 
been deliberately chosen to offset Thompson, whilst Lady Layton, 
representing the women's viewpoint in India, was considered neutral. 
The balance of experts had, however, been slightly upset by the 
addition of Schuster, who was so far in favour of the Government's 
proposals as to advise Baldwin on his final broadcast of the 
series. Schuster had only been added reluctantly by Reith, and 
the latter emphasised to the Controller of Programmes, Alan Dawnay, 
how vital it was that both his and Layton's talks should be 
in partial. 
La. nsbury and Attlee were particularly annoyed at the implication 
in the proposals that the Labour Party was simply one of a number of 
opinion groups. This was made clear by their strong objection to the 
term 'Labour8Opposition' which had been used in the BBC's letter of 
invitation. Lansbury protested that his party was 'His Majesty's 
Opposition' and should therefore be given greater consideration than 
other groups. Labour speakers should follow the first government 
speech and immediately precede the last. Attlee told Reith and 
Whitley that 
95. BBC, PIWSC, Reith to Churchill, 31 August 1934; Churchill to 
Reith, 14 September 1934. 
96. Ton bury papers, vol. 15/f117, unsent draft letter fron 
Lansbury to Reith, undated. 
97. Baldwin papers, Bal. 202/f19-20a, undated note by Sir George 
Schuster. 
98. L-nsbury papers, vol. 15/f115, Reith to C. Edwards (Labour 
Chief whip), 16 August 1934. 
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It was not for them to decide the issues, but for the political 
people in the country. 
He objected to the BBC's attempt itself to state the issues and wrote 
to T nsbury that the BBC had 
set the stage for a struggle between Government and Diehards. We 
object to being sidestepped like this .... The allocation of. 
places between rival groups within the Capiitalist Government does 
9 
not concern us. They are all our enemies. 
Attlee felt that even where the Opposition agreed with government 
policy, its approach was so fundamentally different that it should 
have a broadcast - just as in the House of Commons the Official 
Opposition enjoyed certain rights of reply over other groups. Thus it 
was not for the BBC to decide whether or not to give the Opposition 
an opportunity to broadcast, basing its decision on how much Labour 
disagreed with the Government. Rather it was for the Opposition to 
decide whether or not it wished to broadcast. 
Reith readily conceded the penultimate broadcast to Labour, but 
stood firm at first on the idea of giving it a second speaker. As 
Dawnay told Lansbury, 
we are approaching the question primarily in the light of 
presenting to our listeners a fair symposium of public opinion - 
as opposed to political opinion in the strict sense1of seeking a 
balance based upon the party grouping in Parliament. 
This was a view which would not have appealed to any political party 
and certainly not to Labour, for it diminished its status 
considerably. It soon became clear, however, that Schuster, Thompson 
99. Lansbury papers, vol. 28/f204, Attlee to Lansbury, 4 September 
1934. 
100. BBC, PI, Dawnay to Lansbury, 12 September 1934. 
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and the Liberal speaker would be sympathetic to the White Paper 
proposals, and that Linlithgow would be considered by opponents as 
yet another Government speaker. With Reith absent in South Africa, , 
Whitley therefore decided to approve a second Labour speaker 
having first consulted the Board and the PAC, even though, as Dawnay 
remarked of the latter, 
we do not attach very much lo ht to the opinions of the members 
composing it as individuals! 
The series on India, having started out as a symposium of views and 
expert opinion, was increasingly in danger of degenerating into a 
predominantly party political series, with even the experts taking 
very pronounced lines. 
Nevertheless the BBC had for the most part retained independence 
of action in its negotiations with Churchill and Labour, altering 
arrangements only where it considered it reasonable to do so and 
resisting unreasonable demands. Equally revealing was the course of 
negotiation with the Government. Correspondence was nominally with 
the Chief Whip, Margesson, but was immediately passed on to the India 
Office and No. 10, Downing Street. Initial reactions to the series at 
No. 10 were not unfavourable; Schuster was considered 'good but not 
ideal', Sir John Thompson was 'an ally of the Government',, Ow3hilst 
even Andrews was felt to be 'pro Gandhi but all right'. The 
India Office regretted the inclusion of Lloyd and Churchill, hoped 
that one might be eliminated by negotiation, but admitted that both 
had a claim to speak. 
The nature of negotiations, of the relationship between BBC and 
Government, were particularly well illustrated by memoranda within 
Downing Street and between No. 10 and the India Office. Considerable 
101. BBC, PI, Dawnay to Carpendale, 24 September 1934. 
102. Ibid. 
103. Prem. 1/145, N. Butler to H. G. Vincent, 28 August 1934. 
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attention was paid to the question of who should negotiate with 
Reith. It was stressed that it should be by a visit rather than 
correspondence, and by someone who was personally on friendly terms 
with Reith. There was a clear recognition that informal contact 
rather than formal pressure would bring the best results. This was 
made even more evident by the phrases used in reference to 
negotiation with Reith: 
If Sir John Reith were prepared to omit .... But it seems 
unlikely that he will be willing to do this and it would probably 
be unwise to press it. .... If Sir John Reith will not accept 
this .... if Sir John Reith definitely declines to consider "... 104 
it would be advisable to enlist Sir John Reith's sympathy... 
When C. J. Harris, representing the Chief Whip, learnt that Hoare was 
planning to contact the Postmaster General and that he was 'at least 
putting to Sir K. Wood the possibility of his (KW) bringing some 
pressure to bear on Reith to exclude one or other of the Diehard 
speakers', he inaediatelp issued an 'emphatic warning': 
The PM has never intervened in the arrangement of political 
talks by the BBC, and it was precisely to eliminate such 
intervention by they RIG that the Chief Whip was appointed as the 10 
official channel. 
The India Office therefore decided that all they could justifiably 
press for was a rearrangement of the speaking order, so that the 
first Government speaker came after Lord Lloyd instead of before him. 
An informal conversation between Vincent, W. D. Croft of the India 
104. Prem. 1/145, unsigned and undated India Office note for 
interview with Reith, c. 29 August 1934. 
105. Prem. 1/145, N. Butler to H. G. Vincent, 31 August 1934. It is 
curious that Harris was still representing the Chief Whip in 
these discussions, as he had by now moved from the 'Whips' 
Office, and was P. S. to the Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Treasury. 
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Office and Reith, appeared to produce results. Reith himself was 
amenable to altering the order, but as he was on the point of leaving 
for So the Africa, he left the final decision to Dawnay and 1 
Whitley. They, however, felt strongly that the series as a whole 
should be opened by a statement of 
107 
the Government's case, and 
rejected the India Office's request. Hoare was not satisfied, 
and at first the India Office contemplated a threat: 
If the order remains as at present proposed, they would find it 
difficult to agree to open the series. 
08 
After further consultation with No. 10 and the Whips' Office, however, 
Croft drafted a milder letter which, using the proper channels, the 
Chief Whip sent to Dawnay. He regretted that the right wing speakers 
might go unanswered until the end of the series: 
Would you not agree, for example, that it would be a serious 
matter from the Government point of view if, as might well 
happen, the Second Reading on the Government Bill took place in 
the House of Commons in the weeks immediately109 following Lord 
Lloyd's broadcast according-to your present plan? 
Croft proposed, therefore, that Lloyd should be followed by Sir John 
Thompson who would answer his arguments, 'týh0ough not in any way to be 
regarded as a Government spokesman'. Knowing that further 
protests would be likely in view of the imminent addition of a second 
Labour speaker to the series, Dawnay decided to meet this request, 
although he was by now dubious of Thompson's status: 
106. BBC, PI, Reith to Dawnay, 5 September 1934. 
107. BBC, PI, Dawnay to H. G. Vincent, 8 September 1934. 
108. Prem. 1/145, T. D. Croft to C. J. Harris, 18 September 1934. 
109. BBC, PI, D. Margesson to A. Dawnay, 20 September 1934. 
110. Ibid. 
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I find it difficult to agree that Sir John is "not in any way to 
be regarded as a Government spokesman"! Not an "Official 
Government spokesman" perhaps - but he must sry be counted as 
a strong reinforcement to the Government side? 
The negotiations had been protracted, but the deliberations of 
the Joint Select Committee were more protracted still. It rapidly 
became clear that it would not report before November and that the 
parliamentary debate would not take place until December. There had 
been no constitutional objections so far to the prospect of the radio 
series preceding parliamentary discussion, but now this problem was 
raised. Government doubts were expressed as to the propriety of a 
minister addressing the nation before he spoke in the House. Reith 
also warned Dawnay that party meetings were to take place after the 
Report's publication and that ministers might not wish to broadcast 112 
before they had addressed their parties. The BBC could only 
submit to this argument - indeed it had no alternative - and Reith 
agreed to postpone the series until the New Year, with Linlithglolw 
however, broadcasting imnediately the Select Committee reported. 
With the series consisting of eleven speeches to be given at 
weekly intervals, it was becoming far too unwieldy. The BBC therefore 
decided to compress it by having two programmes each week, the entire 
series being thereby contained between the first and second reading 
debates, with the final talk by Baldwin occurring only a few days 
before the latter. This was timing which pleased Margesson, who told 
Sir Samuel Hoare that quite fortuit: busly . the order of speakers was 
good from a Conservative point of view: 
It brings Lloyd into action a fortnight before the National Union 
Conference. ... It brings Thompson in immediately before the 
Conference, and it does not feature Winston until after the 
111. BBC, PI, Dawnay to Margesson, c. 25 September 1934. 
112. BBC, PI, Reith to Dawnay, 5 September 1934. 
113. BBC, PPBPAP, Dawnay to PAC members, 30 October 1934. 
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Conference. During the week of the Conference two innocuous 
people (the Rev. C. F. Andrews and a Liberal) will be speaking, 114 
which ought not to do any harm. 
The series of controversial talks on the Indian question, 
therefore, finally took place in January 1935, immediately prior to 
the second reading debate and at the height of the issue's 
topicality. Although the BBC had postponed it until after the initial 
parliamentary debate the issue was still under active discussion. 
During the previous year the Government had enjoyed unanswered 
factual descriptions of the White Paper and the Select Committee 
report, although the BBC argued with some reason that these 
statements were necessary in order to inform people of the basic 
issues involved. The BBC had certainly modified its original 
proposals considerably to meet the conflicting demands of Churchill, 
Labour and Government, and had evidently kept the Government informed 
throughout, via No. 10, the Whips' Office and the India Office. Reith 
had himself . proved slightly more amenable to government 
representations than had Whitley and Dawnay, but the BBC had made 
every attempt to retain its freedom of action, if not always 
successfully. All negotiations were discussed and ratified by the 
Board. Interestingly, the BBC had perhaps gained from its policy of 
informal contact with No. 10, for Neville Butler and H. G. Vincent had 
proved ready to protect it against possible pressure from the India 
Office. 
The Government had on this occasion accepted the limits of its 
influence over the BBC and had resorted to informal contact. Whether 
that contact had passed the fine boundary between amicable 
negotiation and the unreasonable use of friendship for the exertion 
of moral pressure is questionable. In fact the only issue on which 
Dawnay acceded to a Government request, where he had the option of 
refusing, was in the placing of Thompson to follow shortly after 
Lloyd - and even there Lady Layton was placed between them. Perhaps 
114. Prem. 1/145, Margesson to Hoare, 22 October 1934. 
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the BBC's principal error was in acceding to Linlithgow's emphatic 
proposal that Schuster be added to the series. Yet here also, when it 
was learnt that the Liberal representative might support the Bill, 
the Board added a compensating Labour speaker and, through Dawnay's 
personal negotiation with the Chief Whip, Margesson, staved off a 
government protest. 
Only. Churchill 
lcontinued 
to object that the ratio was now 9: 2 
against him. But in linking the series to the India Bill the BBC 
had effectively refused to involve itself in immediate pressure 
politics. The issue which it had defined for debate was the Bill and 
not the general question of whether or not the British should rennin 
in India in their existing form. Dawnay therefore had a clear answer 
for Churchill: 
If the question were a straightforward issue between two clearly 
defined bodies of opinion, the solution would be comparatively 
simple .... Unfortunately, however, this is not the case; and the 
protagonists of every point of view tend, like yourself, to 
regard all contrary opinions, however mutually116 ivergent, as 
constituting a solid majority against themselves. 
Churchill was learning that the agenda was set according to the 
questions asked and that the BBC asked the questions of the middle 
ground, noýt17f the extremist opinion that he was undoubtedly held to 
represent. Only in his own broadcast could he define the issues 
as he wished. 
The Indian series had shown finally j? $ 
the BBC that the present 
unrepresentative PAC was ' quite useless'. Moreover it had been 
115. BBC, PIWSC, Churchill to Dawnay, 5 November 1934. 
116. BBC, PIWSC, Dawnay to Churchill, 7 November 1934. 
117. Yet another latin tag had been provided for the BBC in July 
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found almost impossible to arrange meetings at times which were 
mutually convenient to every member, so that for most of the time 
advice had to be sought by post. The PAC members were themselves 
dissatisfied with their role, feeling that their advice was only 
rarely sought and then ignored. Dawnay therefore suggested to Reith 
that, in view of the approaching General Election and the current 
reorganisation of the Corporation's entire advisory committee 
structure, this question should be tackled. Lansbury now appeared to 
be more compliant and Reith accordingly proposed that the Speaker of 
the House of Commons, as a neutral figure, should appoint a PAC with 
the approval of the party leaders. However he was warned against this 
proposal by Margesson, who in general appeared to be genuinely 
solicitous of the BBC's interests. He told Reith that each party 
would insist on their Chief Whips being on the committee and that 119 
they would never agree about anything. The question was set 
aside, and when John Buchan of the PAC was made Governor-Generral of 12 
Canada, in October 1935, the Committee was brought to a close. 
The BBC's experiences in the arrangement of party broadcasts had 
not inclined it favourably towards them. Nor had they proved, for the 
most part, to be good programme material. Reith told the Liberal 
Chief Whip that, 'we do not, 12als 
you know, deal very much in 
specifically political series'. When the Corporation's General 
Advisory Committee suggested increasing the number of political 
talks, it was told that 
Apart from the difficulty of giving adequate representation to 
conflicting points of view, it was felt that strong objection 
would be raised by listeners to the introduction of additional 
political broadcasts - at any rate by the lesser-known 
politicians. 
119. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 120,21 February 1935. 
120. BBC, PPBPAP, Reith to PAC members, 17 October 1935. 
121. BBC, PPBAPB, Reith to W. Rea, 4 December 1934. 
122. BBC, GAC, Monthly Report, June 1935. 
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The BBC was still bound by the fact that it had not yet devised 
methods of discussing direct party politics - party reactions to 
daily current events, divergencies of opinion within parties, etc. - 
other than through the use of protracted series of unedited 
statements by party spokemen and other politicians. There was clearly 
an element of truth in Hilda Matheson's comment that 
It is .... always a temptation to those who administer a public 
broadcasting service to err on the side of timidity. It often 
seems safer at the time to avoid delicate subjects of current 
controversy; it is always tempting to yield to a personal request 23 
or suggestion from a Minister or a public department. 
Yet it was quite mistaken for Randolph Churchill t124escribe the 
Corporation as 'terrified' of political controversy. There were 
many other determinants at work than the personal ones of timidity or 
courage. Not least was the fact that the BBC was not yet geared to 
react to the immediate events of politics. It was committed to a 
policy of considered presentation of arguments. Such a policy allowed 
for planning of series, and planning allowed for consultation in the 
interest of agreement and harmony. Consultation in turn allowed for 
the judicious modification of plans, in response to those 
representations which to the Corporation appeared reasonable. The 
whole process was far more subtle and less covertly suspicious than 
crude notions of terror, timidity, censorship or party and government 
pressure would allow for, as the question of India demonstrates. 
The budget series had now become established and took place in 
1935 without comment. When Baldwin became Prime Minister in June, 
however, and was permitted to broadcast, both Labour and Liberals 
protested that some of his comments were tendentious. Reith followed 
budget procedure by permitting three fully controversial talks to be 
123. Hilda Matheson, 'Politics and Broadcasting', Political 
Quarterly, April 1934,195. 
124. Daily Despatch, 1 May 1933. 
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given, but rejected the notion that the Opposition should always have 
the right of reply to ministerial statements. Nor could he accept 
that the BBC had been in error on this occasion: 
Since on such occasions manuscripts are not required beforehand, 
the Corporation cannot decide until after the talk has been given 
whether or not a right of rejoinder is warranted. 
The second government statement was justified, he considered, on the 
grounds that Baldwin had not known he was to be answered and had been 
inhibited from full freedom of speech by the 'ministerial' label of 
his broadcast. This was the first occasion on which the BBC did 
decide to permit a reply after a ministerial had been given, and was 
indicative of a desire not to allow unanswered partisan statements by 
the Government. It was also to be the last6such occasion before the 12 
row with Anthony Eden over Suez in 1956. Coming as it did during 
the. sittings of the Ullswater Committee on Broadcasting, it was 
perhaps 'a bold'decision. 
The main political broadcasting issue of 1935 was the General 
Election. Reith was anxious that the procedure intended in 1931 - the 
BBC granting a set number of periods and leaving it to the parties to 
agree a ratio - should on this occasion be effective. Accordingly 
Margesson was told that twelve broadcasts would be made available. 
The confusion of 1931 had clearly rendered the previous procedure of 
party equality after the dissolution inoperative, and Margesson 
stated that he would agree to a ratio of 5 talks to Government 
parties, 4 to Labour and 3 to opposition Liberals. As before it was 
suggested that minority parties such as the ILP, Fascists and 
Coamwnists should be given a shorter broadcast at a less advantageous 
125. BBC, BPF, Reith to Lansbury, 27 June 1935. 
126. In 1944 the National Farmers Union protested at a ministerial 
given by R. Hudson, the Minister of Agriculture. The BBC 
accepted that Hudson's talk had not been impartial and gave a 
representative of the NFU an opportunity to reply. There is no 
record of an opposition party right of reply being granted 
until 1956. 
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timee2if they fielded a certain number of candidates, on this occasion 1 
20. 
For once argument was surprisingly limited. Walter Rea, the 
Liberal Chief whip, accepted Margesson's proposals, even though it 
was stipulated128hat one of the Liberal places should be -given to 
Lloyd George. Inevitably the strongest arguments came from 
Attlee who, in addition to being the new Labour leader, was also on 
the IIllswater Committee. The National Council of Labour had told its 
followers earlier in the year that broadcasting would be 'a potent 
element' in the General Election, and now Attlee made suggestions 
that political broadcasts should end three days before the election, 
that the last Labour and Government speakers should be on the same 
night, that all manuscripts should be handed in in advance of the 
series and that all other programmes of a pot1nttially political 29 
nature should be cancelled during the campaign. He proposed a 
ratio of 5: 5: 2, arguing that 'the Government Party' and Labour were 
the only 
3 
two real contestants and should therefore be treated 
equally. 
l 
This was a complete reversal from Labour's high-minded 
statements in 1933 that every party should be given equal treatment. 
Attlee's argument pragmatically prejudged the election and made the 
probable result a determinant of the broadcasting arrangements. 
The BBC had disclaimed all responsibility for obtaining party 
agreement. Nevertheless it was sympathetic to Margesson's proposal, 
which it regarded as remarkably restrained. As Cecil Graves, the new 
Controller of Programmes, told both Attlee and flea, 
127. BBC, PPBGEB, C. Graves to Reith, 15 October 1935. 
128. BBC, PPBGEB, W. Rea to Reith, 17 October 1935. 
129. Labour Party, NEC, NCB to all Labour Party and TU members, 
February 1935. 
130. BBC, PPBGEB, Attlee to Reith, 17 October 1935. It was 
significant of the importance which Attlee attached to 
broadcasting that he handled these negotiations himself, as he 
did also in 1939, instead of leaving them to the Chief Whip. 
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We were .... from previous experience rather surprised to hear 
that Captain Magi sson had not suggested a greater proportion to 
the Government. 
3 
Indeed, compared with the 1931 allocation of six government to four 
opposition broadcasts, the reverse ratio of 5: 7 did appear 
reasonable. The Government did, after all, still claim to be a 
national one of three parties. Yet in relation to the 1924 and 1929 
ratios of 1: 2 and 2: 4 the Government remained at an advantage. The 
5: 4: 3 ratio, which Attlee agreed to under protest, was a recognition 
that the political situation was still somewhat confused, rather than 
a result of the practical application of a theoretical model, as in 
previous elections. It was significant that in arranging for the 
expected 1939 election Margesson himself proposed a 5: 5: 2 ratio, 
accepting Attlee's argument that once parliament had been dissolved 
there was no government, 132 
d that it should not therefore be given 
preferential treatment. Strangely, on this occasion, Attlee 
actually demanded less than he had been given in 1935, stating merely 
that the o3 ition parties as a whole should have parity with the 
Government. As with the arrangement of budget broadcasts, the 
protagonists were becoming more amenable, the issues less fraught, as 
the procedure became regularised and known. Although beliefs as to 
the power and importance of broadcasting were as strong as ever, the 
parties were, quite simply, growing used to broadcasting. Moreover 
the decline of the Liberals to minority status reduced a possible 
bone of contention in the question of the overall ratio of opposition 
to Government broadcasts. To a government which received the first 
and last broadcasts 5: 5: 2 appeared not unreasonable, whilst to the 
major opposition party it was as much as it could expect. 
131. BBC, PPBGEB, C. Graves to W. Rea, 21 October 1935. 
132. BBC, PPBGEB, F. Ogilvie (new D. G. ) to Control Board, 18 January 
1939. 
133. BBC, PPBG, record of meeting of Attlee, A. Greenwood, F. Ogilvie 
and Graves, 1 December 1938. 
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Although the parties were becoming more amenable regarding 
political broadcasts, they were less so with regard to the BBC's own 
progranmes. Whereas in 1929, and to a lesser extent in 1931, 
programmes with political implications had continued during the 
election, the BBC agreed in 1935 and 1939 to the suggestion that any 
such should be cancelled. Thus in 1935 an unscripted debate including 
Harold Laski and Robert Boothby, 'That a Second Chamber is neither 
necessary or desirable', was cancelled, as were talks on proportional 
representation, '134 evaluation of Politics' and 'Keir Hardie' (by 
Philip Snowden). Following Labour and Liberal agreement, 
however, Sir Samuel Hoare gave a talk on 'The Situation in Geneva', 
as a result of the Italo/Abyssinian war, on the strict understanding 
that 
in a broadcast of this nature there can be135 no question of 
government propaganda either direct or indirect. 
It is also interesting to note that the Corporation had not intended 
originally to restrict its normal programmes in this "way. Gladstone 
Murray, now Assistant Programme Controller, had merely stressed 
the importance of special scrutiny of all talks and news in order 
to maintain scrupulou1fairness in giving news and statements of 36 
the political parties. 
134. The third of these was a talk by a medical psychologist on 'The 
dangers of being human: Changing the World: A Revaluation of 
Politics'. Coumenting on this cancellation S. D. Spicer, the 
Talks Executive, wrote: 'One obviously cannot allow a Medical 
Psychologist to say in polite language that all politicians talk 
through their hats two minutes after Mr. Ramsay MacDonald has 
finished speaking. This is a particularly obvious case, but it 
illustrates the kind of thing which may occur if a good look- 
out is not kept at such time'. - BBC, PPBGEB, S. D. Spicer to M. 
Farquharson, 17 April 1936. 
135. BBC, PPBGEB, C. Graves to W. Rea and Attlee, 1 November 1935. 
136. BBC, PPBGEB, Gladstone Murray to J. M. Rose-Troup and J. Coatnun 
21 October 1935. 
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Moreover the first half of the potentially highly controversial 
series 'The Citizen and His Government' was broadcast throughout the 
election period, with a talk on 'The Communist and Fascist 
Experiment' only two days before the poll. As in 1931 the manifestoes 
of the parties were broadcast in the news and were again summarised 
on the evening before the poll. Although election speeches were not 
reported, important election news was given. The progress of the 
campaign, however, was not really covered. 
The biggest row of the election was over Samuel's decision to 
give one of the Liberal broadcasts to Snowden. Snowden had asked 
Reith for an opportunity to talk 'from a non-party stand point', but 
this had been rejected. When he heard that Snowden was to 
broadcast, Margesson was 'furious' and regarded it as a breach of the 
agreed ratio. Reith, however, refused to intervene: 'I waslrised 
that Margesson suggested 5: 4: 3. Now he regrets it'. Other 
requests for broadcasts came from the ILP, Co-operative, Social 
Credit, Scottish Nationalist, Welsh Nationalist, Independent 
Conservative and Communist parties, whilst the BBC's Scottish 
Regional 
130Director 
proposed regional broadcasts on Scottish 
affairs. The ILP seems to have been given a short broadcast at 
an early hour, although it fielded only 17 candidates. But when no 
other minority party polled 20 candidates their requests were 
rejected. Lloyd George, however, had again received somewhat 
preferential treatment. 
The broadcasts themselves were, as ever, of variable quality. 
Reith considered Snowden's 'awful' and Arthur Greenwood's 'really 
137. BBC, PPBGEB, Snowden to Reith, 24 October 1935: 'The great bulk 
of the electors today are not hide-bound party supporters, and 
are distrustful of mere party appeals'. 
138. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 122,25 October 1935. 
139. BBC, PPBPPB, M. Dinwiddie to C. Graves, 15 October 1935. This 
issue was raised again in the 1950s, and was only resolved by 
allowing regional General Election broadcasts in 1966 - D. E. 
Butler and A. King, The British General Election of 1966, 
London 1966,140. 
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140 
disgusting ... a prostitution of broadcasting'. The new success 
at the election was Herbert Morrison, who gave the last labour 
speech. This was not altogether surprising, as he was well aware of 
the importance of the medium, had considered going to a broadcasting 
school to improve his microphone technique and finally arranged with 
Mary Agnes 
lgnes 
Hamilton that the BBC Talks Department should coach 
him. His broadcast, however, only followed a wrangle in the NEC 
between those who wanted George Lansbury to broadcast, even though no 
longer Labour leader, and those who favoured the up and coming 
Morrison. On the whole labour's broadcasts were badly co-ordinated 
and poorly presented. As ever Baldwin produced two of the best 
performances, giving the first and last Conservative broadcasts. 
Before his last Gower told him that other speeches in the series 
reek of party politics and fail to carry weight on that account 
.... I have always held the view that the more personal, intimate 
and friendly these talks can be, the greater the influence they 
will exercise, and there ismnobody who can deliver a talk of this 
kind better than yourself. 
Geoffrey Lloyd similarly told Baldwin of a Labour family in Ladywood 
who were 'brought right over to our side' by listening to his first 
broadcast: 
I therefore think that your speech tonight may be of absolutely 
decisive influence in the Campaign, and jay my be the cause of 
holding a large number of doubtful seats. 
140. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 123,1 and 5 November 1935. 
141. M. A. Hamilton, Op. Cit., 168. Thomas Jones wrote that Morrison 
had 'emerged into prominence owing to the excellence of his 
broadcast speech'. - T. Jones, A Diary With Letters, London 
1954,155-6, Jones to Dr. A. Flexner, 17 November 11435. 
142. Baldwin papers, Bal. 203/f40, Gower to Baldwin, 2 November 1935. 
143. Baldwin papers, Bal. 47/f147-149, minute of phone call from G. 
Lloyd to Baldwin, 8 November 1935. 
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Baldwin's effect was summed up by a listener who wrote: 'altho' I 
have never met you I feel I know you quite well'. 
Press opinion was almost unanimous about the possible effect of 
election broadcasts. The Observer considered that 'an astute or an 
ill-judged broadcast can gain or lose many thousands of votes', 
whilst the Sunday Referee considered radio to be, 
undoubtedly the most important factor in electionsl4t5oday. Its 
influence is to make the whole country move together. 
Harold Laski considered that Labour was 'incomparably inferior' to 
the Government in both wireless and cinema propaganda and urged that 146 
greater attention be paid to it. Only Lord Godfrey Elton, 
writing in the National Labour News - Letter, placed political 
broadcasting in the context of a pluralist media and multifarious 
other political influences: 
Nobody knows what effect these broadcast election speeches have 
on' their audiences. Is there a section of the public which 
listens to each of the series, goes to no meetings and ignores 
the newspapers, and decides its vote on the balance of the 
argument? Nobody knows. 
The election notwithstanding, the most important event of 1935 
for the BBC was the discussion and report of the Ullswater Committee 
on Broadcasting. The Committee's comments on BBC/party relations were 
144. Baldwin papers, Bal. 39/f3-5, J. Adams to Baldwin, 9 November 
1935. 
145. The Observer, 17 November 1935; The Sunday Referee, 17 November 
1935. For other press comments see A. Briggs (1965), Op. Cit., 
140-141. 
146. H. Laski, 'The General Election 1935', Political Quarterly, 
vol. 7 (1936), 7. 
147. Lord Godfrey Elton, 'Politics on the Air', The News-Letter, 9 
November 1935. 
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hardly helpful: 
though we are far from implying that all broadcast treatment of 
political questions should be controlled by the political party 
organisations, we recommend that on the major political issues of 
the day there should be close co-operation and consultation 
between the BBC and the authorised spokesmen of the recognised 
148 
political parties. 
To this the BBC Board somewhat drilr49 plied that such consultation 
had been 'the invariable practice'. Yet the Corporation regarded 
the implementation of such recommendations as a certain moral duty, 
as it had those of Crawford. Moreover it knew that the National 
Council of Labour had taken the opportunity of Ullswater to reaffirm 
its views as stated in 1933. The NCL had called for greater political 
broadcasting 'in the interests of good citizenship', but almost 
entirely by politicians. It expressed its strong opinion that 
if proper provision is made for the leaders of political life to 
appear before the micro hone, there is little need for 1,9 
"unofficial" comnentators. 
The BBC should choose neither subject nor speakers, but only provide 
air-time, leaving the agenda to party leaders. Initiatives for 
broadcasts should come from both government and opposition, and on 
economic and industrial issues from employers and trade unions. The 
NCL's only real concession was its acceptance that the Government 
should have a brief right of reply to all opposition statements 151 
following an initial government broadcast. 
148. Cmd. 5091 (1936). Report of the Broadcasting Committee, 1935, 
paragraph 92. 
149. BBC, UCRCP, Observations by the Board of Goverors, c. March 
1936,11. 
150. Labour Party Annual Conference Report, 1935, Appendix XII. 
151. Ibid. See also H. C. Debates, vol. 311: col. 1028, C. G. Ammon, 
29 April 1936. 
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The BBC could not accept these proposals, but it had to take note 
of them, as it had those of the Ullswater Report. Itsexperiences with 
the parties had steadily turned it against the notion. of direct party 
political talks, but Ullswater and the NCL evidence limited its 
freedom to develop party affairs broadcasting without the full 
involvement of the parties, even had it wished to do so. In fact 
during the succeeding three years the BBC was to demonstrate a 
particular regard for the primacy of parliament and parliamentary 
procedures, which encouraged it, even more than before, to act 
'correctly'. In part this may have been due to Ullswater's coment 
that 
It is in the Parliamentary contest that the issues before the 
country should emerge .... broadcasting should 1l ok 
towards 
Parliament as the focal point of political thought. 
But it was also a reflection of the type of person who was now in the 
senior management of the Corporation. Briggs has mentioned how, 
following the departure of Matheson, Siepim, nn and Fielden from the 
Talks Department, Reith felt it necessary to recruit a number of 
'right wing' staff to balance the general trend there. This was 
confirmed by Reith himself in a conversation with D. Morley-Fletcher 
of Conservative Central Office in 1937: 
It was true, [Reith] said, that nearly 9 in every 10 in the BBC 
are Left, but the administration today is doing1g erything in its 
power to draft in more of the Right to balance. 
The appointment of such men as John Coatma. n to take charge of news, 
Sir Richard Micona. chie as Director of Talks and even Sir Stephen 
Tallents as Controller of Public Relations, may be seen in this 
light. This is certainly not to suggest that such men were 
152. ßnd. 5091 (1936) Report of the Broadcasting Committee, 1935, 
paragraph 90. 
153.000,0004/1/23, D. Morley-Fletcher to Miss Corlett, 11 May 
1937. 
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consciously politically motivated - this would have been anathema to 
Reith. Nor were they any the less idealistically inspired than 
Matheson and Siepnmann; Sir Stephen Tallents is widely recognised 
today as the guardian of the documentary film movement, the notions 
of which on democratic education paralleled Reith's. Similarly 
Maconachie was given the post of Director of Talks partly because of 
a statement of ideals at his interview: 
one of the greatest problems for democracy is the time-lag in the 
transmission of ideas and knowledge from the few to the many. 
That time-lag broadcasting can shorten. 
Yet the background of such men, and of Alan Dawnay and Cecil Graves 
as successive Controllers of Programmes, was essentially 'of the 
establishhro5ent' - the army, the Indian Civil Service, the Foreign 
Office. Whilst no less enthusiastic about broadcasting's 
potential than earlier staff, their previous experience gave them a 
superior respect for constitutional propriety, a re-emphasis of 
Reith's already strong regard for the traditional authority of 
government, parliament and the primacy of democratic institutions, 
itself a reflection of strong democratic ideals. Whether this is to 
be regarded as Briggs' 'further retreat into caution', or as a 
further attempt by Reith to lift the BBC to his intended pedestal of 
political impartiality and h(- to a 56 perfect integration into 
the democratic machine, is a moot point. Indeed the two views are 
compatible; it is merely suggested here that Reith saw it rather in 
the latter terms. 
The BBC remained anxious to avoid direct liaison with the 
parties. Consequently it saw MacDonald's idea of a parliamentary 
Advisory Cornnittee as still the best way of fulfilling IIllswater's 
recomendations, assuming such a body could be made representative. 
154. M. A. Hamilton, Op. Cit., 151. 
155. See B. Haworth 'The British Broadcasting Corporation, Nazi 
Germany and the Foreign Office', Historical Journal of Film, 
Radio and Television, Vol. 1 No. 1, Ib-xch 1981,51-52, 
156. A. Briggs (1965), Op. Cit., 149. 
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To avoid a repetition of Labour's objections to such a conmittee, but 
in order also to prevent it being simply a panel of party nominees, 
it was again decided to ask the Speaker, with the agreement of the 
party leaders, to appoint its members. Farther progress, however, was 
delayed until the Government's decisions on Ullswater were announced 
in July 1936. In the event political broadcasting was not mentioned, 
for the Government was disinclined to take the initiative in altering 
the present comparatively advantageous state of affairs. Indeed it 
was significant that, when asked for his views on a PAC, the fair- 
minded Chief Whip, David Margesson, stated that it was for the BBC to 
take full responsibility on such matter i7 the parties merely 
retaining the right to criticise the results. 
The Corporation, however, felt obliged to follow Ullswater's 
recommendations and so approached the Speaker, Edward Fitzroy. The 
result was only further delay, for with the House about to rise for 
the long recess the latter felt he had no authority to take action 
until it met again in October. The slowness of these negotiations 
suggests that the Corporation itself was no longer as keen as it had 
formerly been to develop party broadcasts, for it was decided to wait 
until its new Charter and Licence came into operation in 1937 before 158 
again approaching the Speaker. Fitzroy, however, was even then 
unwilling to take a decision which he feared might compromise the 
neutrality of his office. Instead he referred the question to the 
whips who in turn, and inevitably, asked for more detla5ls of the 
intended composition and function of such a committee. Thus by 
March 1937 no further progress had been made and the whole question 
was being passed from one body to another. Each was determined not to 
take responsibility for a decision which past experience had shown 
would be unpopular, controversial and quite possibly unworkable. In 
fact the only party broadcasts at this time were two speeches by the 
leaders of the principal contending parties in the IAC 
157. BBC, PPBPAC, Tallents to Reith, 22 July 1936. 
158. BBC, PPBPAC, Tallents to Sir Ralph Verney, 5 February 1937. 
159. BBC, PPBPAC, R. Verney to Tallents, 22 February 1937. 
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160 
elections. 
In understandable frustration the BBC abandoned-this fruitless 
line of approach. Instead the Chairman, now Ronald Norman, wrote 
directly to the Postmaster General, G. C. Tryon, asking his advice on 
haw to proceed from this stalemate: 
I think you will agree that the failure to implement not merely 
the Ullswater Committee's advice but our own desires, formulated 
before this Committee 
iýl met, 
is no fault of ours. We feel that we 
have done our best. 
Tryon, beyond a brief acknowledgement, was not 16 reply 
for almost a 
year and then only after several reminders. Only when Norman 
told him in February 1938 that, 'if you reply that you cannot help us 
we shall do the best we can on our own', did Tryon write to say that, 
indeed; he had no helpful suggestions to make. 
The Government had no particular interest in facilitating these 
negotiations, although there is no evidence that the delays and 
hindrances were deliberate. Nor did Reith have the ear of the Prime 
Minister any longer; he had not cultivated Chamberlain, nor did he 
feel the same affinity with him that he had with MacDonald and 
Baldwin. During the latter part of his premiership Baldwin had been 
too run down and then too involved with the abdication to concern 
himself with broadcasting, although the latter event did bring him 
into close contact with Reith. But he was beyond the stage of taking 
an active interest - so much so that he unthinkingly 'concurred' with 
160. BBC, TPB. LLX , BBC press announcement, 5 February 1937. 
161. BBC, PPBPAC, R. C. Norman to G. C. Tryon, 1 March 1937. 
162. Norman's letter was mislaid by the GPO for four months. Then it 
was too soon before the long recess to consult the Speaker. 
Tryon promised a reply in the autumn but failed to give one. 
163. BBC, PPBG, Norman to Tryon, 7 February 1938; Tryon to Norma, n, 18 
February 1938. 
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a ridiculous and reactionary resolution by the National Union 
Publications Sub-Cc mittee, that at General Elections the total 
number of opposition party broadcasts should not exceed those of the 
Government. 
164 
MacDonald also told Reith in 1936 that 'most of the 
Cabinet cared nothing at all for the serious issues of 
165 
broadcasting'. 
Yet the Labour Party equally seemed content to await the outcome 
of these negotiations, and only Herbert Morrison complained that 
there has been a tendency in recent years for the proportion of 
controversial broadcasts to decrease. I hope nobody has got cold 166 
feet l 
In the debate on the Government's proposals for broadcasting, Attlee 
stressed how essential it was that political broadcasting be 'fully 
utilised'; but during this time Labour showed itself more concerned 
with the current fierce presslgfcusations about BBC administrative 
problems and staff relations. It was left to a Liberal, Megan 
Lloyd George, to push matters further. In the same debate she made a 
long and impassioned plea for greater party and political affairs 
broadcasting, accusing the BBC of being 'scared', proposing that it 
adopt the press principle "'The Editor does not necessarily agree" 
and concluding: 
When democracy is being challenged, as it is all over Europe, and 
when its efficiency compared with autocracies has by no means 
been established, it is vital that the people of this country 
should be well informed as to the issues that have to be 
164. NUCUA, Report of Executive Committee to Central Council, 23 
March 1937. 
165. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 211,6 May 1936. 
166. BBC, CHM, H. Morrison to Reith, 15 October 1937. 
167. H. C. Debates, vol. 314: col. 974,6 July 1936. 
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168 
decided. 
Possibly as a result of this speech Megan Lloyd George was 
invited, in early 1937, to become a member of a General Talks 
Advisory Committee (TAC) which the BBC was establishing to advise on 
talks policy. She immediately advocated greater political 
broadcasting, and the Committee unanimously passed a resolution of 
hers calling for 
discussion before the microphone by whatever method the BBC finds 
practicable, 16live political 
issues which are actually under 
consideration. 
Whilst the PSG was supposedly considering the matter, however, 
the Corporation told the TAC that nothing further could be done, so 
that it was only in March 1938 that this idea was again considered. 
The Director of Talks, Sir Richard Maconachie, was dubious about its 
advisability: 
it would give MPs an enormous "forum" in which they could 
continue discussions begun in the Hou1? 0 and so influence public 
opinion on issues under debate there. 
Similarly Sir Stephen Tallents, the Controller of Public Relations, 
was unwilling to"comtemplate broadcasts by MPs on issues before the 
House, as this would 
create the appearance of a wireless court either parallel to 
Parliament or in the relation of a court of appeal to it. 
168. Ibid., cols. 936-942. 
169. BBC, PPBG, Talks Advisory Committee minutes, 1 July 1937. 
170. BBC, PPBG, Maconachie to Graves, 7 March 1938. 
171. BBC, PPBG, Tallents to Reith, Graves and Control Board, 15 
March 1938. 
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Megan Lloyd George did not accept these arguments. Live issues 
needed to be discussed, she felt, because listeners were required to 
make a decision on them. Besides, such programmes would provide good 
entertainment. These were both arguments which could not help her 
case with the BBC. Maconachie saw no need for instant and emotional 
decision-taking by the electorate, based on partisan argument: 
In the case of a Bill before the House it is not our audience who 
are c172ed upon to form a decision but the members in the 
House. 
The truth was what mattered, not the party interpretations of the 
evidence, whilst the entertainment value of party argument was 
certainly not a consideration. If political affairs broadcasting 
could attract by entertaining, all well and good, 
but the essential desideratum is that it should be educative or 
infonxative .... If the Corporation loses sight of this 
principle, I do not think it will ever attain the position of 
authority and prestige which we earnestly desire for it. It 
should never be satisfied, in dealing with matterl73 f grave 
importance, with presenting a Punch and Judy show .... 
Maconachie may have had a more establishment background than his 
predecessors, but he had no greater a respect for the party system. 
This was a view shared also by the Controller of Progranmes, Cecil 
Graves: 
the normal function of our talks is to provide material for 
listeners to form their own views on the basis of full 
information on all aspects of a subject rather than on the lines 
of unreasoning Party loyalties. In other words our normal 
function is probably to teach people to think for themselves 
172. BBC, PPBG, Maconachie to Graves; 5 April 1938. 
173. Ibid. 
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174 
about politics. 
By February 1938 the Labour Party National Executive was 
beginning to take an interest again. A meeting with the BBC was 
requested to discuss General Election broadcasts and Labour's desire 
to- broadcast on the internatio4al situation following Eden's 
175 
resignation as Foreign Secretary. In reply Cecil Graves made 
what he knew was a thoroughly safe promise: 
should we be officially informed that it was the wish of the 
Government as well as of the Official Opposition that there 
should be a broadcast discussion upon the present iss Ewe might 
be prepared to make arrangements for such a broadcast. 
In the meantime, he stated, both Government and Opposition views had 
been very fully reported in the news bulletins. The BBC Board 
similarly felt that such a discussion would merely repeat the House 
of Commons debate on the subject, which had been fully reported. 
u 
As with Churchill and India, the Labour Party's frustrated wish 
was a desire to influence public opinion and hence government policy. 
The BBC, by contrast, wished simply to inform the electorate of 
decisions taken and. opinions held. The emphasis was quite different. 
This was made clear at a meeting of representatives of the Party and 
the BBC, where Arthur Greenwood argued that a political talk had far 
greater impact on the public than any news reports of parliamentary 
proceedings. Graves, on the other hand, said that political events 
and arguments were best handled in the news, which gave a clearer 
picture of what was happening. He felt that with five news bulletins 
174. BBC, PPBG, Graves to Reith and Control Board, 30 May 1938. 
175. labour Party, NEC, Publicity, Research and Local Government 
Sub-Committee, 15 February 1938; NEC, Minutes, 23 February 
1938. 
176. BBC, PPBG, Graves to J. S. Middleton, 25 February 1938. 
177. BBC, PPBG, Reith to Middleton, 9 March 1938. 
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each evening, covering i178 tional affairs very fully, anything 
more would be superfluous. 
Nevertheless the Board was impressed with Labour's argument that 
it should 'be given occasional opportunities to broadcast, and 
impressed also by its reasonable attitude to the difficulties of the 
BBC's task. Reith told Graves that 
the initiative is with us. The Labour Party want more politics. 
179 
Governors want more politics. And I think we all do. 
Accordingly Basil Nicolls, the new Controller of Programmes, set out 
his views for the Control Board and Governors. His first point, and 
one with which the Governors and his colleagues agreed, was that the 
principal issue the Opposition wished to discuss, foreign and defence 
policy, was in the Government's opinion outside the realm of party 
politics and hence not arguable. Thus on the question of a broadcast 
on Eden's resignation, 
there is not the slightest doubt that the Government (or the 
Conservative Party, 180 the Party point of view) would have 
refused to take part. 
Party broadcasts were therefore automatically restricted to domestic 
issues, and' here the BBC's rejection of issues proposed - of an 
agenda set - by the parties, led it to look entirely to debates in 
the present parliamentary session for possible subjects, with 
interesting results. For it was found that 
apart fron foreign politics and defence issues, [the session] did 
178. BBC, PPBG, Minutes of meeting between Labour and BBC Board 
representatives, 30 March 1938. 
179.27 April 1938. Quoted by A. Briggs (1965), Op. Cit., 657. 
180. BBC, BGP, Board Memorandum G71/38,3 June 1938. See pages 551- 
611 below for a discussion of foreign affairs broadcasting. 
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not contain a single bill of any controversial significance. 
181 
The Milk Bill was the best the session could offer and it was agreed 
all round to be a reductio ad absurdum to ask the parties to wage war 
over milk. The Prison Bill, coming up in the autumn, appeared to be 
the first opportunity for real political controversy on a domestic 
issue. In the meantime the Corporation decided to increase the amount 
of non-party political affairs broadcasting and to approach the whips 
18 
yet again, in an attempt to effect a satisfactory liaison. 
Yet as on previous occasions the BBC's naturally closer links 
with the government of the day led it into error, for Tallents and 
Nicolls proceeded to consult Margesson alone before making a general 
approach. Unfortunately for Labour, Reith's departure from the BBC at 
this moment caused it to cancel a further meeting which might have 
reminded T183 nts of the need for strict impartiality in 
negotiation. The consequence was that Margesson was able to 
quash a proposal for an autumn debate on the King's speech, without 
reference to the other parties. He also urged that ministers should 
not be used for such broadcasts, thereby limiting them to 
backbenchers and so reducing their significa le and authority. 
With 
both of these suggestions Tallents concurred. As ever the summer 
recess was the cause of further delay until October, and Maconachie, 
who had not been involved in the negotiations i8 was annoyed that 
through mishandling nothing had been achieved. In the autumn, 
moreover, with the events of Munich just past, Margesson wrote again. 
to suggest that the times were too critical for party broadcasts. He 
proposed that they be held over until the New Year, a suggestion that 
181. Ibid. 
182. BBC, PPBG, Board meeting minutes, 8 June 1938. 
183. Labour Party, NEC, Campaign Committee minutes, 7 July 1938. 
184. BBC, PPBG, record by Tallents of telephone conversation with 
Margesson, 20 July 1938. 
185. BBC, PPBG, Maconachie to B. E. Nicolls, 2 August 1938. 
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the BBC could only accept. 
Matters looked set for further stalemate, yet from this point on 
events moved, for such discussions, remarkably quickly. At the first 
meeting between Attlee and the new Director General, Frederick 
Ogilvie, the latter emphasised that 
we were very anxious to include as much balanced controversy as 
possible in our programmes, but that it was 
ld 
87ficult to do this 
without agreement amongst Parties themselves. 
Attlee continued his previous comparatively reasonable and patient 
approach and promised immnediately to see Margesson with a view to 
obtaining agreement. Margesson equally showed a most co-operative 
attitude, agreeing to a monthly single programe debate, the three 
parties choosing the subject in rotation and, most importantly, the 
Government accepting a ratio of 1: 1: 1. His only stipulgagtion was that 
foreign affairs should be excluded from the debates. It was also 
agreed that backbenchers only would be used, thereby reducing the 
possibility of friction being created by these debates. Each 
programme would consist of three statements, each of fifteen minutes, 
and it seems to have been decided to discuss either topics of current 
interest not related to bills befor 18týhe House, or bills which had 
recently passed their second reading. 
Agreement had finally been reached by allowing the parties 
freedom to choose subjects and speakers, and it is clear that they 
would have accepted nothing less. Despite the success of negotiations 
Ogilvie was sufficiently dubious of the parties' continued good will 
to suggest to Nicolls and Tallents that the BBC give these debates 
186. BBC, PPBG, Margesson to Nicolls, 28 October 1938. 
187. BBC, PPBG, record of meeting of Attlee, A. Greenwood, F. Ogilvie 
and C. Graves, 1 December 1938. 
188. BBC, PPBGEB, F. Ogilvie to Control Board, 18 January 1939. 
189. BBC, TPBPD, Maconachie to Nicolls, 14 February 1939. 
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considerable publicity, 
in order that it may be less easy for the parties to slide out of 
the scheme if later it does loýt0 happen to suit the political 
convenience of any one of them. 
With a ready understanding of the niceties of euphemism he also 
recommended that they bel9al vertised as 'free and frank discussion' 
rather than 'uncensored'. 
The first debate, on 27 February 1939, was on old age pensions, 
between Sir Charles Edwards, H. Graham White and Sir Arnold Wilson, 
and it fulfilled all Maconachie's worst expectations from a programme 
point of view. The BBC's listener groups were overwhelmingly hostile: 
'very dull', 'dreadfully lamentable and disappointing', 'unutterabl 
boring' and 'political squabble that few want or appreciate'. 
Z 
Yet the difficulty of persuading all parties to debate on more 
interesting subjects, with more important speakers and in a more 
impromptu manner, was at that time too great. Nor were the objections 
to a more adventurous approach entirely on the Government side; when 
Ogilvie suggested to Attlee that he and Stafford Cripps should 
broadcast on their differences over the question of a Popular Front, 
Attlee rejected the idea: 
Hitherto political broadcasting has been confined to the 
discussion of matters at issue between recognised parties. The 
difficulty of admitting fortuitous collections of individuals had 
always been recognised as opening the door very wide to all kinds 
of cranks. I can se 19 no good reason for departing from the 
existing practice .... 
190. BBC, PPG, Ogilvie to Nicolls and Tallents, 17 February 1939. 
191. Ibid. 
192. BBC, PPBG, memorandum by Maconachie, 9 March 1939. 
193. BBC, PPBG, Attlee to Ogilvie, 16 March 1939. 
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Ogilvie, who had already assured Churchill of his intention to extend 
political broadcasting beyond the parties, protested that the present 
party debates should not be the sum total of what political 
broadcasting could and ought to become. The public demanded 
occasionally to hear a Cripps, Churchill, Lloyd George or La. nsbury 
and the BEC considered this reasonable: 
But when any particular suggestion is put forward it happens all 
too often that, for some reason, one or other of the parties to 
the discussion declines, - and the BBC is co194quently accused of 
failure to cater adequately for free speech. 
In view of the 'fiasco' of the first debate the producer, Vincent 
Alford, attempted to persuade the speakers of the second, on 
'Municipal Trading', to break up their contributions into several 
more conversational sections, but without success. It was, however, 
agreed to speak from notes rather than a script, the second and third 
speakers having advance notice of what the preceding ones would say. 
The result was a slight improvement, but in general the remaining 
debates in the series, on 'Unemployment', 'An Emergency Tax on 
Wealth' and 'Agriculture' were failures. A proposal by Attlee that 
the speeches should be followed by an impromptu discussion amongst 
the speakers failed to gain the approval of the Government and 
Liberal whips, despite the encouragement of the Corporation. The 
verdict of the Co-operative News critic on these broadcasts was fair: 
they do not dese1vee the name of debate, and they are doing no 
good to politics. 
Nevertheless, as war cut short further development, it is evident 
that distinct progress towards regular, freer - and more attractive - 
194. BBC, PPBG, Ogilvie to Attlee, 23 March 1939. 
195. BBC, TPBPD, Attlee to Nicolls, 4 May 1939; Nicolls to Attlee, 5 
May 1939; C. Edwards to Nicolls, 11 May 1939. 
196. Co-operative News, 27 May 1939. 
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party affairs broadcasting was being made. The single programme 
debate and the Government's waiving of its insistence on a 2: 1 ratio 
helped; and there can be little doubt that before long criticise 
would have led the parties to accept a less structured format, as 
Attlee was already suggesting. The freer atmosphere was demonstrated 
in particular by a special debate arranged in May on the question of 
Palestine. Malcolm MacDonald had been due to give a ministerial 
broadcast on the Palestine Report. When Attlee complained, however, 
that this report was not that of a Royal Commission but was a 
statement of Government p1licy, opposed by Labour and Liberals, 97 
Ogilvie readily concurred. He immediately contacted MacDonald, 
cancelling the broadcast and offering him a choice either of a 
controversial discussion or of a 19inisterial 
broadcast after the 
issue had been through parliament. In his turn MacDonald proved 
more amenable to persuasion than other ministers in the past and 
agreed to a debate. In view of the fact that the issue of Palestine 
was highly topical, that the broadcast took place only five days 
after it was first proposed and before the parliamentary debate, and 
that all the speakers were front benchers, the whole event was 
something of a new and daring experiment. Its success as a programme 
demonstrated that topicality and experienced broadcasters (MacDonald, 
Lloyd George, Tom Williams and Sir Thomas Inskip) could make 
political discussion attractive as well as instructive. 
. 
One final indication of a greater boldness of approach was 
provided by a discussion of political affairs broadcasting by the 
BBC's General Advisory Can ittee, in May 1939. On this occasion there 
was an almost unanimous expression of a desire for greater 
independence from the parties. Each speaker in turn deprecated the 
control the whips had over the present series. Lord Lothian, for 
example, argued that the BBC could indeed be 
197. BBC, P'PB"B, record of telephone call from Attlee to Ogilvie, 18 
May 1939. 
198. BBC, PPBMB, record of telephone call fron Ogilvie to 
M. MacDonald's secretary, 18 May 1939. 
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a better judge of the tendencies which were important and the 
personalities who ought to be heard certainly than the Whips, who 
were influencle9d9 by an entirely different set of 
considerations. 
There was a widespread call for the discussion of foreign affairs, 
and both Nicolls and Ogilvie emphasised that the BBC would happily 
arrange it if the parties would agree. The general conclusion was 
that 
the BBC should be ready to take a greater measure of 
responsibility upon itself in the arrangement of broadcast 
political speeche 2a and debates including the selection of 
political speakers. 
There was no time for these more hopeful signs to develop; the 
war brought everything to a halt. Nor had there been more than slight 
indications of progress. Throughout the 1930s the BBC had been 
frustrated at every turn by party wrangling, by government reticence 
and, it must be said, by its own essentially 'responsible' and 
respectful outlook. Prevented by external factors from developing to 
any extent the presentation of party political affairs, its own 
inherent antipathy to party politics had made it disinclined to 
gainsay the parties and make the attempt by itself. Broadcasting 
balance still meant and could only mean balance of output rather than 
of opportunity, and the BBC was simply not yet in a position to take 
a different line. Yet to try to persuade all parties to agree both on 
an agenda and on an equitable distribution of air-time was an almost 
impossible task. It was therefore hardly surprising that the 
Corporation came through only with a question mark over its political 
independence, and the label 'timid' around its neck. 
199. BBC, GAC, meanorandum GAC. 123,24 May 1939. 
200. BBC, GAC, minutes, 24 May 1939. 
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Note A. 
An impression of Neville Chamberlain's approach to broadcasting 
can be gained from his letter to his sister Hilda on 21 April 1935 - 
NC18/1/913 : 
I am glad that you heard and approved my broadcast. My P[rivate] 
S[ecretary] gave me, at my request, a draft - largely consisting 
of extracts from the [budget] speech. But I felt that for the 
broadcast something more homely was wanted, and I sat down and 
wrote it straight off, almost exactly as it was delivered. I am 
sure that it was because it was my own thought and not someone 
else's that it made such an impression. I was quite amazed at the 
effect. Two quite different people, who are regular listeners, 
were reported to me by friends as having said it was the best 
speech they had ever heard on the wireless. The press in the 
lobby who listened to it said the Government ought not in future 
to let any other Minister do their broadcasting and Stanhope told 
me it made him feel "quite choky". 
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RAPIER EIGHT 
Broadcasting and Politics: General Political and Foreign Affairs 
Broadcasting, 1931 - 1939. 
"It is by obtaining the willing co-operation of speakers that the BBC 
exercises control (the picture, sometimes drawn, of the Director of 
Talks as an autocrat with blue pencil is wide of the markt). " 
Unsigned memorandum for BBC General Advisory 
Committee, 17 May 1939. 
"what I wanted to tell you has been so censored and altered and cut. 
up by the BBC that I consider it impossible for me to give a talk 
without it being a travesty of the British working class. " 
Broadcast statement by William Ferrie, March 
1934. 
"in each country where the international conception survives and 
struggles, the Nazi threat cuts across the free development of the 
wireless: a demand grows either to utilise our own radio for a 
similar nationalistic purpose, or more often, to curb its educative 
functions lest in letting comwon people know the truth, we rouse then 
to anger or incur the wrath of the Fascist Powers. " 
Kingsley Martin, Public Opinion Quarterly, 1939. 
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The BBC was fundamentally committed to democratic education. This 
commitment, in addition to the aversion of many of its senior staff 
to the very idea of adversary and hence party politics, plus its 
repeated frustration in attempting to develop party broadcasting 
during the 1920s and 1930s, combined to make more general political 
affairs coverage the most important element of the Corporation's 
overall political output. Such programs - talks, debates, 
discussions, news and parliamentary reports - were ones in which, 
theoretically at least, it had greater freedom from external 
influence. Even ministerials were broadcast rather as part of the 
Corporation's pledge to political education than out of constraint. 
Yet in practice parties and government paid considerable attention to 
these forms of broadcasting, and the story of their development is 
one of both internal and external influences. 
It was significant that whilst Labour supporters were most vocal 
in protesting against party broadcast ratios, excessive numbers of 
ministerials and news bias, the Conservative Party reacted most 
strongly to the normal talks and discussion series. Ullswater gave a 
reason for this which, whilst not completely accurate, was broadly 
speaking sound: 
It must be recognised as inevitable that more prominence is given 
to the leaders of the political party in power than to the 
Opposition ... [Ministerial broadcasts] tend naturally to stress 
the beneficence of Government activities. There is an equally 
inevitable tendency in the general probes of the Corporation 
to devote more time to the expression of new ideas and the 
advocacy of change, in social and other spheres, than to the 
defence of orthodoxy and stability, since the reiteration of what 
exists and is familiar is not so interesting as the exposition of 
what might be. 
The BBC, in attempting to be politically impartial, had therefore not 
1. Cmd. 5091 (1936), Report of the Broadcasting Committee, 1935, 
paragraph 89. 
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only to resist pressure from the political parties, but also to avoid 
giving excessive emphasis to programming traits which automatically 
militated against impartiality, or rather against a balanced output. 
Yet if the loudest protests came from the parties, the most 
subtle and influential constraints came directly from the Government. 
This continuous, for the most part seemingly innocuous, pressure can 
be traced in news, ministerial broadcasting, government departmental 
notices and ordinary political affairs programmes. For the most part 
it was not deliberately aimed at restricting the BBC's independence, 
and certainly not consciously at influencing the audience in positive 
directions. Rather it was the consequence of a variety of seemingly 
reasonable considerations mediating a responsible reaction from the 
broadcasters. In particular it was in the field of foreign affairs 
broadcasting and programmes with possible international ramifications 
that the Corporation encountered external pressures which it found 
impossible to ignore. The BBC's true freedom of action must be 
considered questionable when the exact relationship between it, the 
Foreign Office and the government of the day is studied. 
Internal factors also played their part in the Corporation's 
comparative failure to do all that it might to achieve the task of 
democratic integration and political education as originally 
envisaged. One such factor was the relatively crude state of 
programme technique. Particular forms of presentation could be every 
bit as restrictive as other influences, and only gradually did the 
methods which are now at the very heart of current affairs 
broadcasting - the interview, the impromptu discussion, the magazine 
programme, the professional broadcaster - begin to evolve. All these 
developments were foreshadowed in the 1930s and experimentation was 
considerable; but none was fully formed and accepted when war broke 
out, whilst what was done was not necessarily progress in the 
originally intended direction. 
But inevitably the most important internal factor was the BBC's 
own attitude to political affairs programming. It will be suggested 
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below that, keen as it was to utilise broadcasting for political 
education, certain inconsistencies in its approach to the practical 
pursuit of this objective rendered the goal virtually unattainable, 
certainly within the prevailing political and international climate. 
Nevertheless it remains clear that the BBC regarded a large 
proportion of its talks output as politically educative, and in the 
ideologically charged atmosphere of the 1930s it was certainly 
possible to consider broadcast series with such titles as 'The Modern 
State', 'Freedom and Authority in the Modern World', 'War or Peace' 
and 'The Citizen and His Government' as positive contributions to the 
debate within, and as to the validity of, the democratic system. 
Given the Corporation's considerable output in these years it would 
be neither desirable nor possible to give a comprehensive programs 
by progranme account. Our concern is with inferences and change and 
we will concentrate only on such programmes as demonstrate these. Yet 
throughout the period there was a steady, if comparatively limited, 
output of programmes - of nightly news bulletins, topical talks, 
discussion series and debates, which, although not directly 
considering political affairs in party political terms (news 
excepted), were undoubtedly making a very real contribution to 
political education both in general ideology and particular 
knowledge. 
i) Programme Technique. 
Not the least of the BBC's problems was the restrictiveness of 
its own broadcasting techniques. Mention has been made of how the 
spoken tradition rather than the journalistic shaped the 
Corporation's approach. But in addition its dislike of press methods, 
of sensationalism, half-truth and haste, made it favour an altogether 
cooler and more studied presentation of facts and issues. Those 
considerations which were of paramount importance to the newspaper - 
immediacy, scoops, the instant retailing and comment upon events - 
were felt to have relevance only to the broadcast news, and then only 
when the higher criterion of truth was assured. Topicality was a 
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relative term and the day-to-day development of an issue, which was 
the very stuff of the press, was eschewed in favour of a far longer 
term approach. The Corporation addressed itself to informing its 
listeners of the fundamental issues at stake in any subject. It had 
no wish to contribute daily to the influencing of public opinion; 
such moment-by-moment analysis of events was all too often 
conjectural, based on incomplete and frequently misleading evidence, 
and in its turn only encouraged further unjustified speculation. The 
need to feed the public's emotional craving for the latest 
information was far less important than the need to ensure that such 
information as was provided was accurate, complete and impartial. 
Having no desire, either commercial or political, to participate in 
pressure politics or to 'impart a particular line to the largest 
possible audience, and rightly aware of the risk of doing so, Reith 
considered the loss of immediacy a small price for political 
integrity. 
There were technical reasons also for the cooler approach. 
Scannell and Cardiff have very pertinently pointed out how serious a 
hindrance to instant current affairs analysis 2was 
the complete 
absence of an in-house news collecting service. Lacking its own 
reporters/commentators, the BBC had to rely almost entirely on 
outside experts to expand the information it transmitted beyond that 
provided by the news agencies. The use of such experts was usually 
only possible by pre-arrangement and a considerable foreknowledge of 
events, for the type of man the BBC used - even regulars such as 
Bartlett and Barry - was usually at the top of his profession, in a 
full-time occupation completely unrelated to broadcast punditry. Nor 
had the role of broadcasting guru yet achieved such kudos as to make 
it likely that eleventh-hour invitations to broadcast would be 
instantly accepted. The BBC's one foray into taking a political 
commentator - Vernon Bartlett - permanently on to its staff was not 
2. P. Scannell and D. Cardiff, 'The Social Foundations of British 
Broadcasting', in Mass Comnunications and Society, Open 
University 1977. 
3. BBC, GAC, GAC. 71 (37), April 1937. 
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to be a success, and after his departure in 1933 it fought shy of 
repeating the experiment. The Corporation was very conscious of 
its responsibility neither to editorialise nor to be believed to be 
editorialising. Its policy of training the voices of its announcers 
and news-readers into bland, anonymous tones was one reaction to this 
responsibility, whilst its aversion to employing its own reporters 
and commentators was another. There was as yet no such animal as the 
professional broadcaster. Indeed Charles Gardner has suggested that 
one reason why the BBC's news collection and reporting service 
developed so slowly was because of concern that st5aff reporters would 
have to take direct responsibility for output. Although the BBC 
took editorial responsibility for what was said by the experts used 
to provide progranme matter, it was nevertheless felt that this 
responsibility allowed greater latitude for both BBC and speaker than 
would have been possible had the relationship been a permanent 
contractual one. It made it less essential - though still very 
important - that errors or bias be corrected before transmission. 
Mistakes by an employee might possibly have involved dismissal; 
transgressions by an outside speaker would result at worst in his not 
being used again. 
The majority of programmes were, of course, scripted, and this 
again meant that rapid analysis of events was difficult. Hilda 
Matheson's technical reasons for this have already been mentioned and 
the General Advisory Council was informed that vetting occurred, 'in 
the interests of adequacy, accuracy, impartiality, good taste and, 
incidentally, the avoidance of advertisement or libel'. The 
memorandum to the GAC from which this comes is a fascinating 
document, for it set out clearly the BBC's model approach to the 
coverage of an issue. Paragraphs 14 and 16 are worth quoting in their 
entirety: 
4. See pp. 562-583 below. 
5. L. Miall, Richard Dimbleby, London 1966,13. 
6. BBC, GAC, GAC. 120 (39), paragraph 15,17 May 1939. 
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14) In arranging discussions on current problems the first task 
of the Talks Department is to ascertain, in consultation with 
recognised authorities, the different points of view which have 
to be represented. It next has to select the speakers who are 
best qualified as regards both knowledge of the subject and 
broadcasting suitability, to represent them. A discussion in 
which three or four speakers are to take part requires long 
preparation and laborious rehearsals for its successful 
presentation and one of the chief difficulties is to find 
speakers of the desired calibre who are willing to spend the 
necessary time and trouble. 
16) The general purpose of a talk and its place in the prograsie 
is discussed at the outset between the prospective speaker and a 
representative of the Talks Department. Later a script is 
submitted and this is examined first by the individual "producer" 
concerned and then by the Director of Talks himself. Queries and 
suggestions are then discussed with the speaker and almost 
invariably by this process agreement is reached. Only very rarely 
has a speaker, by unwillingness to adopt required modifications, 
made necessary a cancellation of his engagement. As soon as 
speakers appreciate the Corporation's aims and its special 
responsibility they are usually most ready to accept criticisms 
and suggestions. It is by obtaining the willing co-operation of 
speakers that the BBC exercises control (the picture sometimes 
drawn of the Director 7f Talks as an autocrat with a blue pencil 
is wide of the mark! ). 
That many potential speakers were not prepared to 8spend 
the 
amount of time required by the BBC was a real problem. To many 
eminent politicians and other speakers rehearsal seemed unnecessary, 
for they had a lifetime's experience of addressing public meetings. 
7. Ibid., paragraphs 14 and 16. 
8. Conversely on those few occasions when instant coment was 
required some were not prepared to give a quick and 
'unconsidered' statement - BBC, PPBB, Matheson to Reith, 18 
February 1927. 
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Many were also unaccustomed to speaking from a prepared text and 
found spontaneity difficult in these circumstances. It was 
therefore difficult to persuade such speakers to rehearse, 
particularly when it was so difficult for them to gauge the result, 
there being no feedback from a microphone. Speakers received no 
instant response or uplift from broadcasting as they did from 
meetings and many consequently received little personal pleasure from 
the experience. 
Despite these difficulties the BBC laid great stress on the 
desirability of using the highest authorities for its prograames, 
either the men who made the news, or the most informed experts. Such 
a policy, it was felt, gave the greatest guarantee of accuracy and 
established the BBC's reputation for reliability and truth. Such a 
policy was also in line with the Corporations's inherent regard for 
certain forms of institutional respectability and authority - 
particularly the academic. As far as party politics were concerned, 
no one had yet really considered the idea of having broadcasters talk 
about the parties and party policy rather than having the parties 
talk themselves, and this was not surprising considering party 
jealousy as to the projection of their in image. Indeed in 1938 
Basil Nicolls wrote that for party politics, 
the accepted and only acceptable treatment is that of uncensored 
emotional appeals by Front Benchers. 
The suggestion that the parties should each appoint an experienced 
broadcasting 'champion' to put their point of view on all issues was 
rejected by Sir Richard Maconachie as a sorry 'mess of potage'. 
Hot topicality was made difficult not only by the length of time 
9. Baldwin and Chamberlain, for example, both spoke usually from 
rough notes alone. ' 
10. BBC, BGP, B. Nicolls to BBC Governors (G. 71/38), 3 June 1938. 
11. BBC, PPBG, memorandum by Maconachie, 18 May 1938. 
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it took to prepare a series but also by the time it took to transmit 
it. The series on India in 1935 was unusual in being compressed by 
having two talks each week, yet it still took six weeks from 
beginning to end. The compression and summary of argument, even in 
single programme debates, would have to await the development of the 
professional broadcaster and the regular, informal current affairs 
slot. Until then experts and representatives of different opinion 
would have to speak for themselves. This either reduced the number of 
voices and hence opinions it was considered possible to present in a 
single debate, or resulted in a larger series format. Yet the former 
was felt to be unrepresentative of the true range of views, whilst 
the latter effectively reduced the time available for the discussion 
of a wider spectrum of issues. It also provoked a running debate as 
to whether programmes should be balanced within themselves, the 
argument being that a large part of the audience would only hear 
individual talks, rather than the entire series, and would therefore 
receive an unbalanced picture. 
The crude state of recording and editing technology for much of 
the period was an additional factor. Blattnerphones were first 
brought to the BBC in 1931, but the problems of editing steel tape 
made it a costly and awkward facility. Difficulties in 'mixing', 
editing, compressing, moulding and generally tightening up programnes 
after recording, delayed the introduction of such techniques for use 
in talks and ensured continued reliance upon rehearsal and careful 
script preparation to achieve some of these ends in live 
transmission. In any case there was a widespread dislike of recorded 
programmes within the Corporation, where it was felt that they were 
not quite honest. The main objection to editing talks and 
discussions, however, was that the line between editing and 
editorialising would have been too fine to be acceptable to those 
being edited. The idea of 'editing' talks programmes was barely 
considered in the 1930s, but the problems involved were not the least 
of the reasons why presentational technique evolved so gradually. 
This is not to suggest that the BBC was satisfied with its 
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existing programme formats. Siepnnnn, for example, found symposia too 
'cumbrous' and 'embarrassing' on pry grounds. 
12 
Lionel 
Fielden, for his part, told him that alr3ranged studio debates were 
nearly always boring and platitudinous. Sir Arthur Salter of the 
GAC similarly complained that written debates rarely gave the 
impression of reality, whilst Walter Elliot advised Siepmann that 
Debates, as we found earlier, need to be written by someone for 
two actors; and political debates are only bearable in the House 
of Commons. It's lhýe 
possibility of a division that makes a 
debate worth while. 
By contrast the Yorkshire Post expressed its preference for single 
programme debates over talks, as both viewpoints were included in one 
programme, whilst Popular Wireless was incensed that the 1932 party 
debates consisted merely of two uninterrupted statements: 
Shame!.... ' No chance of hearing some snappy interjection; no 
chance of hearing a witty spot of repartee .... not even in the 
House of Commons, let alone on a debating platform, 15 
there any 
rigid enforcement of a rule forbidding interruptions. 
When talks producer Roger Wilson tried to arrange a debate with a 
scripted dialogue he discovered that when one speaker altered his 
argument in order to answer the other, then his opponent altered his 
12. BBC, PPBG, Siepmann to Reith, 21 June 1932. 
13. BBC, PPBPPB, Fielden to Siepmann, 20 June 1933. 
14. BBC, GAC, memorandum by Sir Arthur Salter on 'News and 
Discussions', May 1935. The Manchester Guardian complained that 
'a wireless debate is not satisfactory. It smacks too much of 
rehearsal. Answers fall too pat; stroke and parry have the 
lifelessness of an exhibition bout rather than the thrill of a 
real contest'. - 31 December 1930; BBC, CWE, W. Elliot to 
Siepmann, 6 April 1932. 
15. The Yorkshire Post, 24 February 1933; Popular Wireless, 15 
October 1 332. 
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16 
original statement in order to evade the reply. Another producer, 
Mary Adams, encountered a different problem with speakers who 
considered the responsibility of broadcasting too seriously: 
Speakers do in fact censor themselves before they begin to write 
for broadcasting, and it is this moral censorship which in fact 17 
endangers the freedom of the microphone. 
One of the Governors, Lord Bridgeman, pointed out another, curiously 
modern, danger, when he noticed that already a certain number of 
known and experienced experts were being used repeatedly: 
The public will grow weary o lga continuous stage army 
marching 
regularly through our studios. 
Reith himself was well aware that the novelty of broadcasting would 
not by itself be sufficient to sustain audience interest in serious 
talks. As he told an American audience in 1931, 
There was a risk of educational ballyhoo as well as commercial 
ballyhoo - an assertion that this labelled brand of culture was 
the only culture, as this labelled brand of soap was the only 
soap. That was not the way to sell goods, material or spiritual, 
to the radio audience. Ballyhoo, whether pontifical or 
cocmercial, 19olated 
the first principles of showmanship and 
presentation. 
Ideas as to the best methods of presentation were therefore 
constantly changing, although experimentation did not always bring 
the hoped for results. Matheson and Siepmann had attempted a number 
16. BBC, TU HT 1936, R. Wilson to W. Eady (Unemployment Assistance 
Board), 19 May 1936. 
17. BBC, TDD, Mary Adams to Rose-Troup, 13 March 1936. 
18. BBC, BGP, memorandum by Lord Bridgeman, 11 February 1933. 
19. J. C. W. Reith (1949), Op. Cit., 145 - 146. 
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of unscripted debates, but had come down heavily in favour of 
scripted and rehearsed programs. By 1935, however, new talks 
personnel were becoming frustrated by the restrictiveness of a 
debate, and new experiments were made in unscripted discussions. 
Initial debates with four speakers proved too confusing for the 
listener, however, whilst some debaters found it difficult, 0 
unrehearsed, to compress their argument into a few minutes. Mary 
Adams considered that topics were too cautiously chosen: 'Ideally the 
speakers should have strong views on lively topical subjects'. 
Indeed the most topical issue discussed in the first series of 
unscripted debates was 'flats versus houses', whilst anything party 
political was completely avoided. 
Despite these problems the Progranme Committee considered the 
experiment a success, particularly since goodwill had been gained by 
the absence of censorship an22a good way had been found of dealing 
with 'controversial' issues. Between 1935 and 1939 an effective 
debating format was devised in which each speaker was allowed to make 
a brief uninterrupted statement of his case, followed by an impromptu 
discussion, rehearsal being greatly reduced. 
This technique was pioneered not at Broadcasting House but by the 
BBC's Midland Region. Indeed some of the most controversial debates 
of these years took place on the region's 'Midland Parliament'. 
Started in 1934, certain programmes in the series were broadcast 
nationally from 1936 onwards. The monthly debates were primarily on 
industrial topics such as 'Overtime', 'Should employers be 
licenced? ', 'The five day week' and 'What are Fair Wages? ', but many 
of these had political implications. Some were even more directly 
political, as in 'Land Settlement and Unemployment', 'Family 
Allowances', 'Paid Holidays', 'Higher Wages and Shorter Hours' and 
20. BBC, GAC, memorandum by Sir Arthur Salter, May 1935; TDD, 
Gladstone Murray to Graves, 19 November 1935. 
21. BBC, TDD, M. Adams to Rose-Troup, 13 March 1936. 
22. BBC, TDD, Programme Committee minutes, 21 November 1935. 
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23 
'Strikes or Conciliation'. The series, which used industrialists, 
MPs, trade unionists, workers and others, proved extremely popular, 
and by 1938 an equivalent, broadcast nationally from London, was 
being considered. 
24 
It was hoped that25 ch a regular debating arena 
might tempt the parties to take part. In North Region, similarly, 
a series called 'Northern Cockpit' allowed both experts and ordinary 
people to make a number of short statements within the same programme 
on topical issues of local interest. 
The planning of one series of unrehearsed discussions, however, 
demonstrated well a strong tendency within the BBC to emasculate 
initially bold proposals. In November 1936 Roger Wilson proposed a 
weekly discussion, to be called 'Men Talking', between three 
individuals from the moderate Right to the moderate Left, on one of 
the week's news items. The subjects could be social, political, 26 
economic or artistic. He suggested that so long as 'a BBC 
disclaimer was broadcast at the beginning of each programme such 
topics as intervention in Spain, rearmament and hunger-marchers could 
be discussed. The speakers should not be the usual experts and 
university men, and 
I would make a point of using, from time to time at any rate, 
people with strongly marked accents and, in some c Zs7 s, a weak 
sense of logic, but considerable emotional intensity. 
23. BBC, TMR, Talks-Midland Region File. 
24. BBC, BGP, Director General's report to Board, 14 October 1936: 
'Interesting evidence of the extent to which "Midland 
Parliament" has become established as an important broadcasting 
feature is provided by the decision of the Midland Miners' 
Federation to circularise their members (some 50,000) with a 
recommendation that they should listen to the opening meeting 
of the "Parliament" this autumn'. 
25. BBC, PPBG, memorandum for Board by B. Nicolls (G. 71/38), 3 June 
1938. 
26. BBC, TDD, R. Wilson to Mary Adams, 3 November 1936. 
27. BBC, TDD, R. Wilson to J. M. Rose-Troup, 13 November 1936. 
s. 
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This proposal, which was intended for the afternoon slot for the 
unemployed, was particularly interesting for the purpose which lay 
behind it: 
I hope these discussions will reveal the way people feel about 
subjects rather than a potted scientific analysis of the problem. 
... o if they are successful, listeners will recognise that the 
BBC is departing at one point from its28general policy of 
passionless exposition of logical positions. 
People would then begin to regard broadcasting as 'more human' than 
they currently did. 
The Director of Talks, J. M. Rose-Troup, gave his blessing to the 
idea and appeared to approve all its innovations. Yet almost 
immediately it became obvious that he did not share Wilson's 
confidence in the efficacy of a disclaimer. He emphasised to him the 
limits which the BBC's policy of balanced discussion imposed: 
It must be made quite clear to [speakers] that they must be 
careful about generalisations and they must not make attacks on 
interests not represented in the discussion, or develop their 
views in such a way as to involve us in the necessity of 
providing microphone facilities for an official answer to be 
given. It must be impressed upon them all that they have a very 
great responsibility, and that we are trusting them not to land 
2 
us in difficulties. 
Once Rose-Troup had discussed the series with Cecil Graves, the 
Controller of Programmes, further restrictions were imposed. For 
whereas Wilson had wanted the subjects to be highly topical, by 
having the speakers choose them on the day of the debate, Graves 
insisted that he be informed of the subjects even before the speakers 
28. BBC, TDD, R. Wilson to Rose-Troup, 13 November 1936. 
29. BBC, TDD, Rose-Troup to R. Wilson, 7 December 1936. 
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were selected. 
30 
From having been an extremely topical set of 
debates the series had turned into one planned long in advance. 
Although it retained its non-expert and more emotional character and 
although Graves approved rearmament as a topic, its value as a 
political affairs vehicle had gone. The only 'political' issues 
discussed were the inheritance of wealth, whether there should be an 
aristocracy and university representation in parliament. In the 
second and third series nothing remotely political was considered, 
although Wilson proposed foreign affairs, Russi3a1 and the Means Test, 
all issues of great interest to the unemployed. 
One of the most interesting points to be drawn from this example 
is that although Rose-Troup and Graves were prepared to have 
political issues such as rearmament and Spanish intervention 
discussed, they considered it only possible if absolute balance. was 
preserved within each programme, so that replies were not necessary. 
Another debate on the highly political concept of 'Planning', between 
Harold Macmillan, John Strachey and Arnold Plant, was able to be 
unscripted only because, 'All three of the 3understood the necessity 
of balancing each other's opinions. ' The restriction of 
'balance', which thus virtually excluded such topics from an 
unrehearsed and more emotional type of debate, was the inevitable 
consequence of the limited amount of political affairs programming, 
and of the absence of a regular, informal programme into which such 
replies as Rose-Troup feared could be placed without disrupting the 
advertised prograzmie. The more time given to political affairs 
broadcasting the less crucially important would balance within a 
programme or series become; the more flexible the existing format of 
political affairs programmes, and the more compressed the argument, 
the less time would be needed to achieve the same end. After the war 
the magazine programme - 'At Home and Abroad' and on television 
'Tonight' and 'Panorama' - would help greatly to reduce these 
30. BBC, TDD, Graves to Rose-Troup, 18 December 1936. 
31. BBC, TUT, Wilson to Maconachie, 13 February 1937. 
32. BBC, TDD, C. V. Salmon to Maconachie, 4 May 1937. 
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problems. Before 1939 there were only occasional attempts at such a 
format. Indeed one objection to the whole idea of programmes dealing 
with topics previously unadvertised in Radio Times was that people 
would not listen if their interest had not been aroused in 33 
advance. 
The first such experiment (outside the news and the Variety 
Department's popular 'In Town Tonight') was a series in the spring of. 
1935, called 'From the Four Corners'. In this three or four speakers 
gave brief talks on different subjects within each programme. The 
topics were not controversial or political, but the series 'suggested 
new possibilities of technique', and in 1936 there w3 started a 
similar series which did deal with political affairs. This was 
'Topics in the Air', a weekly half hour programme containing two or 
three talks. As with subsequent magazine programmes the subjects 
varied from politics to art and science, so that typical items 
included the examination system, the Physical Society's annual 
exhibition, the Egyptian constitution and treaty with Britain, 
Rhodesia, cinemas, starlings, Spain, Japan, Gainsborough, defence 
. 
(Liddell Hart), economic conditions, income tax law (Josiah Stampf, 
Chinese art and the Ribbon Development Act in Hampshire. 
Interestingly several talks described and included criticism of bills 
before, or shortly to go before parliament. Thus Liddell Hart, 
speaking a few days before aC amens debate on defence, approved 
government attempts to improve co-ordination between the three 
services, but suggested that more should be done. Josiah Stamp 
similarly stated that there could be modifications in details of the 
coming bill on income tax law, whilst speakers on bills relating to 
tithes, midwifery and the school leaving age, all indicated that 
33. BBC, TSE, Miss Sprott to Rose-Troup, 3 December 1936. 
34. BBC, BGP, Director General's report, 10 April 1935. 
35. BBC, TTIA, Talks - 'Topics in the Air' file. 
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improvements to them were possible. 
36 
The following year a similar 
series called 'Week by Week' discussed issues such as 'The Budget: 
before and after', the right of search at sea and Waziristan. 
Difficulty was encountere3d7, however, in getting authoritative 
speakers at short notice, and it would seem that by 1939 the 
equivalent series, 'Qu3egstions in the Air', was not attempting to 
discuss headline news. Nevertheless it did deal with such issues 
as conscription, trade agreements and Empire migration. 
The state of recording and editing technology was an obvious 
factor in hindering the development of the magazine programme. Only 
when fast cutting and editing became easier would the high speed 
magazine format evolve. Yet crude as it was some producers did 
experiment with pre-recorded inserts. Thus in a series called 'Its 
Happening Now', in January 1937, current social experiments such as 
nursery schooling, health centres, community associations and land 
settlement schemes were 39 mined through the recorded comments of 
those actively involved. Similarly producer C. V. Salmon made use 
of recorded comments in his series on the coal industry in November 
. of the same year. 
He visualised using up to twenty different voices 
in a single programme, taken largely from the miners themselves and 
recorded at the pit. He also recognised the value of recording both 
for cutting down long-winded statements to a reasonable length and 
for making tedious official comments interesting: 
Official views, as we well know, do not make even tolerable 
broadcasting .... we are going to escape from this dilemma by 
introducing the official views as recorded statements in argument 
or narrative which will be robust enough40 to support them and 
lively enough to carry them without tedium. 
36. BBC, 'Topics in the Air' talks scripts, 15 February 1936,, 7 
March 1936,4 April 1936,11 April 1936,23 May 1936. 
37. BBC, GAC, monthly report (GAC. 71), April 1937. 
38. BBC, TIP, G. Barnes to Siepia. nn, 13 March 1939. 
39. BBC, TSE, Talks - Social Experiments File. 
40. BBC, TC, C. V. Salmon to Maconachie, 30 April 1937. 
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These were tentative beginnings to techniques which would become 
essential elements of current affairs broadcasting. Yet more 
important still than the magazine programme or recording and editing, 
for effective compression and presentation of a subject, was to be 
the development of the professional broadcaster and the interview 
technique. Towards the former the BBC had a somewhat ambivalent 
attitude. As early as October 1928 an article in the Radio Times had 
pointed out that experts rarely made good broadcasters, and had 
asked, 
Why not divorce the talk-maker from the talking? In other words 
why not take full advantage of the special aptitudes of experts 
in pure knowledge and skilled write4s, but enlist the specialised 
artist for fit and proper delivery? 
This, however, was an idea which the Talks Department strongly 
rejected. It was felt that the writer gave greater interest and 
humanityt to the reading of his own talk than would a professional 
speaker. Emphasis was therefore laid not only on the question of 
whether a man had anything worth saying, but also on whether he had a 
good broadcasting manner. Again the belief that the BBC's information 
should be seen to come fron the highest and most reliable 
authorities, straight from the horse's mouth, was an important 
consideration, and Basil Nicolls wrote in 1938 that 
we have always set our face against the champion method in 
private talks - i. e. the delivery of bad broadcasters' scripts by 
the announcers, etc. - and this, in a sense, is one of the 
fundamental principles of good broadcasting. 
There was also initially a certain aversion to the idea of radio 
personalities who, it was feared, would command too much authority 
41. Radio Times, 26 October 1928. 
42. Radio Times, 2 November 1928. 
43. BBC, PPBG, Nicolls to Graves, 30 May 1938. 
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for that fact alone. 
When, however, the BBC discovered experts who were also very good 
broadcasters, it rapidly learnt of the many advantages to be gained 
from using them repeatedly. In this way Gerald Barry, Vernon 
Bartlett, Stephen King-Hall and John Hilton became the first 
generation of regular, though freelance, broadcast talks 
personalities, used as much for their mastery of the medium as for 
their considerable knowledge of particular subjects. Thus personality 
and popularity could actually be used as an aid to serious 
broadcasting, and it was hoped without a significant loss of 
integrity, as Hilda Matheson declared: 
By developing the personal link which broadcasting so constantly 
forges between speakers and writers, and by centralising the main 
business of explaining news in the hands of a few individuals 
possessing the rare combination of first class knowledge, the 
-right voice and the right personality, criticism has been avoided 
and a degree of popularity secured for this kind of service which 
was previously undreamed of. 
It was a short step from the BBC using speakers for their 
existing knowledge to commissioning them to survey a particular topic 
and make a broadcast report. Thus in 1933 the author and journalist 
S. P. B. Mais, already an experienced broadcaster on travel and books, 
was commissioned to visit and talk on voluntary relief schemes for 
the unemployed. Even more interestingly Howard Marshall, the BBC's 
news reader and sports commentator, was used in a series on housing 
and slums, visiting a number of cities and towns in order to study 
and rep4o5 on slum conditions and efforts to alleviate the 
problem. He was used solely because of his professional 
broadcasting ability, and not because of any foreknowledge of the 
subject. In these two series Hilda Matheson foresaw tremendous 
44. H. Matheson, Broadcasting, London 1933,93. 
45. BBC, TH, Talks - Housing File. 
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possibilities: 
In both instances the speakers were not official experts using 
official language, still less politicians; but broadcasters 
capable of surveying the field as a whole and presenting it in 
this "new way" to the widest possible audience. If such methods 
are increasingly used, the yawning gulf between expert and 
citizen may yet be bridged, and the awkward lag in time between 
perceiving a remedy amend making it understood and accepted may be 
appreciably reduced. 
N 
In the series 'Its Happening Now', in 1937, Marshall was again used 
as 'compere' (Rose-Troup's description), but this time with a 
difference, for he acted as introducer and link man to the various 
recorded statements and'in particulaar asked questions, 'in the role 
of a critical and puzzled outsider'. 
The interview developed in parallel with the professional 
broadcaster. As early as 1924 a 'broadcast interview' between a 
journalist and the actress Gladys Cooper had been tried out, but had 
not led to further experimentation. In August 1929, however, Hilda 
Matheson hit upon the idea of broadcasting conversations between 
distinquished individuals and a 
"plain man" ... who shall ask pe 4r 
$inent questions whenever he or 
she gets out of his or her depth. 
Following this up, a series of talks was arranged on 'problems of 
everyday 
, 
life', between Gerald Barry and selected experts. The 
technique had two objectives - improved clarity and greater balance - 
as Siepmann explained: 
46. H. Matheson, Op. Cit., 97. 
47. BBC, TSE, Rose-Troup to potential participant, 15 December 
1936. 
48. BBC, TDD, Matheson to R. Eckersley, 20 August 1929. 
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These discussions should help us to break new ground in 
approaching controversial subjects in an uncontroversial way. Mr. 
Gerald Barry will be the tempering influence throughout, 
adjusting the balance of views and securing that neither 
prejudice nor extremist opinion holds the field. He will also 
ensure that all important aspects of the problem are reasonably 
49 
treated in the case of each discussion. 
This device proved valuable and its use was continued. In a 
series on 'War or Peace' in November 1931 Basil Liddell Hart 
interviewed three experts on modern sea, land and air warfare, 
although these talks were pre-scripted. The 'plain' man was rarely 
plain, as R. A. Rendall explained: 
The "ordinary man" is chosen above all for his ability as a 
broadcaster. He must also know enough about the subject to ask 
questions (he is often not at all ordinary and may know as much 
as the expert but also know how to conceal his knowledge, and put 
himself in the place of the ignorant). 
These were qualities required equally by the professional broadcaster 
and so it was not surprising that men such as Howard Marshall and 
John Hilton were used in programmes involving personal report and 
interview. 
Despite the success of these methods of presentation their use 
remained limited, perhaps due to the higher cost of employing an 
49. BBC, TDD, Siepmann to Reith. The planned series consisted of 
nine discussions on 'Are we free? ', including: ownership of 
property (G. B. Shaw or Harold Macmillan), free speech (D. 
MacCarthy), personal conduct (the Archbishop of York), whether 
we have a right to work (Walter Elliot, MP), problems of free 
will (Bertrand Russell), the influence of convention (Lady 
Cynthia Mosley) and the influence of environment (Lord 
Brentford). 
50. BBC, TM, R. A. Kendall to Empire Programme Director, c. March - 
July 1933. Rendall was a producer and secretary of the Central 
Council for Broadcast Adult Education. 
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interviewer than of a straight talk. It was not until the arrival of 
Sir Richard Maconachie as Director of Talks, in 1937, that the 
'Interlocutor Technique' began to be regarded as an invaluable aid to 
the presentation of controversial issues. Seeking to increase the 
amount of 'balanced controversy' and to allow speakers the greatest 
possible freedom of speech, Maconachie considered talks series 
unsatisfactory, involving as they did a week's gap between broadcasts 
and with no guarantee that every listener would hear the full, 
balanced series: 
The "interlocutor technique" which ensures that opposing views 
will be heard by anyone who listens even to a single talk is free 
from these flaws, and seems to me indispensable if "balanced 
controversy" is to be satisfactorily broadcast. 
As envisaged by Maconachie the technique involved a greater degree of 
critical intervention, of taking issue with the interviewee, than had 
previously been the case, and he recognised that such progranmes 
might overrun due to the argument, for 'Heat expands men as well as 
metals'. 
The hostile character of the interlocutor was a considerable step 
forward, particularly as the same person took a critical approach to 
each speaker in turn. The technique was used in every major talks 
series of 1938 and 1939 and was regarded as highly successful even by 
the ever wary Cecil Graves. In one respect, however, this represented 
a separate line of development from that of the professional 
broadcaster and 'cc mmn man' interviewer, for it was frequently 
considered that as interlocutor only another expert would have the 
knowledge required for effective criticism. Typical interlocutors of 
the period included E. H. Carr, H. Wilson Harris and T. H. Marshall. At 
the same time there is evidence that the 'common man' interview had 
also become a regular device, at least in less weighty progranmes, 
51. BBC, TTP, Maconachie to Graves, 4 March 1938. 
52. Ibid. 
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for George Lansbury was interviewed quite informally about his life, 
on television's 'Picture Page', whilst the taxi driver Herbert 
54 
Hodge became a regular and fluent 'plain man' interviewer. 
Although many of these techniques were still not fully developed by 
1939, it is clear that the war interrupted a period of already 
considerable experimentation and greater boldness. 
It was the role of the interviewer to ask questions the ordinary 
man would like to have asked himself. On one or two occasions 
attempts were made to enable members of the audience to put the 
questions. An interesting experiment in 1933 gave three farmers the 
opportunity to question Walter Elliot, then Minister of Agriculture 
and Fisheries, on the new pig and bacon scheme. The programme was 
not, however, quite so daring as it 5eemed, 
for Elliot was provided 
with all the questions in advance. Although Siepdann expressed 
himself in favour of 'further experiments in submitting Ministers to 
cross-examination' and although Reith agreed, no further progress was 
made in this dSiGrection, probably due to ministerial reservations 
about the idea. The only other experiment in public participation 
came from North Region and once again the war caused the suspension 
of an interesting scheme. In 'Public Enquiry', in the svmner of 1939, 
an audience was given the opportunity to put unrehearsed questions to 
two opposing speakers, on such issues of local government as the 
stabilisation of rates and whether the educational system gave. va. lue 
for money. This series, initially broadcast regionally, was due to go 
out nation-wide when war brought it to a close. 
It is perhaps difficult to appreciate the problems, actual or 
53. Lansbury Papers, vol. 17/f15, D. A. Cannell to Lansbury, 23 
February 1939. 
54. Indeed the 1939 series on the press used -interviewing 
techniques on proprietors and editors which were far from 
respectful or sycophantic. See for example, Herbert Hodge's 
interview with Max Aitken, The Listener, 2 March 1939,466-8. 
55. BBC, CWE, W. Elliot to L. Fielden, 9 June 1933. 
56. BBC, TH, Siepmann to Reith, 12 July 1933. 
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perceived, of providing a balanced service of political affairs 
programmes using only the simple techniques which predominated 
throughout the period. They were mostly too clumsy, too unwieldy, too 
time-consuming, to allow the multitudinous and subtle nuances of 
political argument to be effectively and attractively presented. The 
chronicling of technique experimentation reveals not how much 
progress was made - this was strictly limited - but just how crude 
were the methods normally available. Moreover there was a distinct 
danger that in developing such techniques as interviews, magazine 
formats and impromptu discussions the BBC was indeed in danger of 
sacrificing some of its educative ideals for the sake of a populist 
presentation. Its educational talks, national lectures and talks by 
eminent academics and others remained largely 'high brow' and serious 
contributions whose appeal was strictly limited. Yet in more populist 
programmes such as 'Men Talking', 'Week by Week' and John Hilton's 
widely liked series of talks, the informal and personal style of 
presentation clearly led to a disinclination on the part of the BBC 
to attempt to deal with serious issues. Producers encountered the 
problem originally envisaged of how to present serious questions in 
an attractive manner, and in many series they evaded it either by not 
eventually dealing with such topics at all, or by retreating to the 
academic, bland and exceedingly neutral straight talk. This latter 
tendency was only encouraged by the unwillingness of 'serious' 
speakers to rehearse and adapt themselves to an attractive 
broadcasting style. 
Yet it would be going too far to conclude that the choice lay 
between populism without education and education without an audience. 
The future of current affairs broadcasting would be based upon 
techniques first evolved in the 1930s. If many programmes went too 
far in the search for populist appeal and others not far enough, 
some, such as the talks of Vernon Bartlett, Harold Nicolson, the 
'Midland Parliament' series and those employing the interlocutor 
technique, came closer. than most to resolving the dilemm. In such 
programmes it was discovered that serious issues could be discussed 
both controversially and with an element of showmanship, yet without 
508 
threatening the Corporation's integrity. For of course the 
preservation of that integrity remained the paramount consideration 
if broadcasting was to fulfil its role as democratic integrator. 
ii) News, Topical Talks and Parliamentary Reporting. 
Reith considered both news and parliamentary reporting to be most 
important elements of the BBC's overall political coverage, and 
Briggs has amply shown how assiduous he was in seeking to remove the 
restrictions imposed upon the former by press agency and newspaper 
interests. From 1930 onwards the Corporation assumed the right to 
edit fully the news received from the agencies, and with the arrival 
of John Coatman as Senior News Editor in 1934 and the importation of 
professional journalists as news editors, the BBC began to establish 
the reputation for professionalism and accuracy which was to become 
its hallmark. The rough and ready beginnings to the Corporation's own 
news collecting s r7vice were to provide valuable experience for war- 5 
time requirements. From two evening bulletins in 1930 the service 
had been expanded to five by 1939, and these were complemented by 
-additional news talks. The main bulletins were twenty and for a 
period thirty minutes in length. 
The early news service has been critic58sed for being 
unadventurous and for lacking 'the human element'. Such criticism 
fails to take into account the protracted fight that Reith had with 
the press, and the need to progress whilst constantly reassuring 
newspaper interests that broadcasting posed no threat to their 
livelihood. The 1931 BBC Yearbook emphasised that news bulletins were 
complementary to the evening press; their necessarily abbreviated 
form and somewhat flat style was employed in the firm conviction that 
listeners would obtain any padding they wished from their awn 
papers. 
57. - J. Dimbleby, Richard Dimbleby, London 1975,74-79,84-86. 
58. Ibid., 62 - 63. 
59. BBC Yearbook, 1931,242. 
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Nevertheless there'was a certain amount of experimentation in 
presentation, allied closely to the role of the nightly 'topical' or 
'news' talks. These varied in length from five to fifteen minutes and 
included everything from Vernon Bartlett's talks to sports 
commentaries, from parliamentary eye-witness reports, ministerial 
statements and weekly economic surveys, to arts reports and 
commentaries on ship launchings. It is difficult to gauge what 
proportion of serious to trivial items there were, and surviving 
lists tend to suggest that it was the. lighter and actuality items 
which predominated. However, this impression may be partly due to the 
fact that regular items, such as talks on worlds economic and 
parliamentary affairs, were only occasionally listed. 
Bartlett's regular weekly series on foreign affairs will be 
considered later, but almost equally interesting were the BBC's 
attempts to develop a similar series on domestic affairs. Gerald 
Barry's series in 1929 and another by Harold Nicolson in 1930 had 
proved less of a political commentary than desired, and in November 
1931 Reith ordered the Talks Department once again to search for a 
home Vernon BartlOett to report on parliamentary debates and general 
domestic affairs. In the event Gerald Barry was again used and, 
rather remarkably, the Speaker of the Coz n cons gran 
6e2d him a seat in 
the Foreign Press gallery and access to the Lobby. The success of 
this series encouraged Barry to propose a broadening of the scope of 
political talks in topical periods, a suggestion which brought his 
own regular series to a close. For, as Siepmann, who was 
60. The BBC Board was told in October 1932 that recent 5 minute 
topical talks had been on the Lytton Report, Slatin Pasha, 
Harold Lloyd, Sir Christopher Wren, the Dnieprostroi Dam, the 
Reassembly of Parliament, and the Means Test Debate. - BBC, 
BGP, Director General's report, 31 October 1932. 
61. BBC, PPBPR, Reith to Lord Stonehaven, 1 December 1931: 'It 
requires an unusual combination of qualifications. The man has 
to speak so as to be understood by the man in the street, and 
yet have an interesting literary style; he must be quite 
impartial, but really well up in political affairs; and then 
there is this matter of the voice'. 
62. BBC, OGB, Siepma. nn to G. Barry, 15 March 1932. 
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enthusiastic, told him in a letter foretelling future developments: 
To provide for the different eventualities and the different ways 
of covering political events e. g. eye-witness accounts of debates 
in the House, interviews with prominent men, interpretations of 
political developments, etc. etc., we shall have to have 
available a nucleus of helpers .... Politicians themselves will, 
on occasion, have to be brought to the microphone, and as variety 
will be the essence of success for these brief accounts it 
becomes impossible to tie ourselves63own to a single fee, to a 
single person or to a single method. 
The following month Reith proposed an administrative amalgamation 
of topical talks and news, and it would appear that this was carried 
out, for during 19333 the two became more firmly linked within the 
general programme. Initially talks followed the bulletin, but 
gradually experiments were made in inserting them within it and 
immediately f6o5 lowing the news items they were commenting upon or 
illustrating. An experiment was made in July with a 45 minute 
radio 'news-reel', combining news and several topical commentaries. 
This one-off programme was turned into a weekly half-hour broadcast 
from October until December, when shortage of staff and money brought 
it to an end. 
63. BBC, CGB, Siepmann to Barry, 19 September 1932. 
64. BBC, TIP, Reith to Siepminn, 17 October 1932. 
65. This practice was somewhat akin to the current procedure in 
which a brief factual statement by the newsreader is followed 
immediately by an expansion and commentary from a BBC 
correspondent or editor. The BBC Handbook for 1934, p. 82, makes 
these developments sound very adventurous: 'Short statements 
and descriptions of the important foreign news of the day, 
urgent affairs in distant capitals and cities as well as in our 
own provincial towns, instead of being retailed by the 
announcer from the London Studio, were coming more frequently, 
more rapidly, from the actual spot. The BBC's news service was 
expanding. Special correspondents were springing up at home and 
abroad'. 
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1934 saw the division of Home and Empire news services and a 
consequent expansion of news staff, which Coatman subsequently wrote 
of as a66 reaction to political development in Germany and 
elsewhere. A news library - fundamental to any news service - was 
also established. The BBC Annual explained that the purpose of this 
general expansion was 
to present a varied cross-section of the world's events, in a 
form which may be intelligible and interesting to as high a 
proportion as possible of listeners, bringing the events to the 
microphone, through electrical recordings or eye-witnesses, 
helping the public to understand events in themselves and in 
relation 67 
to one another, by means of expository talks by 
experts. 
Fron 1935 explanatory talks were relegated once again to the end 
of the bulletin, the amalgamation of the two having proved unpopular, 
but ministerial statements were on occasion included within the news, 
being regarded as news themselves. Thus Baldwin, Simon, Hoare, Eden 
and others spoke on both foreign and domestic affairs. Commentaries 
from Geneva and speeches by Roosevelt, Mussolini and Pierre Laval 
were also included. In an interesting final paragraph to its review 
in the 1936 Annual, the News Department thanked the Foreign Office, 
the Ministries of Transport, Health and Agriculture, the Department 
of Overseas Trade and others 
for*the co-operation which contributes so greatly to the fullness 
of the picture that 
the listener obtains of the work and problems 
of government. 
This picture of experimentation in the early and mid-1930s does 
66. J. Coatman, The BBC, Government, and Politics, Public Opinion 
Quarterly, vol. 15,1951,291-2. 
67. BBC Annual, 1935,61. 
68. BBC Annual, 1936,53. 
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not accord with the impressions of Ri9chard Dimbleby and his 
colleagues as recorded by Dimbleby's son. Dimbleby arrived at the 
BBC in 1936 and it must be said that, apart from a gradual expansion 
and Dimbleby's own on-the-spot reports, further innovations were few 
before war brought about a complete revolution in the scale of 
operations. Timidity is a possible reason; lack of interest on the 
part of Reith is not. But accusations of timidity all too often came 
either from those who did not bear the responsibility, or with 
hindsight. Richard Dimbleby and the other young recruits of this 
period of expansion in news came to the BBC from newspaper journalism 
and with an essentially pluralistic outlook. The examples Dimbleby 
used to illustrate his conception of broadcast news were taken from 
the press and the cinema newsreels, and it is not surprising that 
Reith and other senior officials felt not only that to go too far in 
that direction would be politically risky, but that it would also be 
antithetical to their fundamental aims. As stated in the 1935 Annual, 
broadcasting has an opportunity and responsibility which no 
newspaper can ever have. It is impossible to exaggerate the value 
to the nation and the world of an unbiased, accurate, and 
balanced presentation, day by day, of th ? 0significant news. 
That 
is the ideal which the BBC has before it. 
This was an approach which was fully approved by Ullswater: 
The present arrangements for the collection and presentation of 
news appear on the whole satisfactory .... In the presentment of 
news, simpli? ity is desirable and the BBC should be as impersonal 
as possible. 
69. J. Dimbleby, Op. 
_Cit., 
60-72. 
70. BBC Annual, 1935,61. Charles Siepma. nn wrote in the Radio 
Times, in September 1934: 'Inevitably .... progress must be 
gradual, deliberate and circumspect, for the service of news is 
potentially the greatest factor in the influence of broadcasting on the modern world'. - Radio Times, 28 September 
1934. 
71. Cxi. 5091 (1936), Report of the Broadcasting Cormittee, 1935, 
paragraphs 81-83. 
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Whilst it was recognised that questions of presentation were 
important, they were only legitimate when they did not threaten 
higher considerations of impartiality and integrity. Where progress 
in such matters was concerned Reith moved slowly not simply because 
of a need for political caution, but also for the better attainment 
of his idealistic objective. 
There were, however, significant external pressures. The BBO 
usually had little difficulty in answering both Labour and 
Conservative protests of news bias, although this did not prevent 
continued resentment. Labour continued to complain of the press 
agencies' monopoly over the provision of broadcast news, although 
protests from the leadership declined in the2 late 1930s in line with 
its increasingly co-operative approach. On the other side 
Conservative and National Government supporters' objections came to a 
climax with the Spanish Civil War. Press campaigns and questions in 
parliament led finally to a meeting of the 1922 Committee at which 
Reith answered accusations and attempted to quell suspicion. 
Perhaps the best answer was contained in an unsigned BBC memorandum, 
which compared the Daily Mail's portrayal of the war as 'Reds' versus 
'Anti-Reds', with that of the Daily Worker , which saw it in terms of 
'Communist Heroes' and 'Fascist Devils': 
Is it altogether surprising that listeners accustomed to the 
single aspect given by their newspaper, should receive an 
immediate impression of bias, when they hear two sides of the 
case broadcast? 
From the beginning of the war the BBC itself had strictly followed 
Foreign Office practice in calling the Madrid Government 'the 
72. BBC, PPB3, record of meeting between representatives of BBC and 
Labour Party, 30 March 1938. For example of a complaint see 
H. C. Debates, vol. 311: col. 1028, C. G. Amnon, 29 April 1936. 
73. J. C. W. Reith (1949), Op. Cit., 272-3. 
74. BBC, PPBAPB, unsigned memorandum 'The BBC and left wing Bias', 
c. late February 1937. 
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Government'. Likewise it had followed the custom of 'every recognised 
handbook in 
75 
International Law' in calling Franco's forces 'the 
insurgents'. 
The Corporation could dismiss these crude party attacks without 
too much difficulty. Yet its fundamental outlook did lay it open to 
more subtle political influences, even in the news, mostly minor but 
sometimes rather less so. One example occurred in May 1936 when it 
was brought to the Cabinet's attention that certain news bulletins 
had referred to Cabinet meetings, the agenda of which were supposedly 
secret. Ironically the item under consideration was said to be a 
report on budget leakages. This news came from the agency tapes and 
had been widely reported in the press, but the Cabinet immediately 
requested that the BBC agree never to refer to Cabinet discussions 
unless approved by No. 10, Downing Street. Although Ronald Norman 
protested that 'This restriction .... is of course far more severe 
than any newspaper would accept', the BBC Board agreed to comply, 
accepting that in such instances the Corporation stood in 'a position 77 
of special responsibility'. Similarly during the abdication 
'crisis Reith agreed to Sir Horace Wilson's request that the BBC 
should Igo slow on Irish Fre78 State news' It as it was feared that a 
republic might be proclaimed. 
Another instance related to Sunday'news. In Manch 1937 the BBC's 
Control Board considered whether Labour speeches made on Sundays 
should be broadcast, in'view of the fact that other parties did not 
hold Sunday meetings and could not be reported. It decided that such 
items were newsworthy and so should be put out. Yet when, in March 
1938, a delegation from the 1922 Committee complained at unbalanced 
Sunday news bulletins reporting personal attacks on the Prime 
75. Ibid. 
76. Cab-24, C. P. 170 (36), M. Hankey to R. Norman, 29 May 1936. 
77. Cab. 24, C. P. 170 (36), R. Norman to M. Hankey, 11 June 1936. 
78. C. Stuart, p. Cit., 192,10 December 1936. 
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Minister, Reith agreed with the protest. The BBC had never attempted 
strictly to balance news its - indeed the Home News Editor, R. T. 
Clark, estimated that the 9 do of Government to Opposition speeches 
reported was about 5: 2. Now, however, it was decided that the 
BBC 
should not lend itself to publicising personal attacks on the 
Head of the Government at critical times and when there were nd 80 
other speeches in the news to offset these attacks. 
Such decisions might be taken with the national interest in mind, but 
they could clearly have political implications bearing on the whole 81 
question of the proper criteria for news coverage. 
In one aspect of news reporting - parliamentary coverage - the 
BBC's wishes were blocked throughout the 1930s. From the earliest the 
Corporation had seen it as a duty to report proceedings and to 
maintain, and even raise, parliament's prestige. Thus in November 
1931 the News Editor, J. M. Rose-Troup, told Cecil Graves that 
our present policy, by showing as far as possible only the good 
side of Parliament and concealing its futilities is, I believe, 
of very great importance, especially at present, when the nation 
is expecting Parliament to do something. 
The Corporation consistently reported proceedings, taking its 
79. BBC, NBPB, Control Board Minutes, March 1938. This estimate was 
based on one week's bulletins in mid-March. 
80. - BBC, NAPBSN, Graves to Nicolls, 31 March 1938. Reith's account 
of this incident omits to mention that the BBC conceded the 
point at issue, and suggests that it resisted the combined 
protestations of Chamberlain, the PM, and the 1922 Committee - 
J. C. W. Reith (1949), Op. Cit., 307-8. 
81. For a similar example, relating to the broadcasting of police 
messages, see Note A at the end of chapter, p. 612. 
82. BBC, PPBPR, Rose-Troup to Graves, 26 November 1931. 
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information primarily from the Reuter's parliamentary correspondent. 
On major parliamentary occasions it also sent a representative to 
give an eye-witness account. Yet neither of these methods of 
reportage proved completely adequate. The BBC had no seat allocated 
in the press gallery for its eye-witness reporter, and the latter had 
to sit either in the Foreign Press or the Visitor's gallery, where he 
was not permitted to take notes. On each occasion that a seat was 
required application had to be made to the Speaker, and he, in 
consultation with party leaders, was not always ready to provide one. 
Eye-witness accounts were also prone to accusations of being less 
than objective, as Wickham Steed discovered both in budget reporting 
and on other occasions. The Reuters correspondent, by contrast, 
proved to be just too balanced and dry. If good speeches on one side 
were reported at length then the other side was given equal space, 
even when its speeches had all been bad. J. C. S. thcGregor, one of the 
news editors, objected that 
we ought not to be under any sort of compulsion to give matter 
which ß4 not worth 
its place in the bulletins on its own 
merits. 
He felt that although individual bulletins might not be balanced if 
only newsworthy speeches were reported, the BBC's impartiality would 
be maintained over a period of time. The Reuter's correspondent, H. 
Kingston, admitted of his policy of absolute balance that, 'it has 
not always been easy to reconcile this with the news interest 
factor! '. 
8- 
Beith, however, was justly doubtful that the parties 
would accept individually unbalanced summaries, and merely suggested 86 
that the Reuter's report be precised. 
83. There were further complaints, for example, at his account of 
the 'No Confidence' debate of 25 October 1932. 
84. BBC, PPBPR, J. C. S. MacGregor to Siepmann, 9 January 1934. 
85. BBC, PPBPR, H. Kingston to K. Adams, 21 February 1935. 
86. BBC, PPBPR, note by Reith on Dawnay's memorandum to Reith of 29 
June 1934. 
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He nevertheless remained keen to solve these problems by having 
the BBC's own correspondent in the House, and when Ullswater 
recommended that full facilities be granted he applied to the Speaker 
once again for a permanent seat. Fitzroy considered it a matter where 
the party leaders should be consulted, and although Baldwin was 
willing, Attlee categorically rejected the idea. In a minority 
reservation to the Ullswater report he had already made his views 
clear: 
I do not believe that it is possible to find a person who can. at 
the same time give a vivid personal impression [of, a debate] and 
free his mind from political bias. 
The BBC might inveigh against 88 
Attlee's stupid reservation', but 
there was nothing it could do. When Sir Bryan Fell congratulated 
Reith on the reports that were broadcast, he could only reply that 
we are doing a good deal in putting Parliament back into the 
news, and it is rather a89 stery to us why so many difficulties 
should be put in our way. 
A proposal by Guy Burgess, then a talks producer, that current 
debates might be restaged fran Hansard, using readers in place of 
politicians, was reluctantly though realistically rejected as too 
87. Cmd. 5091 (1936), Report of the Broadcasting Committee, 1935, 
Reservation to paragraph 91 by C. R. Attlee. See also 
H. C. Debates, vol. 314: col. 974,6 July 1936. In the same debate 
George Lansbury stated: 'I want to challenge the right of the 
Government and the House to allow the BBC to send men into this 
place and to give their opinion as to whether what we have said 
is sheer rubbish .... ' - col. 913. 
88. BBC, PPBPAC, unsigned memo to Carpendale (probably by Reith), 18 
May 1936. 
89. BBC, PPBPR, Reith to Sir Bryan Fell, 1 March 1937. Fell, who 
occasionally advised the BBC on parliamentary affairs, had 
written that 'the BBC will assist in restoring the prestige of 
Parliament, for Parliament needs propaganda! ' - PPBPR, Fell to 
Keith, 26 February 1937. 
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likely to lead to trouble. 
90 
As with the editing of recorded talks, 
the BBC would have been accused of editorialising had it attempted to 
edit Hansard. Although parliamentary reporting was to be raised again 
with the PL! 3, Attlee and the Labour Party in 1938, and although it 
was pointed out that the BBC intended a proper parliamentary reporter 
rather than a sketch writer, full facilities were not to be granted 
until after the war. Throughout the 1930s, therefore, the BBC was 
forced to use the Reuter's report and ad hoc facilities, inadequate 
though it considered them. Its news and parliamentary reporting could 
never be wholly free and independent while it was occasionally 
blocked and interfered with in this way by government and opposition. 
iii) Programers on Domestic Politics, and Ministerial Broadcasts. 
Despite these problems, the nightly provision of impartial and 
reliable news to a wide audience was one of the BBC's greatest 
contributions to the arena of political communication. Yet we have 
already seen how in addition it had fought for the right to include 
discussion, argument and explanation of political issues in its 
programmes, and how it had reacted to the new challenge betwei 1928 
and 1931. In the larger part of its programming it had, in theory, 
won the fight to set the agenda of political affairs discussion, 
freeing itself from any obligation to consult the parties or 
government. This was the freedom which Postmaster Generals repeatedly 
emphasised in the House, in answer to demands that the Corporation be 
brought to task for its sins as perceived by both left and right. 
For throughout the 1930s accusations of BBC bias remained a 
favourite bugbear both of the left and right wing press and of its 
readership. In the Daily Herald and on the left of the Labour Party 91 
protests about bias in ordinary programmes was considerable. The 
90. BBC, PPBPR, G. Burgess to Maconachie, 6 December 1937; PPBG, 
Ma. cona. chie to Graves, 7 March 1938. 
91. For examples of left wing views see R. East, 'The BBC', The 
Left Review, vol. 1,1934,522-524, and Charles Madge, 'Press 
Radio an ocial Consciousness', in C. D. Lewis (ed. ), The Mind 
in Chains, London 1937,145-163. 
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Party's leadership, however, concentrated almost entirely on party 
broadcasting ratios and news, as seen above, and on the amount of 
ministerial broadcasting. There was comparatively little complaint at 
the general talks progranme and certainly no evidence that the BBC 
reacted to what pressure there was. 
On the right of the Conservative Party and within much of the 
right wing press, particularly the Morning Post and Daily Mail ,. 
there was equally considerable protest: 
the BBC could be described not unjustly as Moscow's principal aid 
in the arts of disturbing national confidence, shaking public 
faith, and sapping stability..... as an asset of the national 
purpose the BBC is about as useful as Gandhi in a cup-tie. 
Again these were accusations which the BBC usually ignored or 
rejected without difficulty. They did, however, find some response 
within Conservative Central Office, where interest in the median 
resulted in attempts both to use it positively and to reduce what was 
-seen as a very real 
left wing bias. This interest might have posed a 
more serious threat to BBC freedom of action than that provided by 
the press. 
Although Lord Stonehaven had expressed his confidence in Reith, 
Gower was less certain. In late 1932 he argued to Baldwin, via the 
Chairman, that one of the new BBC governors, shortly to be appointed, 
should be made a specific representative of Conservative interests, 
in the 
gs3ame 
way that Mrs. Snowden had been an unofficial one for 
Labour. Although it is improbable that Lord Bridgeman was chosen 
with this proposal in mind, Gower immediately reminded him of his 
party loyalties, and Bridgeman, a BBC governor for only two weeks, 
92. Editorial, Era, 20 March 1935. 
93. Opp, 000 4/1/21, Gower to Stonehaven, 29 November 1932; Baldwin 
papers, Bal. 65/f210-211, Stonehaven to Baldwin, 6 December 
1932. The appointment of Lord Bridgeman was announced on 15 
December. 
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agreed with the feeling that 'the bias has lately been a good deal to 94 
the left'. His only suggestions, however, were the same as John 
Buchan's - to train Conservative supporters in broadcasting and to 
encourage them to join the BBC staff. It is impossible to tell 
whether the latter idea was pursued, but there were some moves to 
implement the former. Reith was invited to speak at Ashridge 
Conservative College in 1933 and did so, whilst later in the year a 
weekend 95 
course was held there on 'Broadcasting and Public 
Opinion'. In 1934 Joseph Ball emphasised to Chamberlain the 
imnediate need for 
a team of really effective debaters, each trained in "getting 
across" one or96 re important subjects to the enormous audiences 
who listen in. 
By 1934 Central Office was keeping watch on the BBC's advance 
release of its talks programme and attempting to discover the 
background and politics of each speaker. Gower warned that the series 
of talks to the unemployed 'could be made an instrument for very 
effective Socialist propaganda'. He noted that one of the 
speakers for the series 'Freedom and Authority in the Modern World' 
was a Labour candidate. His biggest concern, however, was over a 
series entitled 'Poverty in Plenty', in which various economists 
considered the economic causes of poverty and slump. Only one out of 
the ten speakers, in his opinion, was not either a socialist or a 
Liberal, and when complaints began to come in from party supporters 
he wrote to the Posteraster General, Sir Kingsley Wood, to express his 
concern. That he did so indicates how rarely such complaints were 
actually made, for Kingsley Wood very properly stated that it was not 
94. COD, 0004/1/23, Bridgema. n to Gower, 14 January 1933. 
95. The Listener, 8 November 1933,693. 
96. Chamberlain papers, NC8/21/9, Ball to Chamberlain, 14 April 
1934. 
97. COD, 0004/1/23, Gower to Kingsley Wood, 29 August 1934. 
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a matter for him and passed the letter directly to the BBC. 
98 
The 
subsequent correspondence, although polite on both sides, showed a 
determination on the part of the BBC to concede nothing. Stonehaven, 
for his part, complained that the title 'Poverty in Plenty' was 
itself 'part of the left wing jargon' and that the talks 
have been used very subtly by Left Wing theorists to secure 
publicity for their views which nothing but the99incomparable 
nation-wide resources of the BBC could afford them. 
Reith in turn stated firmly that the title 'simply expresses an 
economic fact without hidden political intention of any kind'. He 
argued that the speakers represented a wide spectrum of economic 
views: 
Had it been otherwise the whole object and raison d'etre of these 
talks - the fair presentment of all sides and opinions in rder 100 
to promote sensible discussion - would have been thwarted. 
The exchange represented a strong resistance by the BBC to party 
pressure, and there is no reason to suppose that this, the last 
recorded official Conservative complaint before the war, influenced 
the Corporation in its policy. Needless to say Patrick Gower was not 
satisfied with the outcome, and his firm belief in 'the subtle 
propaganda which is being put out by the BBC' led him to undertake 101 
the earliest political' exercise in broadcast monitoring. For 
three months a shorthand writer was employed to listen to every news 
bulletin and potentially political talk, from 'Talks to the 
Unemployed', to 'In Town Tonight' and 'For Farmers Only'. There is no 
record of any action taken as a result of this survey, for its 
98.000,0004/1/23, Kingsley Wood to Gower, 19 November 1934. 
99.000,0004/1/23, Stonehaven to Reith, 3 December 1934. 
100.000, x/1/23, Reith to Stonehaven, 5 December 1934. 
101. COD, CCJ04/1/23, Gower to Miss Gow, 30 November 1934. 
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conclusions as to bias were mixed. 
102 
Gower and Joseph Ball, 
however, remained convinced of the BBC's left wing tendencies. 
Indeed so certain of this was Ball that he told Chamberlain in 
June 1938 that 'I regard the BBC at present as one of our greatest 
handicaps'. He argued that if the Government was not to suffer 'grave 
damage' from the activities of the BBC it would be necessary for it 
to appoint both a new Chairman and a new Director General, 
who can be instructed and trusted to see that we get a square 
deal .... My information leads me to believ lOt3hat nothing short 
of drastic changes in personnel will suffice. 
That, two days after receiving this memorandum, the Prime Minister 
directed Reith to leave the BBC and to go to Imperial Airways was, 
however, a complete coincidence, for Reith had been warned of the 
likelihood on 29 May. 
Another coincidence deserves to be mentioned, although it would 
again be quite wrong to consider it as anything but coincidence. In 
June 1934 Gower asked within Central Office for suitable topics for 
BBC talks. These, like Clavering's film 'The Soul of a Nation', would 
subconsciously reinforce the traditional virtues and emphasise the 
notions of 'Democracy' and 'Government'. A recent analysis by Sir 
Robert Topping had concluded that voters rarely changed their 
allegiance once given and that large numbers never bothered to vote. 
That being so the Party's primary task was perceived as being to 
revive political consciousness and to turn it to Conservative 
advantage. An unsigned memorandum suggested broadcasting as the best 
way of achieving this and of educating the electorate as to 
the value of the present system of representative government as 
compared to the much advocated dictatorial systems of Comnunisn 
102.000,0004/1/24, Broadcasting Reports, Jan - March 1935. 
103. Chamberlain papers, NC8/21/8, Ball to Chamberlain, 1 June 1938. 
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104 
or Fascism. 
In this document the constant and conscious fear present in the minds 
not just of right wing Conservatives but of many at the centre, that 
the very fabric of society was under threat from external and 
internal political and social forces, was evident as a primary 
concern: 
It is my considered conviction that unless sonne such effort as 
this is made to defend Parliamentary Government and to show its 
achievements, there is grave danger that despotism may arrive by 
default. To utter Airy [sic] phrases and to capitalise discontent 
is an easy task for would-be dictators. This endeavour to lead 
the people astray must be countered by a strong and definite 105 
effort on the part of such as believe in constitutionalism. 
The author of the memorandum, probably Gower, appeared to think 
that, if non-renewal of the BBC charter were threatened, Reith could 
be persuaded to agree to a series of talks on 'Our Government'. This 
could then be inserted into the programme in October 1935 to March 
1936, shortly before any anticipated General Election, and would use 
history to teach lessons such as that dictatorship was a prime cause 
of the collapse of the Roman Empire. Debates could also be staged on 
such topics as the limits of state interference with personal 
liberty. 
As ever Central Office had shown itself alive to new ideas, 
although there is no indication of what further action was taken. But 
the proposal was really too far fetched. It was also quite 
unnecessary, for the BBC needed no external pressure to convince it 
that it had a duty to 'plug' constitutional democracy. Me 
coincidence in this case was that a series which in large measure did 
just that, though not at all in the form suggested in Central Office, 
104.00 0,0004/1/21, unsigned memorandum (by Gower? ), c. June 1934. 
105. Ibid. 
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was indeed broadcast in the Autumn of 1935. This was 'The Citizen and 
His Government' and it was to be the cause of considerable argument 
between Government, Foreign Office and BBC. 
In general, therefore, continued press, public and party protest 
at BBC bias in general talks, as in news, had little obvious effect 
upon BBC policy. Reith was suitably contemptuous of such ridiculous 
pin-pricks. Yet the BBC's position was rather like a fortress whose 
drawbridge had been pulled up only after the enemy had entered. ' Its 
apparent rejection of external party pressure in general domestic 
affairs programmes merely obscured the fact that, as shown in the 
last chapter, its entire political affairs output had been greatly 
emasculated both by the refusal of the parties to allow it freely to 
deal with party politics and by its own, part consequent part 
natural, aversion to the coverage of politics from the party 
viewpoint. 
This is not to say that party politics were not occasionally 
dealt with without consulting the parties; we have already seen that 
Gerald Barry and Harold Nicolson occasionally cormnented on current 
legislation, as did speakers in the 'Topics in the Air' series. A 
number of programmes entitled 'Youth looks ahead', in 1935, included 
vehement statements on party politics by John Boyd-Carpenter as a 
young Conservative and Richard Crossman as a young socialist. The 
discussion between Sir Oswald Mosley and Gerald Barry on events at 
the notorious B. U. F. meeting at Olympia, in June 1934, may also come 
into this *category. 
More frequently, however, a close approach was made to party 
political issues without actual mention being made of the parties. In 
1933 Hugh Dalton and Douglas Jerrold debated the question of whether 
profits were legitimate, whilst in April 1936 L. J. Edwards and I. M. 
Horobin asked the contentious question 'Should the Social Services be 
extended? '. A debate on the Means Test, also in 1936, employed the 
106. See pp. 589-596 below. This series was recommended to the BBC by 
its Adult Education Advisory CamiLttee. 
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technique of using two anonymous speakers to put the cases for and 
against. When this programme seemed likely to cause party complaints, 
Admiral C , rpendale, the Deputy Director General, advocated consulting 
Margesson and Attlee beforehand. Cecil Graves, however, resisted the 
idea: 
I felt that if we adopted the course of consulting Attlee it 
would i nediately make the discussion a purely poliot7 cal one. We 
might find ourselves in all sorts of difficulties. 
In May 1938 a series on transport in Britain included a debate on the 
advantages and disadvantages of the industry's nationalisation, 
whilst a discussion entitled 'A Penny on the Rates', in January 1939, 
considered the proper limits of public spending. The Midland 
Parliament debates equally touched occasionally on directly l16,8, y 
political issues, yet without discussing party positions. 
DA 
series organised under the Midland Parliament banner in 1938 
considered the question 'Private Enterprise or Public Ownership? ', in 
relation to coal, electricity, food, insurance and broadcasting. 
Speakers included several MPs, representatives of owners, unions and 
the co-operative movement, and Morgan Phillips, the Labour Party's 
propaganda officer. 
Generally speaking then, the BBC's talks, debates and discussions 
on political affairs did not directly mention the parties, unless in 
a factual and sometimes recently historical context. Explanation of 
issues was emphasised, and where this involved a statement of 
attitudes they were those of the individuals speaking and of like 
minded men, rather than specifically of the parties. A good example 
of this approach was the 'Poverty in Plenty' series, where the BBC's 
position was that the speakers represented the economic rather than 
the party political spectrum. Likewise the 1935 series on India was 
designed not as a party political series, but as one covering the 
107. BBC, 'lWT, Graves to Carpendale, 23 April 1936. 
108. See pp. 495-496 above. 
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entire range of views on the subject, together with expert statements 
of fact. 
It was only by taking this broader approach that the BBC could 
hope both to escape party wrangling and to give individuals who were 
not party spokesmen the opportunity to broadcast on issues which were 
fundamentally political. Put another way, it was only when it had 
divorced the issue from the immediate party battle that the BBC would 
give men like Churchill, Lord Lloyd, Oswald Mosley or Harold 
Macmillan, the chance to broadcast on subjects of particular interest 
to them. Thus Macmillan was able to debate on the concept of planning 
but without applying it, except by implication, to the present 
position of the parties. Mosley similarly gave a broadcast on the 
nature of fascism, in the 1933 series on 'The State', but only after 
the BBC had required him to delete various passages specifically 
mentioning and advocating the British Union of Fascists. 
I09 
In 1935 
he was again to have been given the opportunity to defend the theory 
of fascism, in 'The Citizen and His Government', without act Ö lly 
applying it either to foreign examples or to his own B. U. F. In 
the series 'War or Peace', in the Autumn of 1931, the Corporation 
gave Lords Cecil and Lloyd an opportunity to state their opposing 
views on the possibility or need for disarmament. A similar series in 
1934 allowed highly opinionated men-such as Churchill, Beaverbrook, 
Norman Angell, Austen Chamberlain and G. D. H. Cole to talk on the 
'Causes of War'. 
It has been said, not least by Churchill himself, that he and 
similar individuals outside the mainstream of 111 
the parties were 
excluded from broadcasting throughout the 1930s. In that he was 
not given the opportunity to broadcast on specifically party 
109. BBC, PPBBUF, Siej nn to Reith, and Siepmann to 0. Mosley, 6 
March 1933. 
110. This projected talk was eventually cancelled. See pp. 589-59 6 
below. 
111. See, for example, M. Muggeridge, 'Notes by the Way', Time 
Tide, 18 July 1953. 
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political issues, except for India, this was certainly true. But this 
was a consequence of the BBC's general inability freely to cover 
party politics, rather than of a particular exclusion. In the general 
political affairs type of progranme, in which the BBC chose the 
topic, Churchill broadcast as frequently as any politician and more 
than most. Thus he broadcast twice in 1934, in the series 'Whither 
Britain' and 'Causes of War'. In early 1935 he gave his talk on 
India; in 1936 he rejected a BBC request that he broadcast in a 
series on Scottish, Welsh and English nationalism, excusing himself 
on the grounds of being too busy. In 1937 he gave a talk in the 
series 'Responsibilities of Empire', in which Baldwin and Lloyd 
George also broadcast. He also, in 1938, agreed to speak in a series 
on the political and strategic importance of the Mediterranean, but 
himself cancelled a few days before it was due to be given, in 
October, because of the Munich crisis. In explaining his 
cancellation, however, he complained to producer Guy Burgess that he 
had always been 
very badly treated in the matter of political broadcasts and that 112 
he was always muzzled by the BBC. 
The crux of Churchill's complaint, of course, was that he was not 
given free rein to say whatever he liked and that his opportunities 
to broadcast were not sufficiently frequent. In fact almost all the 
series in which he spoke were designed precisely to give the speakers 
broad latitude in what they said. In 1931 Churchill had turned down 
the offer*to broadcast on 'What I would do with the World'. This was 
a reformulation of the earlier 'Points of View' symposium and gave 
ten eminent individuals the chance to state their general outlook in 
any field. The 'Whither Britain' series was a similar opportunity, 
and in it Churchill included warnings of both fascist and Japanese 
aggression and urged stronger defences. In his talk on the causes of 
112. BBC, CWSC, Guy Burgess to Maconachie, 4 October 1938. That it 
was Churchill who cancelled this talk and not the BBC is made 
clear by M. Gilbert, Winston Churchill, Vol V, London 1976,990. 
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war he urged Britain to make herself the strongest air power in 
Europe, and this was a warning he repeated in the talk on India. In 
his characteristic rhetoric he declared: 
The storm, clouds are gathering over the European scene. Our 
defences have been neglected. Danger is in the air .... Yes, I 
say in the air. The mighty discontented nations are reaching out 
with strong hands to regain what they have lost; nay, to gain a 
predominance which they have never had. 
The responsibilities of Empire, as he saw them in 1937, were to be 
armed and prepared, for 
everwhere it is disputed whether the movement of men and the 
character of their institutions shall be along the, path of 
freedom under representative and democratic government, or 
whether il4shall relapse into sombre forms of tyranny and l 
despotism. 
It would be wrong to infer from this that these talks provided 
Churchill with the free opportunities he wanted. But they did give 
him as much as he, as a private individual and even as an eminent 
statesm. n, had a right to expect. In October 1933 he had complained 
to Whitley: 
I do feel that I have' been denied for three years past those 
opportunities-of giving my guidance to the country through the 
broadcast to which my public service and experience entitle 
115 
me. 
Earlier, in August 1933, Churchill, Lloyd George and Austen 
Chamberlain had jointly protested that as senior statesmen detached 
113. The Listener, 6 February 1935,213-5. 
114. The Listener, 5 May 1937,849-50. 
115. BBC, CWSC, Churchill to Whitley, 21 October 1933. 
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from their parties' general policy1Gthey should not be excluded from 
broadcasting on political issues. 
l 
This was a view with which the 
BBC fully agreed; the stumbling block was effectively on the question 
of who should chase the moment and the subject. Over both of these 
Churchill clearly wanted some control - control which the BBC was 
certainly not prepared to relinquish. 
In its refusal to submit to Churchill's pressure the Corporation 
had considerable press support. The question was asked why Churchill 
should expect the special privilege of broadcasting any mare than 
other men. As the Manchester Guardian declared, 
The BBC has the difficult task, in questions of this kind, of 
weighing a number of different things: the importance of. the 
statesman, the character of the minority whom he represents, the 
nature of the controversy, the possible repercussions of the 
broadcast. It is surely impossible to contend that the 
representative of ahy sort of minority on any sort of question, 
must, whatever the consequences, be admitted to the 
microphone. 
More strongly still, though without mentioning Churchill, the 
Yorkshire Post argued that 
the mere fact that an opinion is "seriously held" should not be 
enough to procure for the holder of it an opportunity of using 
the BBC's vast power of influencing public opinion. There are 
plenty of cranks and fanatics whose views, though most seriously 
held, would strike the vast majority oflllgisteners either as 
intolerably eccentric or grossly offensive. 
116. BBC, PPBPPB, Churchill, Lloyd George and Austen Chamberlain to 
Whitley, 25 August 1933. 
117. Manchester Guardian, 20 March 1933. 
118. Yorkshire Post, 7 February 1933. 
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Churchill's right wing stance and unpopular views led many people in 
the 1930s to put him in just this category. 
The central questions were who should determine the amount of 
political broadcasting and, within those limitations, who should 
choose the speakers and set the agenda. In the first the BBC was 
effectively constrained by party bickering, as it was also in the 
second and third insofar as the parties themselves were concerned: 
Yet where it could stick to its principles it did so, and the 
consequence was a resolve not to be pressured in the choice. of 
independent speakers and a certain resoluteness in striving to 
control the agenda - the balance of its output. In the majority of 
its programmes the Corporation not unreasonably chose the subject 
before deciding upon appropriate speakers. Its problem occasionally 
came in attempting to hold men of independent spirit to the subject 
upon which they had been contracted to speak. For some at least saw 
the BBC's choosing of the'subject as an attempt to get them to say 
what it wanted - and of course in general terms they were right in 
this belief. The important questions were firstly whether the BBC's 
-legitimte agenda-setting ever went beyond that into predetermination 
of conclusions, and secondly whether the BBC's agenda was set too 
narrowly and from one particular standpoint. 
On two occasions in particular the BBC found itself at odds with 
speakers over the relative rights of the individual and the 
Corporation to control what was said. As part of the 'Causes of War' 
series in- 1934 J. B. S. Haldane was asked to give a talk, referring 
particularly to the scientific and biological causes. When received, 
however, ' his manuscript was found virtually to ignore this aspect, 
which he clearly regarded as of secondary importance, and instead to 
concentrate on the aggressive consequences of capitalism and the 
machinations of arms manufacturers. Since these issues were being 
dealt with in other talks in the series, notably that of G. D. H. Cole, 
the BBC asked Haldane to rewrite his contribution. Haldane refused 119 
and the talk was replaced with one by R. M. Kyrle. 
119. BBC, TCW, Talks - 'The Causes of War' file; CJBH, Contributors 
- J. B. S. Haldane File. 
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By cancelling Haldane's talk the BBC not only emphasised the need 
for overall balance in its treatment of an issue, but also asserted 
its right to determine where that balance lay - in other words to 
choose the subject for each talk. In one respect its viewpoint was 
eminently reasonable, for it was indeed better placed than its 
speakers to take an overall view of the treatment of a subject and to 
see what, in its opinion, were the appropriate issues for discussion. 
But the problem came when one of its speakers considered the subject 
for which he had been contracted to be an irrelevancy. Should not the 
BBC have chosen a number of eminent men and allowed them to give 
their own independent opinions on the true causes of war? This was 
certainly what effectively happened in the case of Churchill and 
Beaverbrook, who both gave talks in the same series. As a letter to 
Time and Tide , signed by some seventy Cambridge fellows and 
university staff, declared, 
the public should have the right to hear the broadcast opinion of 
such an eminent man [as Haldane] on so vital an issue, whether 
the treatment of ihre subject conform with the preconceived ideas 
of the BBC or no. 
The second example had occurred earlier in the saune year when 
William Ferrie, a communist official of the National Union of Vehicle 
Workers, had been asked to give a talk in the series 'The National 
Character'. In particular he was asked to describe the adjustment in 
character 12wi 
ich had resulted from changing industrial 
conditions. The BBC could have been under no illusions that his 
talk would be mild and approving. In any case it saw it as a worker's 
view in contrast to that of Sir Herbert Austin, the leading motor 
manufacturer, who was to broadcast the week before Ferrie. Austin 
painted a rosy picture in which he described how the worker's 
character, confidence and general state of mind had been inestimably 
improved by improved living and working conditions. Perhaps not 
120.. Time and Tide, 17 November 1934. 
121. BBC, CWF, Mary Adams to W. Ferrie, 8 November 1933. 
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surprisingly, therefore, the manuscript which Ferrie handed in to 
producer Mary Adams turned out to be a forceful attack on Austin's 
assumptions, on modern industry, capitalism and existing society, 
concluding with the declaration that 'the Moscow road' was the only 
right road for British workers. The word 'character' did not appear 
once, and only by implication could it have been deduced that Ferrie 
did not consider changing industrial conditions to have done anything 
to help the national character. 
According to Ferrie, writing subsequently, Mary Adams proceeded 
to alter the talk 'beyond recognition' - in fact to rewrite it 
completely and to insist that it be given in exactly that form. He 
claimed that he protested vigorously against this: 
Particularly was I incensed at their demand that I should put 
across that the slog22 "Workers of the World Unite! " is not a 
revolutionary slogan. 
R. A. Rendall's interpretation of what happened was rather different; 
certain passages he felt to be 'manifestly irrelevant' to the 
question of national character. The talk was also too literary in 
style and did not speak well: 
The "censorship" amounted to this - that MZr. Ferrie was asked to 
remove or to alter certain passages which3 were purely 
propagandist and not concerned with the subject. 
At the same time his statement that Ferrie was asked if he wished to 
're-alter' anything suggests that alteration on the script occurred 
before he was consulted. Rendall emphasised, however, that Ferrie was 
given full opportunity to propose alterations and did not do so. 
122. W. Ferrie, The Banned Broadcast of William Ferrie, Workers' 
Bookshop Lt . 
123. BBC, CWF, Secretary of Central Council for Broadcast Adult 
Education (R. A. Rendall) to Midland Regional Director, 15 March 
1934. 
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Whatever the circumstances and whatever the actual amount of BBC 
alteration, Ferrie came to the microphone only to declare that 
what I wanted to tell you has been so censored and altered and 
cut up by the BBC that I consider it impossible for me to give a 
talk 
1i4 without 
it being a travesty of the British working 
class. 
He promised to give the talk to the press and was then cut` of f. The 
Corporation naturally rejected the charge and received support for 
its stance from The Times , which declared: 
an understanding expressed or implied between the BBC and the 
speaker that the microphone shall be used responsibly for the 
at purpose for which it has been placedd his disposal is obviously 51 
vital to any kind of broadcasting. 
The Manchester Guardian equally defended the BBC's 
right to sub-edit manuscripts, provided that it dispenses equal 126 
justice to the important and the humble speaker. 
There can be no doubt that Ferrie had grossly exceeded his brief; 
it is at least possible that he would have been permitted to give the 
talk, in his own way, if only it had been tied a bit more obviously 
to the contracted subject, rather than being overtly polemical. The 
important questions, however, were firstly whether the BBC had been 
right in itself proposing alterations - particularly if, as Ferrie 
claimed, these included alterations of sense as well as of style; and 
secondly whether in choosing the subject of 'National Character', it 
had not set an eminently middle class agenda, and one which was 
wholly irrelevant to the daily concerns of the working class. Mary 
124. The Times, 6 March 1934. 
125. Th= s, 7 March 1934,15c. 
126. Manchester Guardian, 7 Ma, rch, 1934,8c. 
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Adams was sympathetic to the expression of working class views, but 
it is certainly doubtful if she recognised the subtle ways in which 
her proposed alterations might have been seen, by a man of Ferrie's 
outlook and background, as changing the talk's entire character. In 
such circumstances the Manchester Guardian's comment about equal 
justice to the important and the humble did not apply. If Ferrie had 
been eminent, alterations to the 'irrelevant' paragraphs of his talk 
would certainly still have been made - J. B. S. Haldane, Harold 
Macmillan and Josiah Wedgwood all had alterations proposed by the 
BBC, where statements were considered irrelevant or undesirable in 
context. But in the case of such men major re-writings, by the BBC, to 
ensure readability, would not have resulted in a markedly different 
outlook being conveyed through the style itself. This could only 
happen when a middle class producer altered and rewrote parts of a 
working class man's script. By altering the style and bringing the 
talk closer to the contracted subject Mary Adams had, in Ferrie's 
opinion, been doubly guilty of casting him and his talk in a 
predetermined *mould. Adams did certainly provide him with the 
opportunity to re-alter the script, 'to make it fit in with his own 
way of saying things', but it is evident either that Ferrie did not 
appreciate this or, more likely, that by that Zt stage 
he had already 
decided upon his eventual course of action. 
The incident served to demonstrate an undoubted and unavoidable 
constraint upon the BBC's 'impartial' handling of political affairs - 
namely its middle and upper class outlook. This was a fact which 
numerous writers, including Asa Briggs and Arthur Marwick have lt8 
commented upon, and it does not require further elucidation. The 
New Statesmmn was only slightly over-stating the case when it argued 
that 
127. BBC, CWF, R. A. Rendall to Midland Regional Director, 15 March 
1934. 
128. A. Briggs (1965), Op. Cit., 40-42; A. Marwick, Class, Glasgow 
1981,. 157-166. J. Curran and J. Seaton, Power Without 
Responsibility, Glasgow 1981,152-154. 
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The BBC is heavily class-biassed, from the composition of its 
Board of Governors through its staff down to the censorship of 
its talks and the tone of its entertainments. It is bourgeois, 
both politically and culturally, in the worst sense of that much 
abused word. Fran the point of view of democracy, that is a fatal 129 
defect. 
Producers such as Mary Adams, Norman Luker, C. V. Salmon, Felix 
Greene and Lionel Fielden were, of course, aware that their audience 
was predominantly of a very different social and intellectual 
background, but efforts to bridge the gap all too often resulted in 
an app rance of talking down to, or of patronising, the working 
class. Occasionally the BBC could reveal an appalling and quite 
unconscious lack of awareness as to the sensitivities of others of a 
different background. Thus Alan Dawnay could not understand why 
Herbert Morrison and the Daily Herald should object when they learnt 
that an anonymous and impartial talk, explaining the importance of 
people voting*in the forthcoming 1934 Municipal Elections, was to be 
given by a Conservative candidate. It was typical of the BBC that the 
. speaker should 
be of a certain eminently reputable type, guaranteed 
because of his character to give an impartial1t1lk. Suspicion of such 
a procedure was quite incomprehensible to it. 
But the fundamental point about the BBC's assumptions was that 
the very notions of democratic education and citizenship which it 
held so dear were themselves eminently 'bourgeois' concepts. In 
Arthur Marwick's beautiful phrase, the BBC was a 'propagator of basic 
assumptions', assumptions about democracy, the nature and value 
systems of British society, which a particular section of that 
129. New Statesman, 31 March 1934. 
130. A. Marwick (1981), Op. Cit., 162-4. 
131. The Daily Herald very pertinently asked 'why in the world, if 
all that was intended was that an anonymous voice should urge 
that to use his vote is the duty of a good citizen, should the 
BBC select a Tory candidate in the crisis of his own election 
fight, for the job? ' - Daily Herald, 29 October 1934. 
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society - of which the BBC was part and from which it took its ideas 
- felt needed propagating. 
2 
'Democracy', 'freedom', 'national 
character', honour, decency, integrity, - such seemingly unambiguous 
and unexceptionable concepts could in fact be interpreted and 
evaluated from many different standpoints, and not necessarily from 
that which the BBC assumed. Yet during the inter-war period the BBC 
saw itself consciously as having a duty to defend democracy and 
certain related ideals, as well as to attempt to perfect them. In its 
reverencing of monarchy, church, empire, parliament and the British 
character and tradition, the BBC was adopting the particular value 
system not necessarily of the nation but of a particular,. if -large 
and cross-class, section of it. When the BBC was accused of left wing 
bias in 1935, Charles Siepma. nn, hardly the most orthodox Director of 
Talks, pointed quite unconcernedly to 
the amount of unobtrusive work going on all the time in series 
of a constructive character, all of 13w3hich 
tend to consolidate 
accepted institutions and traditions. 
He gave as examples talks on the Expire, religious talks and 
services, many of the morning programmes for women, 
and the scores of series and talks such as those recently on 
"Ancient Britain out of Doors", on "The Village Church", etc. 
etc. 
132. A. Marwick (1981), Op. Cit., 157. 
133. BBC, PPBAPB, Siepmann to Gladstone Murray, 29 April 1935. 
Gladstone Murray equally wrote: 'It is indeed a pity that those 
who lose sight of the wood of British oak because their 
attention is riveted on an occasional piece of what they take 
for Russian timber cannot see, for a few brief salutary 
moments, what might be in the programmes if it was true that 
those who drew them up favoured subversion and degeneration and 
the dissolving of standards and the remodelling of the life of 
Britain according to the paper plans of intellectuals with no 
roots in the country. ' - PPBAPB, Gladstone Murray to 
O. Pulvermacher, 30 April 1935. 
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As Alan Dawnay told the Ullswater Codnnittee, 
if anything, the scale comes down a little bit on the side of 
emphasising the virtues of stability rather than of holding out 
the glamorous prospects of change. 
With such basic assumptions it was not surprising that the BBC 
should hold the Government and Civil Service departments in a degree 
of respect. Nor was it surprising that, despite its concern for 
independence, it should allow them, as with news, a certain influence 
over its domestic affairs progranmes. Nevertheless it was anxious to 
maintain its independence, and the relationship in practice was one 
of part resistance, part deference, to government influence. 
The constitutional relationship, of course, would have allowed 
control if necessary. Indeed scree BBC staff felt that the Corporation 
should have been more ready to insist on the use of Clause 4 of the 
Licence rather than submit to, and even anticipate, government 
wishes. There were, however, arguments against this. On the side of 
the BBC was Keith's concern for its outward integrity. On the side of 
the Government was the apprecation by the early 1930s that it would 
invoke public anathema and political scandal of the highest order to 
interfere with the BBC's freedom in such a way. Reith realised that 
this was so; on the one occasion in the early 1930s -when such an 
action was threatened, ' the Hashagen incident, he was convinced that 
the Government was bluffing. This opinion was confirmed many years 
later by Sir 
i 
Kjpgsley Wood, who admitted that he would never have 
used his veto. 
Yet his belief that the Government would find it highly invidious 
134. BBC, UCVEX, Evidence of A. Dawnay, 19 July 1935. For an 
interesting and fair sumary of the practical effect of this 
approach on the programes for one year, 1935, see T. Stannage 
(1980), Op. -Cit., 184-189. 
135. A. Briggs (1965), Op. Cit., 130. 
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to utilise Clause 4 (3) did not incline Reith to pay less attention 
to government opinion. He was, of course, aware that in the long term 
government dissatisfaction with the BBC could well have drastic 
consequences for his creation and his ideal. Indeed before the 
publication of the Government's white paper on broadcasting in 1936 
this was of immediate concern. But quite apart from such pragmatic 
considerations Reith held that the Corporation had a certain duty not 
just to forebear from doing anything which might hinder government 
policy, but actively to give aid in its implementation, where such a 
policy did not too greatly conflict with political balance and BBC 
independence. 
The Corporation was naturally aware of the risk in holding such a 
policy, and this made it wary of government initiated proposals for, 
or opposition to, domestic affairs programmes. The only known 
instance of government initiated opposition - the only such occasion 
on which the Government suc 1e3e6ded in its objective - was the rather 
ridiculous Hashagen affair. Of government proposals for talks, 
however, there are a few more examples. Thus in 1937 the Ministry of 
Health 'suggested that mention be made of its campaign for better 
rural housing, not only in the news and farming programme, but also 
in ordinary talks on country rambles: 
it would be nice if Gypsy Petulengro - who must have a large 
public - could notice a cottage or two ('Before and After") in 
the course of his wanderings. 
The Corporation considered that the campaign was sufficiently 
newsworthy for the farming programme and news, but not surprisingly 
rejected the third suggestion: 
136. For details of the Hashagen affair see A. Briggs (1979), 92. 
Cit., 191-194. For government opposition to programmes with 
international implications, however, see pages 562-611 below. 
137. BBC, (2, A. N. Rucker to L. Wellington, 18 January 1937. 
Petulengro gave regular talks on the countryside. 
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I am sure we do n ltswant to urge general speakers to indulge in 
veiled propaganda. 
The issue was not uncontroversial, for the unions objected vigorously 
to any suggestion that farm labourers' houses were generally good. 
The Ministry of Health Publicity Officer's eagerness to publicise the 
Ministry's health policy similarly obliged Maconachie 
to remind him that the Corporation reserved its independence of 
treatment of the subject, and must 
lr 
9 ntain its policy of not 
over emphasising one particular view. 
Again in October 1938 Sir Richard A. aconachie was called to the 
Cabinet Office, where he was told by the Cabinet Secretary-and Sir 
Ernest Gowers that 
they considered it would be in the public interest if a 
discussion could be staged on the subject of National Service 
which would help to clear the public mind of the vague and woolly 
ideas prevalent on is subject, on which clear thinking was 140 
urgently necessary. 
On this occasion Maconachie readily agreed to the proposal, 
particularly since there was no suggestion that the BBC should accept 
specific speakers. The debate took place the following month between 
L. S. Amery and Lord Snell. 
In the final year before the war government departments showed an 
increasing interest in the use of broadcasting, an interest not 
wholly welcome to the Corporation. By June 1939 Basil Nicolls was 
finding that many departments treated the BBC as though Clause 4 (2) 
138. BBC, CMH, L. Wellington to Ma. conachie, 26 January 1937. 
139. BBC, O H, record of meeting between Maconachie, J. Coatnan and 
A. N. Rucker, 10 February 1937. 
140. BBC, TrP, memorandum by Maconachie, 11 October 1938. 
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of the Licence, requiring the BBC to broadcast official notices, gave 
them the right to demand anything. Indeed the Lord Privy Seal's press 
officer told R. T. Clark several times 'in a hectoring tone ... that 
it is the BBC's job to do what they are told'. The same 
department persistently tried to persuade the BBC to allow the Prime 
Minister to broadcast during a religious service on 2 July 1939. 
This situation was clearly intolerable for the Corporation and, 
although required by Licence to take note of official requirements, 
the Director General, Ogilvie, stressed that his objective was 'the 
minimum of government interference'. More than that, he suggested to 
his staff a practical method of evasion: 
The remedy .... is, I suggest, stalling: - that SNE [Senior News 
Editor] should say that he cannot possibly agree to this or that 
(improper) request with? consulting C(P): C(P) without 
consulting DDG, and so on. 
l 
Where the initiative came from the Government or government 
departments, therefore, the BBC did its best, though not always 
successfully, to guard its position. But when the Corporation itself 
initiated the contact, the very fact of its approach indicated 
recognition that the Government had a right to be consulted on 
matters which affected it. Such a policy of consultation was followed 
both to obtain factual information and as a matter of courtesy, to 
ensure that the work of government would not be seriously hindered by 
the Corporation's actions. Yet it clearly made the latter's position 
that much more difficult. It was a dangerous practice, resulting both 
from its commitment to aid the task of government and from an over- 
confidence in its ability to recognise and repel undue influence. 
Indeed in the early 1930s some government departments proved less 
anxious to be consulted than the BBC was to consult them, their fear 
being that prior consultation would be taken at large to signify 
141. BBC, TGDRBB, Nicolls to Ogilvie, 29 June 1939. 
142. BBC, TGDRBB, Ogilvie to Graves, 5 July 1939. 
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agreement with and responsibility for whatever was said. Similarly 
the Home Office, which generally proved most co-operative in advising 
on straight talks in its particular field, refused to allow its own 
spokesmen to take part in or even advise on potentially awkward and 
embarrassing broadcast discussions. As Sir Russell Scott, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary, told Siepmann, 
on the whole it would be better for the Home Office, so far as 
discussions and surrming up are concerned, to be, as it were, 
clean outside the ring, and that being so, we should prefer not 143 
to be consulted beforehand in regard to them. 
The vast majority of such consultations - and they occurred 
almost whenever a planned talks series impinged on an area of concern 
to a government department - were entirely innocuous, largely because 
the subjects proposed for talks were themselves factual and 
uncontroversial. Very occasionally, however, departmental responses 
to BBC enquiries went beyond factual information. The crucial 
question was where reasonable government request ended and undue 
influence began. Siepmann told Reith in 1933 that, as regards 
political affairs coverage, 
we are always likely to have the government of the day, and even 
more so the Civil Service144 against us, on grounds of expediency 
and the "public interest". 
His warning showed a recognition both that closeness was still 
considered a virtue within much of the Civil Service and that, given 
the opportunity, any government would seek in a delicate situation to 
influence, wheresoever it could, the information . provided to the 
public. Most of the time it had no such opportunity; just 
occasionally it did. 
143. BBC, TIPPP, Sir Russell Scott to BBC, 16 February 1934. 
144. BBC, PPBG, Siepmnn to Reith, 23 February 1933. 
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In April 1937, for example, the Ministry of Labour proved less 
than keen when the BBC proposed to allow representatives on both 
sides of the London bus dispute to broadcast. A stoppage had not yet 
occurred, and Malcolm Brereton for the Corporation explained that 
if a settlement was in view we did not wish to fan the flame, and 
it was only in the event of a strike being actually in progress 
that we wished to give both sides an opportunity of showing the 
public that they had a sufficient case to Justify a situation in 145 
which the public was without its transport. 
Yet despite this reasonable approach the Ministry 
was convinced that it would do more harm than good even to make 
offers to Lord Ashfield (or Mr. Pick) on one side and Mr. Bevin 
on the other to broadcast on the subject of the impending bus 146 
strike. 
In view of this advice Maconachie and Graves decided to abandon the 
-proposal. 
1937 also saw the twenty-first anniversary of the nationalisation 
of the Carlisle brewing industry, an early experiment in public 
ownership which had proved remarkably successful. The Corporation 
considered a talk on the subject and consulted the Home Office. The 
answer was not one that a civil servant should have given. Nor did it 
impress producer Norman Luker, who told h'laconachie that the H. O. 
would be 'roost relieved to hear that the idea of such a programme had 
been dropped': 
The reason for this is .... that it is most embarrassing for a 
Conservative Government to have publicity shining on what is 
definitely a Socialist experiment ... The real opposition is a 
145. BBC, TIP, C. S. M. Brereton to Ma. conachie, 29 April 1937. 
f- 146. BBC, TTP, memorandum by Maconachie, 30 April 1937. 
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147 
political one. 
In the event, although no talk was broadcast, the decision seems to 
have been taken on the grounds of pure newsworthiness and not because 
of Home Office wishes. One comicnt, however, by A. P. Ryan, the 
Assistant Controller of Public Relations, was interesting. He argued 
that if the Carlisle experiment was dealt with, it should be by a 
talk rather than a debate: 
A debate, stirring up the whole question at a time when it is not 
an issue of practical politics, does seem to be gratuitously 
asking for trouble. 
These examples were typical of the level at which such liaison 
and influence occurred. Thus in February 1938 Guy Burgess was told 
that because of a general lack of agreement between Britain and the 
Dominions on emigration policy, the149ime was 'particularly unripe' 
for a programme on the subject. When Australia House was 
contacted about a possible talk on new plans for emigration, it 
advised the Corporation that the moment was inopportune owing to the 
recent arrival in Britain of three Australian ministers to discuss 
this subject with the Government. On both occasions the BBC 
acted upon the advice - by not acting. In such ways liaison resulted, 
to use Lord Burnham's phrase, in 'not censorship, an influence'. 
Individual instances were generally insignificant; taken as a whole 
the effect could be considerable. 
The relationship which existed between the Home Office and the 
BBC in particular provided a good example of the basically 
sympathetic attitude on each side, and of the practical consequences. 
147. BBC, TTP, N. Luker to Maconachie, 4 August 1937. 
148. BBC, TIP, A. P. Ryan to Maconachie, 9 September 1937. 
149. BBC, TTP, G. Burgess to Maconachie, 18 February 1938. 
150. BBC, TrP, M. H. Whale to G. Barnes, 29 April 1938. 
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Siepmann found it a natural step in November 1932, when planning a 
series on crime, to contact the Home Office, request its assistance. 
and assure it that 
Our whole purpose is to assist the Home Office by securing 
through our educational efforts a sane and moderate public 
opinion in face of t1 sensational headlines to which they are 15 
treated in the press. 
The following year he told Sir Russell Scott of the frequent contacts 
between their two staffs and requested a personal meeting: 
We are, as you know, very anxious to work closely with you and to 
miss ri 15_pportunity of service that it is possible for us to 
render. 
Z 
Following this meeting the Talks Department began to prepare a series 
on delinquency and the prison system, which, the Home Office was 
informed, was intended 
to counteract the irresponsible and misleading publicity 
attaching to certain aspects of the work of the Prison 
Comnission, and to inform listeners of the enlight1ne3d practice 
and the general policy of our prison administration. 
This letter was again a request for Home Office co-operation, both in 
giving the intended speaker, a Mrs. Le Mesurier, access to prisons and 
in informally checking her manuscripts in order to ensure that they 
were 'a true and accurate account of the administration'. Sir Russell 
Scott was only too happy to scrutinise scripts, 
151. BBC, TTPPP, Siepmann to H. R. Scott (Prison Commission, Hone 
Office), 8 November 1932. 
152. BBC, TrPPP, Siepmnn to Sir Russell Scott, 28 August 1933. 
153. BBC, TTPPP, Siepna. nn to Sir Russell Scott, 17 January 1934. 
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with the object of correcting any inaccuracy and of eliminating 
any stat154 nt which might be detrimental to the public 
interest. 
Moreover he proposed an alternative expert as principal speaker, 
namely the Conservative MP Sir Vivian Henderson, and Siepmann readily 
agreed to his giving a number of talks in the series. The BBC did, 
however, resist Scott's suggestion that three intended discussions - 
on the causes and prevention of crime, and on the death penalty - 
should not be included. Siepmann and Dawnay considered these to. be 
essential and attractive elements of the series; they were prepared 
to accede to Scott's wishes on the question of Henderson in order to 
have their own way on the discussions. Such on occasions could be the 
BBC mentality which saw this very close liaison as responsible co- 
operation, and compromise as necessary to preserve reasonable 
independence. 
Ministerial broadcasts also formed an integral part of the BBC's 
political coverage, and one in which the Corporation was particularly 
vulnerable to influence. Most ministeriais were unexceptionable, as a 
list for one year, 1934, suggests: 
154. BBC, TTPPP, Sir Russell Scott to Siepmann, 23 January 1934. 
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Table 8.1: Ministerial Broadcasts during 1934.155 
14 February. Walter Elliot The Marketing Schemes in 
Action. 
27 March Oliver Stanley Road Safety Campaign. 
17 April Neville Chamberlain The Budget. 
21 May Anthony Eden The Disarmament Conference 
6 June Sir Kingsley Wood Changes in the Post Office 
Service. 
10 July Leslie Hore-Belisha Pedestrian Crossings. 
12 July Sir Edward Hilton Young The Drought. 
2 August Leslie Hore-Belisha Road Accidents. 
23 August Leslie Hore Belisha Silent Zones. 
24 August Walter Elliot Cattle Emergency Provisions 
Act. 
10 September 'Anthony Eden Opening of the Fifteenth 
Ordinary Session of the 
League. 
25 September Sir Kingsley Wood Telephone Week. 
27 September Walter Elliot Milk for School Children. 
3 October Leslie Hore-Belisha The New Pedestrian Crossing 
Places. 
10 December Sir Godfrey Collins Milk Marketing Board in 
Scotland. - 
19 December Sir John Simon The Naval Conversations. 
20 December Lord Londonderry Empire Air Services. 
* This was followed by three controversial statements by Clement 
Attlee, Sir Herbert Samuel and J. H. Thomas. 
155. H. C. Debates, vol. 297: col. 1552,11 February 1935. 
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Although George Lansbury was at this stage still demanding a right of 
reply for every Government broadcast, protests were rarely made, and 
the Labour leadership came gradually to accept that most ministerials 
were relatively innocuous in content. 
Not all were, however. Just occasionally the Corporation 
broadcast talks which were either not strictly justifiable or not 
wholly impartial. Thirteen days before Sir Edward Hilton Young's 
Housing Bill had its second reading, in January 1935, he was given 
the opportunity to broadcast on its aims and provisions. His talk was 
hardly impartial and the issue itself was certainly not 
uncontroversial. The Bill was fiercely debated in the Comnonsi5with 
the Opposition rejecting it as wholly inadequate and misguided. 
An even more interesting example of a dubious ministerial - 
interesting because of what it shows about Keith's attitude - had 
occurred only two weeks previously. In mid-December 1934 MacDonald 
told Reith that the Cabinet wanted him (MacDonald) to broadcast a New 
Year's message: 
He said the National Government was misrepresented so much in the 
newspapers that the Cabinet thought that they1haad better tell the 
public their point of view over the wireless. 
Reith was very much opposed to the suggestion and emphasised that it 
would only be permissible if the talk was a wholly uncontroversial 
New Year's greeting. At the same time he was unwilling to annoy the 
PM too much: 
It is an awkward position. I am quite ready to take a strong line 
with anybody on certain occasions, but to oppose the government 158 
in a matter like this is of doubtful expediency. 
156. The Listener, 23 January 1935,159; H. C. Debates, vo1.297: cols. 
359-487, and 543-633,30-31 January f935. 
157. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 119,11-12 December 1934. 
158. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 119,14 December 1934. 
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The 
159ewal 
of the BBC's charter was already very much in Reith's 
mind. When MacDonald continued to express a desire to give the 
talk, though agreeing to make it uncontroversial, Reith told him that 
his wishes settled the matter. But the resultant broadcast was little 
more than a National Government apologia, even though Reith 160 
considered it 'not at all bad'. 
Such instances were rare. But the BBC also recognised that all 
ministerial appearances, no matter how innocuous, did give a certain 
amount of publicity both to the Government and to the individual 
concerned, and Siepmann concluded that it would be better if such 161 
talks were not given by ministers. When Sir Edward Hilton Young 
'offered' to broadcast on house building progress in 1933 Fielden 
warned that his comments 
will not exactly be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but 
the truth. So far as I can gather, feeling generally among those 
who are keen o16slum clearance is that no progress whatever is 
being made .... 
Siej nn and Reith agreed that the most that should be offered was an 
opportunity for Hilton Young to be questioned by three critics, as 
had Walter Elliot the previous month. Cecil Graves similarly 
warned in 1937 that 
we have to watch and see that [ministerials are] not overdone, 
otherwise we might find ourselves in the position of having the 
Opposition trying to make out that the Government was being given 
159. J. C. W. Reith (1949), Op. Cit., 210. 
160. The Listener, 9 January 1935,45; C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 119,5 
January 1935. 
161. BBC, PPBG, Siepmann to Reith, 23 February 1933. 
162. BBC, TH, Fielden to Siepmann, 11 July 1933. 
163. BBC, TH, Siepmann to Reith, 12 July 1933. 
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164 
too big a showing. 
In December 1938 Ogilvie told Sir John Anderson, the Lord Privy Seal, 
that any broadcast by him on defence policy would have to be balanced 65 
by an Opposition reply. 
Yet ministers were by now coming to appreciate the advantages of 
ministerials, and this fact, coupled with the BBC's traditional 
liking for broadcasts 'from the horse's mouth', combined to prevent 
any decrease in their number. Opposition complaints that ministerial 
appearances gave the Government undue publicity, even when the 
subject was non-controversial, were revived. The question arose 
as to what level of ministerials was acceptable, and the Corporation, 
which had been too reliant upon its own fundamental impartiality, 
began to realise in the last few months before war that in the 
gathering crisis it had allowed the situation to become unbalanced. 
The same was true of its broadcasting of speeches by ministers from 
outside functions, many of which had a political content. 
Chamberlain's speeches in particular had been broadcast, and Herbert 
Morrison felt obliged in early 1939 to complain that 
the BBC has a very distinct tendency to broadcast ministers on a 
large number of occasions without any corresponding consideration 
for members of political parties opposed to the Government. 
He pointed out that the. previous week two of Chamberlain's speeches 
had been broadcast and one of Sir John Anderson's, whilst his own at 
the same function as Anderson had been omitted. Maurice Farquharson, 
the BBC's Director of Home Intelligence, had to admit of this and 
164. BBC, PPBMB, Graves to Director of Programme Administration, 11 
May 1937. 
165. Note of meeting between Ogilvie and Sir John Anderson, 7 
December 1933 - quoted by A. Briggs (1965), Op. Cit., 655. 
166. BBC, PPBG, Nicolls to Maconachie, 16 December 1938. 
167. BBC, PPBMB, H. Morrison to Ogilvie, 27 January 1939. 
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many similar letters that 
I have found it a difficult charge to answer and1AA. C. (P) has also 
not yet decided on the line of reply to be used. 
When Emmanuel Shinwell asked about the extent of broadcasts by 
government speakers since 1936, the Director of Outside Broadcasts, 
S. J. de Lotbiniere, told Farquharson: 
The list is very far from providing any good answer to the 
innuendo contained in Mr. Shinwell's quest ioýný and it looks as 
though we have been going from bad to worse. 
The BBC's explanation that few such occasions were political, and 
that institutional dinners more often had government than opposition 
members as speakers, was hardly adequate. In answer to another 
parliamentary question the Assistant PM revealed that between 31 
January 1938 and 31 January 1939 ministers had broadcast on 42 
occasions, government supporters in the House on 48 occasions and 
members of the opposition parties on only 33. These figures included 
non-political talks and the regular 'Week in Westminster' broadcasts. 
Excluding the latter, as the Assistant PAM was careful not to do, 
would have made the figures considerably worse, at about 42 
ministers, 38 government MPs and only 13 members of the opposition, 
even though most 170 
the remainder were unexceptionable ministerials 
and other talks. If the BBC had earlier been careful not to 
allow ministerials and other broadcasting facilities for the 
Government to get out o171and, it found it increasingly difficult to 
do so as war approached. 
168. BBC, PPBMB, M. Farquharson to B. Nicolls, 30 January 1939. The 
Assistant Controller of Pro nes was Lindsay Wellington. 
169. BBC, PPBPPB, S. J. de Lotbiniere to II. Farquharson, 2 February 
1939. 
170. H. C. Debates, vol. 343: col. 2065,17 February 1939. 
171. After the war the extent of ministerial broadcasting was again 
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Yet it was precisely during such crises that the BBC aligned 
itself most firmly with the national interest. The increase in 
ministerials and other government notices in the months before and 
after Munich was not due to any relaxation of the policy of 
impartiality; rather it was the result of a genuine and reasonable 
view that, in the dissemination of information and appeals on A. R. P., 
gas masks and other defence measures, the BBC could play a unique 
role. The Corporation responded in this way to the growing emergency 
because in such circumstances the Government did indeed have special 
responsibilities which transcended considerations of party balance. 
The series of party debates in 1939 was intended specifically to give 
Opposition spokesmen air-time for criticism, as a counter to 
government predominance. Where it proved wholly inadequate was in its 
inability to consider the foreign situation. The area where the BBC's 
relationship with the Government was most interesting was with regard 
to foreign affairs, and it is to this that we must lastly turn. 
iv) Foreign Affairs Broadcasting and Programmes with International 
Ramifications, 1927 - 1939. 
The BBC's motto 'Nation shall speak Peace unto Nation' reflected 
its profound concern for promoting an internationalist spirit both 
amongst its listeners and, through public expressions of 
international amity, between states themselves. If the BBC's first 
brief was for constitutional democracy its second was for 
international understanding and world peace. When Whitley told the 
Cabinet that the Hashagen talk had been 'planned as a definite 
contribution towards the elimination of submarine warfare', he did 
not have any c1? 2 rn that the BBC was here taking a very definite 
editorial line. Several of the staff were connected with the 
to become a problem. Not until ministers and departments began 
to accept the BBC's argument that government information could 
be more readily transmitted and accepted through the ordinary 
news bulletin did the practice, and its attendant dangers, 
decline. 
172. Cab. 24, C. P. 271 (32), Whitley to M. Hankey, 28 July 1932. 
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League of Nations Union, whilst the BBC's full coverage of the 
sessions of the League itself, even to the extent of having a 
correspondent in Geneva and giving the British delegation full' 
opportunities to broadcast, represented a strong identification with 
its aims and work. Above all the Corporation saw peace as depending 
to a large extent upon the elimination of national ignorance about 
other nations and international events. It therefore accepted as one 
of its duties the task of informing its audience, of the intricacies 
of foreign affairs, as well as presenting numerous programmes and 
series on aspects of life in foreign countries. It provided 
opportunities for foreign nationals to describe both their own 
countries and their sense of international goodwill, and it promoted 
the learning of foreign languages. 
In its commitment to replacing ignorance with information the BBC 
appeared to have an unexpected ally. This was the Foreign Office 
itself, or more particularly the News Department of the Foreign 
Office. Before the First World War this would not have been so; 
diplomacy and foreign affairs were a mystery to most people and the 
Foreign Office was desirous that it should r main so, lest misguided 
public opinion hinder its delicate work. The war, however, 
changed the FO's outlook. The News Department, established in 1914, 
was initially and primarily aimed outwards, its function being to 
publicise the British case abroad, particularly through the foreign 
press. This concern was to be reflected throughout the inter-war 
period in its approach to the British press and, as we shall see, to 
the BBC, - for it was recognised that the domestic media were a 
valuable source of information on British policy for foreign 
observers. At the same time it was felt that the war and the 
establishment of the League of Nations, together with the extension 
of the electorate and increased education, had raised general public 
interest in foreign affairs and made it no longer possible to exclude 
173. For these details of the pre-First World War Foreign Office and 
the establishment of the News Department, I have relied upon P. 
Taylor, The Projection of Britain, PhD. thesis, Leeds 1978,65- 
67, et passim. 
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domestic public opinion as a factor in policy. For these reasons the 
Foreign Office News Department concerned itself not only with 
publicity abroad but also with the presentation of foreign policy to 
the British populace. 
Various factors combined to determine how it undertook this task. 
Cutbacks after the war ensured that the Department's activities were 
reduced from active propagandising to a more passive informational 
role, providing news on foreign policy to the press and correcting 
misstatements and misconceptions. 
174 
But in any case this was the 
role which the creators of the peace-time News Department defined for 
themselves. They recognised that they had to work with a free press 
whose editorial line could not be controlled. The most that could be 
done was to, provide regular and accurate news and intelligent comment 
in an effort to disarm ill-informed press criticism. With this 
in mind the sudcessive heads of the department, Arthur Willert and 
Rex Leeper, sought to create a friendly and informal atmosphere in 
which mutual6 trust and confidence formed the basis of liaison with 
the press'. Willert and Leeper themselves met the foreign editors 
. of tzjor newspapers regularly, 
in order to discuss privately the 
international situation. In this way they hoped to encourage a 
friendly response and to gain the sympathy - if not the support - of 
these important opinion-makers. 
Such a policy, however, was not always successful, particularly-- 
with the popular press and at a time when an editorial line depended 
as much on proprietorial whim as on factual evidence. Rex Leeper was 
repeatedly frustrated in his aim: 
the muddled-headedness and inconsistency of English public 
opinion as expressed in the newspapers causes difficulties to our 
own Government and accentuates differences in Europe. If 
174. Ibid., 3. 
175. Ibid., 98. 
176. Ibid., 108. 
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newspapers would really maintain close and serious contact with 
the Foreign Office, they would not always agree with official 
policy, but they would at any rate have a much clearer picture as 
to what it was they disagreed with. Their criticisms might then 177 
be better informed and more useful. 
Yet his conclusions as to the best method of dealing with the problem 
remained unchanged. Patience, he hoped, would have its reward: 
We can only hope to induce the Press to exercise restraint in 
foreign affairs by taking these irresponsible persons into our 
confidence. A free Press is an enormous asset to the country 
provided1? 8 t freedom does not degenerate into irresponsible 
license. 
The views of the Foreign Office News Department and of the BBC 
were therefore remarkably compatible, their joint aim being to inform 
the public in a responsible manner about the intricacies of foreign 
affairs. The danger-point for BBC independence was to come precisely 
in that identity of outlook, combined with the FO's primary concern 
for foreign opinion rather than domestic. 
Contact between the FO and BBC was initiated by the latter which, 
whilst still a Company, began the practice of phoning to check 
unconfirmed Reuter's reports for the news bulletin. In 1927 this 
liaison was put on a proper footing when it was arranged that a BBC 
representative could ring or call in at the FO in the same way as the 
foreign editors of major newspapers. The arrangement was a completely 
friendly one, and Arthur Willert wrote to E. C. Henty that 
We are, I think, in agreement that it will be to the advantage of 
both parties that ..... relations should be as close and as 
177. R. A. Leeper to Sir Robert Vansittart, 12 October 1932. Quoted 
by P. Taylor, Op. Cit., 115. 
178. Memorandum by Leeper, 2 January 1938. Quoted by P. Taylor, Q. 
Cit., 119. 
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constant as the relations existing between the News Department of 
the Foreign9 Office and the leading British newspapers and news 
agencies. 
I'7 
Indeed the Foreign Office was as concerned for its own independence 
as the BIC: 
We shall be very glad to do whatever we properly can to 
supplement your knowledge, and to check your facts, provided, of 
course, that it is understood that in doing so we assume no 
responsibility for anything which the British Broadcasting 
Corporation180 y say, except when we hand you an official 
communique. 
When, in 1928, Vernon Bartlett suggested that William Ridsdale of the 
FC) News Department should take over his 'Way of the World' series 
while he was on holiday, Willert vetoed the idea on the grounds that 
we have always been careful to lay it down to the BBC that we can 
take n181responsibility for their utterances on foreign 
affairs. 
Willert's concern was to prevent the Fn becoming involved in an 
organisation over which, ultimately, it had no control. The danger of 
the 'BBC being seen abroad as a government mouthpiece was therefore 
quickly recognised by the Foreign Office, which was as anxious as the 
BBC to stop this idea gaining currency. Apart from this apprehension 
it was gratified by the increased liaison, particularly when during 
the 1927 Naval Conference, 
By means of the BB an accurate statement of the British case was 
repeatedly given to a great many people who never read a decent 
179. PO 395/422, P446/364/150, A. Willert to E. C. Henty, 1 November 
1927. 
180. Ibid. 
181. ID 395/432, P1104/1104/150, Minute by Willert, c. 15 July 1928. 
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newspaper and even to many who do not read a newspaper at 182 
all. 
The arrangements for covering the 1930 London Naval Conference were 
equally a complete success, with the opening speeches and other items 
being broadcast and, later in the year, RamsiMacDonald himself 
talking on the ratification of the Naval treaty. 
83 
The BBC did indeed behave 'responsibly', consulting the News 
Department on dubious items of news and accepting its responsibility 
not to make the FO's job more difficult. It took as its natural rule 
a general policy of avoiding provocative or undesirable 
references to foreign governments and people, and the handling of 
such subjects only by speakers of acknowledged authority and 84 
responsibility. 
In Vernon Bartlett it found, as it thought, the ideal foreign affairs 
broadcaster. His scripts were not submitted to the }O and the latter 
did not consider such a step either necessary or desirable. Indeed it 
was the B3 rather than the ID which in 1931 sought even greater 
liaison, as the arrangements for the series 'Russia in the Melting 
Pot' demonstrate. 
'Russia in the Melting Pot' was the first talks series to be 
broadcast on a specific and contentious foreign subject. Hilda 
Matheson saw it as an essentially factual and, if possible, 
uncontroversial analysis of Soviet Russia given by men and women who 
were experts in the field. She therefore had no apprehension about 
consulting Rex Leeper 'unofficially' as to the18best subjects and 
speakers to ensure a balanced set of progranmes. Reith similarly 
182. ID 395/422, P446/364/150, Minute by A. Yencken, 16 August 1927. 
183. FU 395/440, P266/1/150,1930 London Naval Conference 
arrangements file. 
184. BBC, PPB1, Unsigned memorandum, 22 July 1930. 
185. BB9 TR.. Matheson to R. Eckersley, 7 February 1931. 
I' 
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contacted Sir Robert Vansittart, the Permanent Under-Secretary, and 
Sir Launcelot Oliphant, the Assistant Under Secretary, in order to 
suggest 
some arrangement between us so that you may be in touch with what 
we propose doing in general i Barding foreign affairs, and so 
that we may have proper advice? 
86 
It was unfortunately not clear from this what advice Reith had in 
mind, although his request on the Russian series went no further than 
had Matheson's. Oliphant, however, certainly seemed to think that an 
element of script checking would also be involved, for he told Reith 
that the 
lt 
that could be done was the reading of 'doubtful 
passages'. Again it is unclear whether this suggestion, to which 
Reith agreed, implied anything more than the checking of factual 
information. 
But whatever Reith had in mind, his proposal found little favour 
in the FO, where it was certainly interpreted as more than may have 
been intended. The internal debate on the subject allowed for an 
interesting enunciation. of Foreign Office attitudes. Rex Leeper 
distil uished between the checking of factual news items and of 
opinionated talks. Clearly the FO could not accept any responsibility 
for opinions expressed by speakers, in the same way that it did not 
for opinions expressed in newspaper articles. A newspaper was 
considered entirely responsible for any item it printed. But for the 
first time Leeper posed the crucial question as to whether the BBC 
was analogous to a newspaper and whether, therefore, it should be 
treated in the same way: 
It is not entirely independent like a newspaper, as the 
Government have a right to intervene and foreign governments are 
aware of this .... All I can suggest, if we are to attempt [a 
186. FO 395/453, P418/39/150, Reith to Vansittart, 24 February 1931. 
187. Ibid. 
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liaison] is that our functions should be of a negative character, 
viz. that we should discourage anything of a controversial 
character and advise the omission of any passage which we 
considered likely to cause controversy in the press. In practice 
that would mean that we should confine ourselves to the omission 
of anything that might cause offence to a foreign 18vgernment, or 
the correction of an obvious mis-statement of fact. 
Willert, Oliphant and Vansittart agreed with this suggestion, 
although the latter felt that such negative liaison should be . 
'an 
exception in case of need and not a practice'. Hugh Dalton, the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, was unwilling even to go this 
far, and pointed out that 
It would be awkward to have to admit in Parliament that we have 
exercised even lam negative censorship over 
the manuscripts of 
proposed talks. 
The Foreign Office was therefore strongly opposed to closer 
-liaison on foreign affairs talks, and Vansittart in his reply to 
Reith merely advised him 
to review with particular care the proofs of any lectures 
submitted to you on these delicate questions in order to avoid as 
far as possible controversial matter in any talks which may take 
place, or any refeerence which might affect our relations with any 
foreign country. 
Although the Labour Secretary of State, Arthur Henderson, had agreed 
to the concept of negative liaison, Vansittart intimated no more than 
188. FO 395/453, P418/39/150, Minute by Leeper, 26 February 1931. 
189. FO 395/453, P418/39/150, Undated minute by Vansittart for 
Secretary of State, c. 5 March 1931. 
190. FO 395/453, P418/39/150, Minute by H. Dalton, 4 March 1931. 
191. FO 395/453, P418/39/150, Vansittart to Reith, 13 March 1931. 
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that in 'occasional cases of exceptional difficulty' the FO might be 
prepared to give further advice. 
At the same time the Foreign Office expressed its strong approval 
of Vernon Bartlett's talks. Leeper considered that het had presented 19 
his subject 'with great skill and discretion'. Hugh Dalton 
similarly shared Leeper's favourable opinion of Bartlett and felt 
that the BBC should be encouraged to continue using him. Vansittart 
was therefore fulsome in his praise when writing to Reith: 
I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my 
appreciation of the ability and fairmindedness with which [Mr. 
Bartlett] has treated the many questions on which he has spoken. 
So long as talks on foreign affairs are entrusted to him, I think 
you will agree that neither will you have need of our advice, nor 
is any press or parliamentary criticism likely to occur. 
The FO's confidence in Bartlett was not because he was a cautious 
speaker, for he was not, but because he was accurate and experienced. 
Although he never visited the News Department for information while 
broadcasting, he considered this unnecessary, being himself director 
of the Information Section of the League of Nations Secretariat in 
London. More particularly he had since 1922 been a member of a small 
weekly lunch club which consisted, apart from himself and one other, 
entirely of Foreign O9fffice officials, including William Ridsdale of 
the News Department. The Foreign Office valued Bartlett because 
he knew what he was talking about. 
The Foreign Office was therefore confident that Bartlett and the 
192. FO 395/453. P418/39/150, Minute by Leeper, 26 February 1931. 
193. FO 395/453, P418/39/150, Vansittart to Reith, 13 March 1931. 
194. Letters from V. Bartlett to the author, 2 and 26 August 1977. 
Bartlett comments: 'I venture to think that, from 1922 onwards 
I had more contacts with the F. O. than any other journalist 
except, possibly "Trilby" Ewer of the Daily Herald'. William 
Ridsdale was later to become head of the News Department. 
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BBC represented a popular yet accurate and responsible medium for the 
explanation of foreign affairs, and one which needed minimum 
liaison. This attitude was to be maintained as far as possible 
for the next two years. Nevertheless a number-of events in 1933 were 
automatically to bring the two bodies closer together and cause the 
FO to take a greater interest in what was broadcast. 
On New Year's Eve 1932/3 the BBC transmitted relays of how other 
European countries were welcoming in the New Year. These relays were 
linked by a script which warned, in an extremely superficial manner, 
that Europe was still an armed and arming continent and that peace 
was not assured. Following a relay from Germany was a passage on 
Poland: 
You have just shared the experience of entering the New Year with 
Germany, and in particular with the people of Konigsberg who are 
separated from the main body of their countrymen by the Polish 
Corridor. Passing along this through a country of fields and 
forests and lakes fought over by Teutons and Slavs for centuries 
let us now enter Poland, about a third of whose National Income 
is still allotted to the Ministry of War. 
Following church bells and a radio broadcast from Poland the 
programme returned to Gern . ny, 
whose expenditure upon forces of defence is relatively negligible 
owing to the limitation by the Treaty of Versailles of her army 
and navy t 191115,000 men, no air service, heavy guns, tanks nor 
submarines. 
195. In any case Vansittart knew Reith and his general approach, for 
they had met not infrequently when Vansittart was the Prime 
Minister's Principal Private Secretary, fron 1928 to 1930. 
196. FO 395/476, P56/24/150, Script of broadcast of 31 December 
1932, with modifications, sent by Reith to Foreign Office, 5 
January 1933. 
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The programme as originally written by producer Archie Harding, and 
to a lesser extent as toned down by his superiors, was anti- 
Versailles and anti-armaments rather than ant19P? oland, but it 
inevitably showed a degree of sympathy for Germany. 
The Polish Ambassador immediately protested to the Foreign Office 
and gave his complaint to the press. The FO judged that it was right 
to intervene in this instance as international relations were 
involved, and Reith was asked to provide details. This he did, 
rejecting the idea, in view of the general character of the programme 
and the factual nature of the parltýigcular comments, that there were 
legitimate grounds for complaint. The Foreign Office, however, 
felt differently. Leeper commented that 'it looks as if the BBC had 
made a bad gaffe', whilst Vansittart told the Polish Ambassador that 
in his 
1: 59 
inion 'the BBC broadcaster had been tactless and 
foolish'. It was clear that not all officials had been hitherto 
satisfied with the BBC and its aloofness, for W. Greenway of the FO's 
Northern Department described the incident as 
typical of the BBC's "superior" mentality, and I think it may be 
possible to rap them severely over the knuckles for it. There is 
too much of the 'Manchester Guardian" attitude among the all-wise 
young gentlemen of Bro öÖ ting House; and Sir John Reith is 
insufferably omnipotent. 
197. For example the first German relay was from Hamburg, not 
Konigsberg, and although a large part of eastern Germany was 
receiving it only Konigsberg was specifically mentioned, in 
order to point out that it was separated from Germany (in the 
original script 'The Fatherland'), by the Polish Corridor. 
Austria was similarly treated sympathetically. The original 
script by Archie Harding had been toned down slightly by the 
Foreign Director, C. F. Atkinson, and the Production Director, 
Val Gielgud. 
198. FO 395/476, P55/24/150, Memra. ndum by Reith, 4 January 1933. 
199. FO 395/476, P55/24/150, Minute by Leeper for Vansittart, 5 
January 1933; Minute by Vansittart, 5 January 1933. 
200. FO 395/476, P24/24/150, Minute by W. Greenway, 6 January 1933. 
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Despite this 'omnipotence' the PM was confident that Reith would 
behave responsibly and apologise, and the FO accordingly asskled him to 
put pressure on the Director General to do just that. It was 
suggested that any apology should contain the comment that it had 
been given at the BBC's own initiative, thereby forestalling press 
comments of government control of broadcasting. This Reith* 
reluctantly agreed to do and the incident was closed with a visit by 
him to the Polish Ambassador, an assurance that the offending remarks 
had been 'entirely inadvertent' and a comment that 'internal 202 
administrative action' had already been taken on the matter. The 
FO had acted quickly and successfully to prevent international 
complications, and was now to become increasingly conscious of the 
potential effect abroad of BBC programanes. 
Reaction was therefore mixed when Vernon Bartlett wrote, in 
January 1933, to ask the FO's assistance in arranging microphone 
interviews with European leaders such as Mussolini and Mustapha 
Kemal. Bartlett was now on a two year contract with the BBC as a 
full-time member of staff, responsible not only for broadcasting on 
foreign affairs but also for liaising with other European 
broadcasting organisations. As a result he was more involved in 
travelling around Europe, and hoped to put this wandering to good 
use. He was conscious, however, that it would be difficult to draft 
questions which would evince interesting rather than merely 
platitudin0ous answers, although this was what he hoped to 
achieve. 
In line with its open policy the FO News Department liked the 
idea. Leeper recommended it with the comment that 'We have every 
201. FO 395/476, P71/24/150, Undated draft letter, Leeper to F. W. 
Phillips. 
202. FO 395/476, P129/24/150, Reith to Kingsley Wood, 10 January 
1933. For details of the 'internal administrative action' see 
Note B at the end of chapter, p. 613. 
203. FO 395/487, P186/186/150, Bartlett to beeper, 17 January 1933. 
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confidence in Mr. Bartlett'. 
204 
Departments which dealt with 
specific countries, however, were far less happy. Greenway of the 
Northern Department considered that an interview with any Soviet 
leader would be 'eminently undesirable205The BBC have already given 
the Soviet Govt. too much propaganda'. Alan Walker, also of the 
Northern Department, similarly disliked the whole scheme, which he 
considered would damage international goodwill and simply give the 
interviewees the chance to say something offensive. He particularly 
deplored the idea of a Russian broadcast: 
We have trade relations with the USSR, but let us at least 
abstain from going to the Soviet Government hat in hand, begging 
them to accept our official support in misleading our public 
opinion to a still greater extent than they have hitherto 206 
succeeded in doing. 
For the Central Department Orme Sargent was particularly sceptical: 
Before affording any facilities in either Berlin, Rome, Belgrade, 
or Athens, I should like to go through the questionnaire with 
full right to use a blue pencil -I may as well say straight away 
that my amendments would most certainly result in both questions 
and answers being reduced to a st 2i0n7g of innocuous and therefore 
entirely uninteresting platitudes. 
Such sentiments convinced Vansittart that Bartlett should be 
dissuaded from continuing with the proposal. Accordingly the BBC's 
foreign affairs commentator was approached by Leeper, who knew him, 
and agreed to accede to FO wishes. Instead he asked for help in 
obtaining non-broadcast interviews with the various European leaders 
204. P0.395/487, P186/186/150, Minute by Leeper, 20 January 1933. 
205. FO 395/487, P186/186/150, Minute by W. Greenway, 23 January 
1933. 
206. F0 395/487, P186/186/150, Minute by A. Walker, 23 January 1933. 
207. FO 395/487, P186/186/150, Minute by Orme Sargent, 28 January 
1933. 
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in order to prepare studies for his next series of talks, to be 
called 'Strong Men of Europe'. He emphasised that 
I shall, of course, take great care, if I do ask for permission 
to quote them ipsissima verba, to s 208t statements which would 
be pacifying rather than provocative. 
Although reaction was this time more sympathetic, Orme Sargent 
continued to display the traditional FO reticence, grumbling that 
I still don't like much the idea of a semi-official interview 
with Mussolini in his present temper ..... Must the BBC do this 
kind of stunt? It is only asking for trouble at the present time 209 
when everyone's nerves are on edge. 
Bartlett had by this-time left the country and Leeper therefore 
visited Siepmann, not to oppose the talk, but to emphasise the need 
for care. 
When Bartlett, in the course of his travels, arrived in Turkey 
the Eastern Department was particularly chary of helping him to 
obtain an interview with Mustapha Kemal. Diplomatic relations were 
extremely delicate, and it was decided only to give assistance if 210 
Bartlett agreed to submit his script to the FO before delivery. 
Siepmann and Bartlett readily accepted this condition in return for 
assistance, and the former wrote to express his appreciation of 'the 
friendly relations211 th the Foreign Office which make this kind of 
contact possible'. 
Yet Bartlett was certainly no Foreign Office stooge and could 
208. FO 395/487, P429/186/150, Bartlett to Leeper, 15 February 1933. 
209. FO 395/487, P429/186/150, Minute by Sargent, 20 February 1933. 
210. FO 395/487, P976/186/150, Minute by E. O. Coote, 21 April 1933. 
211. BBC, FCC, SiepIIa. nn to C. P. A. Warner, 21 April 1933. 
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occasionally be remarkably critical in his broadcasts, many of which 
undoubtedly contained clear statements of personal opinion. He 
later described how his aim had been 'to express mildly revolutionary 
ideas in w ords which would win the approval of reactionary 213 
listeners'. Nevertheless he did possess a strong sense of his 
responsibility not only to present a true picture, but also not to 
become himself a damaging factor in international relations. As he 
told A. K. Helm of the Eastern Department, 
The trouble of course is that the British Public would merely 
switch off if I tried to pretend that everything in Turkey is 
perfect L4and yet even friendly criticism is resented in 
Ankara. 
The script which he sent to the Foreign Office in July, whilst not 
uncritical, was therefore hardly the one which would have been 
written if Foreign Office pressure and his own sense of 
responsibility had not intervened. 
The Eastern Department nevertheless considered it desirable to 
tone the talk down, so that Turkey appeared in a more favourable 
light. Most amendments were simple corrections of fact, but in two 
instances rather more was involved. Bartlett had described Mustapha 
Kemal as one of the three greatest men to have arisen since the war, 
but added ominously that, 'Like all dictators he fears rivals'. Helm 
212. See, for example, his talks in The Listener, 3 July 1929,7 
August 1929,7 October 1931 and 27 July 1933. As Reith 
acknowledged to Hilda Matheson, when planning a talks series on 
disarmament in June 1931, 'Vernon Bartlett, although excellent, 
is not impartial either. ' - BBC, TD, Reith to Matheson, 26 June 
1931. 
213. Vernon Bartlett, This is My Life, London 1937,187. He was not 
always successful in this aim. Conservative Central Office 
certainly considered him to be biased, and one listener 
complained to the FO that Bartlett missed no opportunity of 
'belittling our allies and boosting the Soviet. ' - F0 395/484, 
P96/96/150, H. Rowthorn to Sir John Simon. 
214. FO 395/487, P1670/186/150, Bartlett to A. K. Helm, 10 July 1933. 
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crossed this out and wrote 'omit' in the margin. Elsewhere Bartlett 
described the horrors of Ankara slums, including a half-decayed 
horse's leg he had found in the street. He commented that the Turks 
were so proud of their improvements to Ankara, 'that one is not 
supposed to see or say much about this old town'. This was changed by 
Helm to the slightly more friendly observation that the Turks took 
little interest in the old town. J. C. Sterndale Bennett of the Eastern 
Department wanted to delete the entire reference to the slums = 
'negative liaison' indeed - but H215 recognised Bartlett 's point that 
he could not be too laudatory. Bartlett subsequently gave the 
talk as amended. Later in the year, when he broadcast on the tenth 
anniversary celebrations of the Turkish Republic, Bartlett 
automatically sent an advance copy to Helm, with a request to check 
any inaccuracies, uracies, 'or points which it would be unpolitic to 
make? ' 
The story of Vernon Bartlett's projected and broadcast talks in 
the first nine months of 1933 demonstrates clearly how the Foreign 
Office, in its primary concern for international relations, had quite 
automatically begun to exert a degree of pressure upon the BBC to 
which the latter, and its responsible foreign affairs broadcaster, 
undoubtedly responded. It is worth considering the various factors 
which led to this response and which consequently had an influence 
upon the otherwise liberal domestic presentation of foreign issues. A 
major factor, of course, was the extreme regard in which both the 
Foreign Office and its handling of foreign affairs was traditionally 
held, and which the BBC quite naturally adopted. Despite increased 
public interest, international diplomacy was still widely considered 
to be an area in which the normal democratic freedoms could not be 
allowed entirely free rein. The BBC accepted the view that, because 
of the complexity and importance of its task, the Foreign Office had 
215. FO 395/487, P1670/186/150, Undated draft talk. 
216. FO 395/487, P2658/186/150, Bartlett to A. K. Helm. On this 
occasion Helm's only significant alteration was to tone down a 
comment that Kemal was not perhaps as original an innovator as 
he was normally thought to be. 
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a right to expect a particular sense of responsibility from the 
citizens for whose best interests it was working. 
This attitude was reinforced by its rooted belief in the peculiar 
power and hence responsibility of broadcasting itself. Moreover in 
Reith's vision the BBC and the Foreign Office had a dual identity of 
aims. The first of these was quite simply the strengEkening and 
confirmation of the democratic state. The second was the 
encouragement of international goodwill, arising from broadcasting's 
international cross-border character. The feeling that broadcasting 
really could overcome not just territorial boundaries but also 
national prejudices was remarkably strong and very much to the fore 
in the BBC's determination of broadcasting policy. Siepmann told 
Leeper that a primary aim of Bartlett's European interviews and 
broadcasts had been to promote international amity. Bartlett 
himself later wrote that 
in my own opinion I never broadcast one talk which was not 
designed to do its little best 218 build up a better system of 
international relations than war. 
Yet it is clear that such a policy could and did conflict to some 
extent with the aim of presenting foreign affairs in an entirely 
impartial and free manner. We have already seen that the BBC was 
conscious of the need to avoid excessively provocative or undesirable 
references to other countries, and it was inevitable that its own 
international aims should only reinforce this tendency. Foreign 
affairs broadcasters including Bartlett certainly did not shun 
criticism where they considered it necessary; but they did tend 
either to balance or to present it in a form which was reasonably 
palatable to the government concerned. Alan Dawnay described both the 
policy followed and its drawbacks. Standard practice, he wrote, was 
to explain and interpret rather than to praise or condemn: 
217. FO 395/487, P1726/186/150, Siepmann to Leeper, 18 July 1933. 
218. V. Bartlett, Op. Cit., 186. 
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Particularly we have scrupulously abstained from anything in the 
nature of direct condemnation of the domestic actions of a 
foreign government. As a result, references by our speakers to 
foreign internal affairs may appear to be somewhat colourless; 
and the policy of carefully impartial presentation of facts 
implies a moderation in criticism which may at times give rise to 
the impression that those facts are being presented in an unduly 
favourable light. 
The final and most problematical factor mediating the BBC's 
'responsible' reaction to Foreign Office pressure was the extent to 
which it tacitly accepted that foreign governments did indeed see the 
BBC as an official body under the control of the state. As Vernon 
Bartlett wrote subsequently, 
No foreign Government is easily going to understand how a state 
concern like the BBC nevetheless retains a very great degree of 
autonomy. It will never believe that the Foreign Office is not 
express ng-its views through the lips of the speaker on foreign 
affairs. 
20 
Reject though it might the idea that this was a widely held view, the 
BBC could not deny that in many countries it was believed to be so. 
Nor could it ignore the fact that the repeated propaganda of American 
commercially owned companies, who had a vested interest in implying 
that as a public body the BBC exercised 'censorship' and was a 
'government owned22 ny', would have its effect upon those who did 
not know better. It even had to accept that thos 222 who did know 
better might unscrupulously act as though they did not. 
219. BBC, IFA, Dawnay to Reith, 16 October 1933. 
220. V. Bartlett, Op. Cit., 177-178. 
221. FO 395/477, P612/26/150, NBC broadcast introduction to 
Cambridge v. Yale debate, 11 February 1933. 
222. Indeed so blatantly trumped-up were sonne of the British charges 
of bias brought against the BBC, particularly by the right wing 
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The Corporation could only acknowledge that this was a factor 
which, if it was to behave responsibly, had to be borne in mind. Yet 
once it had done so it became difficult, even impossible, to prevent 
the notion working to an extent for its own self-fulfilment. For it 
is clear that the BBC's sense of responsibility did indeed bring it 
closer to the Foreign Office and hence made it more susceptible to FO 
influence. Similarly the resultant readiness of the FO to assist 
Bartlett in obtaining interviews with such men as Hitler and 
Mussolini merely contributed to the latter's view of the BBC as a 
semi-official department. Thus not only were the BBC's domestic and 
international aims not wholly compatible, but its sense of 
responsibility also proved hostile. to its absolute independence. 
Two further incidents in the first half of 1933 illustrate 
developing attitudes and relationships. A BBC news bulletin in April, 
reporting the Moscow trial of two British citizens on charges of 
espionage, was the cause of press comnent. It was suggested that a 
portion of the official Foreign Office report of the trial was 
deliberately omitted because i223implied that the accused had been 
tortured into a confession. Subsequently Professor Arnold ` 
Toynbee's broadcast talk on he trial was criticised for hinting at 224 
the accused's possible guilt. In reply to a Foreign Office query 
Siepn nn and J. C. MacGregor explained that because the FO communique 
referred to had been received late, and had already been fully 
covered by the press it was considered to be stale news and so was 
merely summarised. Alan Walker of the Foreign Office Northern 
Department considered this excuse to be 'hardly convincing'. He felt 
that 
The BBC usually contrive to give the impression that it is "pink" 
press, that it would have been impossible for the BBC not to 
have believed that the accusers really knew better. 
223. Daily Telegraph, 17 April 1933. 
224. Letter to the Editor, Daily Telegraph, 24 April 1933. 
225. FO 395/474, P969/10/150, Minute by W. Ridsdale, 25 April 1933. 
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226 
- probably because it is. 
Even Rex Leeper considered the explanation 'pretty feeble' and 
Toynbee's remarks 'rather cheap', and accordingly he wrote to 
Siepmann to ask that in future an7 Foreign Office communique' 
broadcast should be given in full. On this occasion, however, 
the BBC considered both complaint and request to be unjustified and 228 
Siepma. nn replied to this effect. The exchange had been friendly; 
but although the outcome was an assertion by the BBC of its 
independence, the effect was to strengthen the FO view of the 
Corporation as a complicating factor in international relations. 
The second incident was also an entirely friendly interchange, 
this time between Reith and Maurice Hankey of the Cabinet Office. In 
May Reith sent Hankey details of the BBC's intended coverage of the 
forthcoming international econanic conference in London. One proposal 
was to arrange for a weekly interpretive and explanatory analysis of 
the conference discussions by a rota of economists, 
since bare information without comment must be found by the gr2 tt 
majority of listeners indigestible and consequently useless. 
Having forwarded this information to the Foreign Office, Sankey was 
warned that there was some risk in the proposal. Economists, after 
all, held varying ideas, many of an unorthodox character: 
There may be moments in the Conference when it will be very 
undesirable to have some subjects mentioned at all, especially 
226. FO 395/474, P969/10/150, Minute by A. 'Walker. See also B. 
Hnwnrth, 'The British Broadcasting Corporation, Nazi Germany 
and the Foreign Office, 1933-1936', The Historical Journal of 
Film, Radio and Television, vol. 1, March 1981,50. 
227. FO 395/474, P969/10/150, Minute by Leeper, 27 April 1933; FO 
395/474, P1342/10/150, Leeper to Siepmann, 17 May 1933. 
228. FO 395/474, P1342/10/150, Siepn nn to Leeper, 23 May 1933. 
229. F0 371/17328, W5679/5477/50, Reith to M. Hankey, 18 May 1933. 
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230 
from a controversial point of view. 
That such subjects could and would be freely aired in the press was 
not considered. In any case that was no reason for not attempting to 
persuade the BBC to abandon the idea. Hankey rang Reith for this 
purpose, but found persuasion unnecessary. The Corporation had 
already dropped the idea in favour of a nightly report on the events 
of each day by an observer from the Daily Telegraph -a good example 
of the BBC's natural tendency to tone down certain potentially 
dangerous proposals. In view of this information Hankey immediately 
contacted George Steward, the Press and Public Relations Officer at 
No. 10 and the Treasury (and formerly of the Foreign Office News 
Department), to inform him about the Telegraph's observer: 
I am sure we can rely on you to keep him straight. There my be 
times when he may have to be warned off certain topics. 
Once again the needs of international diplomacy had aroused 
government interest in limiting the BBC's absolute freedom. 
The climactic event of 1933, in the BBC/Foreign Office 
relationship, came in October in a talk by Vernon Bartlett. As a 
staff member of the League of Nations Secretariat Bartlett had had 
both an efficient team to keep him fully informed and an indefinable 
sense of independence. Now on the BBC's payroll, however, he had 
neither. He had difficulty in obtaining his own office in 
Broadcasting House or even the services of one secretary. Moreover, 
as he later admitted, 
Once 
.I 
had been foolish enough to get on to the BBC staff, things 
became much more difficult, since it was more difficult to get 
away with the statement that I was not talking on behalf of the 
230. FO 371/17328, W6273/5477/50, Hankey to G. F. Steward, 26 May 
1933. 
231. Ibid. 
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organisation, but was expressing 
232 
my own opinions. 
Although accepting that in some ways he was given a freedom to 
express his views which would have been allowed by no newspaper, 'at, 
the same time I never escaped from the feeling that I should be 
dropped like a hot brick if I got the BBC into any trouble'. 
Talks producer Mary Somerville later recollected finding Bartlett, 
clutching his few remaining hairs in despair in a small office 
here, completely littered with Press cuttings, in which he seemed 
to be lost. He took I think, the easy way out - of exploiting 
his personal views. 
Recent accounts of Bartlett Is controversial broadcast of 14 
October 1933, when Germany left the League of Nations Disarmament 
Conference, have not perhaps t23ak5en sufficient account of such factors 
and of earlier developments. Placed in context it can be seen 
that this talk was not an initial cause of the BBC's 'responsible' 
(or cautious) foreign affairs policy, nor of FO pressure. Rather it 
was the consequence of and reaction against increasing difficulties 
in honest reporting, encroaching if indirect influence by the Foreign 
Office, and the impossible contradictions contained within BBC 
policy. Not least it was the result of Bartlett's legitimate view 
that honest foreign affairs analysis required the statement of home 
truths, no matter how unwelcome. On certain issues he felt unable to 
compromise his beliefs. 
News of Germany's abandonment of the Disarmament Conference and 
232. V. Bartlett to the author, 2 August 1977. 
233. V. Bartlett, Op. Cit., 178. 
234. BBC, TFA, Mary Somerville to Maconachie, 22 December 1939. 
235. Asa Briggs (1979), Op. Cit., 194-197; B. Haworth, Op. Cit., 47- 
48. 
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236 
the League was broadcast at 9.00 p. m. on 14 October 1933. The 
bulletin also included an extract from a speech by Sir John Simon, 
the Foreign Secretary, and a recording of Hitler's speech in Berlin 
that evening. This was followed by Bartlett who gave a rather 
emotional talk pleading for understanding of the German viewpoint and 
suggesting that in this deadlock it was Britain and her allies who 
were at fault. Such a commentary could only lead to trouble: 
I beg you to try to drop your prejudices, and to face up to the 
facts. We all know that Germany has a pretty good case for 
feeling that the ex -Allies have not kept the pledge they gave 
under the Peace Treaty to disarm. Wie in Great Britain knew that 
before Hitler came to power, and it still remains a fact if 
Hitler's subsequent behaviour towards the Jews has turned our 
sympathies away from Germany. Two wrongs don't make a right. If 
he behaves unjustly there is no excuse for us to do so. 
r 
The circumstances in which the talk was commissioned are slightly 
obscure. Lionel Fielden later said that he had telephoned Bartlett 
earlier in the day to ask him238 give it. Bartlett, however, claimed 
that Reith himself had rung. Reith stated in his autobiography 
that he knew nothing of t239talk beforehand, but would probably have 
approved it had he known. It must be said, however, that Reith's 
236. According to Briggs this incident occurred in the 6.00 p. m. 
bulletin. In fact it was at 9.00 p. m. and, interestingly, 
occurred in the first of the short-lived series of Saturday 
radio news reels. 
237. Broadcast of 14 October 1933, The Listener 18 October 1933. The 
original manuscript no longer survives. In that the Listener 
article was taken from it, it is presumably more accurate than 
the Daily Herald extracts of 16 October 1933. 
238. 'I explained how my belief that the timid policy of our own 
government was greatly responsible for Germa. ny's action would 
make it impossible for me to speak about it with the necessary 
detachment. The Director-General said that he would 
nevertheless like me to broadcast a short talk under my own 
name at the end of the news bulletin. I knew that, as the 
saying goes, my number was up. ' - V. Bartlett, op. Cit., 188. 
239. J. C. W. Reith (1949), Op. Cit., 178. 
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version of events was not always accurate and that almost invariably 
alterations or omissions resulted in a more favourable personal 
picture than was really warranted. In this instance it is almost 
certain that Reith both knew of the talk and anticipated problems, as 
four days after it had been given he informed the Prime Minister's 
Private Secretary 
that he told one of his officials to vet Bartlett's manuscript in 
the ordinary way and to ring him, Reith, up if he was in doubt 
about it. The 2n 
concerned apparently passed the manuscript 
without question. 
Fielden did more than pass the manuscript; he urged Bartlett to make 
it stronger. He felt that the talk as a clear expression of personal 241 
opinion and should be given as such. 
Press reaction went to the two extremes of adulation and 
condemnation, although p2ul is response to the broadcast was 
overwhelmingly favourable. Perhaps most interesting was a quite 
incidental remark by the Daily Telegraph : 
This is not what one expects fron the mouthpiece *of what is 
virtually a sub-department of State2 3 com enting on the speech 
and policy of the Foreign Secretary. 
240. Prem. 1/127, J. A. Barlow to Ramsay MacDonald, 18 October 1933. 
241. V. Bartlett to author, 2 August 1977. 
242. See B. Haworth, Op. Cit., 47-48. 
243. Daily Telegraph, 17 October 1933. Sydney Moseley, normally a 
critic of any form of censorship, wrote in 1935 that 'The 
country must be protected, not only from wilful propaganda, but 
also from dangerously indiscreet speeches by nervous, 
overwrought amateur diplomats who "let themselves go" on the 
spur of the moment ... If there must be any partisan policy or 
propaganda on the air at all, then, in Heaven's name, let it be 
British policy and our own Government's propaganda! Let the 
microphone on such occasions echo the voice of the Government 
in power. There is nothing undemocratic in that, since the 
people elects its own Government'. - S. A. Moseley, Broadcasting 
in My Time, London 1935,232-3.. 
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A primary cause for complaint was that such a talk was given so soon 
after Simon's own speech justifying allied policy and condemning 
Germany's withdrawal. Reith was sufficiently nervous of government 
reaction to ring No. 10 irnediately after the broadcast in order to 
defend it, although he found no-one there. Bartlett himself 
wrote to Leeper rejecting the Telegraph's accusations, but admitting 
that the talk had been indiscreet. 
ý45 
The incident was discussed at departmental, ministerial and Prime 
Ministerial level. There was no doubt in anyone's mind that it had 
had considerable international ramifications. The British Embassy in 
Berlin informed the Foreign Office that the German press was making 
great play of this admittal that the ex-allies were at fault. 
246 
According to Bartlett the talk was actually reported to Hitler 
himself to demonstrate that hii7 action had been justified by its 24 
result in splitting opinion. The French Ambassador reported a 
hostile French reaction, and the situation was complicated still 
further by the interpretation placed upon the broadcast by Le Temps : 
M. Vernon Bartlett, apres avoir evide. ment pris contact aver 
les cercles ministeriels, exprime aux abonn6s de la radio ses 
angoisses officielles. 
To Rex Leeper the conclusion was plain: 
The BBC cannot be regarded as an independent institution and 
244. Prem. 1/127, J. A. Barlow to MacDonald, 18 October 1933. This 
incident is again omitted from the account in Reith's 
autobiography. 
245. FO 395/484, P2484/96/150, undated letter fron Bartlett to 
Leeper. 
246. FO 395/484, P2484/96/150, Telegram from Sir Eric Phipps to 
F. O., 17 October 1933. 
247. V. Bartlett, Op. Cit., 190-191. 
248. Le Temps, 17 October 1933. 
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views broadcast by the Corporation either anonymously or by a 
salaried member of the staff like Mr. Bartlett are inevitably 
249 
associated with HM both here and in foreign countries. 
He felt that in future individuals like Bartlett should be obliged to 
consult the Foreign Office in advance and to accept its ruling on 
what they might and might not say. Orme Sargent equally believed that 
the FO should obtain 
a more satisfactory control over the activities of tthe 
BBC in the 
25 
field of foreign affairs than they do at present. 
Sir George Mounsey suggested in addition that in its news bulletins 
the BBC should return to the practice of reading exactly the words of 
the agency tapes, in order to avoid any editorialisation. Because the 
matter was being dealt with at a higher level, however, no immediate 
action was taken, although Leeper did berate Bartlett for not 
consulting Zh5ilm 
in advance, when the latter next called at the News 
Department. 
The higher level was a letter and phone call to the BBC from the 
Prime Minister himself. MacDonald described Bartlett's talk as 
'absurd in its ignorance' and continued: 
I know your difficulties, especially in dealing with political 
news and observations, but surely at a very critical moment like 
this, when a false statement or an observation which completely 
misjudges the situation may upset international negotiations and 
the handling of the Government, the British Broadcasting 
Corporation should be particularly careful and 2should ask, 
for 
some advice before it puts its foot into it ..... 
249. FO 395/484, P2484/96/150, Minute by Leeper, 18 October 1933. 
250. FO 395/484, P2484/96/150, Minute by Sargent, 18 October 1933. 
251. Fa 395/484, P3016/96/150, Leeper to Vansittart, 5 December 
1933. 
252. BBC, IFA, MacDonald to Whitley, 16 October 1933. 
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On the5telephone the PM told Reith that the BBC was turning his hair 
grey. Keith was determined to defend the BBC against this attack 
and the reply he sent was a firm rebuttal. It was also less than 
honest, for it implied that Reith's phone call to No. 10 had preceded 
Bartlett's talk, which it had not, and that the broadcast itself had 
been no more than an appeal for calm and reason, although it had. He 
concluded that the BBC had always been very conscious of its peculiar 
position, 
but I know from what you yourself have said that you would not 
expect our actions such occasions to be completely determined 254 
by the Government. 
At MacDonald's request Reith and Whitley visited No. 10, where the 14f 
asked if Simon might broadcast an answer to German allegations -a 
talk completely unrelated to Bartlett's. Reith, having defended the 
BBC's honour, agreed to this. 
For the time being this was the extent of contact between 
Government and BBC, although the Daily Herald attempted to suggest 
that a rather more serious interference with the Corporation had 
taken place. Within the BBC internal action consisted firstly of the 
immediate arrangement of a series of three talks, on disar nt and 
the German withdrawal, on consecutive nights. George Lansbury spoke 
for Labour, Viscount Cecil for the League of Nations Union viewpoint 
and Lord Lloyd from an isolationist stance. Simon's requested 
broadcast, however, took the place of one it had been intended to 
offer to the Government. The collapse of the Disarmament Conference 
justified this series without Bartlett's talk, to which no-one 
referred. In addition Alan Dawnay immediately reported to Reith on 
253. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 114,16 October 1933. This telephone call 
probably occurred on the 17th, with Reith writing up his diary 
subsequently, as he is known to have done. The chronology does 
not otherwise fit. 
254. BBC, IFA, Whitley to MacDonald (drafted by Reith), 17 October 
1933. 
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previous talks about German and Austrian affairs, although 
interestingly this research had been requested sonne days before 
Bartlett's broadcast. He was able to state that neither Bartlett nor 
the BBC had acted as apologists for Nazism. In a talk on 27 July, *for 
example, Bartlett had declared: 
I loathe all the bitterness and bullying that have been so 
conspicuous in Germany and I255 uld do anything to prevent the 
same folly in my own country. 
Another broadcaster, S. K. Ratcliffe, had been equally vehement, 
condemning the repressive policies of Nazism as 'indefensible': 
Most of those who resisted are in prison or in concentration 
camps; and one unhappy cornunity - the Jews - is suffering the 
extremity of persecution - in accord, 25sH 
Hitler's book shows, 
with a basic tenet of the Nazi movement. 
Dawnay did, however, admit that criticism had been relatively 
moderate, in line with BBC policy. Bartlett himself was neither 
carpeted nor suspended, broadcasting the following week as normal and 
then being sent off to Paris, Rome and Berlin in order to report on 
public attitudes in these capitals to disarmament and the recent 
events. 
Yet although the immediate furor had died down this was very far 
from the end of the matter, which served, if not to change attitudes 
within BBC and government, then certainly to strengthen thin and 
point the problems inherent in their relationship. What followed was 
a recognition on both sides of the limits of their respective powers 
and rights. The Government and Foreign Office continued to deplore 
what had happened, but realised that formal interference with the BBC 
was out of the question. For its part the BBC, having initially made 
255. BBC, IFA, Dawna. y to Reith, 16 October 1933. 
256. Ibid. 
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the point of asserting its independence, resumed its co-operative 
approach in a strengthened form. 
At the beginning of November the matter was discussed in Cabinet. 
In his memorandum on the subject Sir John Simon asked 
whether it should be in the power of the BBC to create a panic 
whenever one of their officials is so overcome with deep and 
sincere emotion that he has not time to reflect whether the 
broadcasting of his sentiments will injure or improve 
International relations ..... what he says tends to be regarded, 
at any rate abroad, as having something more than official 
permission, and the latitude of comment in which he may indulge 
is at times of great assistance? to other countries, who are 
delighted to put us in the wrong. 
Yet-at the same time he recommended that no inmediate action be taken 
in view of the likely press and parliamentary outcry if government 
were seen to be censoring or tampering with the BBC. Moreover 
Kingsley Wood opposed any threat to the constitutional independence 
of the BB 258 
and to the IM's sole responsibility for 
broadcasting. 
The Cabinet agreed with Simon's recomnendation. It probably knew, 
in any case, that informal discussions on improved BBC/Government 
liaison were already taking place between Reith and the Prime 
Minister's Office. A few days previously Reith had seen J. A. Barlow, 
MacDonald's Principal Private Secretary, in order to ask whether the 
BBC could be kept more closely informed and given access to 
unpublished information, so that it should know what line to take in 
future. Barlow had said he was sure that Reith would wish to avoid 
257. Cab. 24, C. P. 252 (33), Memorandum by Sir John Simon, 1 November 
1933. 
258. FO 395/484, P3016/96/150, Leeper to Vansittart, 5 December 
1933. 
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any arrangement which might give colour to a belief that the BBC 
were inspired by the Government and that he had to consider 
carefully b259 he pressed for such an arrangement to be 
established. 
Reith, however, was confident that he could maintain independence 
within such a liaison: 
He is anxious both to avoid appearing to speak as a Government 
organ -a suspicion which may easily arise because of the 
constitutional and financial relations between the Government and 
the BBC - and to avoid doing harm by allowing inopportune or ill- 60 
informed broadcasts. 
One rung down the ladder, negotiations between Leeper and Dawnay 
equally showed the BBC's desire to be co-operative. Dawnay61 admitted 
that Bartlett's broadcast had been 'a serious blu. nder'. 
2 
Leeper 
left him in no doubt that-this was also the FO view and passed on a 
firm request from Simon that in future the Foreign Office should 
receive copies of all talks on foreign affairs. It was clear that 
this referred to talks once they had been given, and Dawnay agreed to 
the proposal. 
The reaffirmed spirit of mutual co-operation was demonstrated in 
early November over the Panter Case. Noel Panter was a British 
journalist who had been arrested in Germany in October on suspicion 
of espionage. Upon his release Sieptrnn contacted Leeper to say that 
the BBC intended to interview him, since the press would be doing so, 
but wanted the FO's advice in case it was considered inadvisable. He 
259. Prem. 1/127, Memorandum by J. A. Barlow, 27 October 1933. 
260. Prem. 1/127, Unsigned memorandum (probably by Barlow) to 
MacDonald, 31 October 1933. 
261. FO 395/484, P3016/96/150, Leeper to Vansittart, 5 December 
1933. 
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emphasised that Panter would not be allowed to talk on how he had 
been treated in prison, nor on the circumstances of his imprisonment, 
but only on conditions in Germany as observed by him. The Foreign 
Office was anxious to play down the incident and not irritate the 
German Government. Nevertheless, in view of Siepua. nn's assurances and 
of the extreme undesirability of interfering with the BBC unless 
absolutely262 ecessary, it was decided not to object to the 
interview. 
The most obvious outcome of the Bartlett affair was that it 
hastened the end of the latter's position as the BBC's regular 
foreign affairs commentator. It must be asked to what extent this was 
a case of BBC pusillanimity and yielding to pressure, as has 
subsequently been implied. The incident certainly shook the BBC's 
confidence in Bartlett as a reliable commentator. Although Reith had 
defended the talk against MacDonald he had undoubtedly been impressed 
by the argument that Bartlett had spoken without the full facts 
before him. The complete collapse of Bartlett's stock at the Foreign 
Office can also not have escaped him. Leeper's view of Bartlett was 
that previously he had handled a difficult job well but had, since 
joining the 63 ý, 
'let his emotions get the better of his 
judgement'. Vansittart's conclusions were even more damning; he 
considered Bartlett to be 
a superficial, emotional and indiscreet man, who .... has fallen 
almost exclusively under German influence .... He should 
certainly reeceive no facilities or information to assist his Nazi 
propaganda. 
The row over the 14 October talk convinced Reith of two things - 
262. FO 395/484, P2588/96/150, file on proposed broadcast by Mr. 
Panter. 
263. F0 395/484, P3016/96/150, Leeper to Vansittart, 5 December 
1933. 
264. FO 395/484, P3016/96/150, Minute by Vansittart, 17 December 
1933. 
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firstly that it was unwise to give one man a virtual monopoly of 
foreign affairs commentary, and secondly that the short-term 
experiment of taking Bartlett on to the BBC staff had not been the 
hoped for success. No longer did he have the league of Nations team 
to keep him fully informed; no longer did he have the League of 
Nations tag to his name to keep him respectable to the Foreign Office 
and others as a foreign affairs ccmnentator. The fact that he was a 
staff member of the BBC, which was so careful and so closely watched 
to prevent editorialisation, made the whole operation of foreign 
affairs broadcasting much more difficult. Bartlett was not sacked, 
but Reith did encourage him to look for an outside job, so that he 
could becom 265 ne of a panel of occasional foreign affairs 
broadcasters. Bartlett himself approved of the idea - he had not 
enjoyed his time on the BBC staff and nor did he consider it right 
for himself to have so much potential power. 
At the end of 1933 Bartlett left the BBC for the News Chronicle, 
having deliberately chosen a paper whose political stance would not 
be considered too extreme to allow him to continue broadcasting. He 
continued to give a weekly talk until the end26oSf March 1934, when the 
BBC Board terminated his regular contract. This in itself had 
been expected and agreed. What had not was that the BBC should then 
drop him entirely as a foreign affairs broadcaster for several years. 
Bartlett later described this action as cowardly. Yet there can be no 
doubt that he had become an extremely controversial figure. In 
February a Commons debate on the subject took place, in which 
Brigadier-General Spears accused Bartlett of anti-Austria2n bias in 
another talk and described the BBC as a Nazi agency. Other 
parliamentary questions hostile to Bartlett were asked, and articles 
praising and condemning him appeared in the press. On meeting J. A. 
Barlow Reith learnt that Simon had had the BBC on the Cabinet agenda 
ever since the original broadcast, whilst MacDonald mentioned 
265. V. Bartlett to author, 2 August 1977. 
266. A. Briggs (1979), Op. Cit., 197. 
267. H. C. Debates, vol. 285: cols. 1025-31,6 February 1934. 
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Bartlett to Reith when they next dined together. Reith may well 
have been impressed by the extent of criticism and unhappy about the 
trouble in which Bartlett had involved the BBC. But he was also 
increasingly disinclined to use Bartlett simply because the latter 
had become such a controversial figure. Whether justly or not 
Bartlett's reputation as a wholly impartial commentator had been 
severely damaged. He was now widely identified with a cause (though 
certainly not Nazism), and a section of the audience would never have 
the faith in his impartiality that "Reith considered absolutely 
essential if the BBC's reputation for integrity was to remain intact. 
Bartlett's downfall was to an extent because in Reith's eyes his fame 
had become notoriety. 
1933 had been a year in which, for a variety of reasons, 
relations between the BBC and the Foreign Office had become closer. 
The raw at the end of the year only confirmed the FO in its 
conviction that the BBC was regarded abroad as an official 
mouthpiece, and that it could no longer be trusted to broadcast 
without guidance. The BBC's attitude was basically unchanged -a 
readiness to be accommodating, combined with a determination to 
continue its foreign affairs news and conmntaries. Negotiations at 
the beginning of 1934 seemed to augur well for good relations. 
Siepmann wrote to the FO of 'the standing arrangement by which we 
inform you in advance of any programme proposals affecting foreign 
affairs', whilst it was agreed that Dawnay should keep in touch with 
the For2eýign Office News Department as though he were a newspaper 
editor. 
J 
Reith himself met Vansittart and arranged to visit him 
monthly, in order to get background information 0 on 
the FO line and to 
prevent relations again becoming strained. Yet once again the 
Foreign Office was to find this three tier liaison not wholly 
268. C. Stuart, _", 116,26 January and 2 February 1934. 
269. BBC, FOC, Siepmann to F. O., 25 January 1934; FO 395/515, 
P1119/196/150, Minute by Leeper, 20 February 1934. 
270. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 117-118,14 February 1934,28 March 1934, 
30 April 193. 
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adequate in practice, perhaps because it did not initially extend 
downwards far enough. The day-today contact with the Foreign Office 
which the BBC News Department had maintained in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, for example, seems to have temporarily petered out by 
1934, perhaps a victim of the considerable internal reorganisation 
then taking place in that part of the BBC's organisation. A couple of 
inaccurate news items taken from agency tapes induced Leeper to 
complain that the BBC appeared reluctant 271 use the FO News 
Department to check news agency stories. Before a formal 
complaint could be made, however, the BBC News Editor resumed the 
previous practice of checking dubious stories, and Vansittart merely 
suggested to Dawnay that t2 contact be put on a basis of almost 27 
daily personal intercourse. 
Within the Foreign Office Vansittart and Leeper were soon to 
become the strongest opponents of appeasement policy. Alre 
2dy3 
their 
grave concern at Germany's true intentions was evident. 
7 
This 
personal commitment made Vansittart's reaction to the BBC's 
'objective' - and hence softening - policy in foreign affairs 
commentary particularly vehement, as was to become clear at the time 
271. FO 395/515, P1439/196/150, Minute by Leeper, 3 May 1934. 
272. FO 395/515, P1531/196/150, draft letter, Vansittart to Dawnay, 
c. 10 May 1934. According to Brian Haworth this file shows that 
as a direct result of complaints ... Colonel Dawnay accepted 
direct contact between the News Departments of the two 
organisations. ' - B. Haworth, O. Cit., 49. In fact it is clear 
that direct contact resumed before complaint was made, and had 
a long history before 1934. This incident is interesting not 
least because of the main cause of complaint -a news item 
whose inaccuracies presented the German case more favourably 
than the F. O. considered deserved. It merely strengthend 
Vansittart's view of the BBC as pro-German. 
273. In November 1933 Leeper had written: 'To hear Mr. Bartlett talk 
one would think that ... the German professions of peace are 
perfectly sincere. He entirely ignores the grave fears that 
many of us feel about Germany's real intentions, fears that are 
based on the kind of home propaganda which accompanies and is 
directly contrary to the spirit of the foreign propaganda of 
peace. ' - FO 395/484, P3016/96/150, Minute by Leeper, 14 
November 1933. 
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of Hitler's purge of the S. A.. Following Bartlett's departure the BBC 
had decided, purely as a temporary expedient, to take broadcasts from 
abroad by special correspondents. This idea had first been suggested 
in 1930 and again in 1933, but was not even now regarded with any 
favour. Not the least reason for disliking the idea was the extreme 
restraint which any commentator had to use, broadcasting as he was 
from the 
274relevant country and 
through its broadcasting 
facilities. Within a month of commencement Dawnay and Siepmann 
had decided to abandon this method and-to revert to broadcasts from 275 
London, using a number of foreign affairs experts. 
Following the Hitler purge at the end of June, however, it was 
decided that an eye-witness report would be of particular value and 
interest. Accordingly Richard Crossman, currently in Germany, was 
asked to broadcast. Crossman was himself violently anti-Nazi, but, 
knowing that neither Germans nor the BBC would permit a condemnatory 
talk - and probably in some fear for his personal safety - he turned 
in a broadcast which was the very model of objectivity, without any 
praise or blame attached. The Foreign Office immediately received 
letters of complaint from listeners, and Simon heard a rumour that 
the talk was one of exultant approval for everything Hitler had 276 
done. When he read it Orme Sargent admitted that it was indeed 
objective, and blamed 277 e eye--witness system 
for making such 
objectivity necessary. Vansittart, however, was far more 
vehement in his criticism. Such a mild talk on such 'revolting 
butchery' could only be interpreted in Britain as condonation. 
Ironically, in view of the BBC's general lack of concern for 
topicality, he considered it a 'fundamental vice' of the Corporation 
that it should 
274. V. Bartlett, Op. Cit., 185-187. 
275. BBC, IMFA, Sieprm. nn to L. Fielden, 24 April 1934. 
276. FO 395/515, P2201/196/150, Minute by Simon, 5 July 1934. 
277. F0 395/515, P2201/196/150, Minute by Orme Sargent, 5 July 1934. 
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fly at the microphone about everything under the sun & without a 
moment's reflexion .... I have no sympathy whatever with this go- 
getter, sensation-mongering Hearstliness, man-on-the-spot and 
red-hot stuff, especially when it leads to such inevitable 
errors. I submit that it is not the function of the BBC, and that 
if theype27rsist in it their activities will have to be 
revised. 
8 
Significantly he felt that if on such matters the BBC could not be 
outspokenly condemnatory, then it should be silent. 
Yet, despite this incident, liaison between the BBC and Foreign 
Office was generally satisfactory to both sides in 1934 and most of 
1935. Consultation was regular and advice frequently acted upon, yet 
without the BBC feeling that the FO was abusing the relationship. 
Thus in May and June 1934 the BBC broadcast talks by foreign 
representatives, on current attitudes in their respective countries 
to the Treaty of Versailles. Despite its inherently controversial 
nature the FO did not raise objections to the series, about which 
Siepmann had notified them, but took a sympathetic attitude in order 
to encourage continued co-operation. The most controversial talk was 
inevitably the German' one, given by Baron von Rheinbaden, and 
Siepmann accordingly sent a copy to Orme Sargent in advance, to check 
for any inaccuracies. This Sargent did, and Siepmann agreed to try to 
persuade Rheinbaden to correct a number of mis-statements. In 
addition he agreed to Sargent's proposal that there should be a talk 
on the British viewpoint, which would otherwise not have been given 
in the series, and this too2? 9 e place of a final controversial 
discussion on the whole issue. 
Again, in March 1935, the Foreign Office suggested that a 
projected talk on the Assyrian question should be, not cancelled, but 
briefly postponed until after the expected publication of a report on 
278. FO 395/515, P2201/196/150, Minute by Vansittart, 5 July 1934. 
279. FO 395/515, P1687/196/150, Siepmann to Sargent, 4 June 1934. 
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the mat 280 Dawnay readily agreed to this comparatively moderate 
request. The following month a discussion was arranged between 
Jochen Beneiann and Richard Crosses n on youth and labour movements in 
Germany, and the FO was again sent an advance script. Although Orme 
Sargent criticised it as 'lop-sided' and as allowing Benemann to put 
forward 'specious arguments to disguise the militarism of the Nazi 
regime', his general approach was helpful, and he did not suggest its 81 
cancellation. The talk went ahead, although at the last minute 
Vyvyan Adams replaced CSrossma. n. . 
This comparatively harmonious liaison was the result of a number 
of factors. It was the result of the Foreign Office News Department's 
belief that positive co-operation and accurate news was preferable to 
negative obstruction. It may have been in part the result of closer 
links between Reith and Vansittart. According to one recent analysis 
it was also a consequence of the BBC's 'cautious selectivity 2o8f 
speakers', of 'the "right people"', to talk on foreign affairs. 
To an extent this was so, but if Sir Evelyn Wrench, Sir Frederick 
Whyte and Sir Arthur Humbold broadcast, then so did Richard Crossman 
and F. A. Voigt. The BBC chose its speakers not necessarily because 
they were safe - though certainly it looked for people who knew that 
it did not want polemicism - but because they were extremely 
knowledgeable in specific fields. The two principal broadcasters on 
foreign affairs in 1935, alternating fortnightly, were Sir Frederick 
Whyte and F. A. Voigt. Whyte was engaged to broadcast on events in 
America and the Far East, upon which he was undoubtedly a highly 
reputable authority. F. A. Voigt, for his part, was chosen 
specifically because of his outstanding reputation as a forceful and 
critical comme ntator on German affairs. His was certainly no cautious 28 
appointment. At the same time Voigt had contacts at the FO to 
280. BBC, FOC, Note by Dawnay, 5 March 1935. 
281; BBC, MPBRBG, Orme Sargent to BBC, 5 April 1935. 
282. B. Haworth, Op. Cit., 52. 
283. B. Haworth, Op. Cit., 53. 
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match Bartlett's, whilst his critical commentary was very much in 
line with284 e approach of Vansittart and Leeper to the German 
situation. The BBC found him a- good replacement for Bartlett, 
and he remained the most f2requently used commentator on foreign 
affairs from 1935 until 1939.8ý 
Relations between the BBC and the Foreign Office were therefore 
good and close, and when Rex Leeper gave evidence to the Ullswater 
Committee, in May 1935, he declared that in the opinion of the 
Foreign Office 
the officials of the BBC show a high sense of responsibility and 
impartiality in dealing with these questions which are very 
delicate and controversial; that they do their best to avoid 
causing embarrassment to our own Government, while offering the 
public as good a service as possible. They try to give both sides 
as far as possible, and also they do their best to avoid giving 
offence to any foreign Government, a2dd6we find that the kind of 
liaison that we have works very well. 
In August Orme Sargent noted that he was 'in close and continual 
284. Brian Haworth mentions that Voigt's appointment was 'welcomed 
by some British officials as being a step towards informing the 
public "how serious the European situation is"'. To an 
interesting extent, therefore Voigt's appointment was a 
reflection of the stance of Vansittart and the Foreign Office 
News Department. 
285. Brian Haworth (Op. Cit, 54) is mistaken to imply that Voigt did 
not broadcast after October 1935. He spoke roughly monthly in 
1936 and 1937, and at least six times in 1938. This was 
certainly more than any other commentator, and demonstrates the 
BBC's considerable regard for him at a time when it had turned 
to the policy of using a wide variety of speakers. Nor is it 
correct to suggest that the BBC did not like using journalists 
as commentators. Another occasional broadcaster, for example, 
was J. C. S. Sprigge, city editor of the Manchester Guardian, and 
its former foreign correspondent - the position Voigt now held. 
286. BBC, UCVBG, Evidence of R. A. Leeper, 29 May 1935. This evidence 
was given before the row over 'The Citizen and His Government' 
series, not after as Haworth suggests - B. Haworth, Op. Cit. , 
50. 
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touch' with Alan Dawnay. 
287 
Seen in this context the row over 'The Citizen and His 
Government' series in late 1935 was perhaps something of a surprise. 
Yet it is noticeable that discussions were conducted in a remarkably 
friendly and unemotional atmosphere considering the issues of 
principle involved. The confrontation was the consequence of both 
pragmatic considerations and questions of principle, and the Foreign 
Office drew upon its long experience of firm diplomacy to achieve its 
aim. It recognised that in asking the BBC to cancel programmes, and 
ones which were not actually on foreign affairs, it was on dangerous 
ground. But that it was the BBC which eventually gave way was 
symptomatic of where the balance in their relationship lay. 
Although the incident has been described by Asa Briggs, some 288 
further points need to be brought out and a reappraisal made. 
This series of twelve talks was designed to compare the place of the 
individual citizen within a number of different constitutional 
systems, including the communist and fascist. Given the BBC's 
commitment it was hardly surprising that of the first seven 
explanatory talks six were on democratic government, one only on 'The 
Communist and Fascist Experiment'. Moreover the first four were given 
by a Conservative MP, Captain Harold Balfour, and the following 
three, including the one on communism and fascism, by Agnes Headlam 
Morley, lecturer on politics at Oxford and herself shortly to be a 
Conservative candidate. The concluding five were to be more 
controversial, with Oswald Mosley and the Communist leader Harry 
Pollitt giving 'a critical examination of existing machinery and the 
exposition of plans for altering it', whilst three representatives of 
the Liberal, Labour and Conservative rties would conclude with a 
defence of constitutional democracy. Party politics was to be 
excluded, and it was emphasised to the three final speakers that 
287. FO 371/19467, N4463/998/38, Minute by Sargent, 30 August 1935. 
288. A. Briggs (1979), Op. Cit., 198-201. 
289. BBC, TCHG, R. Wilson to A. Dawnay, 17 July 1935. 
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there should be 'strong and relatively united criticism of the 
revolutionary points of view' by the defenders of democracy. 
The Foreign Office was informed of the scheme in early July and 
initially raised no objection. Only at the end of August did the 
increasing likelihood of a formal protest from the British to the 
Soviet Government over growing communist propaganda, cause the FO to 
look again at this series. J. L. Dodds of the Northern Department 
argued that it would be difficult to uphold such a protest, since 
the Russian Government can retort that we don't really mind 
291 
Communism if we allow it to be preached on the BBC. 
He admitted that already the Government's failure to ban the weekly 
publication in Britain of the Comintern 's International Press 
Correspondence gave the Soviets just such an argument. But whereas 
the British press was freeeý 'I understand that we have ways and means 
of influencing the BBC'. 
The recent visit of Harry Pollitt to Moscow and his speech in 
support of Comintern activities, gave Rex Leeper the excuse to 
contact Dawnay and explain that any broadcast by Pollitt would weaken 
the British case in Zprotesting 
to the Russian Government about 
Comintern propaganda. 
9 
Vansittart used the same argument with 
Reith and added that the 1294 Abyssinian conflict made a talk by 
Mosley equally undesirable. The BBC, however, was more than 
usually inclined to take a strong line. Most importantly invitations 
to Mosley and Pollitt had already been sent out, and it would have 
290. BBC, ON, R. Wilson to H. Morrison, 22 July 1935. 
291. FO 371/19467, N4463/998/38, Minute by J. L. Dodds, 30 August 
1935. 
292. Ibid. 
293. F0 371/19467, N4463/998/38, Minute by Leeper, 14 September 
1935. 
294. BBC, TCHG, BBC statement handed to Vansittart, 15 October 1935. 
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been difficult to cancel without losing face. In addition the series 
had been sufficiently important to have gone before the Board for 
approval, so that an informal discussion and agreement on the issue 
between the FO and BBC executives was simply not possible. Equally 
the series had been suggested and approved by the BBC's Adult 
Education Advisory Committee, which would undoubtedly have objected 
vociferously to interference and cancellation. Last but not least the 
incident was particularly important precisely because a fascist and 
communist were involved. The Corporation was conscious of accusations 
that it was failing to give air-time to such important if minor 
sections of opinion, and saw this comparatively academic approach as 
a good way of doing just that. As Dawnay explained to Vansittart, BBC 
policy was to allow the periodic discussion of communism and fascism, 
provided a full opportunity was given 'for the arguments put forward 
to be c 295tered adequately and conclusively immediately 
afterwards'. The BBC Board felt strongly that the series should 
go ahead. In view of the Italian attack bn Abyssinia there was no 
time in fascist history when the arguments of fascism would be less 
likely to co mend themselves to the British public. Talks would be 
checked to ensure that the Italo-Abyssinian conflict was not 
mentioned. As for Pollitt's talk, there was no comparison between 
this series and Comintern propaganda. The Governors were confident 
that 
There should be no difficulty in making it plain to the Soviet 
Ambassador that the BBC ... is neither authorised nor inspired by 
artment in arranging this or any other similar any Government De G 9 
series of talks. 
More harm than good would be done by 'muzzling' such speakers. The 
Board concluded with the hope that this disagreement would not change 
the 'happy and satisfactory relationship' between the BBC and Foreign 
Office. 
295. Ibid. 
296. Ibid. 
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Vansittart was faced with a problem. He admitted that the BBC had 
presented its case well, and was loath to resort to the PM's formal 
veto. At the same time he felt that British policy was wrong in 
merely protesting to the Russians instead of prosecuting them for 
contravening international agreements on overseas propaganda: 
If we were to drop protest and take to prosecution, our objection 
to the BBC allowing its microphone to be used for soviet 
propaganda would largely vanish. But so long as we maintain the 
system of protest we 2annnot really withdraw our opposition 
to the 
proposals of the BBC. 
Yet although this point was put to Dawnay the only hope he held out 
to the FO was that an early General Election might possibly cause the 
automatic cancellation of the last five talks. When the Election was 
announced a few days later the most the Corporation would ould do was to 
'postpone to a later date' the five concluding talks. 
The Foreign Office hoped at this point that the incident would 
the a natural death, but in December the Corporation readily agreed 
to the suggestion of its Adult Education Advisory Committee that the 
talks be revived in the New Year. Cecil Graves, who had now taken 
over from Dawnay as Controller of Progranines., accordingly wrote to 
Vansittar29tto ask that he reconsider the BBC's arguments and give his 
comments. Reviewing the case J. L. Dodds considered that the 
series resulted from the BBC's 'perverted sense of liberalism'. 
It was absurd, he argued, to suggest that the Soviet Government could 
'easily' be convinced of the BBC's independence: 
297. FO 371/19467, N5491/998/38, Minute by Vansittart for Secretary 
of State, 16 October 1935. The Secretary of State at the time 
was, of course, Sir Samuel Hoare, not Eden, as stated in 
A. Briggs (1979), Op. Cit., 198. 
298. BBC, TQ G, BBC Press Announcement, 26 October 1935. 
299. BBC, TCHG, Graves to Vansittart, 18 December 1935. 
300. FO 371/19467, N6663/998/38, Minute by J. L. Dodds, 30 December 
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This is emphatically not so. Nothing will persuade the Soviet 
Government that HM have not authorised the talk and that BM's 
protests about propaganda need not [sic] be taken seriously. 
301 
On 15 January 1936 Lord Stanhope, the Under-Secretary of State, 
met the PMG, G. C. Tryon, who assured him of his readiness both to 
take the2matter to Cabinet and to use his formal veto to prohibit the 
talks. 
303Armed with 
this assurance Stanhope met Graves on 23 
January. He emphasised that both. the Foreign Secretary (now 
Eden) and the PW were vehemently opposed to broadcasts by Mosley and 
Pollitt, and that the Government considered such talks extremely 
embarrassing. But, as Graves recorded, Stanhope went beyond this: 
He further told me that if necessary they would be prepared to 
tell us that the talks were not to be given ..... He was not 
anxious for such a course to become necessary; it was naturally 
preferable if we, on our own initiative could cancel the talks, 
but if we could not find a formula for doing this he was quite 
prepared for us to say that we have cancelled them because the 
304 
Government were not anxious that they should be given. 
The following day Stanhope rang Graves to say that Eden would 
actually prefer it if the Government were not mentioned in any 
cancellation announcement. 
The BBC therefore knew that, whether or not the Government would 
actually dare to implement the veto, it certainly considered the 
issue to be sufficiently serious to consider and threaten such a 
301. Ibid. 
302. FO 371/19467, N6663/998/38, Minute by Lord Stanhope, 15 January 
1936. 
303. This vital meeting and conversation is not mentioned by Briggs 
in his account, and the whole emphasis of persuasion and 
capitulation is thereby crucially altered. 
304. BBC, TCHG, Record of interview with Lord Stanhope by C. Graves, 
23 January 1936. 
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move. Faced with the strong possibility of a veto the Board agreed to 
a compromise, namely cancellation on condition that a public 
announcement could be made that this action was the result of 305 
government anxiety on the matter. In fact, having won his point, 
Stanhope then took pains on 6 February to assure Reith that a veto 
had never been likely. But the BBC's decision had been taken with 
very different information, whilst a Cabinet decision on 12 February 
actually agreed that if necessary the veto would be used. 
Having gained this much Stanhope was anxious to see if he could 
win more. The BBC had compromised once over the most important issue; 
it might be persuaded to compromise again, and to this end he 
presented the Corporation with arguments of expediency: 
I imagine that the Board has considered the effect that may be 
produced in Parliament by a public announcement, shortly before 
the new charter comes up for discussion, that the Government have 
felt impelled in the public interest to stop a series of talks. 
It seems to me that it may strengthen the 
306 
e for those who 
demand more Parliamentary control of the BBC. 
Reith and Norman were impressed by this argument; as already seen 
they were particularly conscious of the need not to rock the boat at 
this time. Reith told Graves that it was 'a matter of expediency'. 307 
Graves, however, disagreed, and argued his case forcefully. When 
the Governors met on 12 February Stanhope's letter was discussed, but 
it was resolved to adhere to thei 3 p$ vious decision to broadcast an 
explanation of the cancellation. 
o 
Ronald Norman, however, now 
took advantage of his position as chairman of the Board. At the 
305. BBC, TCHG, Graves to Lord Stanhope, 31 January 1936. 
306. F0 371/19467, N692/75/38, Lord Stanhope to Graves, 5 February 
1936. Quoted by A. Briggs (1979), Op. Cit., 199. 
307. Reith to Graves, 7 February 1936. Quoted by A. Briggs (1979), 
Op. Cit., 199; BBC, TCHG, Graves to Reith, 6 February 1936. 
308. BBC, BGP, Board Minutes, 12 February 1936. Briggs is incorrect 
in implying that the Governors capitulated at this point. 
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Cabinet meeting on 12 February the matter had been discu3ss9 and 
Tryon authorised . to negotiate with the Corporation. The 
following day Norman and Tryon met, and Norman compromised on the 
brief given him from the Board by agreeing that, although the Adult 
Education Advisory Committee would be told of Government 
intervention, no mention 310 
it would be made in the public 
announcement of cancellation. 
The Adult Education Advisory Committee was no more impressed by 
being told of Foreign Office representations than was Oswald Mosley, 
on being informed that he had been cancelled in view of 'the effect 
which the proposed talks might have on an inter3n1a1 ional situation 
already aggravated by recent developments'. Yet despite 
complaints from both Mosley and the Committee the Foreign Office had 
succeeded both in getting the talks cancelled without use of the veto 
and in reducing knowledge of its own involvement to the minimum. At 
the same time it had undoubtedly interfered with a series which was 
not concerned with foreign affairs, and had certainly limited the 
BBC's ability to discuss the issues of communism and fascism at even 
an academic and constitutional level. As Mosley wrote, 
I can see nothing which can aggravate any international situation 
in the fact of Englishmen discussing their own Constitution and 
their own structure of Government. 
This was a view shared by the chairman of the Adult Education 
Advisory Committee: 
309. Cabinet minutes, 12 February 1936. Quoted by A. Briggs (1979), 
On. Cit., 200; Cab. 24, C. P. 29(36), Memorandum by A. Eden, 7 
February 1936. 
310. BBC, TCB, Record of meeting between R. Norman and G. C. Tryon, 
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reaction of the BBC's Adult Education Advisory Committee see A. 
Briggs (1979) Op. Cit., 200-201. 
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The discussion of constitutional questions has always been the 
touchstone of any real freedom of speech. No latitude in 
contro1ersy on other topics can compensate for a lack of freedom 
here. 
'The Citizen and His Government' affair did not damage BBC/FO 
relations. Indeed, in that it showed the Corporation how far Foreign 
Office interest in its programmes extended, it brought the two bodies 
closer together. Reith was undoubtedly convinced that a responsible 
attitude entailed close liaison and a considerable degree of co- 
operation with Foreign Office wishes. He felt a close sympathy with 
Sir Robert Vansittart, with whom he got on well, and their contact 
was increased from late 1935 onwards by their joint membership of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence's Sub-Committee on Broadcasting, their 
liaison over preparations for war, the commencement of overseas 
broadcasting services and plans for the contemplated Ministry of 
Information. Reith's personal involvement in preparing for war almost 
certainly made him more sympathetic to the problems of the Foreign 
Office. Between 1936 and 1939 there is evidence that whilst his 
subordinates sought an expansion of foreign affairs discussion, Reith 
proved more amenable to senior Foreign Office views. It is also 
noticeable that whilst the FO News Department remained comparatively 
liberal in its outlook, Vansittart and his Secretaries of State grew 
increasingly unhappy about foreign affairs broadcasting. 
Relations between the two bodies remained good and virtually 
without incident throughout 1936. The weekly commentary on foreign 
affairs, which had been given a winter break, was resumed in April. 
Leeper was informed of this and replied that the FO would be grateful 
to have a talk with speakers who were to deal with questions shortly 
to be, or actually being, discussed with foreign governments. 
Earlier Hitler's re-militarisation of the Rhine had induced Reith to 
ring Orme Sargent and himself offer 'to put on a special talk tonight 
313. BBC, TCHG, J. H. Nicholson to C. Graves, 6 March 1936. 
314. BBC, FOC, Deeper to Graves, 6 April 1936. 
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315 
if FO liked, to offset scare headlines etc. '. Sargent, however, 
was dubious, perhaps because he then had to listen to Reith's own 
uninformed and confused appreciation of the situation. 
In July producer Moray Mclaren proposed a series of discussions 
between two politically opposed nationals of foreign countries, on 
vital and unresolved issues, in partic bar such territorial questions 
as Danzig and the Polish Corridor. This series, to be called 
'Vexed Questions' went to the BBC Board and was approved, although in 
the event inter-country disputes were not dealt with, presumably 
because of their sensitivity. Instead two Spaniards, Germans, 
Belgians, Italians, Russians and Frenchmen argued respectively over 
the Spanish Civil War, the Nazi regime, Rexism, Italian fascism, the 
new Russian constitution and the French political situation. This was 
certainly a new and bold departure, but it had inevitably been 
checked with the FO beforehand. Orne Sargent had been encouraging, 
but had made what Graves called 
the very sound point that, supposing things were internationally 
taking a turn for the better it would be stupid to bring into the 
limelight issues which 3a1t7 
that particular moment it might be 
desirable to gloss over. 
One of the discussions was to be between a Jew and an Arab on the 
issue of Palestine. The Colonial Office was consulted and Rose-Troup 
promised to keep in close touch, 'so as to ensure that 18he talk on 
Palestine did not occur at an unpropitious moment'. Yet even 
this assurance did not please the Colonial Secretary, W. Ormsby-Gore. 
On hearing of the proposal he immediately sent a message that he felt 
'very strongly' that such a talk was both 'undesirable' and 
315. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 209,7 March 1936. 
316. BBC, IFA, M. McLaren to Graves, 16 July 1936. 
317. BBC, TVQ, Graves to Rose-Troup, 30 July 1936. 
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'dangerous'. Rose-Troup could only concede that 'we must, of course, 
respect su31hha strong expression of opinion', and the discussion was 
cancelled. 
1936 and 1937 saw a limited discussion within the Government and 
Foreign Office as to the pros and cons of greater public information 
and guidance on foreign affairs. The question was discussed in 
Cabinet in March 1936, where it was agreed that public opinion 'was 
very ignorant as to t 320reasons as to the Government's policy towards 
France and Germany'. It was suggested that the best means. of 
rectifying this would be a broadcast by either the Prime Minister or 
the Foreign Secretary. The one - and decisive - argument put forward 
against the proposal, however, was party political. Ministers were 
reminded that the BBC would insist on any such defence of Government 
policy being answered by the two opposition parties. Yet although 
Duff Cooper, the Secretary of State for War, felt that this would not 
do much harm, and although Vansittart subsequently gave it as his 
opinion that Hugh Dalton would make a good broadcast on the subject, 
wariness of criticism prevailed and Eden and Baldwin decided not to 321 
broadcast. Most ominously for the future the Cabinet considered 
that 
if [the BBC] were told 
broadcast, except by the 
was undesirable in the 
would probably at least 
expressions of views on 
that the situation was such that any 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
present international situation, they 
refrain from Zranging for independent 
the situation. 
319. BBC, TVQ, Rose-Troup to Graves, 25 September 1936. Reith's 
account of this incident is almost completely erroneous - 
J. C. W. Reith (1949), Op. Cit., 288. 
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Within the Foreign Office Rex Leeper was beginning, in 1936, to 
expand his conception of the role of the News Department in educating 
public opinion both abroad and at home. He believed that 
international relations had reached the stage where the British 
public needed to be rearmed both 23 ially and morally and brought 
'face to face with realities'. While Goebbels was using 
propaganda to unite the German people, the British were receiving 
minimal guidance. He urged that the News Department should link the 
various media and opinion-forming bodies, including the BBC, in order 
to instil a greater sense of realism into the public. Vansittart 
agreed in principle - the public were receiving no adequate education 32 
to prepare them for the coming trials. 
Yet, in practice, education to Vansittart entailed a greater 
degree of FO supervision over BBC output than the Corporation was 
prepared to concede, or, indeed, than was really practicable. 
Sympathetic and co-operative as it was, there were limits as to how 
much consultation the BBC would countenance or consider necessary. 
Two broadcasts in early 1937 gave Vansittart cause for complaint. The 
first was a schools broadcast on Russia by John Hilton, in a series 
called 'History in the Making'. Collie Knox of the Daily Mail accused 
Hilton of indulging in ccmmmist propaganda, of praising without 
condemning the Soviet regime. In retrospect Hilton's talk appears as 
a typical example of BBC impartiality, mildly critical and mildly 
laudatory, well calculated, because it did not come down in overall 
condemnation, to incense a person of Vansittart's violently anti- 
communist outlook. 
The second broadcast was part of a series entitled 'As Others See 
Us', which had succeeded 'Vexed Questions'. In these programnes 
foreign nationals, including a German Nazi, were given the 
opportunity to broadcast their views on Britain and British policy - 
323. Minute by Leeper, 27 January 1936. Quoted by P. Taylor, 
op. $1 286. 
324. Minute by Vansittart, 1 February 1936. Quoted by P. Taylor, 
Op. Cit., 288. 
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a good instance of the BBC's attempts to improve international amity 
by giving its audience an insight into foreign attitudes. The Foreign 
Office, however, was unhappy about the German broadcast; Charles 
Peake considered it 'a characteristic piece of Nazi propaganda', 
whilst Leeper equally felt that 
Many listeners (they are not all intelligent) will miss the point 
and will in the process swallow a lot of propaganda. 
Vansittart in particular was not impressed by the BBC's international 
ideals: 
It is most definitely not the business of the BBC to put people 
on the air to tell us "how others see us". That is simply opening 
the door wide to subversive or offensive propaganda, and it is 
really childish at this time of day that the BBC should be guided 
in its programmes by these out of date conceptions not only of 
its functions 
26 
but of the principle of that blessed word 
"impartiality". 
3 
Vansittart's conclusions from this analysis were made clear a few 
days later when, at his request, Reith visited him to discuss the 
matter. At this meeting Vansittart told Reith that 
I thought that if it were possible it would be better to give no 
prominence for the next year at least to lectures either on 
Conimänism or Naziism. If however this was not compatible with 
making the BBC programmes attractive and up-to-date, I felt sure 
that no lectures should be delivered on these subjects without 
the closest previous contact between the Foreign Office and the 
325. FO 395/546, P1223/20/150, Minute by C. Peake, c. 24 February 
1937; Minute by. Leeper, 25 February 1937. Peake was a First 
Secretary at the Foreign Office, and subsequently head of the 
Press Section of the News Department. 
326. FO 395/546, P1224/20/150, Minute by Vansittart, 25 February 
1937. 
601 
BBC. It would be very difficult to devise any form in which 
lectures on these subjects could be delivered without their 
taking the form of either polemics or propaganda, both of which 
it was for the time-being in our national interest to avoid. 
So highly did Vansittart rate the importance of a close working 
understanding between BBC and FO that he stated that he would himself 
be at all times available for consultation with Graves, Maconachie 
and Reith. Thus Vansittart argued in effect that, whilst frank 
criticism was preferable to BBC impartiality, silence was preferable 
to both, since criticism only made international relations worse. 
Reith was impressed and sympathetic. He told Graves that, 
although Vansittart might have been exaggerating about the 
seriousness of the international situation, there could be no doubt 
about the urgency of his appeal to the BBC. At the same time he 
considered him to be somewhat '-unbalanced' in his attitude, and so 
did not give positiv 328 structions about the omission of talks on 
Communism and Nazism. He did, however, pass Vansittart's views 
about this on to Graves and advised greater contact still with flex 
Leeper. 
Vansittart had also talked about the Spanish Civil War. Franco, 
he said, was convinced that the BBC and The Times were against him 
and that, since he believed them to be government controlled, the 
British Government was against him also. It was obvious now that 
Franco would win, and the Cabinet was anxious to avoid anything that 
would drive him further into the arcs of Germany and Italy. One 
problem was that because the BBC tended to receive more news from the 
Junta than from Franco this was reflected in its news bulletins. 
Vansittart asked, therefore, that greater care should be taken to 
327. FO 395/546, P1225/20/150, Minute by Vansittart, 9 March 1937. 
328. C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 214,9 March 1937. Vansittart later 
claimed that he had only meant that the BBC should not 
discriminate between fascism and c munism. This is clearly not 
so - C. Stuart, Op. Cit., 233, footnote 12. 
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balance exactly the amount of news broadcast from either side. He 
also hoped that the BBC might substitute the word 'nationalist' for 
'insurgent' as a description of Franco's forces. Indeed, as Reith 
told Graves, 
It is quite obvious, in fact, that he would be glad if we became 
sufficiently obviously pro-Insurgent to convince 2Fýranco 
that we 
and therefore the Government are not anti-Franco. 
Reith's response to these requests was somewhat equivocal: 
I think we can without inconvenience do what he [Vansittart] 
wants with regard to Spanish news, but I don't think0we can adopt 
the new term. We might, however, drop the old one. 
Whether the phrase 'do what he wants' referred to adopting a pro- 
Franco stance or merely to balancing news output, was unclear, 
although it would hardly have been in character for Reith, however 
sympathetic, to agree so readily to the former, which was tantamount 
to using the news as veiled propaganda. 
As a result of this meeting, which had been entirely amicable, 
Graves and Sir Richard Maconachie visited Rex Leeper. Leeper was 
still somewhat at odds with his superiors as to the desirability of 
improved guidance of public opinion. He saw the BBC, properly 
directed, as giving a real lead in getting the public thinking along 
the right lines. But Vansittart was doubtful if the BBC could be 
positively directed by FO wishes in the way that Leeper suggested. 
Despite Reith's obvious sympathy Vansittart remained convinced that 331 
in its lower echelons the BBC had a left wing bias. He doubted 
very much whether the Corporation could be a positive aid to the 
Foreign Office, and Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, agreed: 
329. BBC, IFA, Reith to Graves, 9 March 1937. 
330. Ibid. 
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is it really inevitable that there should be more BBC talks on 
Foreign Affairs. I wish that there could be less, and I share the 
apprehensions expressed in these minutes as to its quality. 
The overall Foreign Office view was therefore hostile to any degree 
of broadcast foreign affairs coverage and Leeper's more positive 
proposals were left in abeyance. 
Faced with such an attitude and given its own outlook it was not 
surprising that the BBC itself acted cautiously. The ideas and the 
desire for more ambitious programmes were there at all levels of the 
Talks Department, but suggestions, even when acted upon, rarely came 
to fruition. In September 1937, for example, the Assistant Director 
of Talks, George Barnes, proposed a series of talks on the post-war 
historical development of the various eastern European states. The 
format was to be a factual description of how and why they had been 
created. Maconachie fully supported the idea and by March 1938 
the series was in an advanced state of preparation. Maconachie boldly 
suggested that one programme should be on the question of racial 
minorities and the Jews, although he admitted that such subjects were 
'obviously explosive' and noted a334 recent Roumanian objection to a 
similar talk by Wickam Steed. Yet only days later the 
international situation caused him reluctantly to cancel the entire 
project and to admit that 
It does not seem to be practical to give a series on 
international affairs at all while conditions are fluctuating so 335 
violently and feelings running so high. 
A fortnight later he likewise rejected a proposal of C. V. Salmon's 
332. FO 395/547, P2120/20/150, Minute by A. Eden, 31 May 1937. 
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for a 'non-controversial' series on the international economic 
situation, with the sad comment: 
I ..... have come to the tentative conclusion that we can only 
get a non-controversial subject outside the3rraange of politics and 
economics e. g. the theatre, literature etc. 
The regular weekly 'World Affairs' series, broadcast throughout 1937; 
was increasingly taken over in 1938 by talks on such non- 
controversial topics as trade agreements, and by ministerial 
statements on defence measures. From July to October it was brought 
to a temporary close and replaced with what was initially intended as 
a weekly lightweight talk by Harold Nicolson on 'The Past Week'. 
The most interesting progranme cancellation occurred at the 
beginning of March, when a debate on the German claim to colonies - 
in which it was anticipated that the German case would appear in an 
unfavourable light - was withdrawn by Reith at the personal request 
of the new Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax. Halifax's telegram on the 
subject to the British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson, 
provides a fascinating example of how the BBC could be used as an 
arguing point with Hitler, and deserves to be quoted at length: 
In view of the conversations in Berlin I saw Sir J. Reith 
yesterday who agreed that he would on his own responsibility 
cancel the arrangement. It was clearly understood between us that 
there was no question of Government intervention. Unless you see 
objections, I should be glad if you could convey to the 
Chancellor [Hitler] in confidence intimation of the action taken 
by the BBC on their own initiative as a token of their desire not 
to create difficulties. You should at the same time make it clear 
that the BBC have acted independently, as I am most anxious to 
avoid giving the impression that the Government are attempting to 
muzzle either the BBC or the press. Our intention is merely to 
336. BBC, TTP, Maconachie to G. Barnes, 29 March 1938. 
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instil a sense of responsibility in difficult and delicate 
circumstances. If it was thought that action in this instance had 
been taken at Government instigation, His Majesty's Government 
might be held 3e ponsible, in a measure, for anything that is put 
out in future. 
7 
Despite this increasingly restrictive atmosphere a certain amount 
was achieved by the BBC, in line with its growing sense of 
frustration; but it was done most responsibly. A valuable series on 
the political and strategic importance of the Mediterranean was 
planned and began in October 1938. The Foreign Office was, of course, 
consulted in advance. Earlier in the year talks on 'The Way of Peace' 
had been given. In these the interlocutor technique was used to 
examine the value of the League of Nations and alternative 
suggestions for the maintenance of peace, such as isolationism, 
pacifism : and the New Commonwealth. Yet when, in arguments against 
pacifism, Josiah Wedgwood planned to make certain remarks about 
Hitler, Mussolini and Franco which the Corporation considered unwise, 
he was asked to alter them. Wedgwood refused to do so, withdrew from 338 
the talk and was replaced by Wickham Steed. In a reference to 
this and other debates on international issues Sir Stephen Tallents 
defended BBC 'reserve', on the grounds of foreign belief in the BBC 
as government controlled: 
we cannot without irresponsibility disregard the special bearing 
of these accidental qualifications Son 
our treatment of 
international issues in home progranmes. 
Harold Nicolson's talks on 'The Past Week' provide at one and the 
same tine examples of the BBC at its most informative and topical, 
337. FO 371/21679, C1523/184/18, Lord Halifax to Sir Neville 
Henderson, 4 March 1938. 
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and at its most circumspect. With the worsening international 
situation it was decided by the Corporation and Nicolson together to 
alter the nature of his talks from a lightweight chat to a more 
serious commentary. From 14 July he began to include foreign affairs 
in his talks and gave, for example, an explanation of the Czech 
problem on 1 August. From mid August his talks were entirely devoted 
to a commentary on developments in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland 
and, to an extent, Japan and Manchuria. The programmes were 
explanatory, mildly interpretive and most informative. With these 
talks and its increased news bulletins during the crisis, the BBC did 
seem to be doing its duty in keeping the audience well informed of 
events as they happened. The Foreign Office was consulted beforehand 
and the scripts probably approved. On the whole, however, its 
attitude was liberal and Nicolson, a former Foreign Office official 340 
himself, was praised for his skill in dealing with the subject. 
On 5 September, having received alt week's script from Nicolson, 
George Barnes visited Rex Leeper. Leeper fully approved the 
commentary, but referred it to Sir Alexander Cadogan, who had now 
taken over from Vansittart. Cadogan in turn referred it to Halifax 
himself, who clearly disliked the whole idea, and Leeper told Barnes 
that the FO would prefer that no talk on the German/Czech situation 
was broadcast that week. Acting on Basil Nicoll's instructions Barnes 
rang Nicolson and asked him to talk on a different subject. This 
Nicolson agreed to do, but his resubmitted script proved still to be 
contentious, describing as it did the Nazi assault in church of the 
Bishop of Rothenburg. Only after a long argument did Nicolson agree 
to omit completely such references and to talk instead about the rise 
in milk prices to 7d a quart. 
Nicolson, a National Labour MP, felt that the FO's strong line 
was possible only because it could rely upon him not to make the veto 
340. Perhaps Nicolson's best talk was given on 26 September 1938, 
with events at their most critical. See The Listener, 29 
September 1938,639-40. 
341. BBC, CHIN, Memorandum by G. Barnes, 5 September 1938. 
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public. Immediately after the Munich terms were known he became an 
outspoken critic of Chamberlain's final concessions. Yet during the 
crisis itself, although he did not omit to mention opposition to the 
negotiations, the weight of his commentary was sympathetic to the 
Government. As he said in the rewritten talk on 5 September, 
the situation today is so delicate and so changeable that 
anything I say could perhaps be twisted into something which 
might give offence to the German people with whom we all desire 
to live on terms of friendship. I am confident myself that . the 
Prime Minister and Lord Halifax are striving, calmly, 
persistently, courageously - to find some solution which will 
bring peace to the world ... I should not wish, when the whole of 
Europe342 is a powder magazine, to strike even the tiniest 
match. 
By the end of 1938, therefore, the Foreign Office could be 
reasonably content with the working relationship it had established 
with the BBC and with the responsible attitude taken by the 
broadcasters. Its objectives were twofold: to prevent the 
broadcasting of matter to which other governments might object, and 
to educate the Corporation accurately as to what British foreign 
policy actually was. Thus Leeper could note that 
The connections of the News Department both with the Press and 
with the BBC are now so close that it can conduct this work 
quietly a343 smoothly without giving the impression of 
propaganda. 
The Government, however, had objectives additional to those of 
the Foreign Office. It wanted the country to present a united face; 
342. Broadcast talk, 'The Past Week', 5 September 1938. 
343. Memorandum by Leeper, c. October 1938. Quoted by P. Taylor, 
Op. Cit., 413. 
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it desired full support for the foreign policy it was pursuing. Not 
least it wished to keep criticism to a minimum. Ne have already seen 
that the Government's primary condition in agreeing to the broadcast 
party political debates in 1939 was that foreign affairs should not 
be discussed. Yet at the same time the speeches of the Prime Minister 
were broadcast, by virtue of his office, without reply and as 
statements of national policy. Within the Corporation Sir Richard 
Maconachie was particularly conscious of the 'informal pressure froh 
Government'. He argued strongly with Nicolls and Ogilvie that a 
situation should be reached where, 'no subject of current political 
interest which is discussed3in the Press can be pronounced unsuitable 44 
for broadcast ventilation'. 
At the end of March 1939 the natter was raised in the Cocoons by 
a Liberal member, R. T. D. Acland. Acland argued that since political 
broadcasting was determined by the party leaders and since the 
opposition leaders desired to broadcast on foreign affairs, it was 
effectively the PM who chose whether or not opposition views could be 
heard. This was an accusation which Chamberlain himself evaded 
and the Postmaster General denied by saying that such matters were 
for the BBC to decide. Its point, however, was not lost on the BBC's 
chairman, Ronald Norman. In a letter to Tryon on 5 April he laid 
before the PPG the difference between the Corporation's technical 
freedom and its actual control by government. He accepted that the 
BBC had a duty to regard the PM's own speeches, as statements by the 
nation's leader, outside the party battle, even when they contained 
passages of a party nature, as many had in recent months. But, he 
continued, the main difficulty arose with other speakers: 
for the obligation to balance speakers means, in effect, where 
, political questions are at 
issue, that the refusal of any one of 
the three main parties - or at any rate of the two main parties - 
to co-operate in a discussion results in an absolute banning of 
344. BBC, PPBG, Ma. conachie to Ogilvie via B. Nicolls, 6 March 1939. 
345. H. C. Debates, vol; / 345: cols. 1842-1850,27 March 1939. 
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that particular question. 
In this way foreign affairs had been excluded as a debatable subject: 
These issues are frequently debated in Parliament; they are daily 
canvassed in the press; but the vast audience of thirty millions 
who listen to the wireless in this country are deprived of the 
opportunity of getting, through the unrivalled instrument which 
we control, such an education in the most vital controversial 
questions as it is in the sole power of broadcasting to offer. 
All this is due to the reluctance of the Government to allow 
their members or supporters to discuss the questions in front of 
the microphone, coupled with our policy of balance. Thus it is 
uncomfortably near the truth to say that th 34d7ecision who should 
speak is in the hands of the Prime Minister. 
He concluded that since it could not be right that such politicians 
as Lloyd George, Churchill and Eden were not heard, the policy from 
which their effective exclusion stemmed could equally not be right: 
It may be that the Government policy of refusal to participate is 
wrong: that is for you to consider; or it may be that our 
insistence on balance is pressed too far: that is for us to 
consider. But in some way or another I feel that it is essential 
to bring to the microphone from time to time not only the 
principal members of His Majesty's Govern n$t, but also the 34 
leading statesmen who are not holding office. 
This was the crux of the matter. The inherent preference of 
government for limited and controlled transmission of information, 
its desire not to upset foreign governments accidentally, combined 
with the BBC's 'reasonable' approach and its regard for balance of 
346. Prem. 1/301, R. C. Norman to G. C. Tryon, 5 April 1939. 
347. Ibid. 
348. Ibid. 
f* It 
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output rather than balance of broadcast opportunity, led inevitably 
to severe if unwritten restrictions upon the free expression of 
views. Tryon considered Norman's proposals 'most dangerous', whilst 
O. S. Cleverly, Chamberlain's Principal Private Secretary, felt that 
any such broadcasts - for examp349 by Lloyd George - would be 
'irresponsible and mischievous'. Cleverly told Sir Horace 
Wilson, one of Chamberlain's closest advisers, that 
whatever may be said in Parliament and in the Press it is 
definitely undesirable that at times like the3 present issues. of 
Foreign Policy should be discussed on the air. 
50 
What he was saying in effect was that whilst the Government could do 
nothing to prevent 'irresponsible' criticism in the press and on the 
platform, it could and would use its greater influence over the BBC 
to prevent this most powerful medium being used for attacks upon it. 
The Corporation received no response to its Chairman Is appeal. 
Norman's term of office was coming to an end in any case and he was 
replaced by Sir Allan Powell. Reflecting its slightly more 
adventurous policy in other areas the BBC did broadcast a modest 
series on the back 3 
ground to such current issues as Czechoslovakia, 
Danzig and Suez. 
51 
In June 1939 Basil Nicolls told the Talks 
Department to prepare a series of talks on '%7hat I Stand For', in 
which prominent men, including Eden and Churchill, could state their 
views on what it was worth living and fighting for. This series, 
planned for October, was overtaken by events. Weekly foreign affairs 
commentaries had been resumed in March, with Voigt again as the 
principal contributor. But in May even these were withdrawn. As the 
international situation worsened there was little that the BBC could 
349. Prem. 1/301, J. Napier to O. S. Cleverly, 6 April 1939; 
Memorandum by O. S. Cleverly, 20 April 1939. 
350. Prem. 1/301, Memorandum by O. S. Cleverly, 20 April 1939. 
351. BBC, TTP, G. Barnes to Lindsay Wellington, 21 August 1939. 
352. BBC, TIP, Memorandum by Maconachie, 20 June 1939. 
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do but give the news and prepare itself for war. 
v) Broadcasting and Politics: Conclusion. 
It is undeniable that in seeking to establish itself firmly 
within the body politic, and for a variety of other reasons, the BBC 
did come too close to accepting the views of a certain established 
order, of the current representatives of that system of government to 
which it sought itself to contribute. Perhaps the Corporation was 
unfortunate that its formative inter-war years were so completely 
dominated by Conservative or National governments. The BBC's aim of 
strengthening and confirming the democratic system was a respectable 
objective, and in a somewhat freer, challenging atmosphere and 
changing society, Reith might have found it easier to practise what 
he had preached about the free play of ideas 'as a basic requirement 
of democracy. 
It would be quite wrong to dismiss what the BBC did achieve -a 
greater outpouring of information, news and informed thought to a 
wider audience than had ever before been possible. Yet another aspect 
of the liberal democratic aspiration by which Reith and his staff 
. continued themselves 
to be influenced was to militate against 
complete broadcast freedom. This was the idea of a reasoned and 
reasonable rather then an emotional or doctrinaire response to 
problems. This approach married naturally with the Corporation's 
statutory duty to maintain its political impartiality and encouraged 
a certain antipathy towards party politics. But it also had as a 
direct issue certain notions as to the need for a degree of 
pragmatism and a readiness to appreciate the problems of government. 
Above all such an outlook laid particular emphasis on the BBC's 
positive duty to the nation -a duty embodied in the concept of 
national interest - which, in the prevailing climate, tended 
naturally to come down on the side of the status quo. For when the 
BBC looked to the national interest it could not but pay regard to 
the state as it was and not as it might be in a perfect democratic 
, system. 
In this respect, as in such areas as its international 
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aspirations, the BBC's ideals were therefore to prove inimical one to 
another. 
Yet in that climate, in which not just democracy but the 
democratic states were perceived to be under threat, it was not 
surprising that the BBC tended in its own operations to stress the 
particular ideal, both democratic and totalitarian, of national 
unity. It was only unfortunate that in so doing other equally' 
important aims suffered. The experiment of an educated, rational, 
politically intelligent and integrated democracy had little 
opportunity to show its potential when the state conceived of itself 
as being in danger. It had little opportunity, despite repeated 
declarations by all concerned that only through such a fulfilment of 
the democratic ideal would the democracies survive the threat both of 
alternative ideologies and of the emotional depravity of the mass 
mind. The 'integrating' element of the BBC's commitment could exist 
and prove invaluable without the democratic, and it certainly 
received greater weight during these years. In one sense, therefore, 
the Corporation failed to fulfil the democratic aims initially held 
out for it because of the very pragmatic concerns of parties and 
governments for political success, and of the state itself for 
survival. But in another it could be said that the BBC was hamstrung 
by its own ideals. 
Note A. 
One further possible source of interference, with potentially 
political implications, should be given, although the details of the 
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particular example are obscure. According to the files of the 
Metropolitan Police, the BBC News Editor, Rose-Troup, agreed on 28 
October 1932 to broadcast, if required, police requests to the 
general public to keep away from the demonstrations of the National 
Unemployed Working Men's national march. It would seem likely that 
the initiative came from the police, who were genuinely concerned 
lest the demonstrations got out of control. Nevertheless the BBC 
should have been conscious that such an action would have highly 
political implications. It may have seen it as consistent both with 
the Licence requirement to broadcast police messages and with its own 
advocacy of conciliation and integration. Yet it could equally be 
regarded as symptomatic of a wider establishment fear that the NUWM 
had undemocratic political intentions in organising these 
demonstrations. Whether the BBC was bound to broadcast such messages, 
or voluntarily undertook to do so, this incident reveals a further 
influence upon the BBC which might have led it to an undeniably 
political action. There is no evidence that in the event any message 
was requested or broadcast. The relevant file, Mepol. 3064, is closed 
to research. The incident is mentioned by John Stevenson in G. Peele 
and C. Cook (ed. ), The Politics of Reappraisal, 1918 - 1939, London 
1975,153. Further details have been obtained from John Stevenson, 
who saw the file before it was closed. 
Note B. 
A conment should be made on the ominous sounding 'internal 
administrative action'. Curran and Seaton (1981, p. 157) state that 
the producer concerned lost his job. This was not so. Archie Harding 
was presumably ticked off and apologised for the furor he had 
created. Later, in September 1933, he was promoted to Progranme 
Director of the North Region, where he continued to assert his 
independence of spirit by broadcasting an interview with hunger- 
marchers and, on another occasion, transmitting a regional concert by 
unemployed Merseyside musicians in preference to a national one by 
pablo Casals - D. G. Bridson, Prospero and Ariel, London 1971,39; A. 
Briggs (1965), Op. Cit., 328,330. According to'D. G. Bridson Reith 
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saw the northern appointment as something other than a promotion; 
when it was made he is said to have told Harding: 'You're a very 
dangerous man, Harding. I think you'd better go up North where you 
can't do so much damage'. - J. Curran and J. Seaton, O. Cit, 154. 
Bridson describes Harding as an 'Oxford intellectual Marxist'. - D. G. 
Bridson, Op. Cit., 28. 
Note C. 
The BBC's objections to WWedgwood's talk were that his remarks 
were conjectural. The two particular passages he was asked to modify 
were: 
Franco's Spain will want Gibraltar and justice, Egypt will want 
the Sudan and justice, Poland or Roumania will want Palestine and 
justice, Pirow wants Bechuanaland and justice, and de Valera 
might want Ulster first and Liverpool next. 
and: 
What Hitler wants is - Austria, Czecho-Slovakia, Lithuania, 
Latvia, Esthonia, some of Poland and the Ukraine, and, I hope the 
southern Tyrol - not to mention Switzerland, Alsace-Lorraine, 
Schleswig-Holstein and Malmedy. Mussolini is more moderate, but 
requires Majorca, Malta, Cicilia, Palestine, Egypt, Arabia, Tunis 
and the control of Spain. 
The BBC did not object to criticism of Hitler if factual and 
deserved; in Wickham Steed's replacement discussion with Sir Arthur 
Salter the former stated: 
You begin by saying "All war is wrong" ... You say further that 
if enough men in any nation held sincere convictions along these 
lines the Government of that nation would not dare to go to war. 
Would this prevent the governments of other nations which 
persecute the Catho lic and Evangelical Churches as the Nazi 
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Government of Germany is doing, from going to war? You know what 
for - in order, as Herr Hitler puts it in his book, "to establish 
peace upon the victorious sword of a ruling race bending the 
world to the service of a higher Kultur" ...... Take [Hitler's] 
doctrine upon the treatment of inferior races. Suppose you let 
him apply that to the inhabitants of large stretches of Africa? 
..... Would you preach to the African natives the Christian 
virtue of non-resistance - and to our people the virtue of 
conciliation? Or would you wish a strong League of Nations, such 
as Herr Hitler emphatically rejects, to call the Germans to 
order? 
It should, however, be added that whereas in Wedgwood's talk the 
dictators had been central, here they were only incidental. - BBC, 
TP, Memorandum by BBC Home Intelligence Department, Public Relations 
Division, 4 March 1938. 
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The Cinema Newsreels and Politics, 1929 -1939. 
"I think that years hence it will be found very entertaining - when 
more is known of the world to-day than we may know now - to look at 
the news-reel of to-day. The news-reels will seem the comics, and it 
will be the Marx Brother films that seem more truthful, less 
distorted in their picture of civilization which has found ways of 
preserving everything but itself. " 
Charles Grinley, 'Notes on the Newsreel', Life and 
Letters, 1937. 
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The newest mass medium of the inter-war years was the talking 
film, although the industry which created it was already of enormous 
proportions, with a thirty year history and time-established customs. 
Where John Reith had a clean canvas upon which to leave his impress, 
the cinema industry was already a colourful and gaudy picture, giving 
little opportunity for the long, sweeping brushstrokes of the 
visionary. Yet for immediacy and accessibility the talking film 
seemed incomparable, combining as it did verbal and visual images in 
a way that was quite unique. The possibilities of'using the medium 
for genuine and valuable education - social, moral and political - 
appeared immense. Few of those who entered the industry specifically 
for this purpose, however - John Grierson and J. Arthur Rank amongst 
them - enjoyed popular success whilst they confined themselves to 
furthering their consciously articulated ideals. Yet the efforts of 
the Conservative Party and belatedly of Labour to use films to 
project a political message outside the coinnercial cinema industry, 
must be considered as of only minor significance in comparison to the 
potential which existed within and for working through it for 
political education and propaganda. The efforts of left wing film 
groups to get some of their films, in 35 mu. versions, past the 
British Board of Film Censors, and the one Conservative attempt at a 
commercially viable feature documentary, demonstrated a firm belief 
that to break into the commercial industry and cinema circuits could 
bring untold rewards. 
The weekly audience for 'the pictures' was indeed a valuable 
prize. In 1934 there were 4,305 registered cinemas in Britain 
(excluding Northern Ireland), providing 3,872,000 seats. There was an 
average weekly audience of 18.5 million, totalling 963 million 
annually. If a proportion of the audience visited a cinema twice 
weekly, so that the total number of individual patrons was something 
less than 11.5 million, it still represented a high proportion of the 
population. By 1939 the weekly figure was in the region of 21 
million. The Social Survey of Merseyside, in 1934, estimated that 
N. Pronay, 'British Newsreels in the 1930s. 1. Audience and 
Producers', History, vol 56, October 1971,412. 
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some 40% of the area's adults visited the cinema each week, whilst 
according to a wartime survey of The Cinema Audience, carried out in 
1943,70% of adult civilians visited the cinema occasionally, whilst 
32% went once a week or more frequently. Even allowing for a higher 
2 
attendance in wartime than in peace these figures were impressive. 
It is also clear that the working class predominated as cinema 
patrons, that the ratio of seats to population was highest in 
industrial areas and that the highest proportion of 'regulars' was to 
be found in the working class age group, from 15 to 35. This was a 
politically significant age and a stratum of the population for which 
newspapers, books and the wireless were not so important, as sources 
of information and entertainment, as they were amongst the middle 
classes. The cinema was undoubtedly one of the principal pleasures of 
the working man and woman throughout the period, and its place in 
society was recognised in a number of social surveys. 
As an added inducement to the audience to patronise his cinema 
rather than that of his rival the exhibitor offered hors d'oeuvres 
before the main feature, in the shape of cartoons, shorts, cine- 
magazines and a newsreel. Such additional items were popular and 
became an obligatory part of the package which the cinema-goer came 
to_expect for the price of his ticket. Indeed the newsreel predated 
the feature and, by the coming of the 'talkies', was long established 
as a necessary part of the progranme, albeit one severely restricted 
in its news-carrying potential by the lack of sound.. This latter 
development, however, in 1929-30, was as significant for the newsreel 
as for the main film. The personalities on the screen could talk to 
the audience, and the newsreel editors could equally describe and 
interpret the events they chose to portray. As a device for 
communicating either an objective or a subjective picture of the most 
important news of the day the newsreel was full of possibilities. Yet 
the comments of contemporaries hardly suggested that this was 
recognised by the newsreels themselves. Writing in 1937 Charles 
2. The Wartime Social Survey, The Cinema Audience, London 1943. 
Quoted by A. Aldgate, Cinema and History, London 1979,56-57. 
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Grinley described how the reels catered for audience tastes: 
materfamilias has to have her item. She has, say, the Duchess of 
Hogs Norton at a Bazaar, or scenes at a poultry show;. something 
to appeal to her shopping instincts. Paterfamilias likes to 
remember his young days, so we have a beauty parade .... and a 
sport item. Pater-to-be is still interested in sport, so we have 
a bit more, and as the "rising generation" is mechanically 
minded, we have airplanes or cars. The young man's girl has to be 
considered (that's why he bought two seats) - she gets a giggly 
bit about sunbathing ..... Then, to encourage all of them, 
there's another military parade or "naval occasion" ... e while 
bands blare over the whole show. There's your reel. And there it 
has to be, because the cinema caters to that audience. 
In like manner John Grierson described newsreels as 
dim records .... of only the evanescent and the essentially 
unreal, reflecting hardly anything worth preserving of the times 
they recorded. 
A recent film historian has described them as 'for the most part 
faultlessly neutral and bland'. 
It is certain that a large proportion of each newsreel was 
devoted to items similar to those thought up by Charles Grinley, and 
his explanation of this phenomenon had more than an element of truth 
in it. Additional reasons are not hard to find. Such items had made 
up the staple fare of the silent newsreels whose personnel now ran 
3. C. Grinley, 'Notes on the Newsreel', Life and Letters, vol. 17, 
1937,122-128. 
4. J. Grierson, Grierson on Documentary, London 1979,72. Quoted 
by A. Aldgate, Op. Cit., 65. 
5. Rachel Low, The History of the British Film 1929-1939, Films of 
Coment and Persuasion in the 1930s, London 1978,18. 
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the sound. The filming of real news, of sudden events as they 
happened, was in any case an expensive process, and like every 
business the newsreels were concerned to pay their way. The pre- 
arranged event, the regular function, was cheaper to film; it was 
also a great deal easier to get the cumbersome newsreel film 
equipment to it and set up in good time than it was in the case of 
the unexpected story. Little spontaneous and real news happened by 
chance under the watchful eye of a newsreel camera; it can hardly 
have been coincidental that when, in 1939, unemployed protestors sat 
down in front of the London traffic, they did so at the junction of 
Oxford Street and Berwick Street, a matter of yards from Movietone's 
offices. 
Yet if a major part of most reels was devoted to pre-arranged 
events, non-news items and sport, by the same token a fair proportion 
did deal with real political issues from home and abroad. Indeed the 
international nature of the film and newsreel industry had the effect 
of promoting a system of constant exchange of news film between 
countries, so that images of America, the Empire and of other 
European countries became familiar, for the first time, to British 
audiences. This was not an inexpensive item in the newsreels' budget, 
as far more film was imported weekly than could be used, and it was 
necessary to pay import duty on all incoming film, whether or not it 
was put into the actual reel. If the newsreels' motivation for 
importing foreign news items was partly a natural response to their 
international structure and partly a desire to make use of the 
curiosity value of such scenes, it nevertheless also reflected a 
recognition of increasing public interest in foreign affairs, and of 
6. Suggestions that the newsreels, owned by the big feature 
companies, were break-even ventures designed to keep the names 
of their parent companies before the audience, and that they 
may have been subsidised, do not appear to be totally 
warranted. Gerald Sanger, the editor of British Movietone News, 
told the author that there was never any question but that his 
reel had to pay its way. For details of the cost and size of 
the newsreels see A. Aldgate, Op. Cit., 27-34. 
7. British Movietone News (hereafter BMN), Issue No. 502a, 19 
January 1939. 'Unemployed Men's "Liedown" Strike'. 
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inter-war idealism as to the need for harmony between nations. The 
end product was a ten minute mixture of news, sport and miscellanea 
which satisfied few serious critics, but which remained virtually 
unchallenged as the comercial cinema's major contribution to 
political education for a quarter of a'century. 
How did the newsreels themselves assess their role? Did they see 
themselves as entertainers, news-providers, or a mixture of both? Few 
newsreel editors have written about their work, either at the time or 
since, evidence perhaps that few if any entered the business with a 
conscious vision or for anything other than purely commercial 
reasons. As Gerald Sanger, British Movietone's editor, has stated of 
his attitude in 1929, when the first sound reel was started: 
Obviously I hoped that it would have a good future before it - 
preferably some weight. But at that time the whole idea of a 
sound newsreel was so challenging, so attractive, that I doubt if 
I had any actually formed idea of what the future might hold for 
it. 
Elsewhere he commented that newsreels 
were simply the recorders of events, whose editors were guided by 
what they judged was popular opinion and public interest at the 
time .... News, yes. But in our case, we were expected'by our 
customers to cram into ten minutes the headline news of the 
newspapers from all the world, the sensational news of 
catastrophes at home and abroad, fashion news exhibitions and 
other great spectacles ... and above all sport. 
With only two issues a week this was indeed a tall order. 
S. Gerald Sanger in interview with author 21 April 1979. 
9. Statement by Gerald Sanger prepared for Metropolis Pictures 
film, 'Before Hindsight' 1977, a copy of which was given to the 
author. Only a very small part of this useful statement was 
incorporated into the film. 
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Popular opinion and general interest were therefore primary 
considerations for editorial policy, but other editors professed an 
altogether higher vision. Responding to an article in the Gaumont 
British house journal, R. S. Howard, the editor of Gaumont Sound News, 
wrote: 
the writer was good enough to say that the news film could be as 
great a national force as our daily newspapers. It is indeed 
becoming a vital factor in the life of the people - growing and 
progressing almost every week - and, although still in its 
evolutionary stage, it is already recognised by the governments 
of the world as the medium for reaching the masses. In this way 
the Newsreel takes its place side by side with "The Times" and 
the BBC, but it has the additional advantage of bringing the 
living personalities of our leaders before the public, which 10 
neither the BBC or the newspapers can ever do. 
Later in the year he added his opinion that 
the newsreel is principally a matter of recorded sight, and not 
of synthetic emotion - as, for good or ill, newspaper reports so 
frequently are. 
The editor of British Paramount News, G. T. Cummins, was initially 
more circumspect in his declarations. Like Sanger he recognised the 
importance of public opinion: 
Propaganda is forbidden. Partiality is proscribed and 
parochialism is taboo. The daily life of the whole civilised 
world is to be told in pictures, nothing must be omitt ed. But 
nothing must be included which the average man will not like. 
10. R. S. 'Howard, Gaumont British News (house journal), June 1932. 
11. Film Weekly, 2 December 1932. 
12. Newsreel Supplement, Kinematograph weekly, 25 October 1934,8. 
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Yet when, in 1937, Jeffrey Bernard of Gaunont British expressed 
similar views, Cummins was sharp in his retort: 
To me, the newsreel [is] a phenomenon of the twentieth century, 
which deserves greater intelligence than as a medium for the 
presentation of mediocre pictures of laying of foundation stones 
or seaside baby shows solely for the purpose of scoring with an 
effective wisecrack. The newsreel deserves the position which it 
can achieve of being a worthy screen representative of the Fourth 
Estate - reporting, with equal freedom and as much intelligence 
the trends and events of this amazing world in which we live. 
Likewise Fred Watts, Pathe's Production Manager, rejected the idea of 
tame newsreels such as would result from censorship: 
An emasculated news-reel shorn of enterprise and virility, would 
be a bad thing both for the kinema and the public. News editors 
were just as conscious o l4their responsibilities 
as were the 
editors of the daily press. 
1 
Such high-sounding references to the fourth estate, The Times and 
the BBC did not marry well with the newsreels' desire not to offend 
the average man'. Nor did they bear much relationship to the 
majority of newsreel practice. But they did reflect a certain desire, 
on the part of these editors, to assume a degree of journalistic 
respectability, and to aspire to a position of importance in the 
field of news reportage. The title of 'newsreel' was valued by the 
men who worked in the industry, and they certainly saw themselves as 
part of the journalistic profession, even if only a few had 15 
journalistic experience. The motto displayed at the beginning of 
13. Today's Cinema., 16 September 1937. 
14. F. Watts, 'Reeling Out the News', Photographic Journal, April 
1936,230-232. 
15. For the typical background of most newsreel men see A. Aldgate, 
Op. Cit., 35-37. 
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each reel, that Gaumont British was 'Presenting the World to the 
World', was indicative of this assumption, whilst Movietone's 'It 
Speaks for Itself' was a profession of objectivity, a natural 
corollary to the dictum that the camera could not lie. Movietone had 
particular reason to see itself as part of the journalistic world, 
for it was part owned by Esmond Harmsworth, and was effectively part 
of the Rothermere empire. 
It is interesting to note that when the editors did make such 
declarations of broad policy, it was more often in response to 
demands that they reduce the serious content of their reels than to 
criticisms that it should be increased. Thus R. S. Howard's conments 
were made in reply to suggestions that the reels should include more 
film stars and 'human touches', and fewer politicians. Cuirrnins 
equally rejected the idea that unpleasant news should not be 
mentioned: 
If the public does not learn the facts of life, so to speak, from 
the accredited news organs, they are very liable to get them in a 
distorted or perverted form through less reputable channels. The 
suppression of all public reference to the sterner realities is a 
very old-fashioned plan for improving conditions, and is seldom 
effective ..... we are providing an attractive feature which 
meets the public demand for authentic news entertainingly 
presented .... and there is always sufficient news of a lighter 
character to relieve the unavoidable sombreness of any particular 
story. We aim to please most of the people all the time, but so 
-'long as we are reporting news, and news only, we cannot produce a 
newsreel in which England wins all the Tests, an 1Gthe problem of 
unemployment is solved by a wave of a fairy wand. 
Editors were also anxious to assert their reels' impartiality, 
their rejection of propaganda and their freedom from censorship or 
other control. Cummins stressed that although the camera could lie it 
16. G. T. Cummins, 'Can Newsreels be Censored? ', Binematograph 
Weekly, 8 March 1934,2. 
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was essential that newsreels used it for telling 
the strict truth .... We do not even asked to be allowed to show 
on the screen anything that would be harmful to the public 
interest, but we do wish and intend to show all the news that is 17 
fit to screen. 
Gerald Sanger made the point even more clearly: 
The commentary on Movietone is purely of an explanatory nature 
and it should be hardly necessary to stress the fact that 
'British Movietone News" never has and never will abuse its 
influence as a news publishing medium to distort the significance 
of events or to give them propagandist flavour. It is in a 
public-spirited . manner and complete disinterestedness that 
Movietone will follow the events of this busy and confused 18 
world. 
The stated policies of the newsreels, such as they were, were 
therefore not ignoble, not unidealistic. If the primary concerns of 
making money and increasing business were not mentioned, this was 
hardly surprising. To achieve these latter aims the need to entertain 
was also recognised - the cinema was, after all, first and foremost a 
pleasure palace to which people went for relaxation. The vast 
majority of the audience went primarily for the feature film, and so 
incidental was the newsreel that distributors frequently "tacked" 
their particular reel onto the feature, making acceptance of one 
condition for provision of the other, in order to persuade the 
independent cinemas to accept it. The cinema chains of the major 
film producers and distributors inevitably showed their own company's 
newsreel, but there was constant competition for the patronage of the 
other 79% of independent' film theatres, using the weapons of price 
17. Ibid. 
18. Newsreel Supplement, Kinematograph Weekly, 14 November 1935. 
19. G. Sanger to author, 21 April 1979. 
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under-cutting, tacking and simple popular appeal of the reel. It is 
perhaps significant that, according to World Film News in 1938, the 
reel with the largest circulation was Universal, easily the most 
lightweight of the newsreels, followed by Gaumont British!! 
o 
the most 
aggressively and exhilaratingly packaged and entertaining. 
This is not to suggest that the news function of the newsreels 
was not popular with much of the cinema audience. One correspondent 
to Film Weekly rejected the many complaints at excessive politics and 
argued that the screen interview provided an intimate, personal 
touch: 
To me Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, Mr. Baldwin and others have only 
become real personalities since I met them on the screen. 
21 
The industry considered the newsreel sufficiently popular to 
establish specialist newsreel theatres, rising to an eventual total 
of 35 throughout the country. Few of these, however, were really 
successful ; nor- did they restrict themselves to the showing of 
newsreels. Cartoons and other short films were also staple fare, 
although the newsreels did occasionally produce specials to go into 
their news theatres, and also used these cinemas as an outlet for the 
American, Empire and other overseas stories and reels whic23 they 
received weekly, but could not put into the domestic issue. The 
considerable cost of producing specials and prints of overseas reels 
for such very limited exhibition, however, proved a serious hindrance 
to the extensive development of this trend. 
20. World Film News, vol. 2, January 1938,37. World Film News was 
a well informed and researched journal, and it seems not 
unreasonable to accept these facts as probable. 
21. J. Gamnie, 'Women Are interested in Newsreels', Film Weekly, 18 
November 1932,10. 
22. See N. J. Hulbert, 'Newsreels must give us the real news', 
Kinematograph Weekly, 13 January 1938. 
23. G. Sanger to author, 21 April 1979. 
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Operating as they were in a coamercial context, constantly 
jockeying with each other for business, the newsreels could not 
afford to alienate themselves from their audience by straying too far 
fron the requirements of entertainment. They recognised, as did the 
popular press, that news was a saleable commodity if it could be 
leavened by a generally popular and entertaining presentation. It is 
noticeable that even Movietone, which must be regarded as one of the 
more serious reels, introduced the majority of its news stories with 
unfailingly jolly music irrespective of the mood of each item. When 
parliament reassembled in October 1937 and a petition was delivered 
by the fishermen of Newlyn, this was the cockney commentary, 
admittedly untypical for political items, from Movietone: 
Well the boys is back 'orace, back wiv throttles open to the 
'eavy grind of parliamentary life. From the 'urry they're in 
you'd think they'd got an important job on 'and. I suppose after 
a time yer gets the idea the country can't get on withaht yer. 
Funny ain't it. And blimey, if this ain't a packet of all right 
blowin' in from nowhere. 'The Rosebud', not 'alf. Sailin' all the 
way from Cornwall and tyin' up at Westminster pier. The blokes on 
board 'as got a petition to 'and to the Minister of 'ealth, and 
it's all abaht their 'ouses which someone says is slums and 'as 
to be pulled dahn. Perhaps yer knows the place, 'orace, Newlyn 
in Cornwall. Nice place for an 'oneymoon I should say .... 
In such ways the newsreels attempted to make themselves more 
attractive to the audience and hence to the exhibitor who actually 
booked them. This presentation in a reel which otherwise employed few 
such crude and patronising devices reflected a recognition of the 
pluralist environment in which the newsreels operated, vying with one 
another for business. Yet it was not the pluralism of the press; 
unlike the newspaper reader the average cinema-goer did not choose 
the newsreel he watched. He came for the feature, and the choice of 
reel was the prerogative of the exhibitor, unless part of a dependent 
24. BMN, Issue No. 438,25 October 1937, 'Parliament - by Carl 
Bernard'. 
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chain. Put another way, the newsreel editor did not choose his 
audience; he was presented by the exhibitor with a mixed bag of men, 
women and children whose only cc mon denominator was their love of 
Dick Powell and Ruby Keeler, Clark Gable and Myrna Loy. Profit being 
the main objective, both for newsreel and exhibitor, there was no 
strong reason for the newsreels deliberately to incur the displeasure 
of the audience and hence the exhibitor, by excessively unpopular 
items or by blatant political propaganda which would be objectionable 
to a proportion of patrons. The newsreels were apparently in a 
situation where they suffered all the commercial disadvantages of a 
pluralist system, without enjoying the freedom to state freely their 
own opinion on controversial issues, such as would normally have been 
the case. 
Yet at the same time they were commercial operators, bound to 
impartiality of presentation not by a charter and licence such as the 
BBC's, but solely by an understanding of what was good commercial 
practice. Commercial sense sometimes suggested that a particular line 
should be taken. Where newsreels considered public opinion 
sufficiently unanimous, and where it complemented their own personal 
inclinations, they could throw themselves whole-heartedly behind it. 
Never was this more evident than after Munich, when Pathe devoted its 
entire issue to a biography of Neville Chamberlain, 
the man acclaimed today as the First Statem. n of the Empire , the 
world's great advocate for peace and justice amongst nations. 
Cheered by the people, honoured by our gracious King and Queen, 
we join in praying for success for his efforts, health and 
happiness for him, and the lady who shares his joys and sorrows. 
Britain will never forget the hour and the ma25 who fought so hard 
for the peace of the world, and won [cheers]. 
The Gaumont British edition was equally a masterly paean of praise, 
the climax of'the newsreel editor's art, whilst Movietone admitted 
25. Pathe Gazette (hereafter PG), Issue No. 38/80,6 October 1938, ' 'Man of the Hour - Neville Chamberlain. 
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that 'our words of admiration and thanks are exhausted for the man 
who averted Armageddon'. 
Such overt editorialisation was comparatively rare. But, as we 
have seen, the reels were run by men who claimed to aspire to the 
freedom and independence of the press, and who looked tot?? it as their 
example, even in the structure of their organisations. With such 
a means of communication available to them, without any legal 
proscription upon editorialisation, and lacking any tradition or 
stated guidelines as to the practice, obligations and meaning of 
impartiality, it was hardly surprising that their personal 
inclinations occasionally got the better of their pure business 
sense. In any case it was almost inevitable that, given the limited 
space they had available to them, their selection of stories should 
reflect in some degree their personal approach not only to their 
business responsibilities and priorities, but also to society and to 
the political situation. 
Personal inclination, public opinion and other factors, 
therefore, could all act in opposition to the line of impartiality 
indicated by primary business considerations, just as those same 
business considerations could work against the definite sense of duty 
to provide real news as well as titbits and other trivia. To what 
extent, then, did the newsreels cover real political news, and in 
what degree did they deviate from their professed impartiality? 
In research of this nature the considerable cost of present day 
film viewing prevents a comprehensive analysis of the reels 
themselves. It is possible to view only a very small proportion of 
the output of the five major newsreels. Some stories are missing 
whilst others of those seen have lost their soundtracks. Nor, at the 
time of writing, is it possible to study the surviving scripts of 
26. BMN, Issue No. 487,3 October 1938; see also Gaurront British 
News (hereafter GBN), Issue No. 497,3 October 1938. 
. 27. 
For the structure of the newsreels see A. Aldgate, p cit., 34- 
43. 
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three of these reels28 Gaumont British News, British Paramount News 
and Universal News. Only a fraction of those of Pathe Gazette 
have survived and almost none (pre-war) of British Movietone News. 
The newsreel issue sheets, which recorded the title of every story in 
each issue and occasionally a brief description, have survived, with 
the exception of those for Gaumont Sound News, which preceded Gaumont 
British, from 1929 to 1933. Inadequate though it is, however, a 
quantitative analysis of stories, based on titles as recorded by the 
issue sheets, does give some guide to newsreel policy and the extent 
to which they attempted to deal with serious news. 
Two such quantitative . analyses of 
British newsreels have been 
carried out already. The Slade Film History Register looked at 
stories relating to Germany or the Germans as issued by Paramount and 
Movietone between 1933 and 1939. It divided these stories 
qualitatively into 'News Type items' (viz. serious news) and other, 
and reached the following conclusions:: 
28. Visnews, the film library holding these scripts, is currently 
undertaking extensive rebuilding, such that during the period 
of this research access to them was not allowed. 
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Figure 9.1: Stories relating to Germany or Germans 1933 -1939.29 
British Paramount 
'News type 
items' Others Total 
British Movietone 
'News type 
items' Others Total 
1933 20 11 31 20 10 30 
1934 12 7 19 11 8 19 
1935 18 16 34 21 11 32 
1936 16 22 38 16 8 24 
1937 26. 15 41 11 5 16 
1938 43 12 55 43 9 52 
1939 29 5 34 16 1 17 
Total 164 88 252 138 52 190 
The Slade register worked on the estimate that each issue of each 
reel contained an average of twelve stories. In fact this is 
something of an overestimate, certainly for the earlier years, for 
neither Paramount nor Movietone often exceeded eight items per issue 
and averaged about seven. Only Gaumont British approached eleven or 
twelve, with Pathe averaging about ten and Universal eight. All the 
companies issued some 104 reels each year. Working from these figures 
it can be seen that Paramount and Movietone produced roughly 730 
stories annually, Universal 836, Pathe 1040 and Gaumont British some 
1150. From this it would appear that the number of serious stories on 
Germany by Paramount and Movietone was low in proportion to the total 
newsreel output - no more than 3% for either company - but high in 
proportion to the total number of stories on Germany - 65% for 
paramount and 70% for Movietone. Moreover, assuming each issue to 
29. Slade Film History Register, Unpublished 'Survey on Stories 
Relating to Germany or Germans, 1933-1939. Quoted by A. 
Aldgate, Op. Cit., 76. 
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contain only one story on Germany, over 22% of all Paramount issues 
and nearly 19% of Movietone contained serious stories on Germany, a 
not dishonourable proportion. Care should be taken not to assume that 
the majority of such serious stories were more than factual 'surface' 
news, or that they provided a full understanding of the German 
situation. Yet just occasionally they could produce commentaries 
which in a few words got surprisingly close to the heart of the 
matter. Thus one such in the autumn of 1933: 
Adolf Hitler, the founder of the Nazi legions which now parade 
before him, reviews his followers. Militarism long dormant in 
Germany has been rekindled by the dynamic Hitler. Nightmare 
visions of war rise30before our eyes. Only wise statesmanship can 
preserve peace now. 
A similar exercise has been carried out by Anthony Aldgate, 
assessing newsreel coverage of the Spanish Civil War. Analysing items 
on the war in all the reels, from its start in late July 1936 to 
Franco's entry into Madrid in April 1939, he comes up with the 
following figures: 
31 
Figure 9.2: Stories on the Spanish Civil War, July 1936 April 1939 
Newsreel Total number of issues Stories on Civil War 
Gaumont 280 77 
paramount 277 67 
Movietone 281 66 
pathe 278 64 
Universal 281 39 
30. Quoted by N. Pronay in British Universities Film Council 
Newsletter, No-35 (1978), 19. 
31. A. Aldgate, Op. Cit., 77. 
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The very different priorities of Universal fron the other reels is 
obvious fron this analysis, for only 14% of its issues contained 
stories on the war. Of the remaining four, however, even Pathe 
included stories in 23% of its issues, whilst for Gaumont British the 
figure was 27.5%. As Aldgate concludes, 
To suggest that the newsreels were exclusively trivial in content 
is unfair. Sport may well have been the most popular newsreel 
topic by far. But a good deal of32 ime was also given to foreign 
affairs and to war in particular. 
An analysis of the issue sheets in order to assess British 
political affairs coverage is similarly possible, but cannot produce 
such clear-cut results. It is possible to record every issue sheet 
title in which a British politician or party is mentioned, each 
obvious strike and demonstration, items relating to slums, rehousing, 
the economy, industry (excluding technological stories) and foreign 
affairs where Britain is mentioned on the sheet. This reveals that in 
the period 1932 - 1937 such items occurred in only about 8.5. % of 
Universal's issues, 13% of Pathe's and between 2333 and 26% of those 
of Gaumont British, Movietone and Paramount. These figures, 
however, are certainly somewhat on the low side. A large number of 
foreign affairs stories mentioned Britain and British policy even 
though this was not recorded in the title. Other items on Abyssinia, 
the Spanish Civil War, Germany, American policy, international 
rearmament, the Empire and especially the League of Nations, would 
also, to an audience of the time, have had implications for Britain, 
even when it was not mentioned. In addition many items, titled as one 
story, were in fact linked together by the newsreel. Thus Movietone's 
32. Ibid. 
33. These dates, 1932-1937, have been taken as 1932 was the first 
year when all five reels were operating fully, whilst after 
1937 the increase in defence stories (A. R. P. etc. ) and the 
Munich crisis tends to distort and confuse the normal state of 
affairs. The average for Gaumont British is based on issues 
between 1934 and 1937 only, as issue sheets before 1934 do not 
exist. 
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1937 story on parliament reassembling and the Newlyn protest, 
facetious though it was, actually consisted of three separate items, 
for the two quoted were followed by one of Lloyd George at a 
horticultural show. This item also illustrates how difficult it is to 
assess stories qualitatively from their titles. The issue sheet 
description reads 'Parliament - by Carl Bernard -A few observations 
on political topics and other'doings'. Only by seeing the item would 
it be possible to discover that Bernard was Movietone's cockney 
humorist. 
It may be safely assumed that a large number of the issues of 
paramount, Movietone, Gaumont British and even Pathe and Universal, 
would have been considered by the audiences of the day to contain 
serious news stories. By far the majority of these, however, were 
foreign affairs items, perhaps with a reference to British foreign 
policy. Purely domestic issues occupied a tiny fraction of newsreel 
time and attention. Eliminating, insofar as it is possible, obviously 
lightweight stories (for example on Lloyd George opening an 
irrigation system on his farm at Churt), it would seem that serious 
domestic news appeared in, at most, 17% of Paramount, 11% of 
Movietone, 10% Gaumont, 7% Pathe and 3.5% of Universal issues. 
Serious domestic political stories made up not quite 4% of Paramount 
and Movietone's items, 2.4% of Gaumont's, 1.4% of Pathe's and under 
1% of Universal's: The total time occupied was probably little 
greater, for if the Chancellor's budget filmed statement was longer 
than the average 'story, the Labour Party conference could be dealt 
with by a brief flash in the picture paragraph section of the reel. 
An exception was at General Election time, when news of the hustings 
and filmed statements by party leaders could occupy the larger part 
of two or three issues. 
Like the BBC in the early'30s, therefore, the newsreels found it 
34. One of Movietone's sound recordists, Pat Wyand, recalls that 
out of some 800 items he covered for Movietone between 1934 and 
1939 only about fifty had any political relevance, and even 
fewer of these were in any way serious items. - Letter fron Pat 
Wyand to author, 4 March 1979. 
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somewhat easier to deal with foreign affairs than with domestic, a 
tendency encouraged by the industry's structure and, of course, by 
the very important part which foreign and defence policy was 
increasingly to play in the minds both of populace and politicians. 
Nevertheless to many writers, both of the period and since, it has 
appeared surprising and positively reprehensible that the newsreels 
gave so very little attention to domestic issues at a time of 
economic and industrial depression, continuing slum conditions, 
demonstrations and political activity. Given the means of political 
communication, why did the newsreel men communicate so little 
politics? 
Some of the reasons have already been given. As a ten minute 
bonus in the evening's entertainment it was not for the newsreel to 
cast a pall over the proceedings by an overly serious catalogue of 
depressing or emotionally antagonistic stories. The audience, it was 
felt, did not want to know what their own lives were like, although 
they were interested in the cause of peace, in foreign wars and the 
problems of other nations. As Nicolas Pronay has commented, 
What good would the other approach have done [the audience]? It 
could have brought militancy and further embitteredness which 
might have appealed to their self-chosen champions, but hardly to 
the ordinary people who, as their vote showed, had no such 
intentions. As for t 3e5 newsreels, it would have led to the loss 
of their public ..... 
The exhibitors were strongly opposed to anything which might 
upset their audiences being foisted on them, and knew that politics 
would always be a dangerous area. Joseph Ball had discovered in 1927 
that cinema owners would not display party political films, and in 
1929 the Bioscope warned its readers not to screen election films-. 
King Picturegoer is a pleasure-loving monarch. In his hour of 
35. N. Pronay, 'British Newsreels in the 1930s. 2. Their Policies 
and Impact', History, vol 57, February 1972,67. 
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relaxatiion he does not wish to be troubled with affairs of 
state. 
A Gaumont cinema manager in 1930 told the cautionary tale of a 
colleague who suffered every exhibitor's nightmare - lost custom - 
when he announced a by-elec3ion result to his audience and had the 
orchestra play the Red Flag. 
The few political speeches that newsreels did include were 
considered by the exhibitors to be too many. The party political 
speeches which preceded the 1931 election provoked a storm of protest 
from cinema managers. At the meeting of the South Wales and 
Monmouthshire branch of the Cinematograph Exhibitors' Association it 
was reported that audiences had 'audibly objected' to political 
speeches. It was unanimously agreed that such speeches in newsreels 
were detrimental to business. This complaint was echoed by the CEA's 
South Midland's branch, which passed a resolution opposing 
any kind of propaganda being introduced into new38reels, as being 
distasteful to various sections of the audience. 
Mention was made of the fact that because each newsreel print was 
used by up to five cinemas, each showing it for half a week, some 
would even then, weeks after the poll, be showing Ramsay MacDonald 
appealing for votes. In the Devon and Cornwall branch, cinema manager 
Joe Tapley complained that, 
Personally, he was very sick of showing Ramsay MacDonald and 
other politicians on the screen. They had among their patrons 
people of all parties and creeds, and 3týhey 
did not want politics 
thrown at them at places of amusement. 
36. Editorial, The Bioscope, 10 April 1929,21. 
37. F. Hughes, 'Beware of Politics', Gaumont British News (house 
journal), May 1930,16. 
38. The Bioscope, 18 November 1931. 
39. The Bioscope, 2 December 1931. 
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His motion to support other branches 'protesting against the 
introduction of politics in news reels' was carried unanimously. 
These complaints were taken up by the General Council of the CEA, 
where it was reported that one exhibitor had had to cut out the 
political part of his newsreels, with the result that there was very 
little left to show. It was resolved to protest to the newsreel 
companies 'against the introduction of controversial political 
40 
matters on our screens as being detrimental to our business'. 
Although the amount of politics, both speeches and news reports, 
was greatly reduced from its election peak, the occasional item still 
annoyed exhibitors. In March 1932 it was suggested that the protest 
to the newsreel companies be repeated, whilst Joe Tapley complained 
again in April 19333 that 'too much politics was creeping into the 41 
news reels again'. A fellow CEA member said he had noticed that 
as soon as certain politicians were put on the screen many 
patrons walked out. That, he said, was not good for the 
business. 
These protests were sunned up in a strident editorial in 
Kinematograph Weekly, in October 1933: 
There is not an exhibitor in the country who will defend the 
policy of letting political views intrude upon the screen. The 
CEA has repeatedly protested against it. News reel editors have 
acknowledged the justice of these protests. And yet from time to 
time we get enthusiastic politicians trying to get their lessons 
preached to audiences who may or may not agree with them, but do 
very definitely realise that, while there is a time and place for 
all things, political propaganda in a kinema entertainment is an 
40. The Bioscope, 18 November 1931. 
41. The Bioscope, 16 March 1932,; Binema. tograph Weekly, 6 April 
1933. 
42. Kinem. tograph Weekly, 6 April 1933. 
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offence .... There is no excuse for letting any political speaker 
address the people who have paid money at the Box Office to be 
entertained. If they show their resentment by disorderly conduct, 
who can wonder? But if, as is more usually the case, they show it 
by staying at home, and keeping their cash in their pockets, it 
is the exhibitor that suffers. 
3 
Although it was not made clear, it would seem likely that 
greatest objection was taken to filmed statements by politicians, 
rather than to news reports. These were often badly delivered and, 
like party p1olitical broadcasts, decidedly dull to those who were not 
interested. Moreover, apart from the occasional statement by 
Lloyd George and non-aligned speakers, they were almost exclusively 
by government spokesmen. The exhibitors' demands for less 
'propaganda', however, did not particularly distinguish between 
speeches and news reports, nor between propaganda of the Government 
and of other parties. When the Leicester CEA branch discussed 
politics in newsreels it was agreed that, although the people of 
Leicester might not consider it propaganda, care should be taken to 
avoid all political references. 
45 
The following month the General 
Council of the CEA made a formal protest to Paramount for including a 46 
statement by Oswald Mosley and a news report on Hitler. This 
protest 4w? as 
paralleled by one made at the LX by Herbert 
Morrison. Later in the year Binematograph Weekly reported a 
protest by Ernest Bevin at a filmed statement by Lord Lloyd in favour 
of increased armaments: 
43. Editorial, Kinematograph Weekly, 26 October 1933. 
44. J. P. Carstairs, 'Those newsreel Scenes', Picturegoer, 26 August 
1933: 'the inevitable speech from one of the chief politicians 
of the day would be bearable if they let him stand up for a 
change instead of being discovered at a large desk with three 
"property" books placed on the left of same'. The books were to 
hide the microphone. 
45. Kinema. togra. ph Weekly, 27 April 1933. 
46. Kinema. togra. ph Weekly, 4 May 1933. 
47. Kinen . tograph 
Weekly, 13 April 1933. 
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Even when you came to such places as this for your amusement [the 
Lyceum Picture Palace, Laisterdyke, where he was addressing a 
meeting], you are faced with propaganda which is aimed against 
your own class, and I appeal to you to show resentment against 
such tactics. When you see your Lord Lloyds 
ýagnd similar people 
shown to you in the news-reels, hiss them off. 
A further complaint by the indomitable Joe Tapley that recent reels 
had included Lloyd George, MacDonald, Baldwin and the 'very 
unpopular' Chancellor of the Exchequer4g Neville Chamberlain, was 
reported by Kinematograph Weekly in June. 
These complaints appeared to produce some response, for it was 
recorded at the Nottingham and Derby CEA meeting that one newsreel 
had agreed to exclude political propaganda in future, whilst the 
Devon and Cornwall branch was told that the General Council had 
received as ýOnces 
regarding politics in newsreels, in response to 
its protests. So slight were the figures already for domestic 
political stories, however, that it is impossible to observe any 
further reduction in newsreel coverage. The editors would seem to 
have resisted these calls for the total exclusion of controversial 
political stories, but to have recognised equally that there was 
absolutely no demand and no justification for an increase. Not until 
1936 did the CEA General Council graciously give 'permission' to the 
newsreels to include statements by cabinet ministers, a decision 
which made no effective 51difference 
to the amount of politics the 
reels actually included. Nor did this permission suggest a more 
liberal attitude. The trade was still cautious: 
In these troublous days, it is only too easy to include items 
48. 'Trade Union Protest', Kinematograph Weekly, 26 October 1933. 
49. Kine ntograph Weekly, 8 June 1933. 
50. Kinematogra. ph Weekly, 25 May 1933; 6 July 1933. 
51. Kinema. tograph Weekly, 23 July 1936. 
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ýp 
which cause the deepest resentment to people who take the affairs 
of the world seriously. If newsreels are to coamlence to comment 
on the rights and wrongs of any political event, it will 
inevitably man dividing cinemas into political categories egories -a 
result which would be disastrous to the box-office. 
If most complaints were about the inclusion of politics generally 
and of unspecified 'propaganda', the trade did occasionally identify 
and protest at particular biases. During the Spanish Civil War 
occasional complaints were made of pro-Franco ten5encies, accusations 
which Aldgate has shown to be quite justified. Thus in February 
1938 the Glasgow CEA cited it as a well known fact that Franco played 
up to newsreel men in Spain, so as to gain advantageous publicity: 
It would be a very regrettable thing i54 the cinemas in this 
country became the cockpit for propaganda. 
Following the orgy of praise after Munich it was hardly surprising 
that many exhibitors complained of propaganda. The fear was expressed 
at the CEA General Council that 
the screen would tend to lose its entertainment value if party 
politics were introduced to such an extent. 
A meeting with the Newsreel Association, formed earlier in the year 
and comprising representatives of all five major newsreel companies, 
was therefore arranged, and the General Council accepted the reels' 
statement that 
The policy of the newsreel companies in which the CEA concur is 
52. Editorial, The Cinema, 1 March 1938,5. 
53. A. Aldgate, Op. Cit., 104-194. 
54. Today's Cinema, 18 February 1938. 
55. Kinematograph Weekly, 17 November 1938. 
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and has always been to present political and controversial items 
impartially and according to their news value, and that 
comaentar6 should avoid anything in the nature of criticism or 
approval. 
5 
There is little doubt that most of the reels firmly believed in their 
professions of impartiality, for after this meeting it was recorded 
in the Newsreel Association minutes that 
the few complaints instanced by Exhibitors had but little 
foundation in fact, and there was no reason for the Newsreel 
Companies to modify the practice they had always7 adopted of 
presenting their reels without bias or partisanship. 
The newsreels were also subject to constant objections from 
exhibitors and others concerning the depiction of violence in their 
issues. War, riots, assassinations and even lynchings, visually 
newsworthy as'they might be, were continually objected to by those 
who considered such scenes morally repugnant, particularly when 
children and other sensitive souls could be in the audience to watch 
an otherwise anodyne Buck Rogers programme. As one critic wrote, 
The actual horrors of modern war are too dange5oous to screen 
before audiences which may include pregnant warmen. 
Protests came from exhibitors, the press and local authorities, and 
in these instances a positive newsreel response was clear. In 
September 1930 Movietone decided of its own accord that film of the 
recent riots in Bombay was too horrific to be shown uncut , whilst 
56. Ibid. 
57. British Movietone News Offices, News Reel Association minutes, 
14 November 1938. 
58. R. Herring, 'Films on Spain', Life and Letters, vol. 16, Scanner 
1937,129. 
59. The Bioscope, 3 September 1930. 
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in 1933 Paramount withdrew film of a lynched man with the comment 
that 'We are servants of the public and we withdraw it as a gesture 
to their opinion'. In 1937 film of the bombing of Shanghai 
provoked discussion of just how much the newsreels should show. 
Jeffrey Bernard of Gaumount British pointed out that the exhibitors 
ran the cinemas in order to entertain the public: 
The public trust exhibitors to show entertainment and therefore 
they take their children. I contend that to show a film of the 
bombardment of Shanghai in a discreet manner, to show the horrors 
of war by showing the debris, and, in long shots, the devastation 
that can be caused through bombing a town, is perfectly in order, 
but to show the ghastly destruction of human beings in 61e most 
horrific form is, I contend, letting down the exhibitors. 
The directors of Movietone similarly declared that 
The editorial policy of British Movietone News eschews the 
exhibition of horrific films or horrific incidents in a film. It 
is no part of a newsreel's function to shock or horrify any 
section of its audiences. 
Interestingly they added that, 
In general our company considers itself governed by those 
principles which have proved efficacious in the case of feature 
films under a film censorship, the application of which to 
newsreel work is not, of course, practicable. 
For the most part, therefore, the newsreels were sympathetic to 
the likes and dislikes of their audience and exhibitors. This was 
60. The Times, 2 December 1933. 
61. 'Shanghai Film Disagreement', Today's Cinema,. 15 September 
1937. 
62. 'Horror in Newsreels', Today's Cinema, 17 September 1937. 
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hardly surprising for a commercial enterprise - not for them the 
Reithian autocratic approach of giving the audience what it ought to 
have rather than what it wanted. But if added pressure on the 
newsreels to comply was needed it was provided by the ever present 
threat of censorship. Throughout the period the British Board of Film 
censors (BBFC), closely regarded by established authority, exercised 
a firm control over the character of films exhibited commercially in 
_ 1. Britain, control which 'Niclolas Pronay and Jeffrey Richards have 
demonstrated comprehended a very effective political censorship. 
Newsreels were exempted from this official regulation, in view of the 
speed with which they had to be produced and exhibited, but this 
putative freedom did not in fact free the newsreels from the need to 
be careful. Because the exemption from censorship was primarily for 
technical reasons rather than the moral one of press freedom, the 
reels were greatly concerned to give no grounds for the removal of 
their privileges. Censorship would have slowed down the newsreel 
operation, and speed to the newsreelnan was everything. For it was 
feared that few - amongst the audience, exhibitors and especially the 
authorities - had recognised in cinema a new means of communication, 
only a new source of entertainment. Just as the audience would have 
objected had it been excessively 'communicated to' in its 
entertainment, so the idea of newreels enjoying press freedom would 
have appeared ridiculous at a time when the other, far older, forms 
of entertainment - the book and play - were still subject to the Lord 
Chamberlain's control. As Neville March Hunrsings has commented, 
exemption from censorship only placed the reels in a 6r4e exposed 
position, for they were completely unprotected by the law. 
Newsreels existed in a business where censorship was the nofm, 
unlike the traditionally free press. The fact that there were 
63. N. Pronay, 'The First Reality: Film Censorship in Liberal 
England', in K. R. M. Short (ed. ), Feature Films as History, 
London 1981,113-135; J. Richards, The British Board of Film 
Censors and content control in the 1930's: Images of Britain; 
Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 1. (1981), 95- 
116. 
64. N. M. Hunnings, Film Censors and the Law, London 1967,110. 
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continual calls for extending censorship to newsreels, throughout the 
1930s, indicates that people did not feel the same way towards them 
as they did towards the press. Screen journalism was not considered 
to be an important press freedom. The Times called for censorship 
after Paramount's lynching film, whilst Warwickshire County Council 
made complaint twice in 1934 6t5 
the Film Censorship Consultative 
Cormittee at the Home Office. Following the lynching film and 
film of the assassination of King Alexander of Serbia in October 
1934, questions were asked in the Commons and newsreel censorship 
suggested. After the second of these incidents the Home Secretary, 
Sir John Gilmour, stated that he had seen representatives of the 
newsreels and warned that, 
it rests with them so to handle their material as to make it 
unnecessary for the Goveýr6nment to consider the imposition of any 
censorship on newsreels. 
The newsreels knew, therefore, that censorship was a constant 
possibility. But in any case they were aware that the whole question 
of the legal status of their exemption was being considered. 
Following the independent production of the documentary/propaganda 
film 'Whither Germany' in 1933, using newsreel film, the BBFC had 
decided to take legal opinion on what constituted a 'photograph of 
current events', the phrase used to exempt newsreels from censorship. 
Both Counsel consulted had deemed that although a silent newsreel 
might come under such a definition, a sound one could not: 
A film which included a commentary on the events shown on the 
film could not be said to be a "photograph of current events" 
within the meaning of the condition. Such a film would be a 
photograph of two things - current events and what Mr. A. B. said 67 
about current events. 
65. See A. Aldgate, Op. Cit., 80-81. 
66. H. C. Debates, vol. 283: cols. 1297-8,4 December 1933; vol. 
293: col. 339,1 November 1934. 
67. F. D. Morton, in British Board of Film Censors Annual Report, 
1933,21. 
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Neither the BBFC nor the Home Office, however, had any desire to 
bring newsreels formally within the definition of films requiring to 
be censored, and it was accordingly decided to re-word the exempting 
clause following discussions with the newsreels themselves. At these 
discussions it was made clear to the companies that, whilst 
censorship was not contemplated, there. was a widespread desire that 
they should be even more careful than previously to avoid irrelevant 
and offensive scenes. Moreover, as Sir Cecil Levita, chairman of the 
Film Censorship Consultative Committee, told them, it was accepted 
that 
simple -description of a picture should be permitted by 
definition$ but that criticism and propaganda should be 
excluded. 
The newsreels were anxious to avoid possible censorship and 'to 
refute any suggestion that it effectively existed. At this same 
meeting Gerald Sanger read out a prepared statement on behalf of all 
the reels, declaring that, 
Absolute editorial discretion is necessary for the complete 
exercise of this responsibility [of running a newsreel], as in 
the case of the press; and we maintain that the newsreels should 
continue to enjoy9 the same freedom from outside control as 
newspapers enjoy. 
6 
He rejected Levita's suggestion that when an editor was in doubt 
about putting out an item he should consult the BBFC informally. 
Later in the year he told Movietone and Gaumont British staff: 
It is up to us to correct any disposition to impose any form of 
censorship on news-reels. News-reels should be as free as the 
68. Public Record Office, Home Office papers, HO 45/17955, record 
of meeting between Sir Cecil Levita and newsreel 
representatives, 28 March 1934. 
69. Ibid. 
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Press and the discretion of editors of news-reels, who are 
experienced people, should be trusted neither to outrage the 
feelings of the public or to attach to the film any commentary 
that was likely to inflame the public. There have been attempts 
recently to put a certain amount of pressure upon news-reels and 
to restrict ict our activities and functions, that we must 
resist. 
Again, in 1939, after a well directed resolution by the Association 
of Cine-Technicians, condemning political censorship of the 
newsreels, the Newsreel Association 'emphatically refuted the 
implication that there was any official or semi-official censorship 
71 
of the newsreels'. 
'Censorship' in this context clearly-. referred to the submission 
of editorial judgement to external and official pressure, such that 
the editorial decision was actually changed as a result of such 
pressure. The willingness or otherwise of the editor to acquiesce was 
incidental to whether external influence was or was not censorship, 
but it was a vitally important consideration to those newsreel 
editors who were accused of thus deferring to authority. To submit 
against their will and better judgement was to yield to censorship; 
to willingly acquiesce to 'reasonable' requests with which they had 
sympathy was editorial discretion. The word. 'censorship' had 
undesirable connotations to those who aspired to be part of the 
journalistic profession, and so they rejected the idea that, outside 
wartime, they were censored. Yet it is evident that there were 
several occasions when requests from authority evoked a sympathetic 
response, as well as some where there was acquiescence, if not 
agreement. 
/ 
In 1930, for example, the cuts made by Movietone in its film of 
70. 'Movietone Chief on Liberty', Kinema. tograph Weekly, 5 July 
1934,23. 
71. News Reel Association, minutes, 8 May 1939. 
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the Bombay riots followed a request by the India Office which was 
anxious that the item not be shown. The result, according to the 
Bioscope critic, were shots which were 
relatively free from any kind of pictorial suggestion as to what 
all this Indian' business really means ..... [they] not only fail 
to convey the ?2 th of the situation, but help to create still 
more confusion. 
Such publicity for public expressions of opposition to government 
were always unwelcome to the authorities, and in 1932 there occurred 
an example much closer to home. Following the May Day demonstrations 
in Hyde Park the Carnissioner of Police, Lord Trenchard, suggested 
that in future the Office of Works should refuse permission to film 
in the Park to any film-maker who intended to use the results for 
conmunist or even Labour Party propaa. nda. Clearly he was concerned 73 
with rather more than public order. It was therefore agreed that 
whenever a permit request was received, 
Special Branch can be consulted on each occasion as to whether 
the views of the promoters of the demonstration are patriotic or 
not. 
There was certainly no fear that the newsreel companies would abuse 
the privilege of filming in the Park, but it was clear from this last 
statement that the criterion for permission to film was as much the 
intentions of the demonstrators as those of the film-makers. 
Accordingly, when the National Unemployed Workers' Movement 
organised their hunger march to London in October 1932, Trenchard let 
72. The Bioscope, 10 September 1930, and 3 September 1930. 
73. Public Record Office, Metropolitan Police Papers, (hereafter 
MEPO), MEPO 2/3236, Minute by Lord Trenchard, 2 May 1932; 
Trenchard to R. R. Scott (Home Office), 9 May 1932. 
74, MEPO 2/3236, Deputy Assistant Commissioner to Trenchard, 27 May 
1932. 
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it be known to the newsreel ccapanies that he did not want this 
demonstration filmed. In addition the Office of Works refused permits 
to film in Hyde Park. The response from Universal, Pathe, Gaumont and 
Movietone was immediate. Universal's editor, Cecil Snape, wrote to 
hasten to assure you that it is not our intention to take or 
publish 7such pictures either 
for cinemas in the country or 
abroad. 
In addition the editors of the five reels met to discuss the question 
and Gaumont's Editorial Manager, Louis Behr, reported accordingly to 
the Commissioner: 
We understand that it would be against the wishes of the 
Authorities for any pictures to be taken and published either in 
England or abroad, and we therefore agreed that this subject 
should not be covered by us. The Editors of the other Newsreels 
with the exception of Paramount Sound News, were in agreement on 76 
this point .... 
Paramount was already gaining a reputation for-independence. When 
eventually the Newsreel Association was formed it was to refuse to 
join at first. Its editor, Tom Cummins, was determined that such a 
visually spectacular show as the massive NtJWM demonstration should be 
shown, particularly since he would thereby gain a complete scoop. 
Using hand held cameras amongst the crowd he therefore obtained 
unique pictures of the ensuing clashes between demonstrators and 
police. Cummins, however, was certainly no subversive and the 
commentary that was attached to these shots showed where Paramount's 
sympathies lay. Some central parts of it, unfortunately, are today 
indecipherable: 
75. MEPO 2/5507, C. R. Snape to Trenchard, 26 October 1932. 
76. MEPO 2/5507, L. F. Behr to Secretary of the Metropolitan Police, 
27 October 1932. 
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Caption: Hunger Trek Ends. London. Police shepherd rm. rchers! 
Unemployed from all parts meet at Hyde Park to demand removal of 
dole restrictions. 
Cornnentary: Hunger marchers from all over England converge on 
London, and the Southern contingent crosses Chelsea Bridge on the 
way to Hyde Park. Near to the end of their thirty days four 
hundred mile trek the Scottish section approach the top of 
Edgware Road. All available police, specials, and the entire 
strength of the mounted section are. here, and every precaution is 
taken to keep order. And in Hyde Park, although they speak peace, 
the marchers' leaders rally their supporters with extremist 
speeches. 
Caption: Disturbances in crowd take ugly turn but cool tempered 
police soon restore order. 
Commentary: Traffic's completely disorganised, and the police are 
hard put to it to keep things moving. The most humane force in 
the world has its own methods of keeping order. Mounted 
reinforcements are quickly on the scene. But the hooligan element 
is getting out of hand, and inside the Park [drunkards? ] 
unconnected with the marchers give the police a warm time. The 
mob take anything they can lay their hands on, but discipline 
tells and its one more [indecipherable]. By calmness and great 
courage th17 police have averted bloodshed and serious 
disturbance. 
The film, which Film Weekly described as 'Really graphic and 
exciting .... [with] several 
"close-ups" of mounted police charging 
the rioters with drawn baton 7$ was too much for the other newsreels 
and the Metropolitan Police. Gerald Sanger defended his decision 
not to show the film: 
The exhibition of the pictures showing the clashes which took 
place in Hyde Park will undoubtedly exacerbate the situation ... 
77. British Pa. ramxunt News (hereafter BPN), Issue no. 175,31 
October 1932. 
78. Film Weekly, 4 November 1932. 
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and it was for this reason that the editors of British newsreels 
either forebore to cover the subject, or to release such pictures 79 
as they obtained. 
In a joint letter to the Police Commissioner the four newsreel 
editors stated that they had decided not to show these pictures, 'in 
the national interest', and deplored Paramount's actionb particularly 
since it had exported the pictures for showing abroad. 
Trenchard therefore decided to teach Paramount a lesson and when, 
a few days later, all the newsreels requested permission to film the 
Lord Mayor's Show, this was granted to all but the offending company. 
Cummins and his News Editor, J. Slee, were appalled; much of their 
regular news depended upon such routine permission being given. Slee 
inm-diately wrote to the Home Secretary and visited the Home Office 
and Deputy Commissioner of Police to apologise. He explained that he 
had been uncertain whether or not to take the film because the 
Commissioner's wishes had only been passed on, second hand, via a 
rival company: 
there was no direct request from the Commissioner that pictures 
should not be shown; their film exhibited the police in a 
favourable light; they consulted the Trade censor (by telephone) 
and were told that he, knowing their reputation and record, would 
raise no objections; and in all the circumstances they released 
the Marble Arch film, but not the Trafalgar Square film (of 
rioting), which was "too bad". 
To the Deputy Commissioner Slee was 
79. 'Should Newsreels be censored? ', Film Weekly, 11 November 1932. 
80. MEPO 2/5507, joint letter from Movietone, Gaumont, Pathe and 
Universal to Trenchard, 3 November 1932. 
81. Home Office papers, HO 45/17415/456374, Minute by ?- 
indecipherable (Home Office official), on meeting with J. Slee, 
7 November 1932. 
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full of apologies and emphatic that his firm were most anxious to 
fall in 82h the views of the authorities on any matters of this 
kind .... 
He agreed to try to stop the film being exhibited in America and sent 
a telegram to Paramount U. S. A. to this end. Although this proved to 
be too late, it was decided that Paramount had learnt its lesson and 
the company was removed from the blacklist. As the Police 
Commissioner's Secretary, H. M. Howgrave-Graham, commented, 
the incident was useful as it made clear to all the news film 
companies that we could hit them pretty hard if they don't behave 
nicely. 
In February 1934 another hunger march raised the issue once 
again. Again the Commissioner asked the newsreels not to cover the 
event as being contrary to the public interest, and again Cecil Snape 
of Universal gr4 plied 
that 'we are only too anxious to fall in with 
your wishes'. On this occasion Paramount was in full agreement: 
In view of the Comissioner's feel8ng in this matter we deem it a 
pleasure to accede to his request. 
Only Gaumont British queried the decision, but its reason was even 
less anti-authoritarian than Paramount's had been: 
we have not taken any picture of the hunger marchers marching 
through London, but today we took a short picture of the 
82. MEPO 2/5507, Deputy Police Commissioner to Trenchard, 9 
November 1932. 
83. MEPO 2/5507, H. M. Howgrave-Graham to Sir Patrick Gower, 3 
December 1932. 
84. MEPO 2/5507, C. Snape to Trenchard, 3 February 1934. 
85. MEPO 2/5507, J. Slee to H. M. Howgrave-Graham, 5 February 1934. 
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Deputation in Downing Street, with a very different object, which 
is as follows: - We have secured film of Riots in Spain, Paris, 
Austria and also shots of Hitler Meetings and it was our 
intention to make a comprehensive picture shaving the disturbed 
state of European Countries compared with the peaceful conditions 
at home, such a picture, adequately edite 
86 
with an impressive 
commentary, would make excellent propaganda. 
This 
gi7 em was 
in fact issued, although Trenchard had opposed the 
idea. Gaumont reasoned correctly that it could hardly be 
penalised for such a very correct piece of propaganda. 
The riots in Paris in March were nearly the occasion for once 
again landing Paramount in trouble. Film of this rioting had been 
suppressed in France and the French Government requested that British 
paramount News, which had also obtained film, should not show it. 'It 
would seem that the Foreign Office was approached, for according to 
Cummins 'diplo 88ic representations, delayed the release of this film 
for two days'. That the result was delay and not cancellation 
suggests that the French desire for suppression was not endorsed by 
the British Government and that no severe pressure was placed on 
Paramount. 
Universal had consistently shown itself to be the most cautious 
and least controversial company. It was not therefore surprising that 
when Cecil Snape decided to produce an item on the League of Nations 
Union Peace Ballot, in November 1934, he took the precaution of 
consulting the Home Office beforehand. The idea was to have two 
opposing speeches by Lord Cecil and Lord Beaverbrook, but having 
decided on the item Snape began to have doubts. Accordingly he 
86. MEP O 2/5507, R. S. Howard to H. M. Howgrave-Graham, 27 February 
1934. 
87. Gaumont British News (hereafter GBN), Issue No. 14,15 February 
1934, 'Turmoil in Europe'. Neither the film nor the script is 
currently available for viewing. 
88. Kinema. togra. ph Weekly, 8 March 1934,4. 
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telephoned A. S. Hutchinson of the Home Office and told him that, 
since they [Universal] had entered into negotiations for this 
film, they had had qualms as to whether it might not be 
acceptable to the Government, and I gathered that they had been 
impressed by the "ticking-off" which they got from the Home 
Secretary in connection with the film of the assassination of 
King Alexander ... The Editor said that he was quite willing to 
do whatever the Home Secretary suggested and he would like to 
know as soon as possible whether the Government had any views on 89- 
the matter. 
Hutchinson immediately contacted the Foreign Office and was told that 
indeed, 
looking at the matter from the Government point o view, the 
production of the proposed film would be undesirable. 
Not only could Beaverbrook not be considered as representative of 
opponents of the Peace Ballot, but also the Ballot itself could not 
be considered a balanced and fair poll. It was made clear to 
Universal, in a letter which carefully avoided outright opposition, 
that the Government would rather 9clh a film was not made, a wish 
with which Snape of course complied. 
In 1935 it was the turn of Gaumont British nearly to get into 
trouble. Following the start of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute Gaumont 
produced an item with the clear message that Britain should not 
involve herself. According to a Foreign Office informant, 
89. F0 395/515, P3230/119/150, A. S. Hutchinson to H. J. Seymour 
(FO), 12 November 1934. 
90. FO 395/515, P3230/119/150, H. J. Seymour to A. S. Hutchinson, 13 
November 1934. 
91. F0 395/515, P3230/119/150, A. S. Hutchinson to C. Snape, 14 
November 1934. 
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it was certainly extremely tendentious, and designed to give 
ignorant people the impression that the Government was pursuing a 
strong isolationist policy. 
The subsequent events were described by C. F. A. Warner of the Foreign 
Office: 
I have been in touch with Sir Albert Clavering, who is 
responsible for the National Government films, and he has spoken 
to the Manager of Gaumont British, who has since telephoned to me 
and offered to withdraw the film, explaining that it was produced 
with no kind of propaganda motive and that the last thing GaumDnt 
British wished to do was to embarrass the Government. In 
accordance with Sir. A. Clavering's suggestion, I arranged with 
Gaumont British that the news-film should be withdrawn at the end 
of this week. To withdraw it earlier would be likely, as on a 
previous occasion, to give rise to stories of Government 
pressure; but if it is withdrawn at the end of this week it will 
at least not93be shown at any of the small theatres up and down 
the country. 
This was not the first or the last time that Clavering, or other 
Conservative officials such as Sir Patrick Gower, were to make an 
appearance-as liaison between government and newsreels. 
The nature of government influence over newsreels was therefore 
92. FO 395/532, P2935/2896/150, unsigned and undated review of 
Gaumont British newsreel issue on Italo-Abyssinian dispute. 
Apparently the film contained 'a number of silent shots of Mr. 
MacDonald, Mr. Baldwin, Sir Samuel Hoare, Mr. Eden etc., 
printed across with such remarks as "We shall not fight for 
7,000,000 Abyssinians", "We must keep out", "Our duty is to 
keep peace within the Empire". This was done to give the 
impression that these remarks were made by the subjects of the 
photographs. The film ended with the Union Jack and 'Land of 
Hope and Glory"'. 
93. FO 395/532, P2935/2896/150, Minute by C. F. A. Warner for Mr., 
Hoyer Millar, 27 August 1935. 
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clear and its degree considerable. Yet a member of the newsreel 
trade, Norman Hulbert, MP and Managing Director of a news theatre 
chain, saw no inconsistency in the two halves of his statement that 
There is no censorship of newsreels, and I hope there never will 
be, because newsreels are talking newspapers.... There was no 
government control, although sometimes a hint might be given that 
it is not desirable to publish a certain ýiýtem, and 
it was usual 
to respect their wishes on such occasions. 
The following month during the abdication crisis, which most reels 
ignored until they could do so no longer, Paramount daringly issued 
an early story on the question and almost imnediately withdrew it 
again, although there is no evidence as to why it did so. 
The two most notorious instances of deletion at government 
request require litt le expansion, having been discussed already by 
Aldgate and Low. In February 1938 Paramount covered Anthony 
Eden's resignation by allowing Clement Attlee to make a statement in 
which he declared that the Government was 
not prepared to stand for the League of Nations; they are not 
prepared to stand for democracy; they are prepared to make any 
kind of a deal with the dictatorship powers. There will be no 
longer in this country a Government-that is prepared to stand up 
for international law and right, but a Government that is 
prepay 96to enter into any kind of a deal with aggressive Fascist 
powers. 
Not surprisingly this produced a reaction, such that 
94. Kinematograph Weekly, 5 November 1936,17. 
95. A. Aldgate, Op. Cit., 84-90,175; R. Low, Op. Cit., 36. 
96. BPN, Issue No. 730,24 February 1938, 'Mr. Attlee expresses the 
views of the Opposition parties'. Quoted by A. Aldgate, O2. 
Cit., 175. 
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within a few hours of the delivery of this reel to the exhibitors 
urgent orders were issued that the item must be deleted. 
The speed of the deletion was consistent with action taken by Gower 
or Clavering rather than the Foreign Office or other government 
officials, who tended to take a day or two to act, but further 
evidence on this incident is lacking. 
Whilst Gaunxnt, Movietone, Pathe and Universal took a very 
sympathetic line to the events of Munich in September and October 
1938, Paramount once again demonstrated its different approach by 
including, in its reel of 22 September, some highly critical film 
statements by Wickham Steed and A. J. Cummings. Steed, in his 
cormients, stated: 
Our Government, together with that of France, is trying to make a 
present to Hitler - for use against us when he may think the time 
has come - of the 3,000,000 men and the thousands of aeroplanes 
that he would need to overcome Czechoslovak resistance .... And 
all this because British and French ministers feared to take a 
risk when they could have taken it successfully and believed they 
could diminish the risk by helping Hitler to gain a triuumsph, when 
he was at his wit's end, instead of standing up to him. 
Cummings, in his turn, declared bluntly that 'our statesmen have been 
guilty of what I think is a piece of yellow diplomacy'. The same 
day that this issue was released, however, a telegram was sent by 
paramount to all cinemas showing it, with the instruction delete 
the item as, 'we have been officially requested to do so'. 
100 
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What exactly had happened? Recent accounts of the incident have 
considered only the Camions discussion of it. Thus on 23 November 
Liberal MP Geoffrey Mander asked why the Government had made 
'representations' to the American Embassy to secure the deletion of 
the Paramount item, to which Sir John Simon replied: 
His Majesty's Government considered that certain passages in the 
newsreel referred to, which was being shown at the time of the 
Prime Minister's conversations with Herr Hitler at Godesberg, 
might have a prejudicial effect on the negotiations. The 
Ambassador of the United States, I understand, thought it right 
to communicate this consideration to a member of the Hays 
organisation which customarily deals with matters of this kind 
and which brought it to the attention of Paramount who from a 
sense of public duty in the general interest, decided to make 
certain excisions from the newsreel ..... Ia 1alad that the 
Ambassador and ourselves were in complete accord. 
i 
Subsequently Neville Chamberlain himself denied that the Government 
had specifically requested that the items be deleted: 'the attention 
of the American Ambassador wal0drawn to certain items and he was 
asked to look into the matter'. 
Not surprisingly this explanation failed to convince many MPs, 
and Geoffrey Mander instigated a full Commons debate deploring any 
attempt to establish direct or indirect political censorship. He 
argued that 'in every case where cuts have been made, nothing anti- 
Government, nothing anti Fascist is permitted, but anything that is 
favourable to the policy the Government is pursuing is allowed to go 
forward', and he suggested that Conservative Central Office was 'not 
wholly disinterested in or without knowledge of what is going 
101. H. C. Debates, vol. 341: cols. 1727-8,23 November 1938. Quoted 
by A. Aldga. te, Op. ", 84-85. 
102. H. C. Debates, vol. 342: col. 584,1 December 1938. Quoted by A. 
Aldgate, 22 ., 86. 
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on'. 
103 
He blamed the newsreel producers and exhibitors for lacking 
courage. Sir Samuel Hoare, for the Government, reminded the Commons 
that 22 September had probably been the most critical day of the 
crisis: 
The Foreign Secretary was definitely of the. opinion that it was 
undesirable that those two speeches should be heard while the 
talks at Godesberg were actually in progress on that particular. 
date 22nd September .... It was his view, with reference to that 
film, during the time the talks were going on at Godesberg, that, 
while he did not wish to apply any pressure - and he did not 
apply any pressure - and there was no question of 10ensorship, 
those speeches might compromise the chances of peace. 
This line of argument, however, was effectively, but as we shall see 
not wholly justifiably, answered by Dingle Foot, who scorned the idea 
that the Godesberg talks might have been influenced by a newsreel 
showing in London: 
Is that the proposition which the Rt. Hon. Gentleman is seriously 
putting before the House of Cons? I dos not suppose that any 
Hon. Member will believe it for a moment. 
The crucial question was the extent to which pressure had been 
brought to bear. The actual events of 22 September are revealed in 
the Foreign Office papers. Immediately upon its issue the Paramount 
reel was monitored by Conservative Central Office, who had a rough 
transcript produced. Patrick Gower at once contacted Vansittart at 
the Foreign Office, cani nting that the item was 
pretty outrageous sort of stuff, and if any steps could be taken 
103. H. C. Debates, vol. 342: col. 1273,7 December 1938. Quoted by 
A. Aldgate, Op. Cit., 89. 
104. H. C. Debates, vol. 342: col. 1305,7. December 1938. 
105. H. C. Debates, vol. 342: col. 1313,7 December 1938. 
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to prevent it being shown during the rest of the week it would 
save a great deal of harm being done ..... My experience of [the 
newsreel companies] is that they wish to be friendly, but their 
desire to portray events in the most dramatic manner, combined 
with their ignorance of politics and diplomacy, lead them on 
occasions to put out stuff that may be extremely damaging from 
our point of view. I am inclined to thi106 that if they were 
approached they might welcome co-operation. 
Vansittart and the Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax, agreed and 
Halifax immediately contacted Joseph Kennedy, the American 
Ambassador107 about 'the desirability of cutting out the 
speeches'. Kennedy contacted Paramount's American Managers (the 
Hays Organisation was not mentioned and does not seem to have been 
involved) and reported that they were willing to delete the item if 
desired. Kennedy did, however, point out to Halifax that such 
censorship might cause a public reaction. On Halifax's instructions, 
therefore, Oliver Harvey, his Private Secretary, discussed the matter 
with the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare: 
The Home Secretary was of the opinion that it was definitely 
undesirable that such speeches should be heard in the cinemas 
whilst the talks at Godesberg were actually in progress. " Whilst 
he did not wish to apply any pressure and there was no question 
of censorship, he would prefer that the speeches should be taken 
out on these grounds. 
Kennedy was informed accordingly and he in turn communicated in this 
106. FO 395/622, P2759/2645/150, Gower to Vansittart, 22 September 
1938. Earlier that day Gower had spoken to Vansittart's 
secretary on the matter. It would seem probable, although not 
certain, that this letter, enclosing the transcript, was hand 
delivered the same day, Conservative Central Office and the 
Foreign Office being only 200 yards apart. 
107. FO 395/622, P2759/2645/150, Minute by Oliver Harvey (Private 
Secretary to Lord Halifax), 22 September 1938. 
108. Ibid. 
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sense direct with Paramount. The next day press suggestions of 
censorship induced Kennedy to propose a suitable obfuscation to the 
Foreign Office, and it was agreed to state that the Ambassador 'had 
109 
merely been asked to look into it (not to hold it up)'. 
It would seem, therefore, that the action had been instigated as 
a result of Central Office alertness and that the Foreign Office had 
indeed expressed a strong desire that the item be deleted, whilst 
itself denying such an expression the name of pressure or censorship. 
At the same time Hoare would appear to have been correct in, his 
Commons statement that the Government had been primarily concerned 
that such dissenting speeches should not be made whilst the 
negotiations were still in progress. However this only emphasises the 
point that, desirous as it was to prevent such speeches and 
discussion of alternative policies, but unable fully to censor the 
press, the Government took action to 'censor' such channels of 
communication as it did have influence over, namely the newsreels and 110 
the BBC. 
Unlike the newsreels the monthly current affairs film magazine 
'March of Time', shown in Britain from late 1935, was subject to the 
rulings of the British Board of Film Censors, for it was considered 
rightly to be a compilation and not a film of current events. The 
strict and effectively political censorship of the BBFC ensured that 
109. FO 395/622, P2759/2645/150, Minute by 0. Harvey, 23 September 
1938. 
110. The ever well-informed Kingsley Martin described the indirect 
form of censorship exercised during the crisis: 'The Government 
propaganda organisation was, in--fact, able to arrange that 
films supporting the Government's policy were widely shown 
everywhere and that films that challenged this policy were 
stopped. As regards the Press, unusual efforts were made to see 
to it that national organs pf opinion were brought into line, 
and there is no doubt at all that Sir Samuel Hoare and other 
members of the Government took great pains to "nobble" 
proprietors and other influential persons in the Press world. '- 
K. Martin, 'Public Opinion - Censorship and the Crisis', The 
Political Quarterly, vol. 10,1939,134. See also F. Gannon, 
The British Press and Germany 1936-39, Oxford 1971,136-228. 
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this forthright magazine suffered repeatedly from cuts and even 
outright refusal of a licence. Thus its issues 'Geneva', about the 
League's failure to deal with the Italo-Abyssinian war, 'Rehearsal 
for War', about American and European intervention in Spain, 'Inside 
Nazi Germany', 'Algeria', 'The threat to Gibraltar', 'Arms and the 
League', 'the Resignation of Anthony Eden' and 'Britain's Dilemma', 
on the Munich crisis, were all the victims of censorship by the BBFC. 
Geoffrey Mander was convinced that the BBFC kept in regular contact 
with the Forei ill 
Office, from whom it took it cue. This was not in 
fact the case. 
il 
But as Pronay has demonstrated, the structure and 
character of the BBFC were digs Zinctly political, such that actual 
contact was hardly necessary. Moreover, as with the newsreels, 
Conservative Central Office was vigilant and active. In January 1937 
a note by Joseph Ball to Chamberlain informed him that 
I have had some little success in stopping the exhibition of the 
"March of Time" film, but a great de 113 of damage has, I fear, 
already been done by it in some places. 
Given the Conservative Party and National Government interest in 
films for their own propaganda, it would have been surprising indeed 
had they not attempted to involve themselves in the commercial cinema 
and the newsreels. , 
)Ve have already seen how they received assistance 
in the making of their own propaganda films from film professionals 
such as Clavering and even Korda. It is equally evident that Gower, 
111. FO 395/662, P526/526/150, P685/526/150, P837/526/150 and 
P1833/526/150, correspondence between G. Mander and Foreign 
Office, 15 February to 13 May 1939. 
112. N. Pronay, 'The First Reality: Film Censorship in Liberal 
England', in K. R. M. Short (ed. ), Feature Films as History, 
London 1981,113-135. See also G. Elvin, 'This Freedom, and 
A. J. Cunnings and G. Mander 'Censored', in The Journal of the 
Association of Cine Technicians, vol. 4 no. 19, January 1939-, 
and vol. 4 no. 20, March 1939. 
113. Conservative Research Department papers, Neville Chamberlain 
correspondence with CRD file, Ball to Chamberlain, 29 January 
1937. Alongside this coment is the tantalising marginal note, 
'See separate file'. This has not survived. 
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Ball and Clavering were at some pains to maintain good relations and 
close contacts with the newsreel companies. When Paramount found 
itself in trouble with the Commissioner of Police over the hunger 
strike film in 1932, Sir Patrick Gower was very ready to intercede on 
its behalf. He assured the Deputy Commissioner that 
they had always found this Company most helpful and ready to do 
anything that they wanted. They took quite a lot of trouble, for 114 
instance, in connection with the Conversion Loan. 
Although he was defending Paramount, however, Gower's true interests 
were made clear by his comxent to Trenchard's secretary, Howgrave- 
Graham, that 'it will not have done any ham to have asserted your 115 
authority'. 
Gower and Clavering felt that particularly valuable publicity 
could be obtained by getting filmed ministerial statements into the 
newsreels, and there can be no* doubt that they were generally 
successful in persuading the reels to take such items when requested 
to do so. Frequently the companies themselves requested such items. 
Thus Sir John Simon's statement to Gaumont after Germany left the 
League in October 1933 followed an appeal to him to make a film by 
Patrick Gower, Simon havingl previously decided against the idea when 
approached by Movietone. 
l 6 
Similarly at the beginning of the 
Italo-Abyssinian dispute, when Clavering arranged for the. withdrawal 
of the Gaumont British film, Gower again pleaded the newsreels' case 
to Sir Samuel Hoare: 
They all feel that a short statement from you, in very general 
terms, would have a good influence, more especially as some of 
114. MEPO 2/5507, Deputy Police Commissioner to Trenchard, 9 
November 1932. 
115. MEPO 2/5507, Sir Patrick Gower to H. M. Howgrave-Graham, 6 
December 1932. 
116. FO 395/485, P2555/127/150, Minute fron H. L. Hopkinson to Simon, 
19 October 1933. 
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the newspapers have been indulging in somewhat sensational 
headlines. They have also asked me to remind you that your 
statement would be heard by millions and millions of people. 
Persuaded, Hoare arranged to make a film and only extreme pressure of 
work prevented him from fulfilling this engagement. 
The Government had other cards to play in the constant effort to 
improve its film propaganda. By 1935 Joseph Ball's spy system had 
extended to Attlee's private office itself, and the Party was able to 
obtain a copy of Attlee's General Election newsreel statement before 
Baldwin made his. Patrick Gower, who wrote Baldwin's speech, sent him 
a copy of Attlee's, with the convent that 
I am not supposed to have seen it, but I managed to secure a 
copy. I am told that his. film speech is a very poor affair from 
every point of view, but I have endeavoured to counter his 
arguments . in the draft which I am sending you. 
118 
The result was indeed a superior effort, and a party supporter who 
saw the film at a cinema in Wood Green told Baldwin that his was the 
only film statement that was clapped: 
As we came out, I overheard a working man say to another "What I 
likes about Baldwin, 'e don't sling no mudl". 11In slightly 
different phraseology those are also my sentiments. 
The National Government was clearly very much , alive to the 
potential of the newsreels. The previous year Joseph Ball had been 
able to tell Chamberlain that, despite the film industry's public 
117. FO 395/532, P2935/2896/150, Gower to S. Hoare, 23 August 1935. 
118. Baldwin papers, Bal. 202/f. 296, Gower to Baldwin, 27 October 
1935. 
119. Baldwin papers, Bal. 39/f. 68, Miss J. M. Hardwill to Baldwin, 11 
November 1935. 
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opposition to political propaganda, in cinemas, 
much has nevertheless been loýJnOe without protest from the public 
by means of the "newsreels". 
He felt, however, that even more could be done and suggested that 
an obvious line of approach is to bring influence to lbeal .r on 
thq 
proprietors of the various cinema news organisations. 
During the next four years he personally worked to this end and by 
1938 could inform Chamberlain, confidentially, that 
I have cultivated some close personal contacts with the "leaders" 
of the British Film Industry, and I am satisfied that I can count 
upon most of them for their full support to any reasonable degree 
.... we must devote the closest attention to the possibilities of 
exploiting screens of the ordinary cinema theatres throughout the 
country (seen by 20,000,0000 people weekly). I have already 
prepared the way for this with all the big circuits among 
exhibitors (including the all powerful Cinematograph Exhibitors' 
Association), with Korda among the prlo2d2 cers, and with the 
Chairmen of the five News Reel Companies. 
Paramount's dissenting voice in September 1938 suggests that 
Ball's net was not as tight as he believed. Nevertheless the 
necessary question, given all these indications of general 
compliance, must be to what extent the various newsreel companies 
were sympathetic to the Conservative Party or the National 
Government. A quantitative analysis of serious domestic political 
stories reveals that all reels gave an overwhelming preponderance of 
120. Chamberlain papers, NC8/21/9, Ball to Chamberlain, 14 April 
1934. 
121. Ibid. 
122. Chamberlain papers, NC8/21/8, Ball to Chamberlain, June 1938. 
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coverage to the Government. However this merely emphasises the fact 
that the newsreels made no attempt to balance their coverage nor to 
deal with party politics as such. Just as it was natural for the 
government of the day to gain greater broadcast coverage in news and 
ministerials, so it was natural that this should be the case in the 
newsreels. Universal and Pathe gave minimal attention to domestic 
politics between mid-1930, when they started sound reels, and August 
1931 when Labour lost power,. but it would be difficult to deduce fron 
this a definite political bias. Paramount, between its inception in 
March 1931 and August, gave the Labour Government no less coverage 
than it later gave the National. Symptomatic of its general 
independence was the fact that it covered Labour's 1931 budget by 
giving Neville Chamberlain, the Shadow Chancellor, the opportunity to 
criticise it. That Paramount was in active negotiation with the 
Labour Party at the time of the crisis, however, suggests that it had 
no positively anti-Labour line at that time. The Gaumont issue sheets 
of the Labour years have not survived, so that it is currently 
impossible to assess bow it covered politics in 1930 and 1931. The 
Labour sympathies of the Ostrer brothers who owned Gaumont, however, 
would tend to suggest that coverage, when given, was not hostile. 
Movietone equally, the only reel to have been operating in sound 
throughout the Labour Government's term, gave it coverage which was 
certainly comparable with that subsequently given to the National 
Government, whilst the Conservative Opposition received only small 
attention. 
The 1931 crisis and election, however, do help to give some 
indication of the newsreels' political positions. Pathe news coverage 
of the crisis was nondescript, although it did have a filmed 
statement by Baldwin. Its election issues, however, contained 
statements by Simon, MacDonald and Baldwin, a further Baldwin extract 
taken fron a public meeting, one by Lloyd George, but, apparently, 
none by any Labour leader. The story title, following the election, 
was 'Now - Let us all pull together for prosperity - National 
Government of all parties elected by sweeping majority. PM flies back 
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to get on with the Job'. Paramount included statements by 
MacDonald and Baldwin, following the formation of the National 
Government, but it did also give Arthur Henderson the opportunity to 
state the Labour Opposition's case. When Britain left the gold 
standard Sir Josiah Stamp appeared to explain the move in terms 
sympathetic to the Government cause. During the election, however, 
the studio interview which Baldwin gave to the newsreels was not used 
by Paramount. An extract from his first public meeting was shown and 
film statements by MacDonald and Simon also given, but so were 
statements by Lloyd George and Arthur Henderson. Gaumont's election 
coverage appears to have been the same as Paramount's, although it is 
uncertain whether or not the Baldwin interview was used. Universal's 
issue sheets, unfortunately, give little indication of how it dealt 
with the crisis and election. 
Movietone's news coverage of the crisis was absolutely factual, 
but it did follow it with statements by the three National Government 
leaders - MacDonald, Baldwin and Sir Herbert Samuel. When Britain 
left the gold standard Movietone described it as a 'courageous 
decision' by the Treasury and as a 
united action of bankers and politicians to set us back on the 
main road again ..... in spite of the fact that the pound note 
may, for the time being, have less value than the gold sovereign 
united efforts will presently bring it back to its old purchasing 
power. 
The Josiah Stamp interview was used, as was one by Keynes, in which 
he declared that leaving the gold standard was the best thing that 
could have happened to Britain. The election issues contained 
statements by MacDonald, Baldwin and Simon, but also by Lloyd George 
and Henderson. The accompanying news items included a postal workers' 
123. PG, Issue No. 31/87,29 October 1931. 
124. BMN, Issue No. 120a, 24 September 1931, 'Britain abandons the 
Gold Standard'. 
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demonstration in Hyde Park and a fisher girls' strike at Yarmouth, 
both in the same issue, but these were offset by a story, probably 
made up from stock shots, entitled 'Signs multiply of a better time 
coming. Hope revives in industrial 125cashire as mills and mines 
reopen and fires are stoked afresh'. Stories from the hustings 
were fairly equally divided, although recorded extracts from speeches 
by Samuel, Churchill, Lord Burleigh, J. H. Thomas and Austen 
Chamberlain were generally longer and more comprehensible than those 
of the decidedly unrepresentative examples of Labour candidates 
shown, namely Ellen Wilkinson, James Maxton, Jack Jones, Fenner 
Brockway and Jenny Lee. The only determined heckling shown was aimed 
at a Labour candidate who had declared that capital was leaving the 
country: 
If capital's leaving the country as you say, w le2rýe's 
it going - 
Russia. Ask no questions and I tell you no lies. 
The final word from the hustings, however, went to Oswald Mosley: 
You go to bed one night, you get up in the morning, and you find 
the great champions of yesterday side by side on the same front 
bench, arms round each other's necks, dear old pals in the same 
National Government ..... You could put the whole lot today, 
Henderson, Graham and Lloyd George, and MacDonald and Baldwin and 
Thomas all in one great bag, shake l em all up, pour them along 
the front benches, and you'd have the same result that you've got 
127 
today. 
During the 1931 crisis and election the National Government 
received generally greater and more sympathetic coverage than the 
125. BMN, Issue No. 123a, 15 October 1931. 
126. BMN, Issue No. 124a, 22 October 1931, 'Britain's destiny at the 
ballot boxes'. 
127. BM N, Issue no. 125,26 October 1931, 'Sir Oswald Mosley has an 
uphill fight in Stoke'. 
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opposition parties. This was particularly true of Movietone. Shortly 
before the poll Leslie Landau, Movietone's News Editor, urged 
MacDonald to make a special 'last word to Electors' film. As he 
commented to MacDonald's secretary: 
Naturally it would have had more value from the propaganda rather 
than the story point of view .... it was only because I thought 
it would have made so nany people's minds up for them at the last 
minute that I persisted in urging you to ask the PM to do it ... 
I think you will agree that we have done our part both in putting 
over propaganda1speeches and in stimulating interest in the 
election itself. 
8 
Gerald Sanger himself, before the election, wrote that in their 
latest issue they had included a statement by Sir John Simon and that 
We have run Simon as an extra item and it constitutes propaganda, 
pure and simple, for the National Government. 
He quoted with approval the opinion of a Movietone agent in Cardiff 
that 'British Movietone News is definitely helping the National 
Party' and that the film of Arthur Henderson 'demonstrated the 
feebleness of the official Labour programme, and as such, was an 
extremely welcome item'. This speech of Henderson's was in the 
128. MacDonald papers, PRO 30/69/5/42, L. Landau to Miss R. 
Rosenberg, undated. 
129. MacDonald papers, PRO 30/69/5/42, G. Sanger to L. Landau, c. 22 
October 1931. 
130. Ibid.. This agent reported that, 'As far as the Prime Minister 
is concerned even in the toughest of situations where there is 
a communistic element, the opinion as to the Prime Minister has 
veered around during the past two weeks. About three weeks ago 
we endeavoured to interest one of the lVorkmens' Hall Committees 
in British Movietone News as a, regular item and the particular 
number we sent up contained a long speech ? of the Prime 
Minister's. This was almost hooted off the screen, but I find 
since then a complete change of opinion has occurred, and much 
to my surprise on Monday night last while discussing British 
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same issue of Movietone as the editorial statement that 
British Movietone News, in presenting subjects which bear on the 
General Election, is hopeful of adding to the information of the 
public concerning the issues at stake. Naturally it does not 
identify itself with the views of any one leader or party. 
l 
The exact nature of the relationship between Movietone and the 
Conservative Party has been a matter of some dispute. Paul Rotha, for 
example, has stated that Movietone had 'a close but unofficial 
connection with the Conservative Central 1Office' ,a suggestion which 
Gerald Sanger not surprisingly rejects. Care, however, must be 
taken not to confuse the personal positions of the newsreel chiefs 
with that of the newsreel. We have already seen that Movietone's 
General Manager, Sir Gordon Craig, and its editor and producer, 
Gerald Sanger, were ardent Conservatives, as was its titular editor 
and director, Sir Malcolm Campbell, and that Craig was on the central 
committee of the Conservative Films Association. It would seem that 
Movietone personnel occasionally assisted the CFA in its own film 
production and exhibition, for Neville Chamberlain mentioned in July 
1931 that 
British Movietone News (Ye Gods! what a name) ..... have helped 133 
the C[entral] O[ffice] a good deal in cinema work. 
Yet. such contact did not. necessarily indicate newsreel bias. The 
Movietone News with a client from one of the mining centres, I 
heard that the audience cheered the Prime Minister'. 
131. BMN, Issue No. 124,19 October 1931, 'Britain's destiny at the 
ballot boxes'. 
132. P. Rotha., Documentary Diary, London 1973,122. For similar 
coaments see N. Pronay, 'The Newsreels: The illusion of 
actuality', in P. Smith (ed. ), The Historian and Film, 
Cambridge 1976,118, footnote 24. See also Note A, at the end 
of chapter, p. 693. 
133. Chamberlain papers, NC18/1/749, Neville to Ida Chamberlain, 25 
July 1931. 
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assistance which Chamberlain mentioned could not have referred to 
Movietone's own output, for so far its coverage of Conservative 
stories had been minimal compared to its coverage of the Labour 
Government. Craig, moreover, took no part whatsoever in making up the 
newsreel or in determining its policies, whilst Sanger is adamant 
that he took extrem care to distinguish between his CFA and his 13 
Movietone activities. 
It would have been surprising, given the Conservative 
predilections of many of Movietone's senior staff and the controlling 
interest in it of Esmond Harmsworth, who appointed Sanger a13e5ditor, 
had the reel not occasionally revealed certain sympathies. Like 
the Rothermere owned Daily Mail, however, it certainly did not give 
undivided support to the Conservative Party. In 1930 and 1931 it 
alone of the newsreels (Gaumont issues being unknown), gave Oswald 
Mosley two opportunities to make a statement on his beliefs. Mosley 
was a good friend of Esmond Harmsworth, which may have influenced 
Sanger, although the latter has stated categorically that never once 
did h130receive specific editorial instructions from Movietone's 
owner. 
Evidence against any strong link between Movietone and the 
Conservative Party is further provided by events immediately 
following the formation of the National Government. According to Sir 
Patrick Gower, Baldwin's film statement, taken by all the reels, 
134. Sanger to author, 21 April 1979. Pat Holder, Movietone's film 
librarian, described Sanger as 'a real English gentleman of the 
old school', and the present writer came away from a long 
interview with exactly the same impression. These assurances by 
Movietone's editor were certainly made in all good faith. 
135. Sanger and Harmsworth had been in the Royal Marines Artillery 
together and Sanger was Harmsworth's secretary before being 
appointed to British Movietone News. 
136. In a letter to The Times, 30 November 1977, Pathe Gazette's 
news editor, commentator and script writer, Mr. Donald 
Barrington-Hudson similarly stated that 'never at any time did 
I receive policy direction and was allowed to write my own 
commentary'. He denied any deliberate editorial bias. 
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caused him to have 'a goodly scrap with* the British Movietone 
people'. Gayer was still thinking as a Conservative: 
I found that they intended to push it out as part of a tri- 
partite film containing Ramsay MacDonald and Herbert Samuel. This 
would have meant giving may about three minutes, and yourself 
[Baldwin] and Herbert Samuel less than a minute each ..... I put 
a veto on it and told them that in no circumstances could I agree 
to the film being used in this way. They got a bit nasty about 
it, but after a prolonged argument I tol13them that I could not 
give way one iota, so we left it at that. 
Yet despite such clearly stated objections Sanger went ahead with 
this film, a fact which apparently resulted in his being 138 ormed 
that Movietone had incurred Baldwin's 'serious displeasure'. 
Similarly while Movietone was attempting to help MacDonald, 
MacDonald was doing his best not to be helped. When Movietone 
attempted to take a sound film of him with J. H. Thomas in Derby, the 
Prime Minister was distinctly hostile: 
"Who are you? " He asked, addressing the representative of the 
film company. "British Movietone News, " was the reply. "Ah, you 
are an American Company, " sa i39 he Prime Minister, and would not 
permit a "talkie" to be made. 
Again, following the election, Neville Chamberlain refused to make a 
statement on his new appointment as Chancellor, even though Movietone 
137. Baldwin papers, Bal. 44/f. 83-84, Gower to Baldwin, 5 September 
1931. 
138. N. J. Hulbert, 'News Films and Their Public', Sight and Sound, 
vol. 2,1933,133. Rachel Low's comment that these three talks 
were not shown is incorrect - R. Low, Op. Cit., 35. 
139. Derby Daily Telegraph, 22 October 1931. Both Movietone and 
Paramount were frequently accused of being American. This was 
true in Paramount's case, but only partly so for Movietone. 
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had sent a crew to the country house where he was staying. 
140 
By 
1934 Albert Clavering was convinced that Movietone could frequently 
be positively unfriendly, a fact which he ascribed to its connections 
with the Daily Mail. He told Baldwin that 
On more than one occasion Movietone News has refused to include 
in its programne speeches by Ministers against whom the "Daily 
Mail" was running a campaign, and on one or two other occasions 141 
speeches actually shown were badly mutilated. 
According to one critic Movietone 'strives after a BBC 
impartiality, although it is a BBC jockey trying to ride a Wardour 
Street horse', and this is 142 cert ainly 
the impression gained from 
viewing many of its issues. Its news stories were largely 
factual and the commentary read, for the most part, in a flat and 
undramatic tone. Only occasionally and in the later 1930s did 
Movietone go in for background music and patronising cockney humour. 
In early 1931*, * when Movietone followed its coverage of the India 
Round Table Conference with a statement by Winston Churchill, it 
proudly, if somewhat exaggeratedly, declared: 
British Movietone News thus fulfils its aim of presenting all 
sides of this most vital problem of our day. 
43 
Further evidence of Movietone's serious aspirations was provided 
in 1933 and 1934 when it produced three one and two reel specials for 
its news theatres, specials which are quite remarkable for their 
innovatory techniques in the field of current affairs presentation. 
140. Chamberlain papers, NC18/1/760, Neville to Hilda Chamberlain, 7 
November 1931. 
141. Baldwin papers, Bal. 48/f. 231-9, unsigned and undated 
memorandum. Internal evidence indicates author and date. 
142. D. Fraser, 'Newsreel, Reality or Entertainment? ', Sight and 
Sound, vol. 2,1933,89-90. 
143. BMN, Issue No. 93,16 March 1931, 'Winston Churchill foresees 
grave crisis in India'. 
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The first, 'Peace or War', was the least interesting, being made for 
Armistice Week and consisting simply of statements in praise of peace 
and decrying war, by four eminent women. Their statements were partly 
to camera and partly laid over film of war and devastation. In the 
second, however, Professor C. E. M. Joad, hardly a figure of the 
Conservative establishment, asked the question 'Will Civilisation 
Crash? '. Joad argued to camera that western civilisation was 
scientifically advanced but socially deficient. Illustrating his 
thesis with shots of scientific and industrial achievements 
contrasted with those of poverty and slum conditions, Joad suggested 
the need for a redistribution of resources and an alteration in the 
international economic system. He concluded by expressing optimism as 
a result of President Roosevelt's first nine months in office. The 
final film, technically by far the most accomplished, was 'Europe 
Today'. In this Vernon Bartlett, no longer with the BBC, sat at a 
desk like any latter-day television current affairs commentator, and 
gave a superlatively relaxed and professional analysis of the rising 
European ferment. Again this was partly to camera and partly to 
illustrative shots of events since Versailles, the rise of Hitler and 
subsequent reactions in Russia, France, Italy, the Balkans, Austria 
and Spain: 
Germany signed the VersaillesTreaty because she had to: today she 
feels strong enough to refuse to sign what she does not want to. 
This impressive film, produced by Leslie Landau and described in 
Sight and Sound as 'a landmark in film journalism', was a serious 
attempt to tackle a difficult issue, not the trivial product of a 
narrowly Conservative company anxious to avoid trouble and to toe the 44 
line. Its production costs, however, ensured that it would be a 
ccmercial failure, and it was the last such film Movietone 14 
made. 
144. Review of 'Europe Today', Sight and Sound, vol. 3,1934,33-34. 
145. All three of these films are at the National Film Archive. 
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Movietone's general attitude, partly sympathetic and partly 
independent, was best illustrated on the same occasion that Vernon 
Bartlett found himself in trouble, when Germany left the League of 
Nations. Following Germany's withdrawal both Movietone and Paramount 
rang the Foreign Office to ask Sir John Simon to make a film 
statement. Paramount went so far as to state that 
they would prefer to give the Government's point of view on the 
subject. But if they cannot get you [Simon] or some member of the 
Government to do it, they would be obliged to fall back on some 
other speaker who would be prepared to do it, but who would 
perhaps not be so sympathetic with the Government point of l 
view. 
Having just broadcast on the issue Simon felt no need to accede to 
these requests, 147i1st Baldwin, when shown Paramount's threat, called 
it 'blackmail'. Movietone, meanwhile, had gone ahead and filmed 
a statement by'Lloyd George in which he declared: 
Germany disarmed in accordance with the Treaty [of Versailles]. 
The victors, instead of disarming, have increased their armaments 
and are still doing so. They have not carried bout their 
undertaking, and that is the trouble which has arisen. 
In the same Movietone issue the President of the Disarmament 
Conference, Arthur Henderson, was shown reading the entire German 
statement on withdrawal and part of his own reply, whilst the Daily 
Mail correspondent, G. Vlard Price, in an interview with Dr. Goebbels, 
interpreted the latter as saying, 
146. FO 395/485, P2555/127/150, Minute by H. L. Hopkinson for Simon, 
18 October 1933. 
147. Ibid., note on Hopkinson's minute, by Baldwin: This is 
blackmail. I go to Belfast to-morrow evening pregnant with 
three speeches'. 
148. BMN, Issue no. 228a, 9 October 1933, 'International crisis 
dominates mind of entire world'. 
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0 
Germany took part in the negotiations of the Disarmament 
Conference only under the special conditions that Germany should 
receive equal consideration and equal rights. You [Goebbels] 
consider that the German Government, as a self-respecting regime, 
has no other cour 149 
pen to it except that of retiring from the 
League of Nations. 
According to Simon's Private Secretary, Henry Hopkinson, the Lloyd 
George speech was included 
in spite of an appeal from Mr. Steward at No. 10 who urged that 
to show 15 film of this sort would be contrary to the national 
interest. 
Gaumont and Paramount immediately 'informed' on Movietone to Sir 
Patrick Gower. In Paramount's case, however, this was decidedly 
hypocritical since it too had decided to include an extract from 
Lloyd George's'statement in its reel. Encouraged, therefore, by Ralph 
Wigram and Rex Leeper of the Foreign Office and by Sir Patrick Gower 
and Ramsay MacDonald himself, Simon agreed to make a, statement, but 
exclusively for Gaumont as a sign of disapproval to Movietone and 
Paramount. Interestingly Gower had told Hopkinson that 
British Movietonews have been very difficult to deal with on 
several occasions and that he would like to see them pulled up 151 
over this matter. 
Gerald Sanger was annoyed by what he considered to be 
'discrimination' in giving Simon's interview to Gaumont only. He was 
also worried that Movietone might suffer if such ministerial 
statements were withheld in future. He assured Simon, therefore, that 
149. Ibid. 
150. FO 395/485, P2556/127/150, Minute by H. Hopkinson for Simon, 25 
October 1933. 
151. Ibid. 
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'our company ha15b2een at pains throughout its career to publicise the 
official view'. Emphasising, however, that speed was the essence 
of newsreel work he added: 
if the news reels are to put forward what the Government may 
regard as a discreet representation of any political question, 
the co-opera ion of Government spokesmen must be forthcoming in 
good time. 
A meeting with Rex Leeper ensued at which the latter stressed that if 
Movietone wanted the Foreign Office's assistance in such matters it 
should take their advice. Sanger agreed that it was desirable to keep 
in closer touch and the incident was closed amicably. Leeper's final 
comment to Simon, however, indicated that he himself would have 
preferred the newsreels to stick to trivia: 
The trouble is that a powerful instrument for good or evil, like 
the news reels, l 
is in the hands of men who are ignorant of 
foreign affairs. 
Whilst Movietone's relationship with the Government and the 
Conservative Party was complex and occasionally stormy, Gaumont's was 
generally much smoother. Following the 1931 crisis it would seem that 
the Ostrer brothers followed MacDonald away from the Labour Party and 
fell in line with the National Government. When Movietone disgraced 
itself by issuing the Lloyd George item in October 1933, Gaumont 
expressed its thorough disapproval of the speech and refused to take 
it for patriotic reasons. More to the point they made use of the fact 
that the Movietone newsreel was shown in a proportion of Gaumont 
awned cinemas to order the Lloyd George item to be deleted from the 
152. FO 395/485, P2556/127/150, G. Sanger to Sir John Simon, 24 
October 1933. 
153. Ibid. 
154. F0 395/485, P2556/127/150, Minute by Leeper to H. Hopkinson, 
and seen by Simon, 1 November 1933. 
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reels shown there. It was not surprising then that Rex Leeper 
and George Steward, the Press Officer at No. 10, considerle5d6 it 'quite 
safe' for Simon to give his interview to Gaumont. By 1935 
Gaumont's owners were firmly behind the National Government, and in 
March they took a further and highly significant step. For sympathy 
was turned to active support when a clear but highly secret link 
between Isodore Ostrer and the National Publicity Bureau was 
established, 
to place the entire organisation of 1G umont British and the 
"Sunday Referee" behind the Government. 
This agreement had immediate effect when, at the request of the Prime 
Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, the whole emphasis of a projected story 
on German rearmament was altered in order to stress that the country 
stood for peace, and to conclude with a speech by Sir John Simon for 
the Government. According to Sir Derwent Hall-Caine, 
it was quite obvious that Simons' [sic] remarks coming at that 
moment, made a deep impression on the audience, judgipg by the 158 
remarks that I heard from people immediately around me. 
The previous week Gaumont had shown a statement by Ramsay 
MSacDonald, filmed in the Cabinet Room, in which he defended the 
155. Kinematograph Weekly, 26 October 1933,3. In return for the 
newsreel contract in a proportion of their cinemas Gaun nt 
received copies of Movietone's foreign film, Gaumont itself not 
having a complete world service. 
156. FO 395/485, P2556/127/150, Minute by H. Hopkinson for Simon, 25 
October 1933. 
157. MacDonald papers, PRO 30/69/6/38, Sir Derwent Hall-Caine to 
MacDonald, 21 March 1935. Hall-Caine, a former National Labour 
MP and active supporter of MacDonald, claimed to have organised 
this arrangement. The Sunday Referee was a small circulation 
and fairly highbrow Sunday newspaper owned by Ostrer, 
previously considered to be somewhat left wing. 
158. Ibid. 
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recently issued White Paper on Defence. Stating that Britain had 
stood still whilst all around others were rearming, he declared: 
we have now reached the time when we must make good some of the 
deficiencies in our defence. So we have issued our white Paper. 
This is no changed policy .... Peace remains the best policy for 
this Government. Peace will remain its policy; peace is its 
policy. 
This interview was shown also by Pathe and Paramount, whilst 
Movietone built up a story around the question 'Is there to be an 
armanEnts race? '. For this item it abandoned its normally deadpan 
approach, the cocnentator adopting an urgent, insistent and driving 
voice, whilst background music was played throughout shots of 
evidence of world wide rearmament: 
At the new home of the League of Nations in Geneva the chief news 
is of nations arming. It is announced that Britain will spend 
more on armaments. Why? Because the whole world is arming. 
[Japan, Germany, Russia, Italy and France are all rebuilding, 
their military strength] and Britain, long content with dominance 
on the sea, contemplates bigger estimates for all three services; 
for the army, still the small professional body of tradition, 
successor to the Old Contemptibles; for the Royal Air Force, 
becoming more and more important to imperial defence; and for the 
navy also an increase. So the Government, in their quandary, 
proposed. Already the United States have faced the same problem, 
and have taken the sane course which now seems to lie before 
Britain, an increase in armaments to preserviýsome defensive 
ratio with the offensive power of other nations. 
Given national and international interest in questions of 
159. GBN, Issue No. 126,14 March 1935, 'Mr. Ramsay MacDonald speaks 
on Armaments and Peace. 
160. BMN, Issue No. 300a, 7 Marchý1935, 'Is there to be an ar. Ents 
race? '. 
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disarmament, rearmament, peace and war, it was not surprising that 
the newsreels gave these issues considerable attention. The 
disarmament conferences of the early 1930s were, for the newsreels, 
well covered, as was the work of the League of Nations. Movietone, 
for example, initiated a series of statements by world leaders, 
including Mussolini, Smuts and MacDonald, on the theme 'If the 
nations of the world could see and speak to each other, there would 161 
be no more war'. The title preceding MacDonald's speech, made. 
before the 1931 crisis, declared: 
The deep sincerity of the Prime Minister's championship of world 
peace is fully attested by his record of public service in its 162 
cause. 
Throughout the 1930s the newsreels continued to play upon the 
public's hatred of war, using it for example, as' Aldgate has 
indicated, to stress the undesirability of Britain involving herself 
in the Spanish Civil War, and thus lending tacit support to the 
Government's policy of non-intervention. The newsreels' antipathy to 
war, however, like that of the public, was quite genuine, such that 
at the time of the Sino-Japanese war Tom Cummins could defend his 
decision to show film of the bombing of Shanghai with the argument 
that 
d 
The only way to stop war is to give people a proper idea of what 
it means ..... My opinion is that certain countries are getting 
very warlike. If the public saw more of the pictures such as we 
are shh3owing, they would think twice before plunging nations into 
war. 
161. BMN, Issues No. 83,87,105a, 110, January-July 1931. 
162. BUT, Issue No. 105a, 11 June 1931,1 "If the nations of the 
world could see and speak to each other there would be no more 
war, "' . 
163. 'Newsreels give anti-war lead - Them real facts from Shanghai 
battlefields - Courageous national service by screen editor', 
Today's Cinema, 14 September 1937. 
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As the 1930s progressed the newsreels' reactions to rearmament 
and Britain's defence tended to reflect government policy on the best 
way of maintaining peace. This was particularly so in the case of 
Gaumont British and Movietone, although the latter may already have 
been inclining towards a policy of rearmament before the Government 
openly adopted it. As ever the practical indications of this are 
small - in October 1933 Lord Lloyd was allowed to make a statement on 
the need for a larger airforce, whilst in September 1934 14 
Earl Beatty. 
welcomed Navy Week by advocating increased sea power. Certainly 
Sir Malcolm Campbell's personal obsession with the need for effective 
air-raid defences and shelters caused Movietone to give early 
attention to these issues, from 1936 onwards. In April 1936 the 
projected army expansion was covered by the newsreels, and Gaumont 
and Paramunt showed a recruiting appeal by the Secretary of State 
for War, Duff Cooper. Similarly in 1937 Hore-Belisha's army reforms 
were reported in such stories as 'Army - Joyrides for Tommy Atkins Is 
excellent recruiting policy' and 'Army5 - Tommy Atkins thinks new 
military plans is a bit of all right'. 
16 
Gaumont's support for the Government's defence policy was 
particularly marked and quite overt. The decision in February 1937 to 
spend £1500 million on rearming between 1937 and 1941 was reported 
with the following commentary: 
Parliament has decided that Britain shall spend one thousand five 
hundred millions on arms in the next five years. Not directed 
against any one country, said the Chancellor, but because of our 
vast responsibilities in all parts of the world, and as a measure 
for the preservation of peace. This means no remission in 
taxation but it gives security. Even more than that, it will 
reduce the figures of unemployment. More ships mean more men at 
work, building, supplying them with every class of material 
164. BMT, Issues No. 227a, 270a, 12 October 1933 and 9 August 1934, 
'Lord Lloyd states case for air might', and 'Earl Beatty sees 
Navy Week going'. 
165. BMN, Issues No. 411,429,19 April 1937 and 23 August 1937. 
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needed in a modern man-of-war ..... Mechanisation of the Army 
will go forward at record speed, rotor car factories will work 
full pressure, more men at work, more employment ..... Every 
aeroplane, every tank means more work and more safety. Even if it 
means an increase in taxation, what a great insurance. It is a 
life policy. Even if it does mean an increase it also means 
security, more employment, and the preservation of peace for this 
great country 6of ours, 
this British Empire [fade in Land of Hope 
and Glory]. 
16 
As World Film News commented, this was 
a long and brilliantly presented sequence in justification of the 
new defence programme, and frequent shots of troops and 16battle 
ships mirror the ideals and intentions of the government. 
A similar item when Germany occupied Austria emphasised that 
Production of armaments in all departments must be increased by 
national effort. Not to take part in war, not to interfere in the 
wars of others, but to preserve the peace of our own Empire. 
These - are the guarantees of our national security, our 
independence, demanding expenditure down to the last shilling if 
necessary ... What sacrifice could be too great to make in 
exchange for security, the safety of our homes and our own 
people, your safety? 
Such wholly blatant propaganda and editorialýsation was 
predominantly the property of Gaumont British. Yet . t. is clear that, 
whether or not they had a particular partisan bias, '-almost all the 
166. GBN, Issue-No. 328,18 February 1937, 'Britain re-arms'. Quoted 
by A. Aldgate, Op. Cit. , 153-4. Gaunoont British used 'Land of 
Hope and Glory' at almost every available opportunity. 
167. 'Film as Propaganda' World Film News, vol. 2 no. 1. April 1937. 
168. GBN, Issue No. 440,17 March 1938, 'Britain re-arms on wartime 
basis'. Quoted by A. Aldga. te, Op. Cit., 173-174. 
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newsreels accepted in practice that they had a positive role to play 
in the democratic system, forming part of the unifying mass 
cocmunications system which, in Reith's phrase, was the nervous 
system of the body politic. In the face of apparent and encroaching 
international political, economic and social upheaval the newsreels 
were prepared to play their part in keeping democratic Britain united 
and steady. As Gerald Sanger later wrote: 
Would a news-reel not be denying a great many of its legitimate 
functions if it did not record events which conduced to the 
upholding of established institutions? Such as the monarchy, the 
Christian religion, democratic Government, the rule of law, the 
trades unions and (by no means least) the Liberty of the Press? 
To show all these institutions in a favourable light is69to create 
confidence in them, and to that extent is propaganda. 
If John Reith had no qualms about assisting in and propagandising for 
the harmonious unity of the established democratic system, was it 
surprising that newsreel editors had none either? This was reflected 
in their readiness to co-operate with government and government 
departments in what they considered to be the national rather than 
party interest, and in their tendency to produce stories comparing a 
stable Britain with a trouble-torn Europe, and projecting an 
essentially optimistic view of Britain's prospects. 
Thus at the level of government messages, Pathe, Gaumont and 
other reels were happy to introduce 'Buy British' stories into their 170 
issues after the 1931 crisis. When Leslie Hore-Belisha was 
developing the Highway Code the newsreels played their part in 
putting it across, whilst Pathe's special film on slums and 
rehousing, 'The Great Crusade', was made with the full co-operation 
and advice of the Ministry of Health and Sir Kingsley Wood, the ever 
169. G. Sanger, 'Propaganda and the news-reel', Sight and Sound, 
vol. 15 no. 59,1946,79 -80. 
170. Gawnont British News (house journal), vol. 2 no. 11, November 
31. 
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publicity conscious Health Minister. This film, which even World Film 
News accepted was not government or party inspired, was nevertheless 
a statement of national progress and success in the field of housing. 
Although severe slum conditions were shown, these were followed by a 
long explanation of 
the great strides that are being made by local authorities, under 
the National Slum Clearance Scheme, t 17bletter the conditions and 
amenities of these stricken districts. 
Having described how busy the various building industries now were, 
the commentary continued: 
All this increased activity in so many industries has only one 
object - rapid progress in the great five year plan to abolish 
the slums and rehouse 1,300,000 people. Much has already been 
accomplished. Already in the two and a half years of the campaign 
new houses' have been approved for well over half a million slum 
dwellers, and over 320,000 of them have moved into new 
homes. 
The film ended with shots of bonny babies, whilst the inevitable Land 
of Hope and Glory swelled to a victorious crescendo. 
Similarly when Paramount heard a rumour in 1936 that the 
Government was about to. instigate a National Fitness Campaign it did 
not hesitate. As the News Editor, E. J. H. Wright, told Ramsay 
MacDonald's secretary when requesting an interview: 
In fact we have been dealing with this subject for the last four 
months, having had an inkling that there was to be a drive by the 
171. Kinematograph Weekly, 5 March 1936; World Film News, vol. 1 no. 
1, April 1936. 
172. National Film Archive, 'The Great Crusade'. 
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173 
Government on this matter. 
By 1939 even a fun item on London Zoo's panda could be used by 
Gaumont British to boost milk drinking as part of a government 174 
campaign. We have already seen that the newsreels were willing 
to co-operate in army recruitment campaigns and the publicising of 
air raid and civil defence precautions, and, according to John 
Grierson, as early as 1936 the Admiralty, War Office and Air Minisarg 
'attend faithfully on the doorsteps of the various Newsreels'. 
75 
By 1939 it was purely a matter of routine for the Newsreel 
Association to agree that Universal would act as liaison for all the 
companies with the Ministry of Labour for the forthcoming National 176 
Service Campaign. Indeed neither W. J. Gell of Pathe nor Sir 
Gordon Craig had any hesitation in emphasising in a Newsreel 
Association meeting, 
the readiness of all the Newsreel Canpanies to assist the 
Government' and Public Departments on all suitable occasions in 
reproducing items deemed to be 177 pecial interest, although not 
necessarily of great news value. 
In 1938 and 1939 the reels were consulted by the embryo Ministry of 
Information as to their likely war role, and in this respect it is 
worth remembering that the Director designate of the Films Division 
of the Ministry was none other than Sir Joseph Ball. Where such 
'official' matters were concerned the relationship between the 
173. MacDonald Papers, PRO 30/69/6/39, E. J. H. Wright to Miss R. 
Rosenberg, 24 October 1936. 
174. GBN, Issue No. 548,23 March 1939. I am indebted to Nicholas 
Pronay for pointing out this item to me. 
175. J. Grierson, 'Films in the Public Service', Public 
Administration, vol. 14,1936,369-370. 
176. News Reel Association, minutes, 29 March 1939. 
177. News Reel Association, minutes, comment by Sir Gordon Craig, l3 
June 1938; see also comment by W. J. Gell in the News Reel 
Association minutes, 19 May 1938. 
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Government and all the newsreel companies was undoubtedly good. 
The newsreels, however, went beyond this in the active support 
they gave to dem eratic unity. As Ni 
hcColas 
Pronay has stated: 
They featured and played up the ordinary, the orderly, the well- 
arranged aspects and events of the society around them, rather 
than the truly sensational. The Newsreels laid stress on thq 
points of similarity, identity of outlook and interest between 
the world of the government, and that of their working-class 
regulars. Above all, they stressed the points of consensus rather 
than the points of conflict. 
Although they did occasionally present items on domestic strikes, 
demonstrations and depression, their attitude to domestic news was 
essentially optimistic and hope-giving. More than any other reel 
Pathe paid attention to slum housing. Yet its stories were 
predominantly not about existing slum conditions but about what was 
being done to remove them. Typical items were "'Sweep away all slurps" 
- Lady Astor, MP, lays foundation stone of model flats for workers', 
"Sweep away all slums" - Princess Alice opens still another block of 
cheap and model flats for workers' and 'Clearing the Slums - Sir 
Hilton Younl g, 9 
Minister of Health, makes tour of inspection at 
Wandsworth'. This last item went thus: 
Commentator: Routing out slums in big cities has occupied the 
active attention of the National Government with local co- 
operating authorities. At Wandsworth, London's largest borough, 
the Minister. of Health is interviewed on this problem by Pathe 
Gazette. 
Sir E. Hilton Young: I'm very glad indeed to see the progress of 
our campaign against the slums in Wandsworth. I believe you have 
178. N. Pronay, 'British Newsreels in the 1930s. 2. Their Policies 
and Impact', History, vol. 57, February 1972.67. 
179. PG, Issues No. 31/39,33/59,35/16,14 May 1931,24 July 1933, 
25 February 1935. 
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nearly 700 unfit slum houses to demolish. 
Wandsworth Representative: Yes we have dealt with nearly half our 
programme, and this is one of the largest areas of demolished 
houses. 
Sir E. Hilton Young: You know we are setting out to rehouse 
nearly 1,300,000 persons. Although the first stages are the 
slowest, we are now rehousing them at the rate of over 150,000 
persons per year, and that rate is getting faster all the time 
.... Certainly it is a great work for a great cause - no more 
slums. 
Similarly, although the newsreels did not ignore the industrial 
depression they certainly did not emphasise it. The majority of 
industrial items-were essentially items of hope. Thus Movietone in 
October 1933: 
Caption: Britain shows signs of new prosperity. Casting of 
world's biggest ingot symbolises steadily improving conditions in 
industrial areas. 
Commentary: Britain continues to make headway against the 
depression. British factories are gradually reducing the huge 
figures of unemployment as new orders find work for extra men. 
The English Steel Corporation's order for new electric plant in 
Canada is giving work and employment in Sheffield, and here a 
furnace is being charged for the forging of the largest ingot of 
special steel ever to be cast ..... The rising tide of trade and 
employment at a time of year when the normal trend is in the 
opposite direction is the m1o8sot cheering augury for British 
industry for many, many years. 
The visuals to this item consisted of shots of men and machinery at 
work, a newspaper headline - '74,410 more go back. Big drop in eight 
months. 360,000 since February. Tariff finding work. 792,000 more 
jobs in a year' - money, and workers smiling broadly as they received 
180. BMN, Issue No. 228a, 19 October 1933, 'Britain Shows Signs of 
New Prosperity'. 
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their pay. The courage of the workers in adversity, their unfailing 
cheerfulness and continued loyalty to the monarchy and other British 
traditions, were further features of such stories. Even sixpence on 
the income tax in 1938 was greeted with "Movietone's ant, 
supposedly to Sir John Sim n: 'Ah well, Sir, I suppose we shall have 18, 
to pay up and keep smiling'. 
Indeed still more noticeable than stories of hope was the, 
emphasis which newsreels lent to notions of stability, loyalty, 
democratic tradition and to a peaceful and non-violent Britain. 
Pathe's commentary on the Labour march of May Day 1936 used the event 
to tell a very different story: 
Commentary: Once again May Day is Labour's heyday everywhere, and 
in London the processions process in the direction of Hyde Park, 
that hubbub of the universe and Mecca of the marching feet of 
fighters in a thousand causes. Other countries may have their 
strikes and disturbances, their fighting and broken windows, but 
Britain keeps orderly - He'll see to that [shot of policeman]. In 
fact the spirit of the day is 182 e 
thy neighbour as thyself, and 
it's another peaceful victory. 
A favourite ploy of politicians and newsreels alike was to 
compare conditions at home and abroad. All the reels were ready to 
give Government spokesmen the opportunity to speak on such a theme, 
and the latter were ready to use these opportunities to best 
advantage. Thus J. H. Thomas, the Dominions Secretary, sent a 
Christmas message through Paramount: 
181. BMN, Issue No. 464a, 28 April 1938, 'The Chancellor on his 
Budget'. 
182. PG, Issue No. 36/36,4 May 1936, 'labour Day scenes in London'. 
See also PG, Issue no. 36/62,3 August 1936, on the state of 
the Spanish Civil War: 'And while we watch this grim struggle 
let us be thankful that we live in a country where men are free 
to express their political opinions without being shot, where 
internal strife is a thing unknown. While we here live under 
the protection of the Law, young Spain learns to shoot'. - 
quoted by A. Aldgate, Op. Cit., 107. 
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At a time when the world is in turmoil, when there appear to be 
conflict [sic] almost throughout the world, it is a great pride 
and pleasure to be able to say that the British Coramnwealth of 
Nations stands out today as an example to the world, in being the 
embodiment of a nation, indeed of an Empire, that makes peace and 
goodwill its motto. And above all a cormon allegiance to a 
monarch whose prestige stands higher today than at any other 
period in history. I believe we have now passed the worst. It's 
because I'm satisfied that at last there is definite signs of 
recovery that I am deli h ed to give this Christmas message of 
183 
goodwill and good cheer. 
In a similar message in 1935 Thomas told Pathe's audience that 
'democracy is firmly entrenched in this country, and wants neither 
184 
dictatorship fron the right or left'. The best example of this 
type of film statement, however, came from Baldwin in November 1936, 
perhaps to prepare people for the abdication. Pathe, Paramount, 
Movietone and Gaumont British all showed it. Each reel chose slightly 
different extracts, but each used the comparison between Britain and 
elsewhere: 
Baldwin: When we read of conditions and events in the world 
around us, I think that we must all be filled with a sense, of 
profound thankfulness that we are living in this country under a 
system of national government. In many countries abroad we see 
fears and suspicion, economic and industrial depression, the 
destruction of liberty and freedom, conscription on an increasing 
scale, violence and disturbance, and in Spain we witness the 
climax in the terrible horrors of Civil War. Contrast these 
conditions with the peace and prosperity of our own country. For 
five years we have enjoyed a steady industrial recovery which is 
still continuing. In the first nine months of this year 
183. BPN, Issue No. 293,18 December 1933, 'To Home and Empire'. 
184. PG, Issue No. 35/4,14 January 1935, 'J. H. Thomas in exclusive 
interview with Pa. the'. 
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employment increased by well over half a million .... What is the 
reason for this remarkable contrast? It can be summed up in one 
word - confidence, confidence in industry, confidence in finance, 
and confidence in one another .... But it is also due to the fact 
that we as a nation, true to our old traditions, have avoided all 
extremes. We have steered clear of fascism, communism, 
dictatorship, and we have shown the world that democratic 
government, constitutional methods and ordered liberty are not 185 
inconsistent with progress and prosperity. 
This was a message which Pathe, Gaumont British and Movietone 
certainly projected on their own account. Movietone's issue for 14 
February 1934, for example, made the point effectively by sandwiching 
a series of three foreign stories headed 'Europe strikes bad patch of 
trouble' - strikes and demonstrations in Paris, threatened 
insurrection in Spain and civil strife in Austria - between'a 
political speech - 'Outlook is brighter, says Mr. Runcima. n. President 
of the Board of Trade, in talk on British Industries' Fair, sees good 
time coming' - and a series of stories entitled 'Picture paragraph of 
Britain at Play'. This last item ranged from Manchester University 
rag week to a two day football game played in the streets of 
Ashbourne, of which the commentator stated: 
Among the great traditions which go to make England what she is 
must be 186 cluded 
Shrovetide football at Ashbourne, 
Derbyshire. 
The reel ended with the Viceroy of India, Lord Willingden, reviewing 
his troops in Calcutta. 
Undoubtedly, however, it was Gaumont British which once again 
excelled in the fervour of its proselytisation. The shooting of Dr. 
185. GBN, Issue No. 303,23 November 1936, 'Stanley Baldwin speaks 
on the achievements of the National Government'. 
186. BMM, Issue No. 245a, 14 February 1934. 
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Dollfuss in Austria was the stimulus for this item in July 1934: 
Caption: Study in Politics, comparing methods at home and abroad. 
Ccýmentary: M. Dourer, President of France, fell at the hand of a 
political assassin two years ago in Paris. Mr. Roosevelt, 
President of the United States, was shot at and narrowly escaped 
death while on a visit to Miami shortly after his election. Dr. 
Dollfuss is the latest victim of these gangster methods of 
conducting a political campaign. We in Britain may well think our 
own country a good enough place to live in. Even a dangerous 
looking meeting in Trafalgar Square is not too deadly to form a 
background for children to play against. Political demonstrators 
are confined almost entirely 1o87 
the vapourings of soap-box 
orators in places like Hyde Park. 
In August 1936 Ted Emmett, Gaumont's commentator and film editor, 
brought all his newsreel skills to bear on a story which combined 
everything which Gaumont British wished to put across to its 
audience. This item is worth quoting at length as representative of 
Gaumont British in full flood and at its overpowering best. From the 
title, 'Wonderful Britain', to the last chords of Land of Hope and 
Glory, this entirely stock shot, fabricated story was newsreel work 
at its most impressive. Following two items on the Spanish Civil War, 
Emmett continued: 
In a spirit not of boastfulness but rather of gratitude we turn 
from these fitful scenes to fortunate Britain, still, with its 
tradition of sanity, the rock of steadying influence amid the 
eddying streams of world affairs. Britain's industries have 
shaken off the chains that kept them fettered in the aftermath of 
the world war. They have risen from the Slough of Despond which 
clogged the wheels of progress in the depression of the last 
decade. Trade returns are steadily improving. Weekly and monthly 
the official statistics form a heartening accompaniment to the 
187. GBN, Issue No. 61,30 July 1934, 'Study in Politics, comparing 
methods at home and abroad'. 
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efforts alike of the small merchant and the big boss of giant 
industry to better times ..... Frequently overlooked, but never 
to be forgotten, is the vital factor of British justice, the 
fairest in the world, the physician of civil life whose equity 
and incorruptibility has never been called in question. This 
honesty in the courts of evil and wrongdoing is a sure fortress 
against the social hatred that fosters revolution. The army, the 
navy and the air force of this country have proved a sure 
protector and deterrent in the unrest that has prevailed abroad. 
Britain is taking her stand in the belief that a strong defence 
is a guarantee of peace. Statesmen who may have drawn upon 
themselves criticism from time to time, have nonetheless worked 
unremittingly for peace at hoarse and abroad. As we look back we 
realise that their efforts have brought this country safely 
through the innumerable crises that have beset it in the past few 
years. And above all we look to the head of this great nation, 
whose example and courage have won the admiration and envious 
respect of other nations less happy ..... For the King, already 
in the short time since his accession, he has proved a worthy 
successor to his great father and to his grandfather, Edward the 
Peacemaker. 
Edward VIII: Humanity cries out for peace and the assurance of 
peace. 
Comnentary: Long may he continue to lead Britain from the chaos 
of world affairs closer to the days of 188 
lasting peace, prosperity 
and happiness [Land of Hope and Glory]. 
During the 1930s the ten minute, twice weekly cinema newsreels 
could not hope to apply the same criteria, or to cover the same 
amount of serious news, as the BBC or the quality press. Although 
they did their best to obtain scoops and to get film of events into 
their reels within hours of having been taken, they could not 
seriously rival the radio or the press as instant providers of news. 
188. GBN, Issue No. 278,27 August 1936. This item is quoted almost 
in full by A. Aldgate, Op. Cit., 124-125, although the 
transcription given above di ers in details from his. 
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In any case a large proportion of the audience saw the newsreel only 
when the news was several days, even weeks, old. The newsreels' 
greatest asset was that they added pictures to the news, so that when 
Malcolm Campbell broke the world land speed record the audience 
actually watched him doing so at Daytona, and when the Labour 
Government resigned in 1931 the audience stood with the crowd in 
Downing Street. What was shown was the visual representation of 
events, together with the newsreels' interpretation of the scene. Fair 
from giving a comprehensive coverage of the serious news, the 
newsreels presented stories for which they had film - either actual 
or stock - stories which were visual, sensational or of particular 
public attraction or interest, stories which took the editors' own 
interest, could be used to pursue a particular editorial line, or 
which were responses to external pressures. 
Yet it would be wrong to suggest that the newsreels did not also 
purvey serious and unbiased news, or that they did not occasionally 
issue items unfavourable to the National Government. Even Gaumont had 
its share of strike and demonstration stories, albeit handled in a 
distinctly bland manner. For an item to be withdrawn at government 
request it had first to be shown, indicating a desire to be bolder, 
as well as too great a readiness to accede to government wishes. This 
readiness, this general caution which prevented the reels from ever 
really fulfilling., the objective of presenting important news in a 
comprehensive and impartial manner, was in part the result of the 
particular predilections of the various newsreel editors. But it was 
also because, like the BBC, the newsreels saw their role as being a 
threefold one - to inform if possible, to entertain certainly, but 
also, if required, to unite the several elements of the democratic 
state, to play their part in proving that a democratic Britain was 
not the equal but the better of its totalitarian and trouble-torn 
neighbours. These three objectives, however, were not compatible. In 
the prevailing mood of the 1930s, lacking age and the experience and 
tradition which were the cornerstones of a free and independent 
press, the newsreels did not have the strength, nor always the 
inclination, to resist many of the apparently reasonable factors 
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mediating a responsible, co-operative, but less than independent 
stance. 
Note A. 
An example of Rothals evidence for Movietone's bias is given in 
his Documentary Diary, p. 112-3. He describes the three film 
statements for the 1935 General Election as 'a typical example of 
newsreel political bias': 
For Stanley Baldwin, leader of the Conservative Party, they built 
a sumptuous set, with pillars and impressive mahogany furniture 
and old master reproductions on the walls and a world globe on 
the desk next to a great bowl of flowers. When Mr. Baldwin was 
'done', the set was cleared away and rapidly it was the turn of 
Sir Archibald Sinclair, leader of the Liberals. For him they 
built a mousy middle-class surburban room with chintz curtains 
and a basket armchair. Next came Mr. Attlee of the Labour Party. 
They brought in what looked like the corner of the workmen's 
canteen from a nearby factory. They took two hours to 'do' dir. 
Baldwin, half an hour to 'do' Sinclair, and Attlee they polished 
off in a few minutes. This was done by Movietone a week prior to 
the election. 
This account, however, is somewhat inaccurate. Nor does the incident 
prove deliberate bias. Samuel, not Sinclair, was filmed, whilst 
Baldwin was filmed after Attlee. The set for Baldwin was actually a 
passable and deliberate copy of the Cabinet Room, for Baldwin was, of 
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course, Prime Minister. Attlee's set, whilst plain, was not so basic 
as Rotha suggests, whilst Attlee adopted the most natural pose of the 
three, by perching himself on the arm of an armchair. His delivery, 
however, was stilted and unnatural, whereas Samuel's was excellent 
and Baldwin's good. Whilst Movietone may have produced these 
statements, which were made available to all the newsreel companies, 
it was more normal for such 'rota' speeches to be shot at Pathe's 
central London studios. Whoever was responsible for them, it war 
hardly political bias to attempt to place each politician in his 
natural habitat. A more probable instance of bias in these items was 
that the sound quality of Attlee's speech was appreciably worse than 
that of Baldwin's and Samuel's, owing to the removal from the camera 
of its 'blimp' - the cover which was used to eliminate the noise of 
the camera mechanism in such studio interviews. The result was an 
irritating background whirr throughout Attlee's speech. 
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Conclusion 
It has not been the intention of this thesis to evaluate the 
impact upon the audience of the methods of political presentation 
which it describes. Its concern has been with the aims and efforts of 
those responsible for them, for the attempted transmission rather 
than the effective c munication of information and ideas. For as Asa 
Briggs has pointed out, 
To talk of "mass communications" is to mislead: the agencies, of 
so-called "mass commurnications" are really agencies of mass or 
multiple transmission. 
Nevertheless broadcasting and film did show themselves to be most 
effective channels of communication in the inter-war years. They were 
also, because of their particular character, their immediacy, 
national outlook, structure and audience, 2f importance in the 
creation of a sense of national community. Their qualities as 
media were further strengthened by the nature of the messages they 
conveyed. The BBC's emphasis of a consensual and even non-party 
approach to politics, and the newsreels of a united national response 
to domestic and international problems, both in their own way 
complemented, and to some extent reflected the ideas embodied in the 
'all-party' National Government. If the underlying motives were not 
identical the outward effect was much the same. But in any case 
these tendencies were further reinforced by the interest which the 
Government itself took in both the BBC and the newsreels. Given these 
various interlocking elements, therefore, it is perhaps not 
unreasonable to suggest that the new media were at least contributory 
factors in Britain's essential stability during the 1920s and 1930s. 
1. A. Briggs, Mass Entertainment - The Origins of a Modern Industry, 
Adelaide 1960,29. 
2. For further evidence of this see M. W. Pegg, British Radio 
Broadcasting and Its Audience, 1918-1939, unpublished D. Phil. 
thesis, Oxford 1979,419-422. 
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It must also be, concluded that the use of broadcasting and film 
to unite the nation and mould opinion was not restricted to times of 
war. Those in charge of the BBC and the newsreels both saw national 
unity as a desirable and legitimate objective. Similarly the lessons 
of 1914-1918, fear of the totalitarian threat and of the supposed 
ignorance and irrationality of the newly enfranchised, were just some 
of the considerations which led the political parties and the inter- 
war, dominated government to take an increasing interest 
in the attitude of the British people towards the social and 
political structure within which they lived. 
The two principal parties both' espoused the cause of rational 
political education. Indeed there was nothing intrinsic in the mass 
proselytisation devices they used which excluded rational argument 
within a pluralist system. Not only the facts but also the way in 
which the two sides interpreted them had to be communicated to the 
electorate, and in the most effective way, lest the propaganda of 
their opponents and hostile elements in the press drew the attention 
and support of the voter. For this reason the parties strove to 
overcome certain organisational, and for Labour financial, 
shortcomings and to utilise modern publicity techniques to reach the 
required audience. 
It was tacitly recognised, however, that democratic decision- 
taking was a mixture of both reason and emotion. The prospect of 
absolutely rational choice was a chimera which did not marry well 
with the reality of a pluralist society and democratic state. 
Consequently the parties appealed to the heart as well as to the 
head, using essentially emotional appeals as a short cut to the 
political power which, it was held, rational political education 
would bring. Moreover the Conservative Party and the National 
Government used their wealth, position and influence to forward their 
message through all the available channels, and proved 
correspondingly more effective than Labour in presenting themselves. 
They also, it must be concluded, took sonne advantage of their 
relationship with the BBC, of the 'responsible' outlook of the 
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Corporation's management and of the predisposition and complaisance 
of the majority of newsreel editors, effectively to obstruct the free 
transmission of ideas and opinions on certain vital issues. Indeed, 
although the Government itself did also initiate proposals for 
ministerials and film statements, its direct interest in the new 
media was largely negative -a concern to prevent either broadcasting 
or film becoming a complicating factor in the task of governing. But 
such negative liaison could have a very positive effect upon the 
balance of the message actually transmitted. In such ways the 
Conservatives and the National Government made use of the integrating 
powers of these two newest but most wide-reaching channels of 
comnunication, thereby showing themselves, perhaps not surprisingly, 
to be more committed to a particular concept of national unity and 
social equilibrium than to the educative element of the liberal 
democratic ideal. 
For in liberal democratic Britain both non-rational propaganda. 
and a degree of censorship were recognised as essential. They were 
necessary for the preservation of an 'educated' democracy in which 
the electorate was felt to be hardly educated, and of ordered liberty 
at a time when the people were seen as being by no means rationally 
ordered. Democracy, increasingly under ideological attack, was too 
important to be left to the undirected whim of the people. Thus 
rationalism as its basis continued to be a dream for the future, 
whilst other less idealistic practices remained essential elements in 
the fight for men's minds and the defence of the democratic concept. 
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